
Sanskrit and Indian Studies

Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls

Volume 2



DANIEL H.H. INGALLS

Sanskrit and Indian Studies

Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls

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PREFACE

From the *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa*, Verse No. 1729:

vahati na puraḥ kaścit pascān na ko 'py anuyāti mām
na ca navapadakṣuṇṇo mārgaḥ kathaṃ nv aham ekakaḥ
bhavatu viditaṃ pūrvavyūḍo 'dhunā khilatāṃ gataḥ
sa khalu bahalo vāmaḥ panthā mayā sphuṭam urjitaḥ

Translation by D.H.H. Ingalls:

No one rides before, no one comes behind
and the path bears no fresh prints.
How now, am I alone? Ah yes, I see:
the path which the ancients opened up by now is overgrown
and the other, that broad and easy road, I've surely left.
The Venerable Dharmakīrti

All the great Indian philosopher–scholars of the past, Śaṅkarācārya, Dharmakīrti, Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Jayantabhaṭṭa, Śrīharṣa, have shared a talent, the ability to write beautiful Sanskrit. They were all as sensitive to literature as they were to philosophy. In our opinion there is no scholar alive today who better represents this old tradition, this old love of ideas and the form they are expressed in, than Professor Daniel H.H. Ingalls, Wales Professor of Sanskrit at Harvard University. His two books, those for which he has achieved his reputation as the leading Sanskrit scholar of his day, reflect this dual interest: *Some Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* was a ground-breaking study of the most difficult area of Indian philosophy, the medieval Indian equivalent of formal logic. Professor Ingalls' work made available to Western philosophers of logic and historians of philosophy, a completely unsuspected wealth of philosophical sophistication. The history of logic had to be revised in the light of this new work. Similarly, his elegant translation of the *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa, An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry* opened up to literary critics from all traditions an entirely new world of poetry and poetic principles that has had an unusual influence upon modern literary critics; the book is found wherever literature is valued. While these two major books have established the unique reputation that Professor Ingalls enjoys among his colleagues,

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those who know him from his teaching at Harvard University are aware of an even greater diversity: there seems to be almost no text, whether it be a grammatical one (he has now prepared, for his own use, more than two thousand pages of notes on the *Kāśikā*), or a historical text, or a work of astronomy, metrics, the Ṛg Veda, the Upaniṣads, the major *Mahākāvyas*, the dramas, poetics, politics and law, that Professor Ingalls has not read and illuminated for countless Sanskrit students, graduate and undergraduate, in his teaching at Harvard. At the same time that he has shown the most painstaking concern for the details of the *realia* of any given text (his notes on flowers in his Anthology are unique), he has never forgotten the broader humanistic context into which these products of the human mind fall. Professor Ingalls loves James Joyce (and knows about him in great depth) as he loves Kālidāsa, and he can speak of both with equal ease, grace, charm and authority. Whether he reads the *Divyāvadāna*, a text of Buddhist stories in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, or the classically perfect *Uttararāmacarita*, he brings to bear a unique vision, an insatiable curiosity and a breadth of scholarship that has probably never been equalled in our day.

Professor Ingalls explained to his students that he loved the study of India's past because through it he was able to break away from the limitations of his own environment. He developed an admiration for those Indian philosophers who strove for the unification of the inner world with the outer world, for a correspondence between the world of feelings and that of everyday behavior. The best Indian writers sought harmony, a lack of self-deception, even if this goal was buried beneath the blanket of theological speculation. Thus Śaṅkara can say, in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*: "There are no gods or demons other than man." It has been Professor Ingalls' unique gift to be able to discern this concern, unearth it, and show it in all its humane beauty to generations of fascinated students. Perhaps this is why his Sanskrit classes at Harvard, famed for their difficulty, have always been popular, and why so many first year undergraduates, once they had taken this seemingly ruthless introduction to Sanskrit, could never again free themselves from the spell it cast. Professor Ingalls would bring to light for them, day after day, deep in the winter at the quiet top of Widener Library, a buried world of wonders, fertile in its imaginative powers, that peopled a universe with creations of beauty, harmony and depth.

It is only appropriate that those of us who were able to profit from this *Indrajāla*, this web of twentieth-century magic, should feel under a deep obligation to repay some of the debt we owe him for the splendours he

displayed for our benefit. Hence this volume which we humbly dedicate to one of the great humanistic scholars of our time. *Sasnehaṃ sādaraṃ ca samarpitam.*

The editors and publishers gratefully acknowledge the partial financial assistance they received from the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard University for the publication of this volume.

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BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

DOUBLE NEGATION IN NAVYA-NYĀYA

Professor Daniel Ingalls published his *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* in 1951. The publication of this pioneering work has been, directly or indirectly, responsible for a number of interesting developments in the study of Indian philosophy. Let me mention only two of them here. First, a wide and active interest in the study and evaluation of Indian logic has been visible, since this publication, among the scholarly circles of Europe and America. Second, and this is more significant, modern students of philosophy in India (and by them I mean the English-knowing students and academics), to whom Navya-nyāya was practically a sealed text-book before, have begun to realize consciously the need to study and analyze Navya-nyāya adequately. All these are matters of common knowledge. I have, however, a very special and personal reason to mention the above book of Professor Ingalls – a reason which I shall take the liberty of describing here briefly.

In 1956, when I obtained my M.A. from the University of Calcutta and started teaching at the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, I decided to study Navya-nyāya in the traditional style of a *pandit* under two senior scholars of the Tol Department of the College, Mahāmahopādhyāya Kālīpada Tarkācārya and Pandit Ananta Kumar Tarkatīrtha. It was Śrī Kālipada who first mentioned to me about Professor Ingalls and his book. He gave me a copy of the book to read (this was, incidentally, the same copy that Professor Ingalls sent to him as a token of his *'gurubhakti'*). I read the book with great interest and enthusiasm. And this reading, in short, inspired me. What happened afterwards has already been described in the Preface of my Harvard book, *The Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, and hence I need not repeat them here. But since my first connection with Professor Ingalls was established through the above mentioned book, I think it is only proper to express my regard for him by writing on a topic which Prof. Ingalls himself discussed at some length in his book.

The phrase 'double negation' immediately calls to our mind what is now known in the Western logical tradition as the classical law of double negation. This law is actually derivable from the law of excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction, and it is maintained as a law under the

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'classical' or standard account of negation in logic.[1] The logical law of double negation, however, attracts more attention than usual when a proposal is made to suspend or restrict it. Thus, it is well-known in Western logic that a nonclassical or nonstandard account of negation should be proposed for constructing nonstandard, multiple-valued logical systems. W.V. Quine has called them 'deviant logics' and described the nonclassical negation as a proposal for the 'mutilation' of our standard sense of negation.[2]

In the context of Indian logic, the phrase 'double negation' is, however, reminiscent of an important and very controversial doctrine of Diṅnāga – the *anyāpoha* 'the exclusion of the contrary', as a possible nominalistic substitute for universals that are reified as meanings of general terms. Diṅnāga's proposal was met with scepticism in opposite camps, and the followers of Diṅnāga apparently complicated the issue by proposing various tentative solutions to the problem. Perhaps, the relevant problem cannot be solved adequately unless one proposes (as Prof. H. Herzberger has done)[3] another nonstandard account of negation. My own feeling is that to make sense of the use of negation in Buddhist philosophy in general, one needs to venture outside the perspective of the standard notion of negation. This is another way by which, I believe, one can provide an alternative interpretation of the so-called Mādhyamika tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*).[4]

In Navya-nyāya the problem of 'double negation' arises in an entirely different context. And the treatment of the problem is, as may be easily understood, essentially conditioned by the peculiar Nyāya doctrine of negation. It is obvious that the Navya-nyāya writers were not at all perturbed by the limitations of the two-valued logic, nor did they worry much about the so-called Vedāntic 'challenge' to the law of excluded middle. Moreover, the Buddhist *apoha* theory was not at all directly relevant to the problem of 'double negation' in Navya-nyāya. There is, however, a minor detail in the Navya-nyāya theory of double negation, where one might detect a reaction to the *apoha* doctrine of the Buddhist. I shall mention it in a note towards the end of this paper.[5]

Navya-nyāya, as I have shown elsewhere[6], is not in favour of the affirmative-negative dichotomy of propositions. Instead, it speaks of contradictory pairs of qualifiers, viz., blue-colour and the absence of blue-colour, or pot (i.e. pot-presence) and pot-absence. Thus, the contradictory pairs of propositions (or qualificative cognitions, to use strictly the Nyāya terminology) are formulated with such contradictory pairs of qualifiers. But each qualificative cognition is seen as attributing (instead of affirming or denying) some property or qualifier to a qualificand.

Nyāya admits mainly two kinds of negation, relational absence and difference, and this two-fold division is rather intriguing.[7] Both are called *àbhāva* or absence in Nyāya, and Professor Ingalls accordingly translated them as constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) and mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*). For the sake of convenience I shall use 'absence' for the former and 'difference' for the latter. Again, for convenience, I will use '$\sim$' for the first and '$-$' for the second. The two-fold division of negation seems to be based upon an implicitly maintained[8] two-fold division of propositions: viz., those expressing qualification and those expressing identity. In the first case, a qualifier qualifies a qualificand and by negating it we get an absence of that qualifier (which is regarded as another qualifier) qualifying the same qualificand. E.g.,

> "The ground is qualified by pot-presence,"
> and its negation,
> "The g. is qualified by pot-absence."

But in the second case, two singular terms are joined by the 'is' of identity and by negating it we get a proposition of the form '$a \neq b$'. The typical Nyāya example is: "(*A* or the) pot $\neq$ (*a* or the) cloth." This is an example of negation being construed as *difference*. Nyāya, however, will also recommend rephrasing of this sentence so that we will get a proposition wherein cloth-difference will appear as the qualifier qualifying the qualificand pot:

> "The pot is qualified by cloth-difference."

It is easy to see that absence of blue-color and difference from blue things are closely related properties. For, the absence of blue-color qualifies only the non-blue things, and since each non-blue thing is different from what is blue, difference-from-blue-things will qualify the same non-blue things. In Nyāya terminology, however, the two negations, absence of blue-color and difference-from-blue-things, are as properties, *samaniyata* 'equi-locatable'. In other words, the class of loci of one is equal to the class of loci of the other. From this, Nyāya generalizes:

> The absence of any property is equi-locatable with the difference-from-the-possessor-of-that-property: $\sim x$ is equi-locatable with $-$ (the possessor of x).

The Naiyāyikas generally agree that because of this equilocatability of the above two properties one should be held as equivalent to the other. This equivalence should not be confused with equality or identity, but should be

seen as a relation of mutual implication. In other words, presence of one in a locus implies the presence of the other, and vice versa. Some Naiyāyikas will be in favour of identifying the absence of x with what is called the difference from the possessor of x just because of their equilocatability. But the prevailing orthodox view was against such a move.

Udayana formulated the law of double negation as:[9]

"The negation of the negation of x is identical with x."

In the same context, Udayana has insisted that one cannot negate what is not there nor can the locus of the negative property (absence or difference) be a fiction. In other words, both the *pratiyogin* or negatum (or what Professor Ingalls has called 'counterpositive') and the *anuyogin* or the locus which the negative property is supposed to qualify should be real entities. This is rather an important feature of the Nyāya conception of negation, but we need not go into it here.[10] Let us concentrate on so-called double negation.

Navya-nyāya gives the following versions of double negation:

I The absence of the absence of $x = x$; *svātyantābhāvātyantābhāvasya svātmakatvam;* $\sim\sim x = x$.

II The difference from what is different from that which is delimited by $x = x$; *svāvacchinnabhinnabhedasya svātmakatvam.*[11]

III The difference from what has absence of $x = x$; *svābhāvavadbhedasya svātmakatvam.*

I shall discuss them one by one.

The first version is almost universally accepted, and it is a very well-known formulation in Navya-nyāya. I say 'almost' for there was some controversy over it, which Professor Ingalls has nicely described in his book.[11] Most authors accept I as a valid interpretation of Udayana's comment on double negation. I is, however, justified as follows: Whatever may be the locus of x must also be the locus of the absence of the absence of x, for as long as x is known to be there x-absence is not cognized to be there, and hence the following statement will always hold true 'there is absence of the absence of x there.' Note that this simply amounts to the class of loci of x being identical with the class of loci of $\sim\sim x$. Thus, from the equilocatability of x with $\sim\sim x$ we can derive their equivalence, and this equivalence can be thought of as a relation of mutual implication in the sense I have already noted above. But remember, in the previous case, the prevailing Navya-nyāya opinion refused to equate the two properties;

absence of x and difference from what possesses x, were treated as distinct. In the present case, however, the prevailing opinion is in favour of identification of x with $\sim\sim x$. It sounds quite anomalous. But an additional consideration in the present case is, perhaps, the law of double negation which seems to be derived from the more fundamental laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. Raghunātha, however, in his intensionalist vein, argued against the identification of x with $\sim\sim x$. For, he thought, the notion of negation conveyed by the second can never be conveyed by the first, and hence it is difficult to think of them as non-distinct.

The second version, II, has not been universally accepted in Navya-nyāya. Here to simplify, we may require "that which is delimited by x" as "that which has x or is qualified by x", or only "the possessor of x". Using '$-$' for 'difference' and 'Locus' for 'possessor or that which possesses', we can represent the complicated expression as follows:

(parentheses will be used to indicate the scope)
II. "$-$(Locus of ($-$(Locus of x))) $= x$."

The argument that is usually given to justify II is exactly similar to that for I above: Wherever x is present it is true to say of that locus that it is NOT DIFFERENT from what is delimited by x. In other words, the two properties are equilocatable. And we have already seen that although equilocatability is not a sufficient condition for identity, it is at least a necessary one. We shall presently see the view of the sceptics who would not accept II.

The third version is equally met with scepticism. It can be rewritten, using the convention of the previous paragraph, as follows:

III. "$-$(Locus of ($\sim x$)) $= x$."

The reason for justifying III is also similar to that for justifying II or I: Wherever x is present as a property, it is true to say of that locus that it is DIFFERENT from what has absence of x. So we have as before only a necessary condition for identity, not a sufficient one.

Sceptics who hesitate to accept II or III not only point out that equilocatability is not a sufficient condition but also formulate some counterexamples where even the equilocatability condition will not be fulfilled. The major problem arises in connection with those properties which are called *avyāpyavṛtti* 'non-pervasive' (Ingalls: "Of Incomplete Occurrence", p. 73). Contact or contact-with-a-particular-monkey is said to be a typical example of this kind of properties. Such a property (I shall represent it by 'c')

is by definition co-occurrent with its absence in the same locus. In other words, as long as one can say that a tree is in contact with a monkey at its top but not so at the bottom, Nyāya will claim in such cases that the tree is qualified by *c* as well as by the absence of *c*. Now, if '*c*' is substituted for '*x*' in III we get an obvious falsehood. For, the tree itself is also regarded as a locus of the absence of *c* (by Nyāya) and hence "difference-from-the-tree" cannot possibly qualify the same tree which is qualified by *c*. We cannot even say of the tree that this is NOT what possesses the absence of *c*. One may wonder that II can possibly be salvaged even when one uses 'c' for 'x'. For it is quite possible to say of the tree that it is NOT DIFFERENT from what has *c*. But sceptics like Gadādhara in many places disallowed the identification of *c* with the DIFFERENCE from what is different from the locus of *c*. For, it is argued, although the tree is qualified by *c* (so that it is a locus of *c*) it is not (known to be) DELIMITED by *c*. (Roughly, a delimiting property has to be pervasively occurrent, not non-pervasively occurrent.) Thus the original version of II uses the notion of delimitation. Hence it is concluded that both II and III fail to be satisfied by a non-pervasive property, and this should be regarded as a sufficient argument against their acceptance as rules of identification, i.e., as versions of the law of double negation (in Udayana's sense, of course).

Some might have the following rejoinder: The above counter-examples may require us to narrow down the scope of application of II and III; they may not force us to reject them totally. Thus, one may hold without embarrassment that as long as we speak in terms of pervasive properties, II and III are acceptable. If, however, such delimitation of scope of application is not allowed, then, so the argument goes, it would be difficult to maintain even I as acceptable. For, using the Nyāya ontological scheme, it is not hard to find a value of *x* which will render the status of the universal acceptability of I dubious. For example, *gagana* or the sky, in Nyāya ontology, is regarded as a non-occurrent entity. (In other words, while most entities qualify or, are occurrent in, some entity or other, the sky does not qualify, or is not occurrent in anything.) Now, if we substitute 'the sky' for '*x*' in I, we will face a peculiar Nyāya problem, which will render I invalid! To wit: since the sky does not qualify anything, its absence will qualify everything including itself (for, as long as the sky does not qualify itself, the absence of the sky can be said to qualify the sky). Now, since the absence of sky qualifies everything, the absence of the absence of the sky will qualify nothing, i.e., it will not be occurrent in anything. This amounts, in Nyāya theory, to saying that the absence of the absence of the sky is fictitious! Therefore, I does not work in such cases (Q.E.D.)!

The point of this rejoinder, stated simply, is this. If we reject II and III because of their lack of universality, we should be prepared to reject I also on the same ground. But many Navya-nyāya authors, such as Mathurānātha, reject this rejoinder and maintain I as an acceptable version of Udayana's comment on double negation. They also stipulate that the absence of the absence of the sky is identifiable with the sky, and hence I is universal. In fact, if we accept the notion of null-class or empty class (of modern Mathematical logic), – a notion that is not easily accepted by Navya-nyāya – then the above stipulation is easily defensible. For, remember, the sameness of the class of one with that of the other was a necessary condition for the equality of the two properties in the given context. Thus, one can say that both the sky and the absence of the absence of the sky are occurrent in such loci as are members of the null class. It should also be noted that as long as the absence of the absence of the sky can be identified with the sky, a real entity, the orthodox Nyāya will never accept the absence of the absence of the sky as fictitious!

Let me conclude after discussing an incidental question which is often asked in this connection. If absence and difference are the two main kinds of negation, then one may expect the following combinations of them:

(i) $\sim\sim x$ (using '$\sim$' for 'absence').
(ii) $\sim - x$ ('$-$' for 'difference').
(iii) $- - x$.
(iv) $- \sim x$.

Navya-nyāya authors generally discuss (i) and (ii) but ignore (iii) and (iv). I have already discussed the meaning of combination (i). There is a general agreement among Naiyāyikas regarding the status of (ii), viz., absence of the difference from x is identifiable with an inseparable property of x, i.e., x-ness (may be, the essential property of x).[12] Professor Ingalls himself has given the Nyāya reason for this identification[13], and therefore I will not go into it here. One may only add that the argument in its essence is based on the condition of equilocatability as before. This identification, however, leads to a difficulty which has already been discussed by Professor Ingalls.[14] It may be remarked that if we use suitable parentheses to clarify ambiguity and keep our rule I operating, we would not face the anomaly which apparently Mathurānātha had to face (and which Ingalls accordingly pointed out). For example, we can write:

(a) $\sim(\sim - x) = \sim x_1$ (where 'x_1' stands for 'x-ness').
(b) $\sim\sim(-x) = -x$.

Note that the parentheses mark out the distinction between the left-hand side of (a) and that of (b). Thus, abbreviating 'counterpositive' or 'negatum' (*pratiyogin*) by '*d*' we will get:

(c) d of $\sim(\sim - x) = \sim - x = x_1$.

Now, if we stipulate that rule I should be first applied to cancel the uninterrupted succession of two absences before we apply the operation with d, we can easily obtain:

(d) d of $\sim\sim(-\mathrm{x}) = d$ of $(-x) = x$.

Thus, we can avoid the undesirable consequence of accepting "a double nature" (*ubhaya-rūtapva*) of $\sim - \mathrm{x}$, that of x and that of x_1.[15]

Why does Navya-nyāya ignore a discussion of (iii) and (iv)? The reason will be obvious if we think about the meanings of these two combinations. Suppose 'blue' (i.e., 'blue color') is substituted for 'x' in (iii). Now, '-blue' will refer to difference-from-blue-color which is a property shared by all and only non-blue things. Let us call this property *eulb*.[16] Now, there are many other properties (and things) besides *eulb*, and all of them will belong to the class defined by the property difference-from-eulb, that we may express by '-eulb' (i.e., by '- -blue'). In other words, the last property cannot be a unique property of only blue things. Hence, it cannot be identified with blue, for the necessary condition, equilocatability, is not satisfied. Similarly it can be shown that 'difference from the absence of blue' (derived from (iv)) express a property which is shared by everything except the absence of blue. Hence, from a logical point of view, these two properties are not very interesting.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that the above has not been an exercise in what may be called 'comparative logic'. My attempt here has been an humbler one. I have tried to understand (myself) and explain some of the issues which Navya-nyāya (and by the same token, Indian logic in general) thought important, interesting and relevant to their way of philosophizing. In my exposition, I have made use of certain modern (logical) terms. Some of these terms have acquired very specialized and technical meanings in the writings of modern logicians. I have, however, taken some liberty with these terms (such as double negation and equivalence) for the purpose of my exposition and translation. I think their intended meanings will be clear from the context of my discussion, and I sincerely hope that such uses will at least help our understanding of the problems of Indian logic.

On the other hand, I deplore the view that maintains that Indian logic is too exotic and too remote from what we understand by logic today to be

relevant to our modern style of philosophizing. For I firmly believe that the study of Indian logic is almost as much relevant today as the study of Aristotle, Plato, and the Scholastics. These will certainly help us to gain insight into the problems of the philosophy of logic and the logic of philosophy. It is also important to understand the exact nature of the questions the Indian logicians asked themselves, and thus to ask ourselves why they fail to solve certain problems satisfactorily. I wish to end with a quotation from Professor Ingalls on this issue:[17]

> There are striking similarities between Western symbolic logic and Navya-nyāya. They deal with similar problems and are often guided by a similar spirit of inquiry.... (but) the complexities of the one tradition are not readily translatable into the other. For all the similarities of subject matter and spirit, the structures of symbolic logic and Navya-nyāya are radically different. They differ not only as wholes; the difference permeates each detail of the architecture.

And, let me add, such details and their differences are always philosophically interesting and certainly important.

NOTES

[1] The ordinary law that is expressed in Latin as *duplex negatio affirmat* has its counterpart in Sanskrit, *dvābhyām niṣedhābhyām prakṛty-arthadārḍhya-bodhanam*, which means that two negatives lead to a forceful assertion of the original thought. See Nāgeśa's *Paramalaghumañjuṣā*, p. 71.

[2] See *Philosophy of Logic*, Ch. 7.

[3] See 'Double negation in Buddhist logic,' *Journal of Indian Philosophy* **3**(1975), pp. 1–16.

[4] For example, I have argued once that the Mādhyamika advocates an extreme form of negation where we have only a *denial* without any 'commitment' aspect. The 'commitment' aspect of a denial is usually derived from its presupposition. See *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, p. 164.

[5] See note 13 below.

[6] See Matilal, *The Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, p. 92–3.

[7] To simplify matters for discussion, I shall ignore the four-fold division of negation, viz., prior absence, destruction, constant absence and difference.

[8] I use the term 'implicitly' here because the two-fold division of propositions based on the two-fold interpretation of the copula 'is' has no explicit parallel in Navya-nyāya. The problem

did not arise explicitly probably because the copula is never explicitly used in Sanskrit. Nevertheless, the point about attribution and identity arose in connection with the Nyāya analysis of negative propositions.

[9] See *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Ch. III, verse 2cd.

[10] Ibid., See also Matilal, *Epistemology* . . . , p. 123–145.

[11] See Ingalls, p. 68–9.

[12] This is an interesting result from the point of view of the Buddhist *apoha* doctrine. Under one interpretation, '*agovyāvṛtti*' means the absence of the difference from the cow, and this is exactly what the Buddhist would like to substitute for the universal cowness. Thus, instead of saying 'cow' means cowness, one may say that 'cow' means the absence of the cow-difference.

[13] See Ingalls, p. 149; Mathurānātha uses this principle and says, "*svavacchinna bhinna-bhedarūpasya*. . ."

[14] Ingalls, p. 71–2.

[15] While Mathurānātha admitted that sometimes $\sim - x = x$ and sometimes $\sim - x =$ x-ness, he was probably confused about the fact that these two results are different because they are derived in different ways.

[16] The idea of 'eulb' is from a comment of A.J. Ayer, 'Negation', p. 51–52. One note for caution: Taking for granted the object/predicate distinction, as is normal in first order logic, and using 'F' for 'pot', we have to say that to say that x is $-F$ (in our sense of '$-$') is *not* to say that $(y)\ (Fy \supset y \neq x)$. Rather to say that x is $-F$ is to say that $x = \{y\ :\ \text{NOT}\ Fy\}$. Note that the sense of '$-F$' is distinct from the sense of 'Not F' or 'is Not F' as used normally in predicate calculus. Thus it is that if eulb is taken to be the class of non-blue things, then things (classes, individuals, or properties) that are distinct from eulb will form the class of -eulb (or $- -$ blue), i.e. to say that the -eulb is the class of things different from the class of non-blue things.

This note owes its origin to a criticism of Mr. Christopher Peacocke of All Souls College, Oxford, who very kindly read my typescript, and whom I wish to thank here.

[17] See *Preface* to D.C. Guha's book, *Navya-nyāya system of Logic,* p. xviii.

J. MOUSSAIEFF MASSON

AUTHORSHIP PROBLEM OF THE *DHVANYĀLOKA*

It is not surprising that the single most important text of Indian poetics should be of special interest to a scholar who has done more than any other Western academic to sensitize us to Indian poetry. Professor Ingalls' familiarity with a vast area of Sanskrit literature helped me greatly in my understanding of the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Dhvanyālokalocana*. It is therefore appropriate to offer him these thoughts on the old and confounding authorship problem of the *Dhvanyāloka*.

From the time that Bühler first announced his find of the *Dhvanyāloka*[1] there has been a constant stream of articles attempting to prove either that the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* are by one author, Ānandavardhana[2], or that the *Kārikās* are by an older, unknown writer, and only the *Vṛtti* is by Ānandavardhana[3]. We know for certain[4] that the concept of *dhvani* existed before the time of Ānandavardhana, or rather, before the time of the *Dhvanyāloka*. Therefore even if we could show that Ānandavardhana wrote both parts of the *D.Al.*, we would not be any nearer to a genuine assessment of the originality of his contribution to Sanskrit poetic theory. On the other hand, even if I succeed in convincing readers that the *Kārikās* are by an older writer, which I believe they are, we will only know a little more than we already know. A close analysis of problematic passages in the *D.Al.* can only make it *probable* that one or the other view is correct. Neither position can be definitely proven unless new evidence comes to light, which seems an unlikely event.

Until the present time, all discussions on the authorship problem have focused on external evidence, and primarily on information we can glean from Abhinavagupta. Let me examine the evidence that Abhinavagupta provides, and the manner in which it has been used by modern scholars.

ABHINAVABHĀRATĪ

In the second volume of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, *adhyāya* 16, on verse 5 (p. 299, G.O.S.) Abhinava says:

> *etam evārthaṃ samyag ānandavardhanācāryo 'pi vivicya nyarūpayat –*

M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 11–31.

> *dhvanyātmabhūte śṛṅgāre samīkṣya viniveśitaḥ*
> *rūpakādir alaṅkāravarga eti yathārthatām*
>
> *ity uktvā krameṇa*
>
> *vivakṣātatparatvena nāṅgitvena kadācana*
> *kāle ca grahaṇatyāgau nātinirvahaṇaiṣitā*
>
> *ityādinā granthasandarbhena sodāharaṇena. tac cāsmābhiḥ sahṛdayālokalocane tad vivaraṇe vistarato vyākhyātam iti tat kutūhalan tad eva gṛhṇīyāt.*

The quotations that Abhinava gives are from *Kārikās* II. 17 and 18. There is nothing ambiguous about the passage, it states most clearly that Ānandavardhana wrote the two *Kārikās* quoted. If we were convinced, for other reasons, that Abhinava held the author of the *Kārikās* and the author of the *Vṛtti* to be different, it would not be impossible, with some imagination, to explain away this passage[5]. But it seems more sensible to admit that Abhinava, in this passage, either considers the authors to be identical, or, what is even more likely, was not much concerned with the matter in any case and took no great care in his pronouncements. There is strong evidence for this latter view in the *Locana*.

DHVANYĀLOKALOCANA

The most important single passage for the authorship problem occurs in the *Locana* at the beginning of the third *Uddyota*. Here is the text (p. 289):

> *yas tu vyācaṣṭe – 'vyaṅgyānāṃ vastvalaṅkārarasānāṃ mukhena' iti, sa evaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ – etat tāvat tribhedatvaṃ na kārikākāreṇa kṛtam. vṛttikāreṇa tu darśitam. na cedānīṃ vṛttikāro bhedaprakaṭanaṃ karoti. tataś cedaṃ kṛtam idaṃ kriyata iti kartṛbhede kā saṅgatiḥ? na caitāvatā sakalaprāktanagranthasaṅgatiḥ kṛtā bhavati avivakṣitavācyādīnām api prakārāṇāṃ darśitatvād ity alaṃ nijapūjyajanasagotraiḥ sākaṃ vivādena.*

This is a disputed passage. The remarks of Mookherjee (pp. 185–187, who disagrees with Kane), Krishnamoorthy (who disagrees with both Kane and Mookherjee, pp. 180–190) and Kane again (who disagrees with both, pp. 181–182), Mookherjee still again (*Indian Culture*, **12**, p. 57, who disagrees with his own earlier views and again with Krishnamoorthy and Kane) and finally Krishnamoorthy more recently (*Dhvanyāloka and its Critics*, Kāvyālaya, Mysore, 1968, p. 85) who disagrees with everybody, are too long and involved to reproduce here. I do not believe that any of the authors has

correctly understood the passage. In order to do so, let me first give the background by translating the whole of the *Locana* up to this point. Only then will we correctly understand Abhinava's position. Abhinava is commenting on the beginning of the third Uddyota which reads as follows:

> *evaṃ vyaṅgyamukhenaiva dhvaneḥ pradarśite saprabhede svarūpe punar vyañjakamukhenaitat prakāśyate –*
> *avivakṣitavācyasya padavākyaprakāśatā*
> *tadanyasyānuraṇanarūpavyaṅgyasya ca dhvaneḥ*

Here then is the translation of Abhinavagupta's *Locana* on this:

> The author of the *Vṛtti* says the following in order to establish a logical connection with the other (preceding) *Uddyotas*. *Evam*, etc. In the second *Uddyota* (*tatra*) the varieties of *dhvani* such as *avivakṣita*, etc., were (described) from the point of view of the *vācya*. And the *vācya*, although it is after all a suggestor – as has been said: "Where a meaning or a word" (I. 13), and therefore these varieties have been (for all practical purposes) described from the point of view of the suggestor, nonetheless this *vācya* sense has been divided (in the second Uddyota) only with reference to the suggested sense. To explain: the literal sense that is not intended is thrown into second place (*nyagbhāvita*) by the suggested sense. The literal sense that is intended but which ends up in a (suggested) sense is said to be just leading to the suggested sense. In this manner, the sense that acts as a suggestor of the two basic varieties (of *dhvani*) along with their own subvarieties, is divided exclusively on the basis of the suggested sense. And so he says: *vyaṅgyamukhena*. Moreover, even though the sense acts as a suggestor, still it is capable of being (itself) suggested, but a word can never be suggested, it is always only a suggestor. Therefore he says: *vyañjakamukhena*. The word '*punaḥ*' conveys the fact that (even) in the varieties of *dhvani* such as *avivakṣita* etc., (a word) can (of course) be a suggestor. It is not that the divisions of *dhvani* according to the word as suggestor have not been given (already), rather, though they have been given (earlier), now they are given (in *Uddyota* III) exclusively from the point of view of the word as suggestor. Thus, without regard to the suggested sense (as a principle of division), one can divide verbal suggestors quite on their own into words, sentences, letters, base and suffix (*padabhāga*, i.e., *prakṛti* and *pratyaya*), style (*saṅghaṭanā*, i.e., alliteration etc.), and paragraphs. But none of these is, like the (literal) sense, ever capable of being suggested, and so the gist of the argument is that the varieties to be given (in the

third *Uddyota*) are given exclusively on the basis of (verbal) suggestors.[6]

Abhinava's point is only that in the second *Uddyota*, the primary concern was not with *śabda* as a *vyañjaka*, although that was incidentally mentioned.[7] Now we can make good sense of Abhinava's remarks on the *Candrikā*:[8]

> As for the commentator who explains (the phrase *vyaṅgyamukhena* in the *Vṛtti* on p. 288) as follows: 'with reference to that which is suggested, namely *vastu(dhvani), alaṅkāra(dhvani)* and *rasa(dhvani)*', well, he should be questioned as follows: It is not the author of the *Kārikās* who has divided *dhvani* into (those) three varieties, rather it is the author of the *Vṛtti* who has pointed out (such a division in *Uddyota* I). Nor can one say that at this point it is the author of the *Vṛtti* who is giving the divisions (found in the third *Uddyota*). Therefore what kind of logic would it be to say: "he did that and now he is doing this" when the agent is not one and the same person? Moreover, this explanation hardly explains the logical connection (of this third *Uddyota*) with the rest of the book that has already gone before, because other varieties also such as *avivakṣitavācya*, etc., have already been shown. And so enough argument with one who is related to someone whom I respect.[9]

Abhinava's point is this: the earlier division into *alaṅkāradhvani, vastudhvani* and *rasadhvani* has been made by Ānanda in the *Vṛtti* in *Uddyota* I, p. 50, and not in the *Kārikās* (in the second *Uddyota*, II. 25–26 *alaṅkāradhvani* is implied, but nowhere is *trividhadhvani* mentioned). Now the phrase on p. 288, *evaṃ vyaṅgyamukhenaiva dhvaneḥ pradarśite saprabhede svarūpe punar vyañjakamukhenaitat prakāśyate*, implies that one and the same grammatical subject is responsible for the two actions, namely *dhvaniprabhedapradarśana vyaṅgyamukhena* and *dhvaniprabhedapradarśana vyañjakamukhena*. But the latter has been done by the Kārikākāra. In other words Abhinava is saying that the Vṛttikāra could not be referring to his own statements, as those are not the product of the grammatical subject who is mentioned in the *Vṛtti* passage on p. 289 as dividing *dhvani* according to the *vyañjaka*. I do not see how one can therefore suggest that Abhinava did not, in this passage, regard the author of the *Kārikās* and the author of the *Vṛtti* as two separate people. But now we come to the strangest part of Abhinava's method. Twice, within only a few pages, he contradicts himself in the clearest possible manner. On p. 302 of the *Locana*, there is a passage that reads: *evaṃ kārikāṃ vyākhyāya tadasaṅgṛhītam alakṣyakramavyaṅgyaṃ prapañcayitum āha yas*

tv iti. Now this *yas tv* is a *pratīka* from *Kārikā* II. Abhinava therefore is implying that the same person who *explained Kārikā* I, is *writing Kārikā* II. In other words, he is saying that the author of the *Vṛtti* and the author of the *Kārikā* is one and the same person. But this is in direct opposition to the phrase *kartṛbhede kā saṅgatiḥ.* So either the gerund form *vyākhyāya* is a misreading (unlikely) or else Abhinava is contradicting himself. Another passage, with precisely the same implication is found on p. 340 of the *Locana: asyārthasya* (namely moderation in presenting the *sandhis* and *sandhyaṅgas*) *yatnāvadheyatveneṣṭatvāt svakaṇṭhena yo vyatireka ukto 'na tu kevalayā' iti tasyodāharaṇam āha – na tv iti.* Now this refers to *Kārikā* XII on p. 329. *Na tu* refers to the *Vṛtti* on p. 340. Since the grammatical object of the absolutive construction must be the same person, it would seem that this supports a unity of authorship and is in direct opposition to the first passage we examined.

These are in my opinion the key passages in the *Locana* on the question of authorship.[10] They give two completely disparate views. What are we to make of this? I suggest that the only interpretation possible is that sometimes Abhinava regarded the authors as identical, and sometimes he regarded them as distinct, in other words, *he did not much care one way or the other.* If this is true, and I don't see how else we can interpret these passages, then we shall have to abandon the *Locana* as the source for deciding the authorship problem of the *Dhvanyāloka.*[7] I believe that far more substantial evidence is to be found in the text of the *Dhvanyāloka* itself. I do not believe that there is a single instance which supports the view of unity.

INTERNAL EVIDENCE

Śāntarasa. The first author to mention *śāntarasa* is Udbhaṭa,[13] in his enumeration of nine *rasas*. But he has nothing further to say on the subject. Shortly after Udbhaṭa, however, and before the time of Ānandavardhana, *śāntarasa* must have suddenly become a matter of great controversy. This is clear from the urgent manner in which Ānanda, the first author to speak of *śāntarasa* in any detail, defends its existence. Thus in the third *Uddyota*, on Kārikā 26 (which does not mention any *rasa* specifically) Ānanda says:[14]

> The *rasa* that is not opposed (to the principal *rasa*), though occurring in the same character, but is opposed because of its immediate occurrence (after it), should be introduced into the work only after the intervention of a third rasa. As, for instance, *śānta* and *śṛṅgāra* have been introduced into the *Nāgānanda* (with the intervention of *adbhuta*). *Śānta*,

> which is characterised by the full development of the happiness that comes from the destruction of desires, is indeed apprehended (as one of the *rasas* by sensitive readers). And so it has been said:
>
> > "The pleasures of love, as well as the great pleasures of heaven, do not equal even the sixteenth part of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of desire."
>
> Even should it be claimed that this is not within the range of experience of all men, still it is not possible simply on this account to reject what is the special state of mind of great men who are not like ordinary people. Nor is it correct to include *śānta* within *vīrarasa*, because *vīra* depends on egoism, whereas *śānta* consists exclusively in the destruction of any feeling of self. If, in spite of this distinction, one should still claim that *śānta* and *vīra* are one and the same, then the same absurd reasoning would apply to *vīra* and *raudra*. In the case of the states of mind in *vīra* which depend on compassion, etc., when there is a total absence of egoism, they can be considered as varieties of *śāntarasa*. If, however, egoism remains, then they should be considered varieties of *vīrarasa*. If we understand things in this way, there will be no contradiction. *And therefore there is śāntarasa*. There is nothing wrong with including, in a work dealing with *śāntarasa*, a *rasa* (intrinsically) opposed to *śānta*, as long as a third and neutral (*aviruddha*) *rasa* intervenes.

Clearly Ānanda is concerned, in this passage, with defending the very existence of *śāntarasa*. Again in the fourth *Uddyota*, there is a much longer passage, concerned with showing that *śāntarasa* is the predominant rasa of the whole *Mahābhārata*. Ānanda ends by saying:[15]

> And so, through the sentence found in the table of contents, it is revealed that everything different from the blessed one is ephemeral, and thereby it is well-established that looking at the *Mahābhārata* as a *śāstra*, the highest goal of man, namely *mokṣa*, is alone intended as the most important (of the goals of life), and looking at it as poetry, *śāntarasa*, which is characterised by the nourishing of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of desire, *is intended as the most important (of all the rasas)*. Because it is the very essence of the whole work, this meaning has been conveyed through suggestion, and not directly.

Clearly the subject of *śāntarasa* is one that lies close to Ānandavardhana's heart. To no other *rasa* does he devote such elaborate discussions. Now if one holds that Ānanda also wrote the *Kārikās*, we can expect to find the *Kārikās* equally concerned with *śāntarasa*. This is, however, not the case.

Nowhere is śāntarasa mentioned in a Kārikā. Now while it is true that the *Kārikās* nowhere name all the *rasas* in a verse similar to the one given by Udbhaṭa (and all later writers), and thus it is not possible to determine for certain whether the author of the *Kārikās* accepted *śāntarasa* or not, there is nonetheless some evidence that he did not. The reason is this: we find that all the *rasas* with which the *Kārikās* are concerned, are specifically mentioned: *śṛṅgāra* time and time again (e.g. II. 15, II. 7, II. 17); *karuṇa* at II. 8 (and by implication in I. 5); *bībhatsa* at III. 4; *raudra* at II. 9 etc. When *śṛṅgāra* is mentioned, its importance is emphasised:

> *śṛṅgāra eva madhuraḥ paraḥ prahlādano rasaḥ*
> *tanmayaṃ kāvyam āśritya mādhuryaṃ pratitiṣṭhati*

And again:

> *dhvanyātmabhūte śṛṅgāre yamakādinibandhanam*
> *śaktāv api pramāditvaṃ vipralambhe viśeṣataḥ*

Now if Ānanda wrote the *Kārikās*, is it not curious that a doctrine of such obvious importance to him (namely *śāntarasa*), should nowhere find mention in the basic text itself? We know of the basic rule that a *Vṛtti* should not depart from the *sūtra*. What is more simple than to have spoken of *śāntarasa* in so many words in a *Kārikā*? Not only to affirm its existence (which would seem necessary for a controversial topic) but to remark that it deserves a prominent place in literary criticism, since this is how he felt. The fact that it is not mentioned in any *Kārikā* seems weighty evidence in favour of separate authorship, though of course it is not decisive. For if Ānanda did not write the *Kārikās*, he would not feel free to add to them, even on issues of such major importance. This seems to be the reasoning behind the next issue:

ANĀKHYEYATVAM

The first *Kārikā* of the *D.Āl.* brings up the problem of dissent:

> *kāvyasyātmā dhvanir iti budhair yaḥ samāmnātapūrvas tasyābhāvaṃ*
> *jagadur apare bhāktam āhus tam anye kecid vācāṃ sthitam aviṣaye tat-*
> *tvam ūcus tadīyam tena brūmaḥ sahṛdayamanaḥprītaye tatsvarūpam*

The first objection, that *dhvani* does not exist, is answered in the first seven *Kārikās*, after which Ānanda says: *evaṃ vācyavyatirekiṇo vyaṅgyasya sadbhāvaṃ pratipādya prādhānyaṃ tasyaiveti darśayati.* "Having in this

manner established the existence of the suggested that is different from the expressed, the author shows its predominance." As for the *bhāktavādins*, they are answered in *Kārikā* XIV:

bhaktyā bibharti naikatvaṃ rūpabhedād ayaṃ dhvaniḥ.

All that remains to respond to is the belief in ineffability. But this position is nowhere answered in the *Kārikās*. Should one argue that the whole of the *Dhvanyāloka* is a refutation of this doctrine, and that the Kārikākāra did not wish to specifically deal with the issue, then one is justified in asking why, if the Vṛttikāra is identical with the Kārikākāra, the same position is not taken in the text of the *Vṛtti*? For Ānanda does respond. The last words of the *Vṛtti* on the last *Kārikā* of *Uddyota* I partially answer the *anākhyeyavāda*:

ye 'pi sahṛdayasaṃvedyam anākhyeyam eva dhvaner ātmānam āmnāsiṣus te 'pi na parīkṣyavādinaḥ. yata uktayā nītyā vakṣyamāṇayā ca dhvaneḥ sāmānyaviśeṣalakṣaṇe pratipādite 'pi yady anākhyeyatvaṃ tat sarveṣām eva vastūnāṃ tat prasaktam. yadi punar dhvaner atiśayoktyānayā kāvyāntarātiśāyi taiḥ svarūpam ākhyayate tat te 'pi yuktābhidhāyina eva.

"Those who say that the essence of *dhvani* is patent only to the minds of sensitive readers, (and thus) ineffable, speak without having given careful thought to the matter. The general characteristics of *dhvani* have already been given, and the specific characteristics will be given in the sequel. If (one should still persist in claiming that) *dhvani* is ineffable, then this would hold true of all things. But if these people only mean this as a hyperbolic statement to show that the real nature of *dhvani* surpasses all other types of poetry, then they will be quite correct in what they say."

Abhinava was aware of this discrepancy, for in commenting on the above passage he says:

evaṃ triprakāram abhāvavādaṃ, bhaktyantarbhūtānāṃ ca nirākurvatā alakṣaṇīyatvam etan madhye nirākṛtam eva. ata eva mūlakārikā sākṣāt tannirākaraṇārthā na śrūyate. vṛt tu nirākṛtam api prameyaśayyāpūraṇāya kaṇṭhena tat pakṣam anūdya nirākaroti.

"In this way, by refuting the three-fold doctrine of those who hold that *dhvani* does not exist, in which is included (the refutation of those who say *dhvani* is) the same as secondary usage, the belief in ineffability is also refuted. That is why we don't find that this doctrine is refuted by the original *Kārikās* themselves. But the author of the *Vṛtti*

> has refuted it. In order to complete the various doctrines to be proven, he brings up that position again and answers it in his own voice."

Surely the doctrine of ineffability is a serious objection that must be met with cogent reasons why it is not feasible. Clearly Ānanda was not satisfied either with the silence of the *Kārikās*, or with his own brief refutation at the end of the first *Uddyota*, for twice in the third *Uddyota* he comes back to the issue. At the end of the third *Uddyota* he gives his final view on the matter:[16]

> Thus the true nature of *dhvani* can be most clearly defined. As for the definition of *dhvani* that someone has given, which is as follows:
>
> > "That is a case of *dhvani* when in poetry an indefinable beauty of certain words and meanings appears, that is only knowable by special experts, like the intrinsic value (*jātyatvam*) of certain jewels",
>
> well, that definition is wrong and does not deserve to be subscribed to. For the speciality of words as far as their phonetic form goes, is that, as well as being grammatically correct and pleasant to the ears (*akliṣṭatva*) they be not used repetitively (*aprayuktaprayoga*). The speciality with reference to the denotative units of the language is clarity (*prasāda*) and suggestiveness (*vyañjakatva*). The speciality with reference to their (literal) meaning is that they be clearly understood, that they be aimed at the suggested (element), and that they be accompanied (or beautified) by a suggested element. Both of these qualities can be spoken of and have (in fact) been explained (by us) in some detail. To assume some special qualities altogether different (from those already defined and explained by us) and to say that they are indefinable is simply the result of the breakdown of the power of discrimination, since ineffability, in the sense that something is beyond the reach of all words, is impossible. For in the last analysis, it is possible to speak of that which is (supposedly ineffable) by the word ineffable itself. As for what is sometimes said, namely that ineffability exists in the sense that (the knowledge of a thing) is non-determinate (*sāmānyasaṃsparśī*) but is beyond the range of determinate words (*vikalpaśabdagocaratva*), this also cannot apply either to particular poems or to particular jewels. For the qualities (of poems) have in fact been explained by literary critics. In the case of particular jewels also, it would be impossible to fix a price for them merely on the basis of non-determinate (knowledge about them). However, (we do admit that) in both cases, the true worth can only be known by particular experts. For only jewellers (*vaikaṭika*) (really) know the (true) value of gems, and only sensitive critics really appreciate the *rasa* of poems. How can

anyone doubt this? As for the well-known doctrine of the Buddhists that all things are ineffable, we will deal with this in another book where the views of the Buddhists will be examined. We don't take up this subject here since to deal with the details of a subject that belongs to another work would surely create boredom (*vaimanasya*) for the sensitive reader. (But we can say this much:) Just as (in spite of their doctrine), the Buddhists are able to define perception etc. (from the *vyavahāra* level), we can also do so in the case of *dhvani*. Therefore since no other characteristic of *dhvani* stands to reason (i.e., *dhvani* cannot be characterised by *bhakti*, or by *abhidhā*, or by *tātparyavṛtti* or by *anumāna*), and since *dhvani* is not identical with the literal meaning, the correct definition is the one we have given. Therefore this is said:

> "It is no definition of *dhvani* to say that it is ineffable, since *dhvani* can be completely expounded. The correct definition of *dhvani* is the one already given."

There can be doubt that this passage refers to the original first *Kārikā*. Abhinava insists on it: *idānīṃ vācāṃ sthitam aviṣaye iti yad ūce tat tu prathamoddyote dūṣitam api dūṣayati sarvaprapañcakathane hi asambhāvyam evānākhyeyatvam ity abhiprāyeṇa*. So it was clear to Abhinava, as it is clear to us, that this theory has not been answered in the *Kārikās*. If Ānanda wrote both the *Vṛtti* and the *Kārikās* what was to prevent him from answering in a separate Kārikā? Should one argue that Ānanda wrote the *Kārikās* early in his career, and only wrote the *Vṛtti* later, the question then is: (1) Why did he not respond to the *anākhyeyavāda* in the first place, and (2) What was to prevent him from swelling the number of *Kārikās* at a later time?

TRIVIDHADHVANI.

For Ānanda, terms such as *dhvaniprakāra, avāntarabheda*, etc., are not mere loose usage to describe vague varieties of *dhvani*. He states right at the beginning of the text that there are three very different varieties of *dhvani*:

> *sa hy artho vācyasāmārthyākṣiptaṃ vastumātram alaṅkārarasādayaś cety anekaprabhedaprabhinno darśayiṣyate.*

There are three forms of *dhvani* then, when it is considered in the largest sense: *vastudhvani, alaṅkāradhvani* and *rasadhvani*. Abhinava takes great pains to show, in his commentary on Ānanda's opening verse to the *D.Āl.*, how all three forms of *dhvani* are found therein. The first question a Paṇḍit

will ask his class about dhvani is: *katividho dhvaniḥ*, and the response is immediate: *trividho dhvaniḥ.*[17] But *nowhere in the Kārikās is this threefold division explicitly mentioned.* In fact, based on the *Kārikās* alone, it is clear that for their author, no such general division was known. It would appear that *guṇībhūtavyaṅgyadhvani* is a more important division, and explictly recognised in the *Kārikās.*[18] Now it is true that the *Kārikās* do mention, by implication, *alaṅkāradhvani* in II. 26, and in II. 25, the author speaks of an *alaṅkāra* resulting from *arthaśakti* as being: *sa prakāro 'paro dhvaneḥ*. But it is clear from what follows that he means nothing as rigid as Ānanda's classification. This can be seen in the *Kārikās* that follow, where he calls this same *prakāra, asau mārgo dhvaner* (II. 27), and again in II. 29 and II. 30, where he uses the expression *dhvanyaṅgatā*. None of these expressions can be seen as anything but the loosest use of a broad term to indicate that something falls within the scope of *dhvani.*[19] On I. 19 for instance, something is spoken of as *dhvanibheda* and what is meant is the classification used in the second *Uddyota* which has nothing to do with the threefold *dhvani* classification favoured by Ānanda. What I suggest is that the natural tendency for classification within Sanskrit scientific literature is evident here also. For the original author of the *Kārikās* this did not seem important, but already Ānanda found it more in keeping with the scholastic attitude to rigorously classify data. For Abhinava it was absolutely necessary to do so. The same process was seen to be at work in the section concerning the dissenting views. Perhaps this same spirit caused Ānanda not only to classify with more precision, but also to judge more rigorously, for it is apparent that he was less interested in *vastudhvani* and in *alaṅkāradhvani*, than he was in *rasadhvani*. With Abhinava this is carried a step further, and he quite consciously denigrates all varieties of *dhvani* except *rasadhvani* (see *Locana*, p. 85: *tena rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalaṅkāradhvanī tu sarvathā rasaṃ prati paryavasyete*).

CONCLUSION

These are just a few of the considerations that I consider telling.[20] I have not been able to go into detail on the question of style,[21] on the *Saṅgrahaślokas,*[22] or on the different attitudes to religion expressed in the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti.*[23] But I think that the evidence so far examined will lead an impartial reader to the suspicion that the author of the *Kārikās* may be different from Ānandavardhana. I use these qualifications advisedly, for while the question is one that allows probability, it cannot, in the nature of things, prove definitive.

NOTES

[1] G. Bühler, *Detailed report of a tour in search of Sanskrit Mss.*, Bombay, 1877, p. 65.

[2] A. Sankaran, *Some aspects of literary criticism in Sanskrit, or the theories of Rasa & Dhvani*, published by the University of Madras, 1929. See Ch. VI, section II, 'The authorship of the Dhvani Kārikās', p. 50. Kuppuswami Sastri, in his edition of the D.Āl., with the Locana and the Kaumudī, published by the K. Sastri Research Institute, Madras, 1944. See the *Upalocanā* commentary, p. 11. Satkari Mookherjee, 'A dissertation on the identity of the author of the Dhvanyāloka', published in the *B.C. Law Volume*, p. 179, vol. I, Calcutta, 1935 (?). K. Krishnamoorthy, 'Authorship of the Dhvanyāloka and Ānandavardhana's date and works', pub. in two parts in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, **25**, 1948, p. 100 (part I), and p. 300 (part II). K. Krishnamoorthy, *Dhvanyāloka and its critics*, Kāvyālaya Publishers, Mysore, 1968. K.C. Pandey, *Abhinvagupta, an Historical & Philosophical Study*, Chowkhamba Skt. Series, Vol. I, second ed. 1963, p. 202 'Who was the author of the Dhvani Kārikā'. R. Gnoli, 'Vṛttikāra and Kārikā-kāra', *East & West*. ISMEO, Year VI, number 4, January 1956, p. 293. B. Bhattacharya, *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana*. Uddyota I. Calcutta, 1965. 2nd rev. ed., Int. p. 27. Professor V. Raghavan in personal communications to the author has also upheld the identity of authorship.

[3] Durgaprasad and Kasinath Parab, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhanācārya*, KM. 25, NSP, Bombay 1891. Under the heading 'Dhvanyālokaḥ salocanaḥ' in the Skt. Int. S.K. De, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, **I**, 1919, 'The Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana', reprinted in *Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics*, p. 80. H. Jacobi, *Z.D.M.G.*, **56**, Introduction to his tr. of the D.Āl., 1902. Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī, in the Kashi Skt. Series (135) ed. of the D.Āl., with the *Bālapriyā*, p. 12 of the Int. 'Kārikāvṛttayor ekatvānekatvavicāraḥ' in Skt, 1940. Sivaprasad Bhattacharya, 'The Dhvanyāloka and the Text of the Dhvanikārikās', *Proceedings of the 6th All India Oriental Congress*, Patna, 1930. Section on Classical Sanskrit, p. 613. P.V. Kane, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, third revised ed., 1961, pp. 161–208. F. Edgerton, 'Indirect suggestion in poetics', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 1936, p. 704. M. Emeneau, review of Kane, *JAOS*, **72**, 1952. Harichand Sastri, *Kālidāsa et l'Art Poétique de l'Inde*, Paris, 1920, p. 86. Sovani, J.R.A.S., 1910, p. 164. K. Goda Varma, 'Different authorship of the Kārikāgrantha and the Vṛtti-grantha of Dhvanyāloka', p. 265 of the *New Indian Antiquary*, **5**, 1943. S.K. De, 'The Text of the Kāvyāloka-locana', p. 238, in *Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics*, Calcutta, 1959. D.R. Mankad, 'Authorship of Dhvanyāloka', *New Indian Antiquary*, December 1943. The late Professor L. Renou, in personal references made to the author, also expressed the view that the two authors were separate.

[4] Both the first (p. 9) and the last verse of the D.Āl. make this clear.

[5] The attitude that Abhinava takes to the D.Āl. from a certain distance need not be so cautious as when he is actually commenting on the work itself. In the *Locana*, Abhinava never states categorically whether the two portions are written by Ānanda alone or by another person. The whole book was at least put together, arranged and explained by Ānanda. It was through his fame that the book reached a large public. There would therefore be nothing strange in referring to the entire work as being Ānandavardhana's. After all, we speak of Keśavamiśra's *Alaṅkāraśekhara* even though he did not write the *kārikās*, precisely

because the original author is not known, and it is a convenience to refer to the whole work as being Keśavamiśra's. It would not be considered an impardonable error were some modern author to refer to the *kārikā* portion of this text and then to say, see Keśavamiśra etc. This might well be, more or less, what Abhinava himself has done in the *Abhinavabhārati*. It should be noted that merely because Abhinava refers to the *D.Āl.* in the *Abhinavabhārati* does not prove that he wrote the *Locana* before the *A.Bh.* For on p. 499 of the *Locana*, Abhinava says: *nirūpitaṃ caitad rasasvarūpanirṇayāvasare.* Now there is no earlier passage in the *Locana* to which he could be referring. He must therefore be referring to the *rasaprakaraṇa* of the *Abhinavabhārati* (on NŚ. VI). This is therefore clear evidence that Abhinava revised his works and was thus able to make cross-references to both texts. I am certain that the same observation holds true in the case of Ānanda as well. At least three times in the Locana, Abhinava uses the phrase *agre vakṣyate* when he refers to his own work.

[6] *Locana, p. 288: uddyotāntarasaṅgatiṃ kartum āha vṛttikāraḥ – evam ityādi. tatra vācyamukhena tāvad avivakṣitavācyādayo bhedāḥ (varṇitāḥ), vācyaś ca yady api vyañjaka eva* (remove daṇḍa) *yathoktam – 'yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā' iti. tataś ca vyañjakamukhenāpi bheda uktaḥ, tathāpi sa vācyo 'rtho vyaṅgyamukhenaiva bhidyate. tathā hy avivakṣito vācyo vyaṅgyena nyagbhāvitaḥ, vivakṣitānyaparo vācya iti vyaṅgyārthapravaṇa evocyate ity evaṃ mūlabhedayor eva yathāsvam avāntarabhedasahitayor vyañjakarūpo yo 'rthaḥ sa vyaṅgyamukhaprekṣitāśaraṇatayaiva bhedam āsādayati. ata evāha – vyaṅgyamukheneti. kiṃ ca yady apy· artho vyañjakas tathāpi vyaṅgyatāyogyo 'py asau bhavatīti, śabdas tu na kadācid vyaṅgyaḥ, api tu vyañjaka eveti. tadāha – vyañjakamukheneti. na ca vācyasyāvivakṣitādirūpeṇa yo bhedas tatra sarvathaiva (śabdasya) vyañjakatvaṃ nāstīti punaḥśabdenāha. vyañjakamukhenāpi bhedaḥ sarvathaiva na na prakāśitaḥ kintu prakāśito 'py adhunā punaḥ śuddhavyañjakamukhena (prakāśyate). tathā hi vyaṅgyamukhaprekṣitayā vinā padaṃ vākyaṃ varṇāḥ padabhāgaḥ saṅghaṭanā mahāvākyam iti svarūpata eva vyañjakānāṃ bhedaḥ, na caiṣām arthavat (i.e. vācyārthavat) kadācid api vyaṅgyatā sambhavatīti vyañjakaikaniyataṃ svarūpaṃ yat tan mukhena bhedaḥ prakāśyata iti tātparyam.*

[7] Abhinava's second point (which does not involve the authorship problem) seems to me false. His point is that the explanation of the earlier commentator could at the most show the logical connection of the third *Uddyota* with that part of the earlier work in which *vastu*, *alaṅkāra* and *rasa* have been mentioned as divisions of *dhvani*, namely in the first *Uddyota*, but it cannot demonstrate the logical connection of the third *Uddyota* with the second *Uddyota* where *avivakṣitavācya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* are explained as divisions of *dhvani*. But this is incorrect, since *avivakṣitavācya* includes *vastu* and *alaṅkāradhvani*.

[8] On the Candrikākāra, see Kane, *H.S.P.*, p. 207. One would think that the meaning would be: "Enough arguing with one of my own respected relatives." However this is not what the text literally says. Abhinava on p. 410 (KM E. of 1935, p. 231): *ity alaṃ pūrvavaṃśyaiḥ saha vivādena.* On p. 290 (p. 151 of the KM 1935 ed.) he says: *yas tu vyācaṣṭe . . . ity alaṃ nijapūjyajanasagotraiḥ sākaṃ vivādena* which seems odd in the light of the later quotation.

[9] A similar passage, often cited as proof of single authorship is found on the *Locana*, p. 502, where Abhinava introduces *Kārikā* 43 of the third *Uddyota* with the following comment: *evaṃ ślokadvayena saṅgrahārtham abhidhāya bahuprakāratvapradarśikāṃ paṭhati – saguṇīti.* This refers to the two *saṅgrahaślokas* on pp. 500–1. Since Skt. grammar de-

mands that the subject of a gerund and the finite verb be one and the same person, it could be argued that Abhinava's remark must apply to one and the same person. This would be correct had the last word been *racayati* and not *paṭhati*. *Paṭhati* cannot mean 'write' by any stretch of its normal meaning, which is 'to recite,' surely the meaning here. Thus Abhinava is saying that the author of the Vṛtti now introduces (*paṭhati*) kārikā 43. Note that Abhinava uses this word *paṭhati* throughout the *Abhinavabhāratī* (e.g. Vol. I, p. 192, etc.), to refer to rival theories. Thus of those who believe in *śāntarasa: nava rasā iti paṭhanti*. As far as I am aware, Abhinava never uses *paṭhati* in the sense of *racayati* anywhere in his works.

[10] There are a number of other passages in the *Locana* which have been used as evidence of a unity of authorship. At the beginning of the second *Uddyota* (p. 165), Abhinava says:

vṛttikāraḥ saṅgatim uddyotasya kurvāṇa upakramate – evam ityādi. prakāśita iti. mayā vṛttikāreṇa sateti bhāvaḥ. na caitan mayotsūtram uktam, api tu kārikākārābhiprāyeṇety āha – tatreti. tatra dviprakāraprakāśane vṛttikārakṛte yan nimittaṃ bījabhūtam iti sambandhaḥ. yadi vā – tatreti pūrvaśeṣaḥ (remove daṇḍa) *tatra prathamoddyote vṛttikāreṇa prakāśitaḥ* (add daṇḍa). *avivakṣitavācyasya yaḥ prabhedo 'vāntaraprakāras tatpratipādanāyedam ucyate. tadavāntarabhedapratipādanadvāreṇaiva cānuvādadvāreṇāvivakṣitavācyasya yaḥ prabhedo vivakṣitānyaparavācyāt prabhinnatvaṃ tatpratipādanāyedam ucyate. bhavati mūlato dvibhedatvaṃ kārikākārasyāpi sammatam eveti bhāvaḥ.*

Admittedly, this is a very difficult passage. Here is Mookherjee (p. 184): "Unfortunately both MM. Durgaprasad Dvivedi the editor of the NSP edition and MM. Kane alike failed to pay proper attention to the clause '*by me in the capacity of Vṛttikāra*' (mayā vṛttikāreṇa satā). The particle *satā* would be redundant unless the functional difference in spite of the personal identity were alluded to by Abhinavagupta." Krishnamoorthy (p. 188) says also: "In commenting on the vṛtti at the outset of the second chapter, "Dhvani has been shown to be of two kinds etc.", Abhinavagupta supplies the necessary corrective "by me, in the capacity of Vṛttikāra" that is the import. This has however not been stated in disregard of the original text (sūtra) but in pursuance of the intention of the Kārikākāra. Here the particle *satā* is very significant. It would be redundant, unless the functional difference in spite of the personal identity were alluded to by Abhinavagupta". The emphasis both authors lay on satā is unwaranted. The phrase is completely ordinary and often used by commentators. It simply means: "By me, being the Vṛttikāra" and has nothing whatever to do with 'capacity' for which there is no word in the original. Śaṅkara uses this same expression in his *bhāṣya* on the *Kāṭhakopaniṣad* I. 4, where he says: *tad evaṃ kratvasampattinimittaṃ pitur aniṣṭaṃ phalaṃ mayā putreṇa satā nivāraṇīyam.* Here then is a complete translation of the whole passage:

"The author of the *Vṛtti* begins to show the logical connection of (this) *Uddyota* (with the previous *Uddyota*). *Evam* etc. *Prakāśitaḥ.* The meaning is: by me, being the *Vṛttikāra.* Nor have I said this (as something) outside of the scope of the original text, but in consonance with the intention of the author of the *Kārikās.* And so he says: *tatra.* In connection with that (*tatra*) i.e., in connection with the two-fold classification made by the Vṛttikāra (in *Uddyota* I) (and in connection with the first major variety, namely *avivakṣitavācya*, under that two-fold classification). The reason underlying (the further division of that major variety) is set forth in what follows (i.e. in *Kārikā* II. 1). Or, *tatra* may be taken as referring to the first *Uddyota* (*pūrvaśeṣa ?*). The following (i.e. what is said in *Kārikā* II.1), is being stated in order to expound the further subdivisions of the major variety (of *dhvani*), namely *avivakṣitavācya*

revealed by the Vṛttikāra there, i.e. in *Uddyota* I. (Understanding *tasya yaḥ* before *avāntaraprakāraḥ, tat pratipādanāya idam ucyate*). This (i.e. what is stated in *Kārikā* II. 1) is being said in order to expound the difference of *avivakṣitavācya* from *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* (to be spoken of in *Kārikā* II. 2), by (in *Kārikā* I) just setting forth the subdivisions of *avivakṣitavācya* (on the basis of the *vācya* being *vivakṣita* or *avivakṣita*) after making a reference to *avivakṣitavācya* as something which is already known (and about which a statement is being made in Kārikā II. 1 – *anuvādarūpeṇa*). The meaning is that there is a basic two-fold division which is also accepted by the author of the *Kārikās*."

Abhinava means that in the case of *avivakṣitavācya*, the basis of division is the *vācya* sense, whereas in *vivakṣitavācya* it is *saṃlakṣyakramatva* and *asaṃlakṣyakramatva*. Now I think it must be admitted that if we hold that Abhinava regarded the two authors as one, this passage reads rather strangely. To say that the author of the Kārikās accepts the two-fold division made by Ānanda (in the first Uddyota, anticipating the second Uddyota) would be an odd way of speaking if the two are a single person. Mookherjee is perhaps right to say that this *could* be (he states it *must* be) a formal distinction. But I feel that it betrays a certain confusion in Abhinava's own mind. Here is Kane (p. 180) on this passage: "Dr. Mookherjee charges me with having failed to pay proper attention to the word satā in the passage quoted and himself translates the words as "by me, in the capacity of a vṛttikāra". If one has already made up one's mind that the authors of kārikā and vṛtti are identical, then only this translation is proper. But it begs the whole question. There is no word for 'capacity'. The literal transaltion is 'by me who am vṛttikāra'. But if one's mind is open and one reads the whole passage up to sammatam eva, a totally different conclusion has to be arrived at as shown above and everything including satā is quite explicable. The vṛttikāra according to Locana means to say: 'I being (satā) a vṛttikāra expounded at length the two major divisions of dhvani; I have not in doing so drawn purely on my own imagination (reading utsūtra) but what I have said is implicit in the words of the kārikākāra."

At the end of the *Dhvanyāloka*, on p. 551, Ānanda gives a verse with an elaborate metaphor that begins:

ity akliṣṭarasāśrayocitaguṇālaṅkāraśobhābhṛto

On the word *iti*, Abhinava in his *Locana* says: *itīti. kārikātadvṛttinirūpaṇaprakāreṇa ity arthaḥ.* On this passage Satkari Mookherjee has this to say (p. 189):

"Again, in the colophon of the work, there are two verses. While commenting upon 'iti' the first word of the first verse, Abhinavagupta observes that it means "in the light of the exposition given in the Kārikās and the Vṛtti". This indicates that Abhinavagupta takes the Kārikā and the Vṛtti to be the work of one person." This is unjustified. A correct translation of the passage from the Locana is: "The word iti means: by means of the explanations given in the Kārikās and in the Vṛtti (or in its Vṛtti)." Ānanda does not state in this verse that he originated what *iti* refers to, namely *dhvani*, nor does Abhinava. He only states that *dhvani* has now been propounded in detail, and Abhinava adds by means of the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* on them. Abhinava does not say: *mayā kārikākāreṇa, tadvṛttinirūpaṇena ca.* If Abhinava was certain in his mind that the author of the *Kārikās* and the author of the *Vṛtti* were one and the same, why did he not make such a clear straightforward statement anywhere in the *Locana*? As we have seen, all the passages involve some sort of confusion.

Another passage used for the unity of authorship is found on p. 41 of the *Locana: ānanda iti ca granthakṛto nāma. tena sa ānandavardhanācārya etac chāstradvāreṇa sahṛdayahṛ-*

dayeṣu pratiṣṭhāṃ devatāyatanādivad anaśvarīṃ sthitiṃ gacchatv iti bhāvaḥ. On this passage, Sankaran (p. 53) says: "Abhinava here interprets Ānandavardhana as having incidentally inscribed his own name so that he might be enshrined for ever in the hearts of all intelligent critics for expounding this science to them. Such an act on the part of Ānandavardhana will be a vain arrogation if he has not been, according to Abhinava, the first exponent of the theory of dhvani." And Mookherjee (p. 188), says the same thing: "Let us now consider whether there are positive indications in the commentary of Abhinavagupta of the unity of authorship regarding the entire work.... The following consideration is decisive. Ānandavardhana maintains that "even writers of exceptional intellectual acumen on the science of poetics have failed to discover the existence of dhvani. But still it will be easy for men of aesthetic taste (sahṛdaya) to detect the presence of dhvani in the famous poetical works such as the Rāmāyana in the light of the definition propounded here". He concludes with a veiled personal reference: "May Ānanda (aesthetic delight and the author Ānandavardhana) find a secure place in the minds of the men of taste. With a view to this end (the nature of dhvani) is being promulgated." Abhinava observes that Ānanda is the name of the author (granthakṛt). The promulgation of dhvani aims at securing a permanent footing for Ānandavardhana in the hearts of lovers of poetry by means of the śāstra. It might be supposed that the latter appellation is only an equivalent of the former and as such has no reference to the entire work, consisting of kārikā and vṛtti. Abhinavagupta refers to Ānandavardhana as Vṛttikāra and also as granthakāra. But the description of Ānandavardhana as the author of *this* śāstra is significant." Now Sankaran's argument hinges on his last sentence, namely that Abhinava says that Ānanda is the *first* exponent of the theory of *dhvani.* But he says no such thing. Here is a translation of the passage: "Ānanda is the name of the author of the work. Therefore may that teacher Ānandavardhana, by means of this teaching, attain a firm footing, a never-ending lodging in the hearts of sensitive readers, just like (the image is securely placed) in the temple of the god." There is nothing to correspond to 'first' in this passage. Moreover, *granthakṛt* (as Kane has pointed out, op. cit., p. 168) always refers to the *vṛtti*, and never to the *kārikās*. As for Mookherjee, the same remarks apply. But it must be added that he distorts the translation of Ānanda also, in order to prove his point. He translates: "Even writers of exceptional intellectual acumen on the science of poetics have failed to discover the existence of dhvani." But he has left out the important word *cirantana*. What Ānanda means is that the older *ālaṅkārikas* did not recognise *dhvani*. In Ānanda's own words, some of these older writers "had touched the fringes of dhvani." Most important of all, Mookherjee claims that Abhinava says that Ānandavardhana is the author of this *śāstra*. But Abhinava says no such thing. He merely states that he achieved what he did, by means of the *śāstra*. This does not imply that he originated the *śāstra* (giving it a full technical sense, which it need not even have here), but merely that he used it. I do not see how, when these passages are correctly translated, they "provide decisive evidence that for Abhinava, Ānanda wrote both parts of the text."

Finally, on p. 259, Ānanda introduces a Kārikā (II. 27) with: *iyat punar ucyata eva.* Abhinava glosses this by: *asmābhir iti vākyaśeṣaḥ.* Now this has been used as clear proof that Abhinava feels the two authors to be the same, since he says: "One must add to the sentence, 'by us'," and since this *iyat punar ucyate eva* is part of the *Vṛtti*, therefore, by introducing the next verse with "by us," he must be the same man. But *asmābhiḥ* means simply "our side," and not "I." This is clear from Abhinava's first sentence: *nanu pūrvair eva yadīdam uktam, kimarthaṃ tava yatna ity āśaṅkyāha iyaditi.* "And objection might be put as follows: if it is really true that this has been shown by earlier writers, what good is your ef-

fort? In order to guard against such a doubt, he says: *iyad*." The *asmābhir* is in contrast to the older writers. The idea is this: true the older writers have shown how one figure may suggest another, and that is why we only add this much.

[11] Thus Sankaran says (p. 53); "...Ānanda expressly claims to have been the originator of this theory and that thereby he has laid all learned men under a deep debt of gratitude to him (Dhvn. p. 144, note especially *asmad upajño na vismāryaḥ*)." This verse occurs in the Vṛtti just before Kārikā X, Uddyota III:

> *iti kāvyārthaviveko yo 'yaṃ cetaścamatkṛtividhāyī*
> *sūribhir anusṛtasārair asmad upajño na vismāryaḥ*

The key phrase is *asmad upajño na vismāryaḥ*, "(this *dhvani*) discovered by us, should not be forgotten". But note three things: (1) The footnote to p. 144 which Sankaran does not quote, reads: *iyam āryā ka, kha, pustakayor nāsti.* Now *ka* is a devanāgarī ms. from Kashmir (see p. 3 of the Skt. introduction) and *kha* is a copy of another Kashmiri manuscript. *Ga,* which is the only ms. to contain this verse, comes from Mysore! (2) Abhinava has no comment. (3) Kane says (H.S.P. p. 162): "I find on consulting five Devanāgarī mss. and two Śāradā mss. (No. 256 and 257 of the collection of 1875 at the B.O.R.I.) that none of them contains this verse. It is certainly spurious." Sankaran also states (p. 53): "Moreover in the opening Kārikā a promise is held out that the writer would expound the nature of dhvani for the enlightenment and pleasure of critics and this promise is not stated to have been fulfilled in the last Kārikā as might naturally be expected, but it is done so only in the last verse of the Vṛtti. Ānanda, who inscribes his name in the last verse, further takes credit for having carried out this resolve made in the first Kārikā, namely the exposition of Dhvani – the most real and striking characteristic of poetry. He also states that there was but a sparkling of the theory of dhvani in the minds of wise men before him. Had the author of the Kārikās been different from Ānanda, the above remarks, in the face of the numerous Kārikās, should certainly be a gross perversion of truth and an unwarranted arrogation of originality which the meanest of men will not be capable of." There is nothing unusual in the fact that the *Kārikās* themselves do not mention that the promise has been fulfilled. The whole point of the book is to show this. Moreover, note that Sankaran says that Ānanda says that he is responsible for the exposition of *dhvani.* But the text reads: *tad vyākarot*, i.e. Ānanda *explained* that, and not that he *originated* it. By *paripakvadhīyām* Ānanda is simply referring to those people whom he respected but who did not fully accept the theory of *dhvani.* Obviously for them not to have accepted it meant that it did exist. How is it anything but the simple truth that Ānanda did explain this doctrine, and more, made it acceptable to other critics as the whole of the later tradition upholds? Finally, Sankaran finds it odd (p. 53) that Ānanda should say of himself *Ānandavardhana iti prathitābhidhānaḥ* in this same verse. Sankaran writes: "Such an act on the part of Ânandavardhana will be a vain arrogation if he has not been...the first exponent of the theory of dhvani." Why? All he says is that he is famous, which he undoubtedly was. Abhinavagupta gives a perfectly rational explanation for this phrase, which has nothing to do with Sankaran's explanation. Thus Abhinava says: "In this world generally people are induced to undertake a thing through the force of the trust (they feel for someone), which is further based on their respect (for him), because of a well-known connection he has with the thing in question. Now this trust based on respect arises because on hearing the name (of some person who is associated with some action or utterance) one remembers that person's other well-known qualities, such as his (unimpeachable) behaviour, his poetic ability, or his learning etc......And people must be attracted in order to fulfil the purpose of the

particular science (they are being asked to study). This is why authors mention their own names (in their works), as a means of attracting to their works the readers for whom those works are intended (*anugrāhaśrotṛjana*). With just this in mind he gives his own name, Ānandavardhana. The word *prathita* ('famous') conveys just this (that we have spoken of, namely attraction of readers.)." Finally, Sankaran brings up another objection (p. 54): "While commenting on the Kārikā pradhāno 'nyatra etc. Dhv. II. 5, which defines Rasavadalaṅkāra differently from that of the earlier writers, Ānanda explains the portion of the Kārikā alaṅkāro rasādir iti me matiḥ as rasāder alaṅkārasya viṣaya iti māmakīnaḥ pakṣaḥ. Here Kārikākāra expresses a certain view of his own, namely, where in any composition a Rasa, etc., is an adjunct to some principal idea, that is an instance of Rasavadalaṅkāra, and Ānanda also says that the very same is peculiar to himself (māmakīnaḥ pakṣaḥ) thus identifying himself apparently with the author of the Kārikās. If Ānanda had used a word like 'api' meaning 'also', such as mamāpy evam āśayaḥ, then it may be argued that he only agrees with the view of the Kārikākāra; but there is nothing of it." But Ānanda is not talking about himself here, he is glossing the Kārikā. He simply glosses *me matiḥ* with *māmakīnaḥ pakṣaḥ*, thereby showing that by *me matiḥ* the author of the *Kārikās* identifies himself with a school, a position on a controversial issue. He certainly is not saying: "this is my position." Abhinava makes it clear by saying: *me matir ity anyapakṣaṃ dūṣyatvena*, thus explaining why Ānanda glosses as he does.

[12] One can be exasperated by Ānanda's *vṛtti*. There are times when he goes on at length about issues that do not seem important enough to deserve the consideration he gives them. A good example is the long *vṛtti* passage on *Kārikā* 43, where Ānanda goes into very great detail, with examples, of the various kinds of *saṅkara* and *saṃsṛṣṭhi* possible of the various kinds of *vyaṅgya* senses, *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, and even *vācyālaṅkāras*. One is relieved to come to the *Kārikās* and to once again deal with important questions of literature (there is no example of a single trivial Kārikā, whereas the Vṛtti has many passages such as the one I have just mentioned). Now in coming to *Kārikā* 44 (p. 516), the wording is very striking.

evaṃ dhvaneḥ prabhedāḥ prabhedabhedāś ca kena śakyante
saṅkhyātuṃ diṅmātraṃ teṣām idam uktam asmābhiḥ

I believe that this is further evidence that Ānanda did not write the Kārikās. For could one use the word *diṅmātram* in the light of the long Vṛtti passage? If the person writing the *Kārikā* knew the *Vṛtti*, surely he would not choose the expression *diṅmātram*. Of course this is hardly conclusive.

[13] Udbhaṭa, *Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha*, IV. 4.

[14] *D.Āl. pp. 388–394: yaḥ punar ekādhikaraṇatve nirvirodho nairantarye tu virodhī sa rasāntaravyavadhānena prabandhe niveśitavyaḥ. yathā śāntaśṛṅgārau nāgānande niveśitau. śāntaś ca tṛṣṇākṣayasukhasya yaḥ paripoṣas tal lakṣaṇo rasaḥ pratīyata eva. tathā coktam –*

yac ca kāmasukhaṃ loke yac ca divyaṃ mahatsukham
tṛṣṇākṣayasukhasyaite nārhataḥ ṣoḍaśīṃ kalām

yadi nāma sarvajanānubhavagocaratā tasya nāsti naitāvatāśv alokasāmānyamahānubhavacittavṛttiviśeṣaḥ pratikṣeptuṃ śakyaḥ. na ca vīre tasyāntarbhāvaḥ kartuṃ yuktaḥ. tasyābhimānamayatvena vyvasthāpanāt. asya cāhaṅkārapraśamaikarūpatayā sthiteḥ.

tayoś caivaṃvidhaviśeṣasadbhāve 'pi yady aikyaṃ parikalpyate tad vīraraudrayor api tathā prasaṅgaḥ. dayāvīrādīnāṃ ca cittavṛttiviśeṣāṇāṃ sarvākāram ahaṅkārarahitatvena śāntarasaprabhedatvaṃ, itarathā tu vīraprabhedatvam iti vyavasthāpyamāne nu kaścit virodhaḥ. tad evam asti śānto rasah. tasya cāviruddharasavyavadhānena prabandhe virodhirasasamāveśe saty api nirvirodhatvam.

[15] *D.Āl. p. 533: tad evam anukramaṇīnirdiṣṭena vākyena bhagavadvyatirekiṇaḥ sarvasyānyasyānityatāṃ prakāśayatā mokṣalakṣaṇa evaikaḥ paraḥ puruṣārthaḥ śāstranaye, kāvyanaye ca tṛṣṇākṣayasukhaparipoṣalakṣaṇaḥ śānto raso mahābhāratasyāṅgitvena vivakṣita iti supratipāditam. atyantasārabhūtatvāc cāyam artho vyaṅgyatvenaiva darśito na tu vācyatvena.*

[16] *D.Āl. p. 517: evaṃ sphuṭatayaiva lakṣaṇīyaṃ svarūpam asya dhvaneḥ. yatra śabdānām arthānāṃ ca keṣāñcit pratipattṛviśeṣasaṃvedyaṃ jātyatvam iva ratnaviśeṣāṇāṃ, cārutvam anākheyam avabhāsate kāvye tatra dhvanivyavahāra iti yal lakṣaṇaṃ dhvaner ucyate kenacit tad ayuktam iti nābhidheyatām arhati. yataḥ śabdānāṃ svarūpāśrayas tāvad akliṣṭatve saty aprayuktaprayogaḥ. vācakāśrayas tu prasādo vyañjakatvaṃ ceti viśeṣaḥ. arthānāṃ ca sphuṭatvenāvabhāsamānaṃ vyaṅgyaparatvaṃ vyaṅgyāṃśaviśiṣṭatvaṃ ceti viśeṣaḥ. tau ca viśeṣau vyākhyātum śakyete vyākhyātau ca bahuprakāram. tadvyatiriktānākhyeyaviśeṣasambhāvanā tu vivekāvasādbhāvamūlaiva. yasmād anākhyeyatvaṃ sarvaśabdāgocaratvena na kasyacit sambhavati. antato 'nākhyeyaśabdena tasyābhidhānasambhavāt. sāmānyasaṃsparśivikalpaśabdāgocaratve sati, prakāśamānatvaṃ tu yad anākhyeyatvam ucyate kvacit tad api kāvyaviśeṣāṇāṃ ratnaviśeṣāṇāṃ iva na sambhavati. teṣām lakṣaṇakārair vyākṛtarūpatvāt. ratnaviśeṣāṇāṃ ca sāmānyasambhāvanayaiva mūlyasthitiparikalpanādarśanāc ca ubhayeṣām api teṣām pratipattṛviśeṣasaṃvedyatvam asty eva. vaikaṭika eva hi ratnatattvavidaḥ, sahṛdayā eva hi kāvyānāṃ rasajñā iti kasyātra vipratipattiḥ. yat tu anirdeśyatvaṃ sarvalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ baudhānāṃ prasiddhaṃ tat tanmataparīkṣāyāṃ granthāntare nirūpayiṣyāmaḥ. iha tu granthāntaraśravaṇalavaprakāśanaṃ sahṛdayavaimanasyapradāyīti na prakriyate. bauddhamatena vā yathā pratyakṣādilakṣaṇaṃ tathāsmākaṃ dhvanilakṣaṇaṃ bhaviṣyati. tasmāl lakṣaṇāntarasyāghaṭanād aśabdārthatvāc ca tasyoktam eva dhvanilakṣaṇaṃ sādhīyaḥ. tat idam uktam*

anākheyāṃśabhāsitvaṃ nirvācyārthatayā dhvaneḥ
na lakṣaṇaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ tu sādhīyo 'sya yathoditam

[17] Cf. the *Dhvanyālokarahasyam*, a *praśnottarī* manual used for *Pāṭhaśālá* examinations, p. 7.

[18] D.Āl. p. 403.

[19] Note that in *Kārikā* II of the second *Uddyota, anyapara* is not explicitly stated, but only the word *vivakṣitābhidheya* (i.e. *vivakṣitavācya*). Abhinava says this is because the word *dhvani*, found in close proximity, naturally implies *anyaparatva*. The term *anyapara* is never used in the Kārikās!

[20] I have discussed, in a forthcoming translation of D.Āl., individual passages. See for example, Kārikās 3, 5, and 6 on which Ānanda's Vṛtti seems to me to depart from the logical

order of the Kārikās; K. 8; II. 5; II. 22; II. 31; II. 32; III. 2; III. 3; III. 4; III. 19; III. 29; III. 30; IV. 7.

[21] I think there can be little doubt that the Vṛtti is superior, as language, to the Kārikās. For instance, contrast the beautiful verses *apāre kāvyasaṃsāre*, and *śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ kāvye* with the clumsiness evident in many of the *Kārikās*. For instance, the word *bibhrad* occurs in *Kārikās* I. 14, I. 15, II. 26 and III. 36, though it never occurs in the *Vṛtti* or in the *Saṅgrahaślokas*. Similarly, the colorless expression *sumedhasā* is found in III. 35, III. 26, and IV. 11. *Mataḥ* occurs at II. 1, II. 2, II. 4, II. 5, II. 16 and II. 27, when one would expect not to find it used more than once by a careful writer.

[22] Note Paṭṭābhirāmaśāstrī, p. 12 of his Skt. introduction to the Banaras 1940 edition: *teṣām padyānāṃ mūlakārikānāñ ca bhāṣayāpi bhedo 'vagamyate*. Note, too, Kane (H.S.P., p. 182): "Some of these (saṅgraha) verses are striking and pregnant with meaning and far better than several kārikās." These verses, called *parikara* (explained by Abhinava on p. 107), *saṃkṣepa* and *saṅgraha*, are found on the following pages of the text: there are four verses in the first Uddyota; p. 107 is called a *parikara*. Abhinava does not explain the verse, nor does he say anything concerning its authorship; 129, three verses, introduced by *saṃkṣepaḥ*. Abhinava explains the verses very briefly, but ascribes no authorship to them. There are also four verses in the second *Uddyota*: p. 197, called *saṃkṣepa*. Again Abhinava explains the verse, but makes no ascription of authorship: 222 consists of three verses called *saṅgraha*. Abhinava, as above, explains the verses, but is silent as to their author. All but one of the remaining verses are found in the third *Uddyota*: p. 302 consists of three verses called *parikara*. The verses are explained by Abhinava, but no authorship is ascribed; 330, one verses, introduced with *paramārthaḥ* but Abhinava has no comment on the verse at all. It is one of the most often quoted verses of the D.Āl.; 334 is called a *parikara* and again Abhinava is silent; 364 consists of four verses called *parikara*, explained by Abhinava without authorship ascription; 457 consists of one verse, with no name given to it, though it is explained by Abhinava without ascription: 497 is introduced with the statement: *tad idam uktam*. Abhinava says: *mayaivety arthaḥ* and then explains them: 498 is introduced without a name. Abhinava explains it, but gives no ascription. It appears in the *Agnipurāṇa*. The second verse on this page is ascribed by Abhinava to Ānanda in the *A.Bh.*, Vol. I, p. 295; 500 has two verses called *saṅgrahas*. They are explained by Abhinava and it may be that he considers them to be by Ānanda; 520 is introduced without a name, but is both explained by Abhinava and ascribed by him to Ānandavardhana. The fourth Uddyota has one verse the authorship of which is problematic; p. 528. We can thus see that there is no consistent pattern. Are these verses by Ānandavardhana or not? The fact that Abhinava is silent need not mean that he does not consider them to be by Ānanda, for we see one instance (p. 498) where he is silent in the Locana, but ascribes it, in the *A.Bh.*, to Ānanda. On the other hand, twice he expressly mentions that the verse is (*eva*) by Ānanda, thus indicating, it would seem, that the matter might have been controversial. I feel that these *saṅgrahaślokas* are partly by Ānanda, and partly by older writers. This fits in well both with the testimony provided by Abhinava and by stylistic considerations. The verses were probably anonymous, belonging to the tradition from which the school of *dhvani*, synthesised by Ānandavardhana, arose. Moreover, this position is borne out by the location of the verses. If they were meant to be real "summing up verses," or, at other times, to add something new to what has been only hinted at in the *Kārikās* (*Locana*, p. 107, *parikārārthaṃ kārikārthasyādhi-*

kāvāpaṃ kartuṃ ślokaḥ parikaraślokaḥ), then we would expect to find them placed with some care in the body of the text. But this is not the case. Many of the verses are so close to the actual *Kārikās* themselves that one often asks what they are doing there. On the other hand, when a real summing up of an argument seems called for, as at the end of the vṛtti on III. 33, an excessively long passage, the verse found there bears little relation to what has preceded.

[23] Ānanda is clearly far more interested in religious matters (*śāntarasa, mokṣa*, etc.) than are the *Kārikās*. Indeed, in more than 125 Kārikās, a superhuman figure is mentioned only twice: once in I. 6, *sarasvatī*, and once again, the same person, in the last *Kārikā* of *Uddyota* IV. The muse is hardly an indication of excessive religious fervor.

S.D. JOSHI

THE CONTRIBUTION OF R.G. BHANDARKAR TO THE STUDY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

I wish to discuss in this paper, in honour of my *guru*, Professor Daniel H.H. Ingalls, the contribution of R.G. Bhandarkar to the study of Sanskrit Grammar, whose 50th death-anniversary occurred in 1975. For among the varied topics of research undertaken by Professor Ingalls, Sanskrit Grammar has an important place.

Dr. Bhandarkar combined traditional, shastric learning with Western scholarship. Through him, Indian students in the field of Sanskrit became acquainted with the critical, comparative and historical method of scientific investigation, which he applied in his own work and to which he devoted a separate lecture in 1888.[1]

Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar (1837–1925) was a school-master and educationist by temperament[2], a grammarian by training[3], and a scholar of the new stamp by general designation[4]. He acted as a Professor of Oriental Languages in the Elphinstone College, Bombay, from 1867, where he was superseded by P. Peterson in 1873. In 1881, after the retirement of F. Kielhorn, he was appointed Professor of Sanskrit at the Deccan College, Poona[5]. Later he became Vice-Chancellor of the Bombay University[6]. He received an honorary doctorate from the University of Göttingen[7] and was a great admirer of German scholarship all his life[8].

The present article intends to summarize and to discuss a few topics of grammatical and chronological interest to Bhandarkar as a grammarian. The points dealt with come under the following heads:

(1) Pāṇini
(2) The relations among the three *munis* of grammar
(3) *Ācārya* and *ācaryadeśīya*
(4) Patañjali's date
(5) The composition of the *Mahābhāṣya*

1.0

A striking characteristic of Pāṇinian grammar is that it does not teach ready-made forms and paradigms, but rules of a particular kind. The an-

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cient Sanskrit grammarians observed and analysed usage carefully. Then, reversing the analytic process, they phrased rules for the combination and integration of the analytically established elements of language. A correct application of these rules results in pure Sanskrit words ready for use in a sentence[9]. A general pattern of rule ordering followed by Pāṇini is that of special rules coming under general rules. Thus, as noted by Bhandarkar, the study of Sanskrit grammar came to possess an educational value similar to that of Euclid. The student has to pay attention to the conditions stated in the rules, to the relations between the rules, and he has to apply them in a succession. It was Bhandarkar's conviction that this method of studying grammar was superior to the one followed in Europe which was mainly based on the study of Latin grammar. Accordingly, when G. Bühler and M. Haug insisted on a practical method for learning Sanskrit in the Indian secondary school[10], Bhandarkar, in his *Second Book of Sanskrit*, adopted and adapted the Pāṇinian method[11].

1.1

The occasion for a discussion on a particular aspect of Pāṇini's grammar arose when Th. Goldstücker published his work on Pāṇini.[12] His idea was that Pāṇini was not the inventor of the grammatical system preserved in his work, though he improved upon the system of his predecessors, and made his own additions to it.[13] Moreover, he availed himself of the technical means of the older grammarians, and, in such a case, never gave any explanation of those technicalities which must have been known to his contemporaries, and, therefore, required no remark.[14] Here the question arises whether or not Pāṇini was the originator of all the technical terms he employed in his grammar.[15] To answer this question, Goldstücker refers to P.1.2.53, the *Bhāṣya* and Kaiyaṭa on that.[16] The sūtra is interpreted to mean that Pāṇini does not treat *saṃjñās*, i.e. conventional names, which admit of an etymology. According to Goldstücker, this applies also to grammatical terms which are etymologically significant, but not to artificial terms like *ṭi, ghu* and *bha*.[17] It follows that, if we find etymologically significant technical terms defined by Pāṇini, this should be taken to mean that Pāṇini has coined them, at least in the sense in which he uses them. Reversely, non-artificial technical terms not defined by Pāṇini have been borrowed from his predecessors.[18] Goldstücker then applies his theory to prove that Pāṇini was later than Yāska,[19] and that the *Uṇādisūtras* were later than Pāṇini.[20]

Bhandarkar criticizes Goldstücker on four points, namely, Pāṇini's al-

leged non-treatment of *saṁjñās* which are etymologically significant; the distinction, as far as definition is concerned, between non-artificial technical terms and artificial ones; the definition of a definition, and the interpretation of the Kaiyaṭa-passage involved[21]. He rightly points out that the etymology of a technical term is not sufficient to explain its sense. For instance, the etymology of the words *bahuvrīhi* or *pratyaya* does not give us a clue to the technical meaning in which Pāṇini uses these terms. As far as this is concerned, these terms are in the same position as linguistic symbols like *ṭi, ghu* etc. Therefore there is no reason for Pāṇini to define the latter and not the former[22].

As regards definition, Goldstücker draws a distinction between the definition which Pāṇini gives of a term and the enumeration he makes.[23] Against this, Bhandarkar argues that enumeration is a legitimate procedure of definition. The principal object of a definition is to distinguish certain things from the rest, and this may be done in ways other than by unfolding the connotation of a term[24]. To Indian authors enumeration of the items to which a term applies is as good as defining the meaning of that term, especially when the latter is difficult to give[25]. Pāṇini is simply guided by convenience. When he found it difficult to define the meaning of a term, he gave an enumeration. For instance, how difficult would it have been to give a connotative definition of *bahuvrīhi*, containing as it does such compounds as *uttarapūrva, saputra, daṇḍādāṇḍi*, so different from *kamalanayana*[26]!

At the end of his review Bhandarkar says that Goldstücker misunderstood P.1.2.56 as well. How could he bring in the idea of a compound and its 'principal part' in his translation[27]? Here Bhandarkar bases himself on the interpretation of the word *pradhānapratyayārthavacana* offered by the *Siddhāntakaumudī* on P.1.2.56. But the *KV* gives a different interpretation which is the one accepted by Goldstücker. According to the *KV*, P.1.2.56 means to say that there is no need to phrase a rule informing us that the meaning of a compound is determined by that of its main member, and the meaning of a derivative word by that of its suffix. For instance, when somebody says *rājapuruṣam ānaya*: 'bring the king-servant', a man is brought, not the king, nor just any man. Similarly, when somebody says *aupagavam ānaya*: 'bring the child of Upagu', the child is brought, not Upagu, not just any child, nor both. This is understood from usage, and grammar need not phrase rules to that effect.

2.0

Goldstücker takes the word *Vārttika* to be characteristic of the relation

between Kātyāyana and Patañjali, and of the relations of both with Pāṇini[28]. To explain the meaning of the term *vārttika* he quotes Nāgeśa's dictum, *sūtre 'nuktaduruktacintākaratvaṁ vārttikatvam*: 'the characteristic of a *Vārttika* is to consider what is omitted (from) or badly stated (in a *sūtra*).'[29] From this Goldstücker concludes that it was not Kātyāyana's intention to justify Pāṇini's rules, but to find fault with them. Thus, to Goldstücker, Kātyāyana leaves the impression of being an unfair antagonist of Pāṇini, twisting words of *sūtras* into meanings which they do not have, and upbraiding Pāṇini for shortcomings of which he is not guilty.[30]

Goldstücker points out that Patañjali's position is different. Patañjali has two predecessors to deal with. Still, his object like that of Kātyāyana being a critical one, he enters into a critical discussion of Kātyāyana's *Vts* which necessarily implies a criticism either of Kātyāyana or of Pāṇini. Moreover, where Pāṇini's *sūtras* call for additional remarks Patañjali phrases his *iṣṭis*[31]. But in his discussion Patañjali seems inclined to side with Pāṇini, against Kātyāyana, even to the extent of occasionally being unfair to Kātyāyana.[32]

2.1

In his small monograph on the relations between the three *munis* of grammar, Kielhorn sets himself the task of examining mainly Goldstücker's views[33]. As far as Kātyāyana is concerned, Kielhorn points out that Goldstücker has failed to provide a test through which one can distinguish Kātyāyana's *Vts* from the rest of the *Mahābhāṣya*[34]. Kielhorn then proceeds to furnish such a test[35]. After having applied it to a number of instances chosen at random and having found it effective, Kielhorn returns to the question regarding the nature and aim of the *Vts*.[36] His conclusion is that the *Vts* are not a commentary in the sense that they explain the meaning of the rules, as, for instance, the *KV* does[37]. It is equally true that Kātyāyana did not propose to himself the task of finding fault with Pāṇini, for he justifies him as often as not. Therefore, instead of calling Kātyāyana an unfair antagonist of Pāṇini, Kielhorn would rather claim for Kātyāyana the title of a judicious admirer of Pāṇini. That is to say, what Kātyāyana did was to dispassionately examine Pāṇini's rules, to consider objections which had actually been raised or which might have been raised, to defend Pāṇini and to correct, add, and discard only when no other course seemed to be left open. Precisely, this was the aim of the *Vts*: to discuss objections, and, on the one hand, to defend Pāṇini agaist unfounded criticism; on the other hand, to correct, sup-

plement, and reject where justification seemed impossible. This is also how Nāgeśa's definition of the notion *Vārttika* is to be interpreted[38].

As far as Patañjali is concerned, even though the *Mahābhāṣya* is in the first place a commentary on Kātyāyana's *Vts,*[39] the *Bhāṣya* is not a *vṛtti*.[40] Patañjali has adopted Kātyāyana's method of discussing Pāṇini's *sūtras*.[41] The object of both is the same; the nature of their remarks on Pāṇini is identically one; but they differ in the form which they have given to their discussions[42], and in the extent to which they have carried them and availed themselves of such artifices as *nipātana, jñāpaka*, etc.[43] Patañjali has rather carried Kātyāyana's method to extremes.[44] Kielhorn points out that it is altogether contrary to fact to say that Patañjali wanted to justify Pāṇini at all costs against Kātyāyana,[45] and the fact is that Pāṇini suffered more at the hands of Patañjali than at those of Kātyāyana.[46]

2.2

In an article published in 1876 Bhandarkar takes up the subject of the relations among the three *ācāryas*.[47] He thinks that Patañjali uses two words which are particularly suited to characterize Kātyāyana's activity, namely, *anvācaṣṭe* and *anvākhyāna* both of which he takes to mean 'teaching (or explaining) in accordance with'. From this it appears to Bhandarkar that Kātyāyana's object was to teach grammar, first by developing and explaining Pāṇini, and then by supplementing him, but not to find fault with him.[48]

Patañjali's work, on the other hand, can be characterised by the word *vyākhyāna*, that is, the *vyākhyāna* of Kātyāyana directly and of Pāṇini indirectly.[49] Patañjali's main object was not to refute Kātyāyana, but to explain his *Vts* in detail, discuss *sūtras*, and occasionally state supplementary rules (*iṣṭis*).[50] To illustrate this, Bhandarkar then gives a short analysis of a part of the *Mahābhāṣya* on the *Aṅgādhikāra*.[51] He sums his findings up by saying that Kātyāyana's work is an edition of Pāṇini with notes, explanatory, critical and supplementary; and that Patañjali's is a commentary on this edition, explaining in detail all points connected with the system of Pāṇini and with grammar generally, whether Kātyāyana noticed them or not, in a manner favourable or otherwise to his author. Finally, Bhandarkar says that Kātyāyana's and Patañjali's aim was the same, namely, to teach grammar by following and explaining the system of Pāṇini, endeavouring to perfect it, even though this sometimes required a remodelling of his *sūtras* or their entire refutation, and to complete it by supplying the omissions and bringing the knowledge of Sanskrit grammar conveyed therein up to their own times.[52]

2.3

Kielhorn's view on the relations between Kātyāyana and Pāṇini seems, on the whole, acceptable. Kātyāyana judiciously examines whether a *Pāṇinisūtra* ought to be changed, supplemented, or altogether replaced, in order to safeguard its control of the relevant linguistic data. Grammatical rules are looked upon as rules of law which must neither contain redundant nor lack necessary terms. If the latter is the case, the problem is how to mend the rule under investigation. More than one course is open: add, delete, reject or make use of interpretative devices.[53] Apart from that, Kātyāyana introduces philosophical issues which may be part of Vyāḍi's heritage.[54] It can also be shown that his general approach to grammar was different from that of Pāṇini.[55]

Now, leaving aside the latter two points, can it be rightly maintained that Kātyāyana and Patañjali, being united in their aim of making Pāṇini's system logically and materially perfect, differ only in the degree in which they subject Pāṇini's rules to scrutiny?[56]

In the first place, the two authors differ between themselves on a number of technical grammatical issues.[57] In the second place, Patañjali's position is much more complex. Obviously, he has to deal with two authoritative predecessors.[58] Here the question of the force of tradition comes in, and that involves a difference, not in method, but in attitude. The *Vārttikakāra* straightforwardly proposes changes in Pāṇini's rules. But Patañjali's attitude in this respect is summed up by his own words, *apāṇinīyaṁ tu bhavati; yathānyāsam evāstu*: '(this) however, becomes un-Pāṇinian; (the rule) should be (kept) in its original formulation only'.[59] Consequently, Patañjali is more inclined to make use of re-interpretation than Kātyāyana, and to do so at the expense of the *Vārttikakāra*, because this is the only way open to him.[60] Still, one could point to the great number of *Vts* accepted by Patañjali. Then on which particular issues does Patañjali become critical of Kātyāyana? It seems that three areas can be singled out, namely, Pāṇini's technique, Pāṇini's formulations, and general linguistics as Patañjali sees it. If Kātyāyana's suggestions run counter to Patañjali's convictions on any issues in these areas, Patañjali turns them down, either directly, or by saying that whatever is stated by Kātyāyana is already implied by Pāṇini. Therefore, although we cannot say that Kātyāyana is an unfair critic of Pāṇini, we can say that Patañjali is definitely not a fair critic of Kātyāyana.[61]

3.0

Goldstücker, on the authority of A. Weber, assumed that Kātyāyana was a grammarian belonging to the Eastern school.[62] When dealing with Patañjali's birth place he finds additional evidence for Patañjali being an Easterner in the epithet *ācāryadeśīya* applied to him by Kaiyaṭa. Strictly, according to Pāṇini, *ācāryadeśīya* should mean 'an unaccomplished teacher'. But since we have no reason to suppose that Kaiyaṭa indulged in irony, we must rather interpret the epithet as 'who belongs to the country of the *ācārya'*. Since Kaiyaṭa contrasts the *ācārya* as the author of the *Vts* with the *ācāryadeśīya*, the latter designation can only imply that Patañjali was a countryman of Kātyāyana.[63]

Bhandarkar, in two articles in the *Indian Antiquary* of 1873, rejects both opinions, namely, that Kātyāyana was an Easterner and that *ācāryadeśīya* means 'countryman of the ācārya'. He points out that whatever school Kātyāyana belonged to, Patañjali clearly considers him to be a *dākṣiṇātya*, i.e., an inhabitant of the South or the Deccan.[64] Further he argues that the term *ācāryadeśīya* should be taken to mean a teacher who is lower in the scale, or the younger teacher.[65]

3.1

In an article in the *Indian Antiquary* of the same year F. Kielhorn had established that the word *ācārya* in the first 240 pages of the Benares ed. of the *Mahābhāṣya*[66] may refer to Pāṇini or Kātyāyana, but never to Patañjali.[67] Bhandarkar takes this problem a step further by proving that the same word in the expression, *ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā 'nvācaṣṭe*: 'the Teacher explains in a friendly way', always refers to Kātyāyana.[68] Some doubt arises in the very first instance of this phrase in the *Mbh.*[69] Since it occurs before the first *Vt. (siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe)* is introduced, Nāgeśa thinks that here the word *ācārya* must refer to Patañjali.[70] Bhandarkar is of the opinion that here also this word refers to Kātyāyana, and for this he has three reasons. The first is that in the other occurrences of the expression (ten out of eleven) Kātyāyana is referred to. That should be sufficient to declare that the same is the case in the passage in question too.[71] The second is that the passage of which the expression forms part describes Kātyāyana's way of expounding grammar and its use to his students. It ends with the phrase, *imāni prayojanāni; adhyeyaṁ vyākaraṇam*: 'these are the uses; (therefore) grammar should be studied.[72] The third is that the opening words of the *Mbh., atha śabdānuśāsanam*: 'now starts the teaching of (the derivation of

correct) words' are Kātyāyana's words, never mind Kaiyaṭa's explanation. They are explained by Patañjali just as other *Vts*, and there is no reason to suppose that here Patañjali first phrased a statement and then himself wrote a comment with the formality of a scholiast.[73]

3.2

As a matter of fact, Bhandarkar's reasoning applies to two more statements at the beginning of the *Mbh.* We could thus postulate the following *Vts*:

I *Atha śabdānuśāsanam* (*Mbh.* I. p. 1, line 1)
II *Laukikānāṁ vaidikānāṁ ca* (*Mbh.* I. p. 1, line 2)
III *Rakṣohāgamalaghvasaṁdehāḥ prayojanam* (*Mbh.* I, p. 1, line 14)

4.0

The bulk of Goldstücker's book is devoted to questions of chronology relating to Sanskrit authors, especially grammarians. Thus, on the strength of P.8.2.50 which teaches the form *nirvāṇa*, translated by Goldstücker as 'free from wind (or not blowing)', and which makes no mention of the Buddhist sense of this word, Goldstücker assumes that Pāṇini lived before Buddhism originated.[74]

4.1

Goldstücker, for the first time, called attention to two passages in the *Mbh.* which afforded a clue to Patañjali's date. These passages are the *Bhāṣya* on P.5.3.99 and on *Vt.* II on P.3.2.111. The first passage contains the phrase, *mauryair hiraṇyārthibhir arcāḥ prakalpitāḥ*: 'the Mauryas wanted gold, and therefore established religious festivities', and the further remark, *yasy etāḥ saṁprati pūjārthās tāsu bhaviṣyati*: '(Pāṇini's rule) may apply to such (idols, as *they* sold); but as to idols which are hawked about (by common people) for the sake of such worship as brings an immediate profit, their names will have the suffix *ka*'.[75] From this Goldstücker concluded that Patañjali must have lived after the Mauryas, i.e., after the last Maurya-king, i.e., after 180 B.C.[76]

The second passage contains two examples, *aruṇad yavanaḥ sāketam*: 'the Yavana besieged Ayodhyā' and *aruṇad yavano mādhyamikān*: 'the Yavana besieged the Mādhyamikas'.[77] These are examples for a *Vt.* which says that the imperfect endings are used when reference is to a wellknown

event of which the speaker was not an eye-witness, but which he could have witnessed, that is, a contemporaneous event belonging to the near past. Identifying the Mādhyamikas with the followers of Nāgārjuna's school and Yavana with the Greco-Bactrian king Menander, Goldstücker, basing himself on the chronological calculations of Chr. Lassen's *Indische Alterthumskunde,* Bd. II, concludes that Patañjali must have written his commentary on *Vt.* II on P.3.2.111 between 140 and 120 B.C. This, according to Goldstücker, is the only date in the ancient literature of India which rests on more than mere hypothesis.[78]

4.2

Bhandarkar takes up the issue of Patañjali's date in an article in the *Indian Antiquary* of 1872.[79] Here he quotes two more passages from the *Mbh.* which provide a clue, namely, the *Bhāṣya* on *Vt.* I on P.3.2.123 and on *Vt.* VII on P.1.1.68. The first *Vt.* prescribes the present tense endings to indicate an action which has been undertaken, but not yet ended. The example in Bhandarkar's reading and translation is *iha puṣpamitraṁ yājayāmaḥ*: 'here we perform (as priests) the sacrifices (instituted) by Puṣpamitra'.[80] Bhandarkar argues that to drive the point made by the *Vt.* home Patañjali had to quote an example which was strictly contemporaneous. This makes Patañjali the contemporary of Puṣpamitra who had a great sacrifice performed.[81] Who was this Puṣpamitra? On this point the other passage gives us a hint. The *Vt.* in question tells us that the *anubandha J* should be attached to the words *rājan*, etc. in P.2.4.23 to indicate that this rule is applicable to synonyms of *rājan*, etc. only, and not to the words *rājan*, etc. themselves.[82] The examples provided by Patañjali (in Bhandarkar's reading) are *puṣpamitrasabhā*: 'the court of Puṣpamitra' and *candraguptasabhā*: 'the court of Candragupta'.[83] From this Bhandarkar concludes that Puṣpamitra was a king. He identifies Puṣpamitra with Puṣpamitra Sunga who overthrew the Mauryas, and dates him around 178 B.C. to 142 B.C.[84] This date combined with Goldstücker's identification of the Yavana with Menander leads Bhandarkar to think that Patañjali lived in the reign of Puṣpamitra Śunga and wrote the third chapter of his *Bhāṣya* between 144 and 142 B.C. The date of Patañjali so derived must be regarded as trustworthy.[85]

After refuting the arguments of A. Weber who wanted to bring down Patañjali's date to about 25 A.D.[86] Bhandarkar in an article in the *Indian Antiquary* of 1873[87] added one more passage from the *Mbh.* in which Puṣpamitra is mentioned. The passage is the introductory Bhāṣya to *Vt.* IV on P.3.1.26. It reads *puṣpamitro yajate, yājakā yājayanti:* 'Puṣpamitra

sacrifices, and the sacrificing priests cause him to sacrifice (i.e., to be the sacrificer by performing the ceremonies for him)'.[88] From this and from the following explanation of the *Vt.* Bhandarkar concludes that Patañjali must have been familiar with the sacrifices of Puṣpamitra. This again is perfectly consistent with the other passages in which the name Puṣpamitra is mentioned.[89]

4.3

This discussion is continued with P. Peterson in 1885. But in the meantime another discussion had taken place on a passage from the *VP* and two passages from the *RT.*

These passages had already been discussed earlier.[90] They are taken up for close examination by F. Kielhorn in two articles in the *Indian Antiquary* of 1875 and 1876. The first article consists of a note on the interpretation of *RT* I.176 in response to an article by A. Weber.[91] Here Weber had expressed views regarding the history of the text of the *Mbh.* which Kielhorn considered to be untenable. Kielhorn states his own views as follows:

> All we know at present amounts to this, that for some period of time Patañjali's great work was not studied generally, and had consequently ceased to be understood. We may perhaps allow a break so far as regards its traditional interpretation, but for the present we are bound to regard the text of the *Mahābhāṣya* as given by our MSS. to be the same as it existed about two thousand years ago.[92]

However, Weber did not change his views and in a later work restates them. He says that from the statements of the *RT* and particularly from those at the end of *VP* II it is clear that the *Mbh.* has suffered manifold fates, that it has been several times *'vicchinna'* and newly arranged, so that the possibility of considerable alterations, additions and interpolations cannot be denied, and that in every case it remains *a priori* uncertain whether a particular example belongs to Patañjali himself, or only to these later reconstructions.[93]

The *VP*-passage concerned reads as follows:

II.482 *yaḥ patañjaliśiṣyebhyo bhraṣṭo vyākaraṇāgamaḥ*
kāle sa dākṣiṇātyeṣu granthamātre vyavasthitaḥ

483 *parvatād āgamaṁ labdhvā bhāṣyabījānusāribhiḥ*
sa nīto bahuśākhatvaṁ candrācāryādibhiḥ punaḥ

Here Weber understands *āgama* in the sense of 'text'; *bhāṣyabījānusārin* as

'searching for the seed (i.e. the original) of the *Bhāṣya*'; *parvata* as the name of a person; and *nītaḥ bahuśākhatvam* as 'made many branches of it'.[94]

Kielhorn translates *āgama* as 'traditional knowledge'; *bhāṣyabījānusārin* as 'following the principles laid down in the *Bhāṣya; parvata* as the name of a person; and *nītaḥ bahuśākhatvam* as 'was widely diffused'.[95]

The *RT*-passages under discussion read as follows:

I.176 *candrācāryādibhir labdhvā" deśaṁ tasmāt tadāgamaṁ*
pravartitaṁ mahābhāṣyaṁ svaṁ ca vyākaraṇaṁ kṛtam
IV.488 *deśāntarād āgamayya vyācakṣāṇaṁ kṣamāpatiḥ*
prāvartayata vicchinnaṁ mahābhāṣyaṁ svamaṇḍale[96]

From the first verse together with the *VP*-passage Weber understands that at the time of King Abhimanyu of Kashmir (mentioned in I.174) all that remained of the original text of the *Mbh.* were fragments from which Candra and others reconstructed a new (or second) text.[97] He takes the second *RT*-verse to mean that king Jayāpīḍa sent for interpreters from elsewhere and set the split *Bhāṣya* going again. From this he infers that the second (reconstructed) text underwent the same fate as the original, and that a new (third) text was prepared under king Jayāpīḍa. This third text is the one transmitted by our mss.[98]

Kielhorn emends part of the first *RT*-verse (*labdhvā deśāntarāt* instead of *labdhvā" deśaṁ tasmāt*) and understand that in the time of Abhimanyu, Candra and others having received the traditional interpretation of the *Mbh.* from somewhere else brought the study of the *Mbh.* into use again. He translates the second verse as follws: "The king, having sent for interpreters from another country, brought into use in his realm the *Mahābhāṣhya*, which had ceased to be studied" (in Kashmir and was therefore no longer understood).[99]

4.4

The very same passages figure in the discussion between Peterson and Bhandarkar on Patañjali's date. Bhandarkar devoted two lengthy articles to this discussion, one published in the *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*,[100] and one printed privately.[101]

Peterson's idea was that Patañjali could be dated much later than 150 B.C. He thinks that the author of the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* makes his statements on the authority of the *VP*-passage.[102] He discredits *RT* I.176, relies on *RT* IV.488, and interprets this latter passage to mean that in Jayāpīḍa's days the study of the *Mbh.* had been disrupted throughout India, not in Kashmir

only.[103] Regarding the *Bhāṣya* on P.5.3.99 Peterson proposes a different translation, especially of the word *maurya* which he, following Nāgeśa, takes to mean a guild or a caste of idol-makers.[104] While explaining the examples quoted in the *Bhāṣya* on *Vt.* II on P.3.2.111 and *Vt.* I on P.3.2.123 he feels that the element of time is not relevant in both, and that the speaker may have lived any number of years before Patañjali.[105] Even if the contemporaneity of the siege of Sāketa by the Yavana and of Patañjali be admitted, it would prove nothing, because there is nothing to show that the Yavana besieged Sāketa in the time of Menander, or did not besiege that city more than once in the centuries that followed.[106]

Eventually Peterson comes to the conclusion that Patañjali lived at the time, and perhaps at the court, of Puṣpamitra. However this is not the Puṣpamitra who reigned in the second century B.C., but rather the Puṣpamitra mentioned in the inscription on the Bhitari Lāṭ and dated in the time of Skandagupta, that is, around 465 A.D., or 336 or 313 A.D., according to the chronology accepted by Bhandarkar.[107]

Bhandarkar in his first reply refutes all of Peterson's contentions by arguing that the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* is a professedly historical work, and that its statements should be accepted unless they are contradicted by stronger evidence;[108] that the *Mbh.* continued to be studied in Kashmir for some time after Candrācārya had revived its study, but then had fallen into disuse in that country. Hence it was that Jayāpīḍa brought pandits from other parts of India and re-introduced the study of the book;[109] that Peterson's translation of the *Mbh.*-passage on P.5.3.99 is wrong on several accounts, and that Nāgeśa's interpretation of the word *maurya* is also wrong;[110] that time is relevant in the examples quoted by Patañjali on the *Vts* mentioned, because otherwise they would miss their point completely;[111] that among the Greco-Bactrian kings Menander is the most likely one to have laid siege to Sāketa;[112] that the part *puṣya* in the *puṣyamitra* in the inscription is almost illegible as is most of the rest of the inscription;[113] and that even if the existence of a Puṣpamitra in the reign of Skandagupta is accepted, this person cannot be reasonably identified with Patañjali's Puṣpamitra.[114] Therefore 150 B.C. may be relied on as Patañjali's date.[115]

Bhandarkar's second reply is almost wholly concerned with Peterson's translation of the *Bhāṣya* on P.5.3.99 and contains a very detailed refutation. Bhandarkar's conclusion is that Peterson has totally misapprehended Patañjali's argument.[116]

In the course of his first reply Bhandarkar makes a digression on the relation between a rule and its example.[117] A rule usually states a condition and prescribes a grammatical operation when the condition is satisfied. The

example is meant to illustrate the point made by the rule, independently of that rule. It shows the effect of the rule in usage, so that the student can see what the rule practically amounts to, even if he has no knowledge of that rule.

In the case of *Vt.* II on P.3.2.111 the conditions stated are (a) *parokṣa*: 'not being witnessed by the speaker', (b) *lokavijñāta*: 'generally known to people', and (c) *prayoktṛdarśanaviṣaya*: 'coming within the range of the speaker's experience', i.e. capable of being witnessed by the speaker. An example is *aruṇad yavanaḥ sāketam*: 'the Greek laid siege to Sāketa'. Here all conditions relating to the use of the imperfect endings have been fulfilled. To make this clear, Patañjali offers three counter-examples, namely,

(1) *udagād ādityaḥ* : 'the sun has risen'. Here the imperfect is not used, because condition (a) has not been fulfilled.
(2) *cakāra kaṭaṁ devadattaḥ* : 'John made a mat'. Here the imperfect is not used, because condition (b) has not been fulfilled.
(3) *jaghāna kaṁsaṁ kila vāsudevaḥ* : 'as is known, Kṛṣṇa killed Kaṁsa'. Here the imperfect is not used, because condition (c) has not been fulfilled.

Bhandarkar then uses the fact that in the example *aruṇad yavanaḥ sāketam* condition (c) has been fulfilled as an argument to uphold Patañjali's contemporaneity with the event mentioned, namely, the siege of Sāketa by the Greek. But this is a different issue. The argument rests on the presupposition that Patañjali is the author of the example, which is questionable.[118] It might have been Kātyāyana's example too. Or do we suppose that Kātyāyana (or Pāṇini, for that matter) was not concerned about examples, leaving the illustrations to later grammarians? Or, that Kātyāyana took an example relating to a contemporaneous event, and that Patañjali changed it to make the sense of Kātyāyana's rule clear to his own students? Or do we conclude from the mention of the same example in the *KV* that the siege of Sāketa happened during Jayāditya's lifetime, because otherwise its purport could not be clear to his students? What seems clear is that the examples which refer to a historical event only allow us to infer a *terminus post quem* and nothing more.

4.5

The same conclusion was reached by L. de la Vallée Poussin.[119] But he

thought that it might be possible to lower the date of 150 B.C., generally assigned to Patañjali, on the strength of the *Bhāṣya* on P.2.4.10. Here Patañjali explains that the word *aniravasita* refers to those *śūdras* whose touch does not permanently defile a dish used while eating.[120] According to the example quoted such *śūdras* are Greeks and Śakas.[121] De la Vallée Poussin thinks that around 150 B.C. the Indians were not sufficiently familiar with the Śakas to include their name together with that of the Greeks in a Sanskrit compound. The Śakas first invaded India around 120 B.C. and expanded their Indian territory only in the first half of the first century B.C. Therefore it seems improbable that Patañjali lived before the first century B.C.[122]

5.0

Assuming that the *Mahābhāṣya* as we have it is the work of a single author called Patañjali, can we say something about the way in which he composed it? Some pertinent observations are made by E. Frauwallner.[123] From his investigation of the *Bhāṣya* on P.1.2.64, which deals with *ekaśeṣa*, it appears that here Patañjali has used an old, preŚabara *Mīmāṁsā* source to a great extent. He may have quoted almost literally. The impression one gains is that here Patañjali's activity consisted in applying the scissors, pasting together the older materials and adding a few editorial remarks to connect them.[124] According to Frauwallner, Patañjali followed the same procedure when dealing with topics belonging to philosophy and general linguistics. Thus it seems that Patañjali was essentially a compiler whose main virtue consists in preserving older sources.[125] The nearest parallel to the *Mbh.* Frauwallner finds in a Buddhist work, the *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra*, which shows the same characteristics, namely, different doctrines strung together, subtlety and a wide range of argument, and the frequent failure of the author to take a stand of his own.[126]

5.1

Supposing that Frauwallner's impression of the *Mbh.* being a compilatory work is correct, how could we account for this impression? It appears that we can account for it in at least three ways: (1) the author was himself a compilator who took and borrowed whatever suited his purpose, (2) the author composed more than one version of the same work, notably, a version called *laghu* and a version called *mahat* or *bṛhat*,[127] and (3) the work didn't have a single author.

Clearly, possibility (1) is taken by Frauwallner. A combination of possibilities (2) and (3) is known from tradition and recorded by Vasudevashastri Abhyankar.[128] He says this:

> Among the various texts in the science of grammar the *Bhāṣya* is regarded the best of all. This text is composed by the sage Patañjali. It is called the *Mahābhāṣya*. Just as the word *mahat* in *maharṣi* (...) indicates excellence, in the same way the word *mahat* is used in *mahābhāṣya*. Here the word *mahat* is not used in a relative sense, but some people think that the word *mahat* like the word *bṛhat* indicates a relative size as well as excellence. Compared to a *laghubhāṣya*: 'small commentary' the *Mahābhāṣya* is large in size and superior. In this connection the following anecdote is traditionally handed down: The *Bhāṣya* which had been composed by a sage in the country Gonarda while teaching his students is the *Laghubhāṣya*. But the sage from Gonarda did not feel happy with this (*Bhāṣya*). Afterwards, one day, at the time of the performance of the *saṁdhyā* a sage dropped from the cupped hands of that sage. People started to call him Patañjali. This has been written by Nāgojibhaṭṭa in his *Śabdenduśekhara* as follows: *gonardadeśe kasyacid ṛṣer añjaleḥ saṁdhyākaraṇasamaye patita ity aitihyāt*: 'because of the tradition which says that he dropped from the cupped hands of a certain sage in the country of Gonarda at the time of the performance of the *saṁdhyā*'. That Patañjali having enlarged the earlier *Laghubhāṣya* of the sage wrote the *Mahābhāṣya*. In this *Mahābhāṣya* other thoughts also have been additionally included. Since in this *Mahābhāṣya* the whole *Laghubhāṣya* has been included, the importance of the *Laghubhāṣya* was lost, and in the course of time that book disappeared. Between the *Laghubhāṣya* and the *Mahābhāṣya* there is absolutely no difference of opinion. In some places, when we find a reference, 'so says *gonardīya*', that must be taken to refer to the author of the *Laghubhāṣya*.

The story, insofar it attempts to explain Patañjali's name, belongs to mythology, but it may contain an element of truth as far as the explanation of the name *Mahābhāṣya* is concerned. However, the fact is that the *Bhāṣya* is twice referred to by the name of *Bhāṣya* in the *Mahābhāṣya* itself,[129] and that Patañjali is known to Bhartṛhari as the author of a *nibandhana* called *Mahābhāṣya*.[130]

Is any evidence available for possibility (3)? As stated above,[131] this was the view advocated by Weber, who, at one time, also held the view that the *Mbh.* was the work of Patañjali's pupils rather than Patañjali's own.[132] It

was rejected by Kielhorn on the basis of two arguments: the mss. tradition of the *Mbh.* is rather uniform and does not show any trace of different recensions in different parts of India; and the *VP*- and *RT*-passages involved do not afford evidence of the *Mbh.* having been tampered by Candrācārya and others. Bhandarkar agrees with Kielhorn.[133]

However, it is difficult to see how the mss. tradition can provide an argument to decide the early history of the text of the *Mbh.*, that is to say, the composition or rather constitution of the text as we have it. If Kielhorn is willing to admit that the text of Pāṇini's grammar has not been handed down to us altogether in its original shape,[134] he should *a fortiori* be willing to accept the same of the text of the *Mbh.* which is a much bigger work. The conclusive force of the *VP*- and *RT*-passages wholly depends on their interpretation, and it seems quite possible to translate these passages in a way which favours possibility (3).

The *VP*-passage was again discussed by Thieme who mainly follows Kielhorn.[135] Still, he takes the whole passage to refer to a revival of the study of Pāṇini, through that of the *Mbh.*[136] He translates *āgama* as 'traditional knowledge'; *bhāṣyabījānusārin* as 'following the intimations of (the logical principles to be followed in the interpretation of Pāṇini, given in) the *Bhāṣya*'; *parvata* as 'the Mountain;[137] and *nītaḥ bahuśākhatvam* as 'made it (into a) many-branched (tree)'.

The meaning of the word *āgama* is unfortunately ambiguous, as is that of the whole passage. *Āgama* is commonly used in the *VP* in the sense of tradition, chiefly written tradition, eventually going back to the Veda.[138] It may also mean an authoritative, traditionally transmitted text in a branch of learning.[139] In the *VP*-passage, because of the contrast between *bhraṣṭaḥ vyākaraṇāgamaḥ* and *granthamātre vyavasthitaḥ*, the word *āgama* probably means tradition handed down by an unbroken succession of teachers and students.[140] *Grantha* usually means a written text,[141] or book. *Bhāṣyabījānuśārin* can be taken to mean 'following the essential point made by the *Bhāṣya*' which admits of different interpretations.[142] Finally, *nītaḥ bahuśākhatvam* can be translated as 'turned into a work possessing many branches'.[143] The underlying idea could be that of a seed (*bīja*) turned into a widely branching tree (*bahuśākha*) due to the efforts of Candra and others. Thus the following translation of the passage is proposed:

> The grammatical tradition which had slipped away from the pupils of Patañjali was preserved in the course of time merely in books among the inhabitants of the South. Having received the (grammatical) tradition from Parvata, Candra and others following the essential points of the *Bhāṣya* turned it into a widely branching work.

This translation leaves room for the supposition that Candra, etc. added to the original *Bhāṣya* – which also might be called *bhāṣyabīja* – and added material from a variety of sources, not necessarily grammatical. In this way, Goldstücker's translation and Weber's interpretation are vindicated, in so far that the *VP*-passage does tell us something about the composition and early text-history of the *Mbh.*

Thieme also discussed the first *RT*-passage again.[144] Reading *labdhvā deśāt tasmāt* for *labdhvā" deśaṁ tasmāt* he translates: "Candrācārya and others having received its oral tradition (its true explanation) from that place, let start (brought to life) the *Mahābhāṣya* (again), and (Candra) made his own grammar." The words 'from that place' are taken to refer to a Śiva-temple mentioned in I.175.

The point of (Kielhorn's and) Thieme's translation is clear: from the *VP*- and the *RT*-passages nothing can be inferred about the history of the text of the *Mbh.* The only thing we know is that at some time the traditional interpretation of Patañjali's work (or that of Pāṇini's, through Patañjali's) was lost and that it was revived in India and specially in Kashmir.

The *RT*-passage can also be translated differently, although this does not affect the point made by Kielhorn and Thieme. The proposed translation is as follows: (I.176)

> "Candrācārya, etc. having received an order from him (i.e. king Abhimanyu) (and having received) its (i.e. of the *Bhāṣya*) tradition have spread the (study of the) *Mahābhāṣya* (again), and composed their own grammar." (IV.488) "Having invited experts from a different region the king has spread (again the study of) the *Mahābhāṣya* which had gone to pieces."[145]

5.2

Where does the argument stated under 4 and 5.1 lead us? In the first place, as far as Patañjali's date is concerned, it is admitted that the examples provide us with an upper limit only. The solitary example *śakayavanam* offers us a reasonable clue to fix the upper limit around 100 B.C. Accordingly, Patañjali, or rather the author of the *Bhāṣya* on P.2.4.10, must have lived after 100 B.C.

In the second place, the question of the composition of the *Mbh.* can be restated as the question of how to account for the impression that the *Mbh.* is a compilatory work. There are at least three possible explanations. External evidence as provided by *VP* II.482–483 and *RT* I. 176 is not

sufficient to decide the issue, but, the *VP*-passage, in one interpretation, may lead us to assume that Candra and others played a role in the constitution of the text of the *Mbh.* as we have it. Internal evidence based on considerations of style, inconsistencies of argument or loosely connected digressions cannot be made available to a sufficient degree in the present state of our knowledge of the *Mbh.* Too little has been translated yet.

But we could venture one more guess based on external evidence. The *VP*-passage II.478–481 tells us that Patañjali composed his *Mahābhāṣya* as a work full of all kinds of germinal doctrines,[146] after the *Saṁgraha* had been lost. The *Mbh.* is therefore described as the protective armour of the *Saṁgraha.*[147] However, the *Mbh.* was destructively criticised by Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakaṣa.[148] Although their arguments were unsound,[149] they apparently carried the day and the *Mbh.* tradition was lost. The text of the *Mbh.* was only preserved in manuscripts in the South. Then Candrācārya and others managed to infuse new life into the study of the *Mbh.* Now the question is, how could they succeed after so much destructive criticism? My guess is that they did so by introducing a number of arguments in the text of the *Mbh.* which could successfully counter the attacks made by Baiji, etc. and their followers. In this way, they could prove the superiority of the *Bhāṣya.* Once that had been proved the study of the *Bhāṣya* could start again. The nature of the arguments introduced was not necessarily grammatical. Candra, etc. may have taken materials from non-grammatical sources like *Mīmāṁsā*, early *Nyāya* and *alaṁkāraśāstra.* This hypothesis accounts at the same time, for Bhartṛhari's statements about Candrācārya, at least in one interpretation. It also accounts for the impression that the *Bhāṣya* is rather a hybrid work.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ATA *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Avyayībhāvatatpuruṣāhnika*, Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S.D. Joshi in collaboration with J.A.F. Roodbergen, *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit*, Class C, No. 5, University of Poona, 1969.

BDA *Patañjali*'s *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Bahuvrīhidvandvāhnika*, Text, Translation and Notes by J.A.F. Roodbergen, Edited by S.D. Joshi, *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit*, Class C, No. 9, University of Poona, 1974.

CW *Collected works of Sir R.G. Bhandarkar*, Vol. I, ed. by the late B.N. Utgikar and by V.G. Paranjape, B.O.R.I., Poona 1933; Vol. II, ed. by N.B. Utgikar, B.O.R.I., Poona, 1928.

GSPIA E. Windisch, *Geschichte der Sanskrit-Philologie und Indischen Altertumskunde*, Erster Teil, Strassburg 1917; Zweiter Teil, Berlin and Leipzig 1920, *Grundriss der Indo-Ārischen Philologie und Altertumskunde*, I. Band, I., Heft B.

KP F. Kielhorn, *Kātyāyana and Patañjali*, Their Relation to each other and to Pāṇini, Bombay 1876. The edition used for reference is the one published by Rameshwar Singh for the Indological Book House, Varanasi, 1963.

KV *Kāśikāvṛtti.*

Mbh. *Mahābhāṣya.*

Pa Th. Goldstücker, *Pāṇini, His Place in Sanskrit Literature*, an Investigation of Some Literary and Chronological Questions which may be settled by a Study of his Work, London, 1861. The edition used for reference is the one edited by Prof. S.N. Shastri, *The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies*, Vol. XLVIII, Varanasi, 1965.

PAI E. Windisch, *Philologie und Altertumskunde in Indien*, Drei nachgelassene Kapitel des III. Teils der *Geschichte der Sanskrit-Philologie und Indischen Altertumskunde, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes,* Band 15-Nr. 3, Leipzig, 1921.

PG O. Böhtlingk, *Pāṇini*'s *Grammatik*, Leipzig, 1887 (Nachdruck, Hildesheim 1964).

RSG *A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians,* Edited by J.F. Staal, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1972.

RT *Rājataraṅgiṇī.*

SA *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Samarthāhnika*, Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S.D. Joshi, *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit*, Class C, No. 3, University of Poona, 1968.

Thieme P. Thieme, 'Pāṇini and the Pāṇinīyas' *JAOS,* **76**(1956), pp. 1–23.

VP *Vākyapadiya* (the edition used for reference is the *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, ed. by K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye, Poona, 1965).

Vt(s) *Vārttika(s).*

WPL *Wilson Philological Lectures* (On Sanskrit and the Derived Languages), Reprinted from the *Collected Works of Sir R.G. Bhandarkar*, Vol. IV, B.O.R.I., Poona, 1974.

NOTES

1 *CW* I, pp. 362–393.

2 *CW* II, p. 503.

3 *RSG*, p. 70.

4 *CW* I, pp. 499.

5 *CW* I, pp. 523–525.

6 *PAI*, p. 11.

[7] *PAI*, p. 12.

[8] *CW* I, pp. 348–349.

[9] *Cw* II, p. 420. See further *SA*, Introduction, pp. ix–xi, and *BDA*, Introduction, pp. i–iii.

[10] *GSPIA*, p. 214, n. 1.

[11] *CW* II, p. 421.

[12] The professed aim of Goldstücker's book (actually, the Preface to his facsimile edition of portions of the *Mānavakalpasūtras*, but also separately printed) was to examine the competence of those who set themselves up as masters and authorities, notably, O. Böhtlingk, R. Roth, A. Kuhn and A. Weber, who, according to Goldstücker, had brought Sanskrit studies close to disaster. See *Pa*, pp. 261–263, 265–279, 285–290.

Goldstücker was the first European scholar who had mastered Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* to some extent, without the help of Indian pandits. He even edited a complete text of the *Mahābhāṣya* in six volumes, London, 1874, numbering 50 copies. See *GSPIA* pp. 246, 252–253. His knowledge in the field of Sanskrit grammar earned him the praise of Bhandarkar (*CW* I, p. 499) and of F. Kielhorn (*KP*, p. 1). Kielhorn says that among all European scholars who worked on the Sanskrit grammarians no one has more thoroughly examined the *Mahābhāṣya* than Goldstücker. "His essay on Pāṇini betrays a familiarity with the work of Patañjali to which no other scholar has as yet attained, and which few are likely to acquire in the future." Thieme has finally declared Goldstücker dead and buried him in fn. 26 on p. 12 of his article.

[13] *Pa*, p. 127. For a different opinion see *PG Einleitung*, p. xiii, W.D. Whitney, 'The Veda in Pāṇini', *Giornale della Societa Asiatica Italiana*, **VII**(1893), p. 243 remarks: "It will be long before we understand, if indeed we ever come to do, what and how much of it is Pāṇini's own and in addition to the work of his grammatical predecessors". The subject was taken up by Mrs. S. Bhate, *Prepāṇinian Grammatical Elements in Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhvāyī* (unpublished thesis), Poona, 1970.

[14] *Pa*, p. 127.

[15] *Pa*, p. 177.

[16] *Pa*, pp. 178–181. According to Goldstücker, the rules P.1.2.54–57 contain Pāṇini's grammatical creed and are the key-stone of his work. See *Pa*, p. 178, n. 194 and p. 186. Against this, *PG*, p. 18 says that even if we assume that these rules originate from Pāṇini, they would still go against his theory. As a matter of fact, P.1.2.53 goes against P.4.2.67–70, which teach the derivation of geographical *saṁjñās*. See further G.B. Palsule, 'An interpolated passage in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*', *ABORI*, **XXX**(1949), pp. 135–144.

[17] *Pa*, pp. 181–182.

[18] *GSPIA*, p. 250.

[19] *Pa*, pp. 242–245.

[20] *Pa*, p. 186.

[21] Bhandarkar's review of Goldstücker's work was first published in 1864 in a newspaper, and reprinted in the *Indian Antiquary* Vol. VI (1877). Earlier than Bhandarkar, A. Weber, had reviewed Goldstücker's book in his *Indische Studien* of 1862.

[22] *CW* I, p. 502.

[23] *Pa*, p. 184, n. 202.

[24] *CW* I, p. 503.

[25] *CW* I, p. 504. However, the distinction between defining the meaning of a term and enumerating the instances to which a name applies seems to be correct. Enumeration cannot be rightly called definition, precisely because it does not state the principle by which the instances enumerated are selected.

[26] *CW* I, p. 504. Bhandarkar's example is rather unfortunate, because Pāṇini happens to define his *bahuvrīhi*-category by the feature of *anyapadārtha* (P.2.2.24). This is the feature shared by the meaning of the compounds mentioned. *Uttarapūrva* means 'region situated between the north and the east', *saputra* means 'a father who is accompanied by his son(s)', *daṇḍā-daṇḍi* means 'fighting stick against stick', *kamalanayana* means 'one who possesses eyes like lotuses'. Here the meanings 'region', 'father', and 'one who possesses' are the *anyapadartha* and that suffices to put them in the same category. *Bahuvrīhi* was also one of Goldstücker's examples for enumeration. See *Pa*, p. 183.

[27] *CW* I, p. 510. Reference is to *Pa*, p. 182.

[28] *Pa*, p. 131.

[29] *Pa*, p. 132, n. 140. See the *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*, Nirnay Sagar Press ed. Vol. I, Bombay, 1912, p. 140 (on *Vt.* I on P.1.1.1).

[30] *Pa*, p. 132.

[31] Compare *Pa*, pp. 100–101.

[32] *Pa*, pp. 132–134.

[33] *KP*, pp. 1–4. In the same year Bhandarkar published his article 'Ācārya, the friend of the Student; and the Relations between the Three Ācāryas' in the *Indian Antiquary,* Vol. V, reprinted *CW* I, pp. 136–147. Here he provides a criterion for distinguishing *Vts.* (*CW* I, p. 138, n. 1) which is remarkably similar to the one provided by Kielhorn and a summing up of the relations between the three *munis*. No reference to Kielhorn's work is made. In the present article it is assumed that Kielhorn's views on these points had been established earlier.

[34] *KP*, pp. 4–5.

[35] *KP*, pp. 15, 19, 25–27.

[36] *KP*, p. 47.

[37] Compare Thieme, pp. 12–13, 18, 22–23.

[38] *KP*, p. 47. For an explanation as to how Goldstücker was led to his views on the nature and the aim of the *Vts*, see *KP*, p. 50.

[39] *KP*, p. 51.

[40] *KP*, p. 55.

[41] *KP*, p. 51.

[42] As for Patañjali's method, see *KP*, note continued on pp. 53 and 54.

[43] *KP*, p. 53.

[44] *KP*, p. 51.

[45] *KP*, p. 50.

[46] *KP*, p. 52.

[47] The article is mentioned in fn. 33.

[48] *CW* I, pp. 140–141.

[49] *Vyākhyāna* does not merely consist in establishing the wording of a *sūtra*, that is, dividing the *sūtra* up into the words of which it consists, but also in stating the example, counter-example, in supplying words. All of this together makes up the *Vyākhyāna*. See *Mbh.* I, p. 11, lines 22–24, and *CW* I, p. 141, n. 2.

[50] *CW* I, p. 141.

[51] *CW* I, pp. 144–147.

[52] *CW* I, p. 147.

[53] *KP*, pp. 47–48, and Thieme, p. 21.

[54] For instance, *Vts* V–XVI on the first *Śivasūtra*. Compare *SA*, Introduction, pp. xvi–xvii.

[55] *BDA*, Introduction, pp. xix–xx.

[56] Thus *KP*, p. 53, and Thieme, pp. 21–23.

[57] For instance, Patañjali's interpretation of the word *avayavavidhāna* in *Vt.* I on P.2.2.3, which shows that he held a different view on the question of conflict between rules. See Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*, *Tatpuruṣāhnika*, Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit*, Class C, No. 7, University of Poona, Poona, 1973, Note (16).

[58] For references concerning the grammarians in the period between Kātyāyana and Patañjali see Thieme, p. 11, n. 23.

[59] Quoted in *ATA*, Introduction, p. i.

[60] For reasons see Thieme, p. 22, sub 54 E.

[61] An instance is given in *ATA*, Introduction, p. ii.

[62] *Pa*, p. 256, See also *GSPIA*, p. 252.

[63] *Pa*, p. 256.

[64] *CW* I, p. 124. The passage referred to is *Mbh.* (Kielhorn's ed.) Vol. I, p. 6, line 16.

[65] *CW* I, p. 129. Compare ibid., p. 134 where Bhandarkar says that greater authority may be attributed even to someone who ranks third. Bhandarkar's explanation of the term *acaryadeśīya* is refuted by Kielhorn, *KP*, note continued on p. 53.

[66] Published in 1871 with Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* by two Indian teachers at the Benares College, namely, Rajaramasastrin and Balasastrin, at the instigation of R.T.H. Griffith. See *GSPIA* pp. 334–335.

[67] See *CW* I, p. 136. This is against A. Weber's view that the word *ācārya* in such expressions as *paśyati tv ācāryaḥ* in the *Mbh.* refers to Patañjali. According to Bhandarkar, here the word *ācārya* refers to Pāṇini. See *CW* I, pp. 126, 128.

[68] In his article mentioned in fn. 33. See *CW* I, pp. 136–139.

[69] That is, in the Benares ed. The corresponding passage in the Kielhorn ed. does not read the words *suhṛd bhūtvā* (*Mbh.* I, p. 5, lines 10–11).

[70] *Bhāṣye – Ācāryapadena śāstrādhyāpako bhāṣyakṛd eva vivakṣitaḥ*: 'by the word *ācārya* in the (text of) the *Bhāṣya* the teacher of grammar, i.e., the author of the *Bhāṣya* only is intended'.

[71] *CW* I, p. 138.

[72] *CW* I, p. 139.

[73] *CW* I, p. 140.

[74] *Pa*, pp. 14–15, 247. See also *GSPIA*, p. 251. Bhandarkar refers Pāṇini to about the eighth century B.C. and puts *Yāska* slightly earlier. See *WPL*, p. 349.
It is not at all certain what Pāṇini's rule means. It may also mean 'when no reference to wind is made', as Böhtlingk translates. Here *vāta* is taken as a substantive. If this is correct and if the rule is not added later on in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, it seems very well possible that Pāṇini knew the Buddhist sense of the word, and rather indirectly refers to it. The *KV* quotes *nirvāṇaḥ bhikṣuḥ*: 'a monk who has attained deliverance'.

[75] This is how Goldstücker understands the passage. His translation is wrong, as is pointed out by Bhandarkar, *CW* I, p. 168. The correct translation is: 'the Mauryas desirous of gold had images fashioned', and '(the rule) will apply to those (images) which are (put up) for worship nowadays'.

[76] *Pa*, 248–249.

[77] In Goldstücker's reading and translation. For the second example the Kielhorn text reads *aruṇad yavano madhyamikām*: 'the Greek laid siege to Madhyamikā', where Madhyamikā is a place-name. For further reference see *GSPIA*, p. 252.

[78] *Pa*, p. 254.

[79] "On the date of Patañjali and the King in whose Reign he lived", See *CW* I, pp. 108–114.

[80] *CW* I, p. 108. Compare *CW* I, p. 115, n. 2. The Kielhorn text reads *puṣyamitram* instead of *puṣpamitram*. Another translation given by Bhandarkar is 'here we sacrifice for Puṣpamitra', *CW* I, p. 179. The example literally means 'here we make Puṣyamitra sacrifice'.

[81] *CW* I, p. 109.

[82] *CW* I, p. 110.

[83] The Kielhorn text reads the first example as *puṣyamitrasabhā*.

[84] *CW* I, p. 113.

[85] *CW* I, p. 114.

[86] *CW* I, pp. 116–117, 119.

[87] 'Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali', See *CW* I, pp. 121–124.

[88] *CW* I, p. 121 where also the grammatical explanation is given.

[89] *CW* I, p. 122.

[90] According to *Pa*, p. 258 n. 80, *RT* I.176 was translated by Böhtlingk in Band II, *Einleitung, Commentar, Indices*, Bonn, 1840, pp. xv–xvi of his first edition of Pāṇini's grammar. Goldstücker proposes a different translation of the words *āgama* ('written document or manuscript' instead of 'coming') and *pravartita* ('established' instead of 'introduced'), see *Pa*, note continued on p. 259. The *VP*-passage has been translated first (from a corrupt text) by Goldstücker, see *Pa*, p. 258.

[91] In his *Indische Studien* XIII (1873) p. 293, as referred to by F. Kielhorn 'On the Mahābhāshya', *The Indian Antiquary*, **V**(1876), p. 242.

[92] Quoted in his art. of 1876, p. 242.

[93] As rendered by Kielhorn, art. quoted, p. 242.

[94] As rendered by Kielhorn, art. quoted, p. 244.

[95] Kielhorn, art. quoted, p. 245. Kielhorn follows Puṇyarāja.

[96] Text and verse number according to Vishva Bandhu, *Rājataraṅgiṇī* of *Kalhaṇa*, Part I, Hoshiarpur, Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, 1963, pp. 22, 165. The verse following I.176, tells us that the event described took place when the Buddhists grew very strong under the leadership of Nāgārjuna. Compare *CW* I, pp. 117–118. Nāgārjuna is assumed to be a contemporary of Kaniṣka whose dates range from 78 A.D. to 144 A.D. The king referred to in IV.488 is Jayāpīḍa, introduced in vs.482. He is believed to have reigned from 775–786 A.D., see *CW* I, p. 166.

[97] Kielhorn, art. quoted, pp. 242–243.

[98] Kielhorn, art. quoted, pp. 242 and 243.

[99] Kielhorn, art. quoted, p. 243.

[100] 'The date of Patañjali, No. 1: being the first reply to Professor Peterson', see *CW* I, pp. 157–185.

[101] 'Date of Patañjali, No. II: being a second reply to Professor Peterson', see *CW* I, pp. 186–207.

[102] *CW* I, pp. 165–166.

[103] *CW* I, pp. 165–167.

[104] *CW* I, p. 168. Peterson's translation is quoted on the same page.

[105] *CW* I, pp. 173, 178–179.

[106] *CW* I, p. 177.

[107] *CW* I, pp. 157, 180–181.

[108] *CW* I, p. 165.

[109] *CW* I, p. 166.

[110] *CW* I, pp. 169–173.

[111] *CW* I, pp. 173–177, 178–179.

[112] *CW* I, pp. 177–178.

[113] *CW* I, pp. 180–181. For Bhandarkar's views on *puṣyamitra/puṣpamitra* see *CW* I, pp. 112, 115.

[114] *CW* I, pp. 181–184.

[115] *CW* I, p. 185. This is also the date accepted in *PG, Einleitung*, pp. ix–x. Basing himself on this date Böhtlingk puts Pāṇini two centuries earlier.

[116] *CW* I, p. 190.

[117] *CW* I, pp. 175–177, See also ibid, p. 179.

[118] This was already pointed out by F. Kielhorn, in his article 'Der Grammatiker Pāṇini' of 1885, in which he admits that assigning a date to an author on the strength of examples quoted by him may not lead to a definite result because we do not know whether the examples quoted originate from the author himself or from his predecessors. We find the same examples in the works of young and old grammarians. See *RSG*, p. 103.

[119] *L'Inde aux temps des Mauryas et des Barbares, Grecs, Scythes, Parthes et Yue-tchi* (*Histoire du monde* publiée sous la direction de M.E. Cavagnan, tome VI/I, Paris, 1930, pp. 199–202. Quoted by E. Frauwallner, 'Sprachtheorie und Philosophie im *Mahābhāṣyam* des Patañjali' *WZKSO*, **IV**(1960), p. 108 n. 11.

[120] *Yair bhukte pātraṁ saṁskāreṇa śuddhyati te 'niravasitāḥ*: 'those after whose eating the dish becomes pure (again) by cleaning (are called) *aniravaṣita*: "not banned (from society)", *Mbh.* I, p. 475, line 9. Here *saṁskāra* may just mean 'cleaning' (by means of washing) or some purificatory rite.

[121] The example is *śakayavanam, Mbh.* I, p. 475, line 4.

[122] See E. Frauwallner, art. quoted, p. 111. For some further considerations of Patañjali's date see D.C. Sircar, *Studies in the Yugapurāṇa and other Texts*, Delhi, 1974, Chapter II, pp. 17–21.

[123] Art. quoted in fn. 119, pp. 92–118.

[124] Ibid., p. 107.

[125] Ibid., p. 107.

[126] Ibid., p. 107.

[127] Compare Nāgeśa's *Laghu* – and *Bṛhac-chabdenduśekhara*, Hari Dīkṣita's *Laghu* – and *Bṛhac-chabdaratna*, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's *Bṛhadvaiyakaraṇabhūṣana* and his *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*.

[128] In the *Prastāvanā* in Vol. VII belonging to his Marathi translation of the *Mahābhāṣya*, Poona, 1954, p. 71.

[129] *Mbh*. II, p. 145, line 18 and p. 177, line 21, in the identical expression, *ukto bhāvabhedo bhāṣye* 'the difference in *bhāva*: 'action' (as conveyed by the verbal base and as conveyed by the suffix) has (already) been stated in the *Bhāṣya*'.

[130] *VP* II. 479. This is probably the first mention of the title *Mahābhāṣya*.

[131] See under 4.3.

[132] Kielhorn, art. quoted, p. 248.

[133] *CW* I, p. 136.

[134] *The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, Edited by F. Kielhorn, Third Edition by MM. K.V. Abhyankar, Vol. I, B.O.R.I., Poona, 1962, Preface to the First Edition, p. 11.

[135] Thieme, pp. 19–20.

[136] Thieme, p. 20. This is because he interprets the the words *ārṣe granthe* (*VP* II. 481) to refer to Pāṇini's work, unlike Puṇyarāja and Kielhorn who understand that the *ṛṣi* mentioned is Patañjali, see Thieme, p. 19, n. 45. Since the words *ārṣe granthe* occur in a context which deals with the *Mahābhāṣya*, Thieme's interpretation is improbable.

[137] See Thieme, p. 20, n. 48 for the explanation of this translation.

[138] K.A. Subramania Iyer, *Bhartṛhari*, Poona (Deccan College) 1969, p. 92.

[139] This is how Goldstücker takes it, *Pa*, p. 258.

[140] Compare K.A. Subramania Iyer, *op. cit*., p. 83.

[141] It could also be taken to mean *granthalipi* which is peculiar to South India. But according to G. Bühler, *Indian Paleography* (Indian Studies: Past and Present), Calcutta 1962, p. 109, the most archaic forms of the *Grantha* script seem to date from the 5th or 6th cent. A.D.

[142] In *VP* II. 479 the word *nyāyabīja* occurs which could be taken to mean 'essential points of doctrines'.

[143] The *vigraha* of *bahuśākhātva* is assumed to be *bahvyaḥ śākhāḥ yasya tad* (*nibandhanam*, see *VP* II. 479), *bahuśākham. Bahuśākhasya bhāvaḥ, bahuśākhatvam.*

[144] Thieme, p. 20 n. 48.

[145] Kielhorn, art quoted, p. 243 mentions the usages *adhyayanasya vicchedaḥ*: 'breaking off the study' and *vicchinnasaṁpradāya*: 'a tradition which has ceased to be handed down' to show that in the expression *vicchinnam mahābhāṣyam* the word *vicchinna* can only refer to a broken tradition, not to disintegrated text. Apart from usages, this seems rather obvious, because otherwise how many disintegrated copies of the *Mbh.*-text do we have to assume?

[146] *VP* II. 479, *sarveṣām nyayabījānām. . .nibandhane.*

[147] *VP* II. 481, *saṁgrahapratikañcuke.* This word cannot be taken as a *bahuvrīhi*, because we may assume that the author of the *Mbh.* wanted to protect the *saṁgraha*-tradition and included arguments of that work in his own book.

[148] *VP* II. 481, *Baijisaubhavaharyaksair. . .viplāvite.*

[149] *VP* II, 481, *śuṣkatarkānusāribhiḥ.*

MASAAKI HATTORI

APOHA AND *PRATIBHĀ*

The *apoha*-theory which aroused much controversy concerning the meaning of the word among the Indian philosophers in the classical period was first expounded by Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. The fifth chapter of this comprehensive work, which is devoted to the elucidation of the *apoha*-theory, begins with the following verse:

> *na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat*
> *kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate*[1]
>
> That [means of cognition] which is based on word is not an [independent] means of cognition other than inference. Because [the word as the basis of] it expresses its own object through the exclusion of the other [things], just as [the inferential mark] '*kṛtakatva*' or the like [establishes the object to be proved through the exclusion of what is not a possessor of that inferential mark].

As is clear in this verse, the function of a word is recognized by Dignāga as identical with the function of a *liṅga* (inferential mark) in the process of inference. That a *liṅga* functions to prove the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) through the 'exclusion of others' (*anya-vyavaccheda*, °*-apoha*) is discussed by Dignāga in the second chapter of the same work, where he deals with the inference for one's own sake (*svārthānumāna*).[2] Take for instance the case in which one infers fire on the mountain from smoke, its *liṅga*. What is cognized by means of inference in this case is not an individual fire that possesses various attributes peculiar to it, such as flame, heat, and so on, but it is 'fire in general' common to all individual fires. However, there is no 'fire in general' as a real entity. What really exists is each individual fire possessing particular attributes. The 'fire in general' is nothing other than a concept which is produced in the mind through the process of thought-construction. One knows from experience that what is not fire, e.g., earth, water, or the like, does not possess smoke. Therefore, on seeing smoke, he understands that the object to be inferred is not a non-fire. By excluding the non-fire, he forms the notion of 'fire'. The fire thus conceived is shorn of particular color, flame, heat, etc. that constitute the characteristic features of each individual fire existing in the external world. It

M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 61–73.

is 'fire in general' which is a mere concept having no objective counterpart. With this clear view of the process of inference, Dignāga asserted that a *liṅga* established the *sādhya* by means of the 'exclusion of others'.

The word functions exactly in the same way to denote the object. The thing which is to be denoted by the word has various aspects, and no single word is concomitant with all of them. A word stands for only one aspect of the thing.[3] Accordingly, one applies various words to express one and the same object: *vṛkṣa* (tree), *pārthiva* (the earthy), *dravya* (substance), *sat* (existent), and so on. If a word had direct reference to the real entity, all these words would be regarded as synonymous with each other, since they all refer to one and the same thing. Or, there would be the absurdity that one thing has as many distinct realities as there are the words expressing it. It is, therefore, hardly maintained that the word denotes a real object. The thing in itself, which exists as the indivisible unity of various aspects, is grasped in its totality only by means of perception free of conceptual construction. The function of the word consists solely in differentiating the directly perceived object from the other things. The word '*vṛkṣa*' differentiates the object from those which are not tree. The same object may be referred to by the word '*dravya*' when it is to be differentiated from non-substances. Accordingly, as the object is distinguished from different things, the different words are applied to the same object. Thus it is to be concluded that the word refers only to that portion (*aṃśa*) of the object which is differentiated from the other things. Since the object itself is an indivisible entity, the portion for which the word stands is nothing other than the product of mental construction. It is a concept formed through the mental act of 'differentiation from others' (*anyāpoha*).

On the basis of this keen observation, Dignāga made elaborate arguments against the opponents who held that the word had direct reference to the individual (*vyakti*), the universal (*jāti*), the relation between the two (*sambandha*), or the possessor of the universal (*jātimat*), and firmly established the theory that a word expresses the object qualified by the exclusion of the other things (*arthāntaranivṛtti, anyāpoha*).[4]

Individual trees are totally different from each other, but the 'differentiation from non-trees' is common to them all. Dignāga admits that the 'differentiation from others' is of the nature similar to the universal (*sāmānya*) which is assumed to be real by the Naiyāyikas and other realists. Like the universal, the 'differentiation from non-trees' is single (*eka*) in many trees, eternal (*nitya*) as it resides even in a newly grown tree, and completely subsistent in each individual tree (*pratyekaparisamāpti*).[5] However, it is not a positive entity like the universal. It is simply attributed to the object through mental construction, and as such it has no objective reality.

After clearly proving that the meaning of the word is nothing other than *anyāpoha*, Dignāga proceeds to set forth his view on the meaning of the sentence (*vākyārtha*).

> *apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vivecitaḥ*
> *vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yaṃ tenādāv upajāyate*[6]
> This meaning of the word [i.e., *apoha*] has been clarified after extracting the word from the sentence. The meaning of the sentence, which is called *pratibhā* (intuition), first arises by dint of that [meaning of the word].

In his own commentary on this verse, Dignāga gives the following explanation:

> Although a word [in a sentence] has no meaning, its meaning is to be determined by extracting the word from the sentence and assuming [its meaning] in accordance with the traditional theories (*āgama*). Since a single [word] is not used, [it is to be extracted from the sentence,] just as base (*prakṛti*) and affix (*pratyaya*) [being extracted from a word]. As the apprehension of the meaning of words according to the traditional theories of other [schools] is not appropriate, in this [treatise], another meaning [i.e., *apoha*] has been laid down, which is also the assumed [meaning]. [Though a single word is unreal, its meaning is to be assumed,] because, *pratibhā* [as the meaning of the sentence] first arises, for a man who is not conversant with the relation between speech and meaning, by dint of the understanding of the meaning of the [component] words. The sentence and its meaning are *śabda* and *artha* in the primary sense, because they are not divisible [into components]. . . .[7]

It is to be noted that *pratibhā* is recognized in this statement as the meaning of the sentence. The concept of *pratibhā* is of great importance in the philosophy of word and meaning of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari. In the Vākyakāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari sets forth his doctrine of *pratibhā* in some verses, beginning with:

> *vicchedagrahaṇe 'rthānāṃ pratibhānyaiva jāyate*
> *vākyārtha iti tām āhuḥ padārthair upapāditām*[8]
> When the meanings [of the words in a sentence] are understood by separating [the words from the sentence], there arises *pratibhā* which is different [from the meanings of the words]. That [*pratibhā*] effected by the meanings of the words is called the meaning of the sentence.

It cannot be denied that the meaning of a sentence is grasped only when the meaning of each constituent word is known. However, the meaning of a sentence is not a mere sum total of the individual meanings. Bhartṛhari laid emphasis on the fact that the individual meanings are mingled together (*upaśliṣṭa*) in one consciousness which flashes on the listener immediately after the speaker's utterance of the sentence. This consciousness is not brought forth through the process of relating with each other the different concepts formed one by one in accordance with the gradual utterances of the constituent words. It is immediate and intuitional. Bhartṛhari regarded this immediate consciousness as the real meaning of the sentence, and expressed it with the term '*pratibhā*'.[9]

It is known that Dignāga owed much to Bhartṛhari for the formulation of his philosophical thoughts.[10] Most probably the concept of *pratibhā* was adopted by him from the work of this grammarian-philosopher. The term '*apoddhāra*', which is employed by Dignāga in the above-cited verse to mean the extraction of a word from the sentence, is often used in the *Vākyapadīya* in the same technical sense. Also in paralleling the *apoddhāra* to the grammatical analysis of a word into base and affix, Dignāga seems to have followed the precedent found in the *Vākyapadīya*:

> *yathā pade vibhajyante prakṛtipratyayādayaḥ*
> *apoddhāras tathā vākye padānām upavarṇyate*[11]

It is emphatically asserted by Bhartṛhari, who is known to be the upholder of the *akhaṇḍa-pakṣa* (the view that a sentence is an indivisible unit), that the words constituting a sentence are not significant by themselves. Dignāga shows his close affinity in thought to Bhartṛhari by the phrase in his *Vṛtti* that a single word in a sentence has no meaning, which phrase is commented on by Jinendrabuddhi in his *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* with a quotation from the *Vākyapadīya*:

> *asataś cāntarāle yāñ chabdān astīti manyate*
> *pratipattur aśaktiḥ sā grahaṇopāya eva saḥ*[12]
> It is [due to] the incapacity of the hearer that he takes the unreal verbal elements, which are in the midst [of the indivisible unit of word], as really existent. [In fact,] they are nothing other than the means of the apprehension.

Reference to the *Vākyapadīya* is made by Jinendrabuddhi also in his commentary on Dignāga's statement that a single word is not used. He says that, in the case of the word '*plakṣaḥ*' being uttered alone, such verb as

'*asti*' or '*bhavati*' is understood to be with it by implication, and cites the following verse from the *Vākyapadīya*:

> *yac ca ko 'yam iti praśne gaur aśva iti cocyate*
> *praśna eva kriyā tatra prakrāntā darśanādikā*[13]
> When the [single] word 'cow' or 'horse' is uttered in answer to the question 'what is this', [it is assumed that the verb 'is seen' is combined with that word, because] there has proceeded the act of seeing or the like in the questioning itself.

All these may prove that Dignāga set forth his view on the meaning of the sentence under the influence of Bhartṛhari. The term '*pratibhā*' does not occur elsewhere in the works of Dignāga's.

In his further discussion, Dignāga emphasizes that a sentence generates an idea (*vikalpa*) in the mind of the listener without reference to the external object. "There are people who, leaving aside *pratibhā*, consider that something else, [for example,] the external object or the relation [of the objects denoted by different words], is the meaning of the sentence. Even for them, that [which is recognized by them as the meaning of the sentence] is [in fact] nothing other than the idea. If you ask why, [we answer:]–

> Even when there is no external object, through repeated practice (abhyāsa), there arises from [hearing] the sentences various ideas, each conforming to its own cause.

"Even when there is no external object, by dint of the impression (*vāsanā*) left by the repeated practice [of forming the idea] in respect to the object, there arises from [hearing] the sentences various ideas, each conforming to [the impression as] its own cause. For example, [there arises the idea of tiger] from [hearing] the sentence 'a tiger is coming', [despite that there is no real tiger]. From hearing a poem, there arises for a man who has passion the idea conforming to passion and for another man who is detached from passion the idea conforming to aversion, although there is no difference [in phrase]."[14]

The influence of Bhartṛhari is noticeable more clearly in this passage. Bhartṛhari also maintains that *pratibhā* as the meaning of the sentence occurs in the mind without reference to the external object. According to him, there is no essential distinction between the word and the meaning, both being two divisions of the *śabdabrahman*, the ultimate reality which is of the nature of the word.[15] The *śabdabrahman* takes the form of *pratibhā* before it is manifested as the phenomenal words.[16] As the primary evolvent of the

śabdabrahman, pratibhā transcends the temporal sequence of sounds and the diversity of form that characterize the phenomenal words, and it is recognized as the original form of the phenomenal words (*vāgvikārāṇāṃ prakṛtiḥ*).[17] It resides in the mind of the speaker before he utters the sounds, and through the sounds that constitute the phenomenal words the listener is awakened to *pratibhā*.

The thought that *pratibhā* is effected by repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) is also found expressed in the *Vākyapadīya*:

> *abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ śabdaḥ sarvo 'paraiḥ smṛtaḥ*
> *bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ ca yathārthapratipādane*[18]
> It is held by some others [who maintain the *akhaṇḍa-pakṣa*] that every word becomes the cause of *pratibhā* by repeated practice, just as in the case of teaching the meaning to children and animals.

The practice of apprehending the meaning of speech is repeated not only in the present life but also in the past life, so that even children and animals are evoked to *pratibhā* by dint of the impression (*saṃskāra, bhāvanā*) of repeated practice. It is through *pratibhā* that they understand what to do (*itikartavyatā*).[19]

It is understood that Dignāga was primarily concerned with the meaning of a word when he formulated the *apoha*-theory. Regarding the meaning of a sentence, he simply accepted Bhartṛhari's doctrine, without discussing the problem how the meaning of a single word is related to the meaning of the sentence. In consonance with Bhartṛhari, he maintained the indivisibility of a sentence, and admitted that the utterance of a sentence immediately produced *pratibhā* in the mind of the listener. It might, therefore, be assumed that Dignāga attributed to the sentence the faculty of expressing its meaning directly, not indirectly through the exclusion of the other meanings. However, at the close of his discussion on *pratibhā*, Dignāga states that the *pratibhā* generated by a certain sentence pertains to the object which is differentiated from the objects meant by the other sentences.[20] In this statement it is clearly noticed that Dignāga applied the *apoha*-theory to the scrutiny of the meaning of a sentence. *Pratibhā* is, according to him, the internal awareness of the idea, which is produced by a sentence. The ideas that arise in the minds of different persons on their hearing the same sentence are not the same with each other, so that each person has his own *pratibhā* which is not communicable to any other person. However, they are generalized and regarded as the object denoted by the sentence, because they have a common feature in that they are distinguished from those produced by another sentence. It is thus to be affirmed that a sentence

denotes its object through the 'differentiation from others' (*anyāpoha*). Dignāga admitted as a psychological fact that *pratibhā* flashed upon a man immediately after his hearing a sentence, and at the same time maintained on a logical analysis that a sentence expressed its meaning through the exclusion (*apoha*) of the other meanings. Because of the brevity of his discussion on the meaning of the sentence, and because of his heavy dependence on Bhartṛhari, his theory seems not to have been duly understood by his opponents.

Dignāga's theory of *apoha* was vehemently attacked by the realists, who held that either an individual (*vyakti*) or a universal (*sāmānya, jāti*) was the meaning of a word. Uddyotakra criticized Dignāga in the course of his discussion on the word-meaning in the *Nyāyavārttika*, II.2.66, and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa devoted one chapter of his *Ślokavārttika* comprising 176 verses for the refutation of the *apoha*-theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail of their arguments, but one verse in the relevant chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* deserves special notice, since Kumārila refers to Dignāga's view of *pratibhā* in it. As a Mīmāṃsaka, Kumārila maintains that a word is denotative of the universal (*ākṛti, jāti*),[21] which, according to him, is a real entity and is directly perceived. To disprove the *apoha*-theory, he lays stress on the fact that, on hearing the word 'cow', we have the notion of 'cow' and not that of 'non-non-cow'. In the process of his close examination of Dignāga's arguments, he points out the inconsistency found there with the following words:

> *asaty api ca bāhye 'rthe vākyārthaḥ pratibhā yathā*
> *padārtho 'pi tathā syāt kim apohaḥ prakalpyate*[22]
> [You admit that,] even when there is no external object, there is *pratibhā* [in the mind of a man immediately after his hearing a sentence, which *pratibhā* is recognized by you] as the meaning of the sentence. It may be [consistent for you to hold] that the meaning of a word is [directly apprehended] in the same manner. Why is *apoha* [unnecessarily] devised [by you]?

The first pāda of this verse is made to conform to Dignāga's expression in the above-cited section. Kumārila considers it hard to maintain that the two verbal units, sentence and word, express their respective meanings in different manners. From his view-point, it is inadmissible for Dignāga, who admits that a sentence generates *pratibhā* which is of positive form (*vidhirūpa*), to deny to a word the faculty of producing a positive knowledge. He is not unconscious of Dignāga's application of the *apoha*-theory to the case of *pratibhā*, but he places emphasis on that a positive

cognition is derived from a sentence as well as a word, and ignores Dignāga's logical analysis with the remark that the cognition does not carry with it, apart from its own form, any other portion that might be characterized as the 'differentiation from the other cognitions'.[23]

Kumārila's criticism gave an incentive to the Bauddhas to modify the *apoha*-theory. The thought that a word has as its direct import a positive image is found clearly expounded by Śāntarakṣita in the Śabdārthaparīkṣā of his *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

Śāntarakṣita closely follows Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in repudiating the objective reality of the universal that is supposed by the realists to reside in many individuals. Against the view held by the realists including Kumārila that a real universal is apprehended by means of a word, Śāntarakṣita proves the conceptual nature of the universal by the example which was originally adduced by Dharmakīrti: some plants, *dhātrī, abhayā*, etc., which are totally different from one another and in which no universal is found to reside, are classed under the general concept 'herb', because they all have the power of producing the same effect, that is, the curing of fever.[24] It is thus the concept that unifies many individuals, and the word which is applied indiscriminately to many individuals stands for this concept. Up to this point, Śāntarakṣita does not deviate from his predecessors. However, he changes the negative tone of the *apoha*-theory to the positive by giving weight to the fact that there appears in the conceptual cognition the image of a thing (*artha-pratibimba*, °-*ākāra*). This image is formed on the basis of the perceptions of the individuals, and for this reason it is apt to be apprehended as the real object.[25] It is, he asserts, this image that is directly referred to by a word. *Apoha* is for him a name applied to this image.

It is not that Śāntarakṣita disregarded the process through which the concept is formed. He states as the main reason for which the image is called '*apoha*' that it is distinguished from the image produced by another word (*anyasmād apohyate*).[26] However, he is chiefly concerned with the psychological fact that the image of an object appears immediately in the mind of the man who hears a word. As a matter of fact, '*apoha*' is a nagative. Śāntarakṣita explains the meaning of '*apoha*' in terms of the two kinds of negation: *paryudāsa* and *niṣedha* (or *prasajyapratiṣedha*).[27] A *paryudāsa* implies the affirmation of something other than what is negated, while a *niṣedha* has no affirmative implication. According to Śāntarakṣita, *apoha* as the function of a word is a *paryudāsa*, because the word 'cow', for example, generates the image of cow by negating the non-cow.[28]

Dignāga admitted that *pratibhā* was directly derived from a sentence, but an objection was raised to him by Kumārila, who considered that the

apoha-theory was inconsistent with the idea of *pratibhā*. With a view to defending the *apoha*-theory against Kumārila's objection, Śāntarakṣita makes the following statement:

> *pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ padād apy upajāyate*
> *pratibhākhyo jhaṭ ity eva padārtho 'py ayam eva naḥ*[29]
> That *apoha* which is in essence the image and which is called *pratibhā* is instantly produced [not only from a sentence but] also from a word. This indeed is for us the meaning [of a sentence and] of a word as well.

Evidently, '*pratibhā*' and '*pratibimba*' (image) are regarded by Śāntarakṣita as synonymous with each other. According to him, both the sentence and the word function to produce immediately in the mind of the listener a positive image, which is expressed by the term '*pratibhā*' or '*pratibimba*'. This image is also named '*apoha*', since it is differentiated from the image generated by the other sentences or words. The inconsistency found by Kumārila in Dignāga's view is thus dissolved by Śāntarakṣita with the new interpretation of the *apoha*-theory.

Dignāga maintained in concert with Bhartṛhari that the meaning of a sentence was not dissolvable into the meanings of the component words. The alteration of Dignāga's view was made by Śānktarakṣita also on this point, and the incentive to it was given by Kumārila. For the purpose of proving that the *apoha*-theory does not hold good with the meaning of a sentence, Kumārila contends that it is impossible, in respect to the meaning of a sentence, to indicate the counter-correlate (*apohya*) which is to be excluded. It is not right, he means, to assert that the sentence, for example, '*caitra gām ānaya*' (Caitra! Bring the cow), functions to exclude *a-caitra*, etc., because the exclusion of *a-caitra* is the meaning of the word and not that of the sentence.[30] In answer to Kumārila's criticism, Śāntarakṣita states:

> A certain number of word-meanings which are conjoined with each other are called the meaning of the sentence. It is quite clear that those which are dissimilar (*vijātīya*) to the word-meanings are the counter-correlates of the word-meanings as well as of the meaning of the sentence, because there is no meaning of the sentence apart from the word-meanings. When the meaning of the sentence '*caitra gām ānaya*' is comprehended, the exclusion of the other agents, the other objects, etc. is understood by implication.[31]

The theory that the meaning of a sentence is the relation of the individual meanings expressed by the component words (*abhihitānvaya*) is known to

have been maintained by Kumārila.[32] According to him, the syntactic unity of a sentence is based on mutual expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), logical competency (*yogyatā*) and phonetic contiguity (*āsatti, saṃnidhi*) of the words constituting the sentence, and by virtue of these three conditions, the meanings denoted by the individual words are related with each other to constitute the meaning of the sentence. In the above-cited statement it is noticed that Śāntarakṣita is very close to Kumārila in holding that the meaning of the sentence is nothing other than the conjunction of the individual word-meanings.[33] The ground for advancing this view was prepared by Śāntarakṣita through the new interpretation of the *apoha*-theory, according to which the positive images are directly produced by the words constituting the sentence.

With a view to meeting the objections raised by Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita introduced a modification on the *apoha*-theory, thereby granting to a certain extent the realist contention that the cognition derived from a word is of positive form. His interpretation of the *apoha*-theory was criticized by the Bauddha logicians of the later period because of the over-emphasis on the affirmative aspect of the *apoha*-theory.

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NOTES

[1] *PS: Pramāṇasamuccaya*, V, k. 1, cited in *TSP: Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Bauddha Bharati Ser., 1), p. 539.17–18.

[2] Cf. *PS*, II, k. 13 and *Vṛtti*. The Tibetan text and a Japanese translation are given in H. Kitagawa, *Indo-koten-ronrigaku no Kenkyū – Jinna no Taikei* – (A Study of Indian Classical Logic – Dignāga's System –), Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1965, p. 462, p. 112. Cf. also E. Frauwallner, 'Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung,' *WZKSO*, **III**(1959), p. 102.

[3] *PST: Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* of Jinendrabuddhi, Tibetan version, Sde-dge ed., 237b.7–238a.2 (Peking ed., 269a.3–5): The thing to be denoted by the word (*abhidheyārtha*) has many portions (*aṃśa*): *sattā, jñeyatva*, etc. The word, for example, '*vṛkṣa*' is not inseparably related to all of them. It denotes that [portion of the thing] to which it is [inseparably] related through the exclusion of the other things (*arthāntaravyavaccheda*), just as *kṛtakatva* or any other [inferential mark establishes the *sādhya* through the exclusion of those which do not possess the inferential mark]. This thought is expressed by Dignāga in *PS*, V, k. 12, cited in *Ślokavārttikaṭīkā* (*Śarkarikā*), ed. Kunhan Raja, Madras 1946, p. 46.7–8: *bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ / svasambandhānurūpyeṇa vyavacchedārthakāry asau //*

[4] *Vṛtti* ad *PS*, V, k. 36d, cited in *Pramāṇavārttika-Svavṛtti* (ed. R. Gnoli, Roma: IsMEO, 1960), pp. 62–63: *śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvan āha.*

[5] *Vṛtti* ad *PS*, V, k. 36d, cited in *TSP*, p. 389.9–12: *sarvatrābhedād āśrayasyānucchedāt kṛtsnārthaparisamāpteś ca yathākramaṃ jātidharmā ekatva* [-nityatva-] *pratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā apoha evāvatiṣṭhante....* As the characteristic features of *sāmānya*, Praśastapāda mentions *nityatva, ekatva* and *svaviṣayasarvagatatva*, cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (Vizianagram Skt. Ser., vol. 4), p. 314. Explicit mention of *pratyekaparisamāpti* is not found in the extant Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika works of the early period. The clear expression is given in *Nyāyamañjarī* (Kashi Skt. Ser., 104), p. 284.27–28:...ucyate pratipiṇḍaṃ kārtsnyenaiva jātir vartata iti. Cf. *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*, ed. Kielhorn, Vol. I, p. 243.24–25: *evaṃ tarhy...*(ākṛtiḥ) *pratyekaṃ ca parisamāpyate yathādityaḥ.*

[6] *PS*, V, k. 46, cited in *TSP*, p. 363.15–16.

[7] *PSV: Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, (K): Kanakavarman's version, Peking ed., 168a.7–168b.1, (V): Vasudhararakṣita's version, Peking ed., 82b.2–4 (Sde-dge ed., 77a.2–4).

[8] *VP: Vākyapadīya*, II. 143. The verse number of *VP* is given in accordance with M. Biardeau, *Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa avec la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha*, Paris 1964 for I (Brahmakāṇḍa), and with K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye (ed.), *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, Poona 1965 for II (Vākyakāṇḍa). The doctrine of *pratibhā* is expounded in *VP*, II.143–152. Cf. also *ibid.*, I.118, II.117, etc.

[9] Bhartṛhari's doctrine of *pratibhā* is discussed in K.A. Subramanya Aiyar, 'Pratibhā as the meaning of a sentence,' *Proceedings and Transactions of the Tenth All-India Oriental Conference*, Madras 1941, pp. 326–332; Gaurinath Sastri, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959, pp. 244–264; S. Ruegg, *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique Indienne*, Paris 1959, p. 77 ff.; M. Biardeau, *Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique*, Paris – La Haye 1964, p. 315 ff. For the concept of *pratibhā* in wider scope of Indian literature, *vide* Gopinath Kaviraj, 'The doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy,' in *Aspects of Indian Thought*, Burdwan: The University of Burdwan, 1966, pp. 1–44; J. Gonda, *The Vision of the Vedic Poets*, The Hague 1963, pp. 318–348.

[10] The close relation of Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā* to the *Vākyapadīya* is made clear in E. Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–116. *VP*, II. 158 and 155 are quoted by Dignāga in his *Vṛtti* on *PS*, V, k. 50, and *VP*, III.14.8 is found cited in *PSV*, (V) 70b.8 (66b.6–7).

[11] *VP*, II.10. Cf. *ibid.*, III.1.1: *dvidhā kaiścit padaṃ bhinnaṃ caturdhā pañcadhāpi ca / apoddhṛtyaiva vākyebhyaḥ prakṛtipratyayādivat //*

[12] *VP*, I.85. This is cited in *PST*, 287b.3 (324a. 7–8) as follows: gaṅ smras pa / *med kyaṅ naṅ gi ba yi ni // sgra rnams yod do ṣes sems te // rtogs pa po yi nus med de // ḥdsin paḥi thabs kho na deḥo //* ṣes so /

[13] *VP*, II.271. This is cited in *PST*, 287b.6–7 (324b.3–4) as follows: de skad du yaṅ bśad

pa / *gaṅ yaṅ ḥdi ci ṣes dris śig // ba laṅ rta ṣes kyaṅ brjod paḥi // dri ba kho na bya ba ste // de la rab ṣugs mthoṅ baḥi phyir //* ṣes so / The thought that a single word is recognized as being accompanied by the verb '*asti*' is found expressed in *VP*, II.270: *yac cāpy ekaṃ padaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ caritāstikriyaṃ kvacit / tad vākyāntaram evāhur na tad anyena yujyate //* Cf. *Yogabhāṣya*, III.17: *sarvapadeṣu cāsti vākyaśaktiḥ, vṛkṣa ity ukte 'stīti gamyate...*

[14] *PSV*, (K) 168b.2–5, (V) 82b.5–83a.1 (77a.2–7).

[15] Cf. *VP*, II.31cd: *ekasyaivātmano bhedau śabdārthāv apṛthaksthitau.*

[16] Bhartṛhari recognized three stages through which the *śabdabrahman* evolves into articulate speech, namely, the *paśyantī*, the *madhyamā* and the *vaikharī*, cf. *VP*, I.142. In Vṛṣabhadeva's *Paddhati* on *VP*, I.14, *pratibhā* is identified with the *paśyantī*: '*pratibhām...*' *iti yeyaṃ samastaśabdārthakāraṇabhūtā buddhiḥ yāṃ paśyantīty āhuḥ.*

[17] Cf. *Vṛtti* on *VP*, I.14.

[18] *VP*, II.148. This verse is cited with slight modification in *TS: Tattvasaṃgraha* (Bauddha Bharati Ser., 1), k. 891.

[19] Cf. *VP*, II.146: *sākṣāc chabdena janitāṃ bhāvanānugamena vā / itikartavyatāyāṃ tām* (=pratibhāṃ) *na kaścid ativartate // ibid.*, I.121: *itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā / yāṃ pūrvāhitasaṃskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate //*

[20] Cf. *PSV*, (K) 168b.5–6, (V) 83a.1–2 (77a.7–77b.1).

[21] The Mīmāṃsā view that a word denotes *ākṛti* is established in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I.3.30–35 (Ākṛtiśaktyadhikaraṇa), and the same view is found maintained in the Vṛttikāragrantha cited in *Śābarabhāṣya*, I.1.5, cf. Bibl. Ind. ed., p. 14.17–18: *atha gaur ity asya śabdasya ko 'rthaḥ. sāsnādiviśiṣṭā ākṛtir iti brūmaḥ.* Kumārila supports this view through detailed discussions in *ŚV: Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika*, Ākṛtivāda and Vanavāda. He takes the term '*ākṛti*' as synonymous with '*jāti*' and '*sāmānya*', cf. *ŚV*, Ākṛtivāda 3: *jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā / sāmānyaṃ tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanam //*

[22] *ŚV*, Apohavāda 40 (=*TS*, 922).

[23] *Ibid.*, Apohavāda 41 (*TS*, 923): *buddhyantarād vyavacchedo na ca buddheḥ pratīyate / svarūpotpādamātrāc ca nānyam aṃśaṃ bibharti sā //*

[24] *TS, TSP,* 1004. Cf. *ibid.*, 722–725; *Pramāṇavārttika*, I.74–75.

[25] *TS*, 1005: *tān* (=arthān) *upāśritya yaj jñāne bhāty arthapratibimbakam / kalpake 'rthātmatābhāve 'py arthā ity eva niścitam //* Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, I.76–77.

[26] Śāntarakṣita gives four reasons for which the image of an object (*arthapratibimba*) is called '*apoha*'. The first reason '*pratibhāsāntarād bhedāt*' is, according to Kamalaśīla's interpretation, adduced on the basis of the primary sense of the word '*apoha*' (*mukhyataḥ*): *apohyata ity apohaḥ, anyasmād apoho 'nyāpoha iti vyutpatteḥ.* The other reasons are based

on the figurative sense of the word (*upacārāt*). They are: (1) that the image is the cause for attaining to the real thing which is excluded from the other things (*anyavyāvṛtta-vastu*), (2) that it arises through [the perception of] the real thing which is excluded from the other things (*aśliṣṭa-vastu* = *anyato vyāvṛttaṃ vastu*), and (3) that it is erroneously taken for the particular which is excluded from the dissimilar things (*vijātīya-parāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇam*). Cf. *TS, TSP*, 1006–1008ab.

[27] The two terms '*paryudāsa*' and '*prasajyapratiṣedha*' ('*niṣedha*' in *TS*, 1003) are variously rendered by modern scholars: 'exception limitative' and 'prohibition valable après application (virtuelle)' in L. Renou, *Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit*, Paris 1957, p. 202, p. 230; 'Exklusion' and 'reine Negation' in E. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ*, Teil II: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, Wien 1967, p. 165; 'limitation (al negation)' and 'negation (subsequent to tentatively) applying' in G. Cardona, 'Negation in Pāṇinian rules,' *Language*, **43**(1967), p. 34; 'nominally bound negative' and 'verbally bound negative' in B.K. Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968 (HOS 46), p. 156, etc.

[28] Śāntarakṣita distinguishes two kinds of *paryudāsa*: mental (*buddhyātmaka*) and ontological (*arthātmaka*), cf. *TS*, 1003. According to him, *apoha* is primarily mental, but it has ontological implication, because the individuals to which the image pertains are ontologically differentiated from the dissimilar things, cf. *TS, TSP*, 1008.

[29] *TS*, 1027.

[30] *ŚV*, Apohavāda 143cd (=*TS*, 977cd). Cf. *TSP*, p. 384.12–15: *yā cātra 'caitra gām ānaya' ityādāv acaitrādivyavacchedarūpānyanivṛttir avayavaparigraheṇa varṇyate, sā padārtha eva syāt, na vākyārthaḥ. tasyānavayavasyetthaṃ vivektum aśakyatvād ity avyāpinī śabdārthavyavasthā.*

[31] *TS*, 1159–61: . . . / *padārthā eva sahitāḥ kecid vākyārtha ucyate // teṣāṃ ca ye vijātīyās te 'pohyāḥ suparisphuṭāḥ / vākyārthasyāpi te caiva tebhyo 'nyo naiva so 'sti hi // caitra gām ānayetyādivākyārthe 'dhigate sati / kartṛkarmāntarādīnām apoho gamyate 'rthataḥ //*

[32] Cf. Bishunupada Bhattacharya, *A Study in Language and Meaning* (A Critical Examination of Some Aspects of Indian Semantics), Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1962, p. 158 ff.; Kunjunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Adyar 1963 (The Adyar Lib. Ser., vol. 91), p. 203 ff.

[33] According to Kamalaśīla, the word-meanings stand in the causal relation to each other, cf. *TSP*, p. 435.2: '*sahitāḥ*' (in *TS*, 1159) *iti parasparam kāryakāraṇabhāvena sambaddhā ity arthaḥ.*

J. GONDA

THE ŚATARUDRIYA

The Śatarudriya, constituting the sixty-six subdivisions of chapter 16 of the Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā, is a litany accompanying no less than 425 oblations and addressed to the hundred forms and powers of the god Rudra. This solemn and awful ceremony belongs closely to the preceding chapters which contain the formulas of the most important *agnicayana*, the piling of the great fireplace; because Agni, that is the fireplace, has on completion become Rudra, the representative of the unconquered, dangerous, unreliable, and hence much to be feared nature.[1] Compare ŚB. 9, 1, 1, 1 "He then performs the Śatarudriya sacrifice. This whole Agni has here been completed; he now is the deity Rudra". The sacrifice is to avert the god's wrath and to secure his favour.[2] After dealing with the performance the Saṃhitā proceeds to mention the *mantras* relating to the propitiatory and preparatory ceremonies in connexion with Agni. The *mantras* of the Śatarudriya are addressed to the various aspects and functions of Rudra who is regarded as a metamorphosis of Wrath (Manyu); "hundred-headed, thousand-eyed, hundred-quivered, with his bow strung and his arrow fitted to the string, Rudra being in quest of food was inspiring fear. . ." (ŚB. 9, 1, 1, 6). The first four *mantras* give a good idea of the tone and character of the whole chapter devoted to the god with the azure neck and red hue who is seen by herdsmen and girl-water-carriers[3] (V.S. 16, 7):

> Homage (be paid), O Rudra, to thy Wrath and to thy shaft homage, and to thy two arms homage. With that most beneficent body (manifestation) gaze on us, O mountain-haunter, which, O Rudra, is auspicious, mild, benevolently looking. That shaft, which, O mountain-haunter, thou art holding in thy hand to shoot, make that, O mountain-protector, auspicious. Do not injure man or (other) moving beings. With auspicious words we salute thee, O mountain-dweller, that all our moving beings may be healthy and well-satisfied.

The god – who is also described as being surrounded by numerous Rudras (VS. 16, 6; cf. 54; 65; 66), his partial manifestations, who had come into existence at the same time as Rudra himself (ŚB. 9, 1, 1, 6)[4] – is implored to protect those who invoke him and to spare their lives. The sections 1, 8, 14,

M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 75–91.

17–46, 64–66 of VS. 16 are stereotyped prose formulas beginning with "homage (*namaḥ*)" paid to the god, his manifestations, functions, activities, weapons, abodes, to various beings of whom he is the lord or leader, and so on. Thus the chapter is an early instance of the well-known Indian enumerations of divine names and epithets the recital of which is considered most effective as a means of compelling a god to be gracious (cf. ŚB. 9, 1, 1, 14; 18; 22; 24) to fulfil wishes, and meritorious as a work of devotion and a method of entering into spiritual contact with the deity.

Although the greater part of the text is not explained or commented upon in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa attention may be invited to a few passages in that work. The Śatarudriya offering was according to 9, 1, 1, 7 instituted by order of Prajāpati who, being afraid of Rudra, had food gathered for him and "appeased him therewith". That food, that offering, was originally called "that by which the deity is appeased" (*śāntadevatya*), but "because the gods like the cryptic" it "is here called cryptically Śatarudriya", another instance of a well-known type of etymological explanation in these texts (9, 1, 1, 2). In 9, 1, 1, 43 the author informs us of how this Śatarudriya sacrifice came to attain to conformity with the year and with Agni: the 425 formulas and oblations contained in it are the 360 days of the year[5], the 30 nights of the month and the 35 days of the thirteenth month[6], which is "Agni's self".

The Śatarudriya litany was not only transmitted by the followers of the White Yajurveda. There exists also a recension in the Black Yajurveda handed down in four versions, that is in all basic texts of that Veda that have survived, viz. the Saṃhitās of the Taittirīyas (TS. 4, 5), of the Kaṭhas proper (KS. 17, 11–16), of the Kapiṣṭhala-Kaṭhas (KapS. 27, 1–6), and of the Maitrāyaṇīyas (MS. 2, 9, 2–9).[7] The information given by the corresponding *brāhmaṇa* portions of these texts in explanation of some particulars of the Śatarudriya ritual need not detain us. Only the beginning of TS. 5, 4, 3, 1 – the *brāhmaṇa* section belonging to TS. 4, 5 – may be quoted:

> The fire (place) is Rudra. He is born when he has been completely piled up. Just as a calf desires the teat, so he here seeks his portion... He offers the Śatarudrīya[8] (oblation); verily he appeases him with (his own) portion...

Other references to the litany and the sacrifice are, in the *brāhmaṇas*, infrequent and almost devoid of special relevance when our object is to trace the history of the text, the use made of it in other rituals and the religious or philosophical significance attached to it. The author of TS. 5, 7, 3, 3, observing that the fire is Rudra says that he has two bodies, a dread (*ghora*)

one, and an auspicious (*śiva*) one. In offering the Śatarudrīya one appeases the former,[9] in offering the "stream of wealth" (*vasor dhārā*) – a consecration rite of Agni on the completion of the great fireplace – the latter (cf. also TB. 3, 11, 9, 9; ŚB. 10, 1, 5, 3). At ŚB. 9, 1, 1, 44 the hymn under consideration is said to conform or to correspond to the Great Litany (Mahad Uktham) which is recited on the Mahāvrata day. In the *śrautasūtra* literature references to the sacrifice are not lacking; see ĀpŚS. 17, 11, 3 ff. (*agnicayana*); cf. also 19, 12, 25; 19, 13, 3; VaikhŚS. 19, 6: 291, 12 ff.; MŚS. 6, 2, 4, 3–7; VārŚS. 2, 2, 3, 3. The stanzas corresponding to VS. 16, 1 and 48 are prescribed in a sacrifice (*iṣṭi*) to be performed when Rudra kills one's children or cattle (MŚS. 5, 1, 9, 26–30; ĀpŚS. 9, 14, 11–14) and for the benefit of a chieftain of the Niṣādas.[10] The whole text or the first and last sections of it occur at HGS. 2, 8, 11 in a description of the spit-ox sacrifice (*śūlagava*) for gratifying Rudra and averting plague in cattle; one should pronounce the *mantra*s while performing a pradakṣiṇa. For the *śūlagava* rite see also MGS. 2, 5, 3. The text – or, again, the first and last sections – are also obligatory in the case of another domestic rite, the Īśānabali (ĀpGS. 7, 20, 8 f.).

Special attention should be invited to a non-Vedic ritual that is elaborately described in the Mānava-Śrautasūtra 11, 7, 1 and 11, 7, 2 and 3.[11] The first, entitled "Ritual for the constant murmuring of the prayers addressed to Rudra", is a complicated rite to be performed on a pure place north or east of the village. One should have the Rudra bath and then, to the accompaniment of *mantra*s taken from the Śatarudriya and some formulas of other origin, place (*nyaset*) the god in the various parts of one's body, that is, one should in this *nyāsa* ceremony assign these parts to the different aspects of the deity. In a similar way the syllables of the formula *Oṃ namo bhagavate rudrāya* are placed on one's crown, nose etc. down to one's feet. Thereupon one pays homage to the gods of the quarters of the universe, Indra (in the East) etc. By this ritual one is delivered from any harm "that has gone into skin and bones"; there will be no damage in the village, at a premature birth etc. caused by demons, deceased persons, robbers and so on. Next a brahmin should meditate on himself in the shape of Rudra (11), the three-eyed, five-faced, ten-armed auspicious god, and undertake the murmuring of the prayers, invite the god, pronounce eight times the Rudra-gāyatrī, meditate on him and again murmur the Śatarudriya. These "prayers are used for the destruction of all evil" (20). There follows a description of a similar ritual for the benefit of those who wish to invoke Rudra with a special intention (*naimittika*). After the bath and the *nyāsa* ritual one should throw flowers of *dūrvā* grass and unhusked grain, once put in water,

towards the Lord (Īśāna). If Rudra destroys the people one should mutter the Śatarudriya in the north-eastern quarter. By muttering one day one is delivered from diseases; by muttering three days from the evil of brahmin murder. After the performance of this ritual one should ask what one wishes, pay homage to Rudra and dismiss him. This ceremony is obviously performed by a brahmin for the benefit of a sacrifice (cf. MŚS. 11, 7, 2, 12). In 11, 7, 3, 1 another variant rite is described: one who performs the murmuring for a year will be delivered from any sin and go to Rudra's world. "What is killed or given by one who murmers to Rudra brings about endlessness, i.e. life eternal" (7).

There are however some indications of another employment of the text. At MŚS. 3, 2, 13 it reads: "If Rudra destroys men, one shall step to and fro on a place in the north-east, muttering the text addressed to the hundred Rudras". The passage, which deals with expiatory rites to be executed if in performing the *agnihotra* rite one is confronted with inauspicious events, showed that the words of the text were already in Vedic times used unaccompanied by a sacrificial ceremony. Hence the appearance of the text in two almost identical enumerations of Vedic texts that are supposed to be purificatory – "by muttering them or reciting them at a burnt-oblation the twice-born are purified from their sins" – in Viṣṇu-Smṛti 56, 3 and VasDhŚ. 28, 11 ff. It is worth noticing that the former work – which in its present form may date back to the 3rd century A.D. – is (at 55, 21) quite explicit on the good results of the muttering:

> A brahmin may beyond doubt obtain the highest perfection (or final emancipation, *saṃsidhyet*) by solely repeating (these formulas), whether he performs any other religious observance or no.

See also Gautama DhŚ. 19, 12; VasDhŚ. 22, 9; BaudhDhŚ. 3, 10, 10; 4, 3, 8; Yājñ 3, 304; Viṣṇu-Smṛti 86, 12 etc. where this collection of formulas is called Rudrāḥ.

Already at an early date a few stanzas of the Śatarudriya came to enjoy a certain popularity. The Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad which, belonging to the tradition of the Black Yajurveda, quotes many passages from the Taittirīya-Saṃhitā and Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka – almost all of them occur also in the Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā – borrowed the stanzas corresponding with VS. 2, 3, and 16: ŚvUp. 3, 5; 3, 6; 4, 22. By the first, the so-called *aghora-mantra,* the god is requested to look auspiciously, the adjective *aghora* denoting the absence of, and restraint in, awful, terrific and violent action, and therefore friendliness. VS. 16, 16, the *mā-nas-tokīya* (Baudhāyana-Dharmaśāstra 3, 2, 9), averts the god's wrath and implores him to spare the lives, offspring

and cattle of those praying. These stanzas may be considered to have held the continuous attention of Śivaite communities.

The belief in the beneficent efficacy of the hymn attested to in the two above *smṛti* works is also expressed in the comparatively ancient Jābāla-Upaniṣad 3 where it is no less a person than the famous teacher Yājñavalkya who is reported to have taught that the muttering of the Śatarudriya enables a man to obtain immortality (*amṛtatatvam*), "because this text is the names of the Immortal one and by means of these (names) one becomes immortal".[12] And at the end of the Kaivalya-Upaniṣad it reads in the *śravaṇaphala*:

> Whoever studies the Śatarudriya is purified by fire, wind, *ātman*, he is purified from the sins of drinking alcoholic liquids, murder of a brahmin, theft of gold... ; that is why he has gained access to the One who is above any aspiration to final emancipation (because he is eternally free from mundane bounds, *avimukta*, i.e. Śiva-Paśupati).[13]

It has – in all probability, rightly – been surmised[14] that some references in later *upaniṣads* to the Rudrajapa, the highly meritorious muttering of Rudra('s names, epithets, aspects etc.), relate to the hymn under consideration: the Viṣṇuite Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīya-Upaniṣad, 5, 10; and compare Atharvaśiras-Upaniṣad 7. The Śatarudriya was even regarded as an *upaniṣad* by those who compiled the collection of these writings which was used by Dara Schakoh where it was, under the title Schat Roudri, number nineteen.[15] In an abbreviated form, it is known as Nīlarudra-Upaniṣad.[16] As already observed by Deussen this short text (26 stanzas) consists mainly of the – partly corrupt – initial stanzas (1–4; 6–14) of VS. 16, followed by VS. 13, 6–8, which pay homage to the serpents in the tripartite universe, in the waters and in the rays of the sun. These verses are preceded and followed by stanzas in description of Rudra-Śiva under various names.

The references in the Mahābhārata to the Śatarudriya are greatly helpful to form an idea of the significance attached to it by the Hindus of the epic period and especially by the worshippers of Śiva. It was regarded as a potent sacred text of superhuman origin (*brahman*) at Mbh. 7, 57, 68 ff. Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, who are in need of a potent weapon, see two terrible snakes; they pay homage to Śiva and "knowing the Veda" (*vedaviduṣau*) they pronounce the *brahma śatarudriyam* – that means that they praise Śiva, that is that they add to his power which they consolidate or confirm (in the literal sense) by eulogizing him, stating his qualities and manifestations, his names and epithets, nature and identity, by indicating his functions and referring to his deeds. The result is that through Śiva's majestic greatness the

snakes are transformed into bow and arrow. The purport and implications are clear: even these exalted personages, Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, had to resort to this mighty series of formulas which, if pronounced by those who know the Veda – and therefore understand the meaning of the text – can induce the god to render help. It may parenthetically be observed that the snakes are Śiva's weapons in disguise and that these animals are mentioned already in the Śatarudriya (VS. 16, 5).[17] In Mbh. 13, 14, 146 f. three great gods are said to have engaged in praising Śiva-Mahādeva, Brahmā with the Rathantara (sāman), Nārāyaṇa with the Jyeṣṭhasāman[18] and Śakra (Indra) with "the *brahman*, the excellent Śatarudrīya". In Mbh. 13, 145, 4 Vāsudeva is explaining how he studies the text under consideration: there follows a glorification of Śiva, his power and some of his exploits, a reference to his terrific form etc. as well as the statement that once the gods praised Śiva respectfully with the Śatarudriya (st. 21), whereupon he showed them his favour.

In a completely Śivaite context, the closing chapter of the Droṇaparvan (Mbh. 7, a. 173), it is stated that in the Veda the excellent Śatarudriya is handed down as a means of approaching the god with worship and prayers (*upasthānam*).[19] Vyāsa mentioning and explaining a number of the god's names recommends his audience to adore Śiva. There are a few reminiscences of the Vedic hymn: 7, 173, 82 on Śiva Paśupati (cf. VS. 16, 17) and 91 where the god is said to be thousand-eyed (VS. 16, 13). The speaker winds up by a eulogy upon the Vedic text, describing it as: "conferring wealth, glory and length of life, sacred, intimated by the Vedas, . . . , accomplishing all objects, pure, destroying all sins, allaying every form of evil, removing the fear off any distress". "The man who always listens to this fourfold[20] hymn of praise (*stotram*) conquers all his enemies and is highly honoured in Rudra's 'world' (heaven)". All wishes of the devout man who continually reads and hears it are fulfilled because the god is graciously disposed.

That the hymn is not infrequently mentioned in contexts dealing with or referring to Śiva's names becomes perfectly clear if we realize that there is no hard-and-fast line between the so-called *nāmastotras* ("praise of (divine) names") and eulogies in a more general sense. Says the Mahābhārata at 13, 146, 22 f.:

> In the Vedas many names of him are explained in accordance with their true meaning because of his (their) greatness and his (their) power (glory) that is apparent from his deeds. And the inspired sages know that the excellent Śatarudrīya forms part of the Veda. . .

In a long and comparatively recent epic passage found in some editions of the Mahābhārata Dakṣa is described as pronouncing a *sahasranāmastotra* on Śiva.[21] The god is identified with a considerable number of beings and entities, the gods Indra, Yama, Varuṇa etc. and with the (sacred text) of the Yajurveda, viz. the Śatarudriya (*yajuṣāṃ śatarudriyam*, line 291).[22] The eulogy recurs in an essentially identical form in the Brahmā-Purāṇa (see 40, 58) and the Vāyu-Purāṇa (see 1, 30, 180 ff.; cf. st. 243).

In another epic passage in praise of Śiva, Mbh. 13, 14, 15 f. it reads: "Of the birds thou art Garuḍa, among the snakes Ananta, of the Vedas the Sāmaveda and of the Yajuṣes the Śatarudriya..."[23] That means also that Śiva himself could, from a definite point of view, be identified with the text which is devoted to him and which is, at the same time, declared to be the best or most excellent component part of the whole Vedic corpus to which it belongs. It obviously is not only the name that is identical with its bearer but also the text containing, explaining or glorifying the name or names. The same line is repeated, for instance in the Śivaite Īśvaragītā 7, 12.

There is other evidence that the hymn was of great importance and ritual significance. It would take too long to discuss many purāṇic and other post-epic texts, but a rapid survey of some of them will corroborate our presumptions. In the Śiva-Purāṇa Vid., ch. 20 a mode of worshipping an earthen *liṅga* is taught; every ritual act is to be accompanied by a sacred formula. Of the fifty-three formulas prescribed no less than thirty-one are taken from the Śatarudriya. In the Īśvaragītā, which forms part of the Kūrma-Purāṇa, the recitation of the Śatarudrīya is (11, 28) on the authority of the sages of yore and on a par with the *upaniṣad*s and the holy syllable *Oṃ* (*vedāntaśatarudrīyapraṇavādijapam*) said to be an object of 'study' (or recitation, *svādhyāya*) that is enjoined upon the faithful and to bring about in their souls the complete attainment (realization) of their true nature (*sattvasiddhi*).[24] Lifelong recitation results in final beatitude (*paramaṃ padam* "the highest place or position", ibid., 11, 100). Inculcating the necessity to worship Rudra devoutly the author of Liṅga-Purāṇa, 30, 2 ff. narrates the story of a sage named Śveta who could successfully offer resistance to Death, because he had worshipped Rudra-Śiva and "repeated the mantras of the holy hymn Rudrādhyāya beginning with "Homage to..." i.e. the Śatarudriya. Nor are stray reminiscences lacking. The author of Matsya-Purāṇa 184, 45 holds out the prospect of eternal beatitude to the man who devoutly concentrated mutters the Śatarudriya at Benares. When, in Liṅga-Purāṇa 2, 18, 31 Śiva is said to be gold-armed one is reminded of VS. 16, 17; TS. 4, 5, 2, 1: "Homage to the gold-armed leader of hosts"; LiP. 1, 96, 80 makes mention of his wrath (VS. 16, 1; TS. 4, 5, 1, 1). In applying the

holy ashes over their body brahmins and *kṣatriyas* should pronounce the *mantra* VS. 16, 16 "Do not harm us in our offspring and progeny" (Śiva-Purāṇa Vid., 24, 33), *vānaprasthas* 16, 2, the *aghora-mantra*, which is also to be repeated by those who wear the rosary (*rudrākṣa*) round the neck (1, 25, 40) as well as by those who perform various rites (e.g. Ṛ. 1, 11, 50). Curiously enough, the author of Vāyu-Purāṇa 59, 57 does not attach to this portion of the Yajurveda the same 'immortality' as to the threefold Veda in general: this tripartite corpus will continue to exist till the universal deluge, with the exception of the Śatarudriya.

The significance and popularity of this celebrated series of prayers and tributes of homage are not difficult to explain. It is an ancient collection of all the floating conceptions regarding Rudra-Śiva, of a great many of the names and epithets given to him already at an early date. It represents him in his ambivalent character, both as a malevolent and as a benevolent deity and describes him as a power that may manifest itself as one, Rudra, or as many, the Rudras. It may be that, in our eyes, the Rudra of the Śatarudriya is "a queer character",[25] he is unmistakably on the way to become an All-God. It is neither surprising that this comphrehensive survey of all that could contribute to characterizing the god could become a fresh starting-point for new developments, one of the foundations for the tenets of post-Vedic Śivaism, nor incomprehensible that it should have belonged to those rare Vedic chapters that continued to fulfil a function in religious practice. In Śivaite circles – where it came to occupy an important place – it has long been a prevailing opinion that the muttering of this litany results in the annihilation of all sins – *śatarudrīyaṃ japatāṃ viduṣāṃ sarvakleśavināśanam* in *stotras* etc. –, the attainment of supreme knowledge and the destruction of mundane existence. Up to the present day it is recited in Śivaite temples every morning. The philosopher Śrīkaṇṭha (13th century?) who expounded the philosophy of Śivaism in the form of a commentary on the Brahmasūtras attributed to Bādarāyaṇa endeavoured to show that the Śatarudriya – which he puts on a par with the famous Puruṣasūkta (ṚV. 10, 90), the foundation stone of Viṣṇuite philosophy – considers Rudra-Śiva to be the Lord of the universe (Śrīkaṇṭha, on BS. 1, 4, 25) identical with Brahman (on BS. 1, 4, 29). From his point of view quite intelligibly, because the author, while accepting the allegiance to the *upaniṣads* and claiming to have interpreted the Vedānta, was fully convinced of the identity of his god Śiva and Brahman.[26]

In the preceding pages the Śatarudriya has been denoted by the terms litany and hymn. It is however also a eulogy, a 'hymn of praise' or *stotra*. We can easily imagine that it has been a great help to poets of the later pe-

riod in modelling their eulogies after an ancient and revered pattern. Rather than trace reminiscences of the text in medieval and modern *stotra*s I would prefer to study more closely an interesting variant of the procedure which in Indian poetics is known as *samasyāpūraṇa*.[27] This practice – an "essay in poetic skill" – consists in constructing a stanza usually on a single line or on even a few words given by others and mostly taken from the work of a former poet, or in completing a piece of poetry part of which has been fixed as a problem. The part of a stanza so given to be completed is called *samasyā* "what is to be combined". The *stotra* published (under n° 36) on the basis of a single manuscript in volume I of the Stotrasamuccaya[28] is, as already observed by the editor, K. Parameswara Aithal, in its entirety based on the Śatarudriya, also called the Rudrapraśna of the Taittirīya-Saṃhitā. It seems worth while to dilate upon the procedure adopted by the poet and to analyse his eulogy somewhat closely. The name of the poet is Aruṇādri;[29] he was the son of Veṅkaṭeśvara and Apītastanī; he belonged to the Bharadvājagotra. He won the favour of Śrī-Śoṇeśa (st. 65).

The author has given his poem the name Rudrārthasāra (st. 1; 64); hence the title Rudrārthāsārastavaḥ. He describes its character as a sort of commentary: having extracted his material from a Śrī-Rudra-bhāṣya he has produced a lamp that illuminates the essence of Rudra and will please all respectable people. Those who being pure in heart read this hymn of praise (*stotra,* st. 64) which removes their sins and who continuously adore Sāmba[30] will be free from illness and affliction and obtain final emancipation. Following the poet the editor[31] characterizes the eulogy as an explanation of the meaning of the Rudrapraśna. From an objective point of view however the poem is not a commentary or explanation but rather a free paraphrasis incorporating a considerable number of words and word groups that occur in the Vedic chapter. Each stanza is followed by a note referring to the portion of the original text summarized, but it strikes us that these portions are of unequal length.[32] As already intimated, words occurring in the original text are borrowed throughout the poem, in many stanzas abundantly, in others on a smaller scale. Compare, e.g., TS. 4, 5, 1 ab: stanza 2:

namas te rudra manyava uto ta iṣave namas /
namas te astu dhanvane bāhubhyām uta te namaḥ
yā ta iṣuḥ śivatamā śivaṃ babhūva te dhanuḥ /
śivā śaravyā yā tava tayā no rudra mṛḍaya

śrīrudrāmitamanyave tava namaḥ kiṃca tvadīyeṣave
kiṃca tvaddhanuṣe namas tava bhujadvandvāya tubhyam namaḥ /

yat te rudra śivaṃ dhanuḥ śivatamā ceṣuḥ śaravyā śivā
yā te rudra bhavaty apūrṇam api tair māṃ rakṣa gaurīpate,

with TS. 4, 5, 1 c: stanza 3:

yā te rudra śivā tanūr aghorāpāpakāśinī /
tayā nas tanuvā śaṃtamayā giriśantābhi cākaśīhi

yā te rudra śivā tanur vijayate lokeṣv anugrāhikā
bhaktābhīṣṭaphalapradā paśupate puṇyā jagatpāvanī /
tanvā śaṃtamayā tayā saralayā kailāsaśaile sadā
sthitvā prāṇisusvapradeśvara dayādṛṣṭyāniśaṃ paśya mām.

These two stanzas allow us to draw some conclusions which are corroborated by a somewhat closer study of the whole poem.

From 3 it appears that even in those stanzas which exceed the original text in length – the number of the syllables of the poet's *śārdūlavikrīḍita* stanzas is 4 × 19, i.e. 76; that of YV. 4, 5, 1 c is 35 – not all words of the latter are adopted with the result that a comparatively large part of the stanza is a product of Aruṇādri's poetic activity.[33] In most cases the author has borrowed single words but larger quotations are not absent.[34] Throughout the poem he had to supplement the quotations which constitute so to say the framework of his stanzas with other material of his own invention – or known to him from the work of his predecessors. These additions, which sometimes are of considerable length, often replace one or more words of the Vedic text. Thus in st. 3 the compound *apāpakāśinī* is not adopted, but in its place one finds no less than five words, one of which is a long compound. There is no denying that Aruṇādri has seriously resisted the temptation to fill the spaces between the quotations with epithets and proper names:[35] in st. 9 there are three vocatives, viz. *śrīdevendra, śateṣudhe* (which occurs in the original) and *śrīcandracūḍāmaṇe*, in TS. 4, 5, 1 l two; the fourth line *kāruṇyārdrakaṭākṣavīkṣaṇakalāmūrtiṃ mayi tvaṃ kuru* is an additional paraphrasis of the words. . .*naḥ sumanāḥ śivaś ca* which are found in the Vedic text. But he has not of course been able to escape other supplementary matter, such as the tautological addition in 19, the elaboration in 20, the repetition of *yathā syāt* in 46 (cf. 9); or the enlargements in 48 and 49. In a few cases the hymn diverges much from the original; the words of TS. 4, 5, 9 pq "Homage to you, beaming hearts of the gods, homage to the destroyed" are hardly recognizable in 42 where only *devānām* and *namaḥ* as well as *hṛdi* instead of *hṛdayebhyaḥ* recur and the remainder of the stanza does not give an adequate idea of the original. The only word quoted from TS. 4, 5, 10 a in 44 is *paśūnām*; the vocatives

nirādhāra "O supportless one" and *ardhanārīśvara* "O half male, half female (god)" cannot be regarded as equivalents of *andhasas pate* "O lord of the *soma* plant"; nevertheless, the general bearing of the Vedic passage has here been rendered fairly well.

Other passages are – not without phantasy or full knowledge of facts – reproduced adequately or even felicitously.[36] For instance, stanza 2 contains all important elements of TS. 4, 5, 1 and 2, irrespective of whether they are represented by the original words or by very acceptable synonyms. The words of TS. 4, 5, 2 mn

> To him who inspires courage by shouting (screaming, or, who causes to weep, *ākrandayate*), to the lord of foot-soldiers homage, homage. To the wholly covered, to the running, to the lord of the warriors (*satvanām*) homage

have been successfully supplemented and explained in stanza 15:

> He who while flapping his hands shouts in battle to (his) adversary – homage to him who appears in that shape, to the lord of the foot-soldiers, to thee, Rudra, homage. And to him whose armour covers the whole of his body homage, to him who (with others) runs impetuously, to the lord of the sentient beings[37] homage, this homage to Rudra, to thee homage.

Generally speaking the words added by the poet correspond more or less and often rather freely with the unquoted portions of the Vedic original.

As appears from the stanzas 2 and 3 – but see also 9 (*dhanus tvaṃ sahasrākṣa śateṣudhe* in TS. 4, 5, 1 l: *ś. dhanur idam* in st. 9), 25; 53 and other places – the order in which the words appear in the Vedic text is sometimes – no doubt mainly *metri causa* – reversed.

Not infrequently, Aruṇādri has substituted other grammatical forms for those used by the Vedic author; in doing so he has eliminated a number of ancient words. Thus, in st. 7 the present *paśyanti* and the perfect *dadṛśuḥ* replace the two aorists *adṛśan*; in 11 *saṃvarjayatu*, *vṛṇaktu*; in 10 *astu* and *santu* appear instead of the two nominal sentences and the aorist *aneśan* of TS. 4, 5, 1 m; in 15 *padātipataye* occurs instead of *pattīnāṃ pataye*; in 43 *vicinvanti ye* instead of *vicinvatkebhyaḥ;* in 51 *stūyamanaḥ* instead of *stavānaḥ* (pass.). A plural form may replace a singular: in 8 *namas kurmahe* instead of *akaraṃ* (aor.) *namaḥ*; or a singular a plural: in 23 *namaḥ sūtāya* instead of the original (TS. 4, 5, 4 l) *saṃgrahītṛbhyaś ca vo namaḥ*. In 7 the compound *parisarpati* replaces *avasarpati*; in 24 two words (*patye rathānām*) are preferred to one (*rathibhyaḥ,* TS. 4, 5, 4 h).[38] In 11 the

adverb *dūrataḥ* stands for *āre*; in 23 *saṃghapataye* for *vrātebhyaḥ*; in 28 *śīghrāya* for *āśave*.

Sometimes a general term is replaced by one with a more special meaning: in st. 3 *kailāsaśaila* occupies the place of *giri* in *giriśanta*. In 25 fishermen take the place of hunters. Epithets may be replaced by others or subjected to some form of variation. Instead of *mīḍuṣe* (TS. 4, 5, 1 i) st. 8 reads *jagatīśektre suvṛṣṭyā*. Instead of TS. 4, 5, 5 ef śatadhanvane ca namo *giriśāya ca śipiviṣṭāya*[39] *ca* we find (st. 27) *tubhyaṃ bāṇaśatāya te śikhariṇām īśāya raśmyātmane*. These substitutions may of course be accompanied with other deviations from the original; thus in 7 Aruṇādri has *dṛṣṭo 'smābhir ajasram atyatiśayaṃ dadyāt* (opt.) *sadā naḥ śivam* instead of *sa dṛṣṭo mṛḍayāti* (subj.) *naḥ*.[40] The substitute may in itself be longer and be given another function in the sentence: in st. 12 we find *haritābhakeśaśirase* (with *śambho te namaḥ*) instead of *harikeśebhyaḥ* (with *vṛkṣebhyaḥ*!). In st. 26 the four compounds of TS. 4, 5, 5 cd

> *namo nīlagrīvāya ca kṣitikaṇṭhāya ca /*
> *namaḥ kapardine ca vyuptakeśāya ca*
> "Homage to the blue-necked one, and to the white-throated. Homage to the wearer of braids, and to him of shaven hair"

are represented by

> *kālālaṃkṛtakaṃdharāya dhavalagrīvāya*
> *bhāsvajjaṭābhārāyāciravīkṣitāya ca...*

Synonyms are preferred in a considerable number of cases. See e.g. 10 *jyārahitaṃ dhanur gataśarā tūṇiś ca* replacing *vijyaṃ dhanuḥ. . .viśalyo bāṇavān*.[41] Very often the choice of a synonym is not the only deviation from the text of the original passage. That is to say, when the poet had to resort to a more or less radical modification of the original text he often took occasion to add one or more words, to paraphrase or elaborate the passage which he was translating and to replace one of its elements by a synonym. Half-synonyms – e.g. *sahasranetra* (8) replacing *sahasrākṣa* – are not absent. The use of the expression *gopuṃsāṃ hananam* in 50 (instead of *goghna uta puruṣaghne* in TS. 4, 5, 10 g) led to – or was caused by – the addition of the words *kṛtasya bhavato yā krūratā vartate*. An interesting instance of elaboration is 24 *astu syandanaśāline natir iyaṃ padyāṃ ca saṃcāriṇe* replacing the simple *namo ratibhyo 'rathebhyaś ca vo namaḥ* (TS. 4, 5, 4 h). The words *namaḥ parṇyāya ca parṇaśadyāya ca* "homage to the leafy one and to him who relates to the falling of the leaves" (TS. 4, 5, 9 m) are 'freely rendered' in 41 by *śuṣkābhūtataruṣv api sthitimate rudrāya...*

In some cases such paraphrases[42] may create the impression that the author tried to provide his readers with an interpretation of the original text. The difficult word *kuluñca* (in *kuluñcānāṃ pataye* in TS. 4, 5, 3 h, explained by "to the lord of the pluckers (of hair)", ". . .of the thieves", or ". . .of the land-grabbers") seems to be given the sense of "mendicant" (19); the uncertain term *sobhāya* in TS. 4, 5, 6 e, which is sometimes left untranslated, but according to the commentaries on VS. 16, 33 denotes "the city of the Gandharvas" is explained in this way: *nivasate gandharvapuryām* (29). The vocative *drāpe* in TS. 4, 5, 10 a "O chaser, pursuer" is rendered by *lokānāṃ kugatiprakalpaka* (44). Compare also *jagatīsektre suvṛṣṭyā namaḥ* taking the place of *mīḍuṣe* (8). The first half of 26 is no doubt an attempt at explaining the functions of Śiva's aspects Bhava, Rudra, and Śarva mentioned in TS. 4, 5, 5 ab: *sarvatrāniśam udbhavāya ca namaḥ saṃsārahantre namaḥ sarvaṃ nāśāyate yugāntasamaye.*[43]

It can on the other hand be said with certainty that in our eyes the poet has committed many mistakes in the form of anachronisms. He is not however to blame for it because, like most of his colleagues, he was accustomed to an ahistorical view of his religion. There can moreover be hardly any doubt about his wish to make the contents of the ancient eulogy as clear as possible to his contemporaries. So he addressed Śiva as Gaurīpate (st. 2),[44] as Śaśin "the Moon" (14), Ardhanārīśvara (44), Nirādhāra "the One without a support" (44); makes mention of the god's residence and paradise, the Kailāsa (3), of the *saṃsāra* from which Śiva saves his worshippers (36 *saṃsārāmbudhitārākāya ca namaḥ*). The expression *kṣetrāṇāṃ pataye* in TS. 4, 5, 2 g "to the lord of the fields"[45] is given the sense of "the lord of the body (considered to be the 'field' of the indwelling soul)", that is, that of *kṣetrajña*: Aruṇādri renders it by *kāyapataye* (st. 13).

Of special interest is the repeated reference to Śiva's devout worshippers (*bhakta*): 3 *yā te rudra śivā tanūr. . .bhaktābhiṣṭaphalapradā*; 5 *bhaktebhyaḥ priyabhāṣaṇaṃ*; 14 *bhaktān pālayate*, passages without a counterpart in the original; in 16 the words *namaḥ sahamānāya* are amplified so as to become *bhaktānāṃ sakalāparādhasahamānāyāstu tubhyaṃ namaḥ*: that a god of overpowering strength is willing to employ his might to dispose of and forgive all the sins and errors of his devotees was indeed in the eyes of Aruṇādri's readers the most obvious interpretation. In 46 the vocative *rudra* – which occurs twice in TS. 4, 5, 10 d – is replaced by *bhagavan* and the last words of the stanza are *aṣṭāṅgapuraḥsareṇa namasā* (this is in the original) *dhīraṃ bhavantaṃ bhaje.*

Thus the Vedic litany was interpreted in the light of a *bhakti* religion of

later, post-Vedic times and transformed into a eulogy that was fully acceptable to the adherents of Śivaite *bhakti* movements. This was not very difficult. Every cult of a divine personality may involve some form of *bhakti* and the Śatarudriya contains many passages that may strike those who feel inclined to adore, in a spirit of contemplative personal devotion, a mighty god who may have pity even upon the man whom he is to punish.

ABBREVIATIONS USED

ĀpGS.	Āpastamba-Gṛhyasūtra
ĀpŚS.	Āpastamba-Śrautasūtra
Baudh.	Baudhāyana
BS.	Brahmasūtras
ChU.	Chāndogya-Upaniṣad
DhŚ.	Dharmaśāstra
GGS.	Gobhila-Gṛhyasūtra
HGS.	Hiraṇyakeśi-Gṛhyasūtra
KapS.	Kapiṣṭhala-Saṃhitā
KS.	Kāṭhaka-Saṃhitā
LiP.	Liṅga-Purāṇa
Mbh.	Mahābhārata
MGS.	Mānava-Gṛhyasūtra
MS.	Maitrāyaṇīya-Saṃhitā
MSS.	Mānava-Śrautasūtra
PB.	Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa
ṚV.	Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā
ŚB.	Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa
ŚvUp.	Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad
TB.	Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa
TS.	Taittirīya-Saṃhitā
VaikhŚS.	Vaikhānasa-Śrautasūtra
VārŚS.	Vārāha-Śrautasūtra
VasDhS.	Vasiṣṭha-Dharmaśāstra
VS.	Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā
Yājñ.	Yājñavalkya
YV.	Yajurveda

NOTES

1 For Rudra's nature see Gonda, J. *Viṣṇuism and Śivaism*. London: The Athlone Press, 1970, p. 5; for his relations with Agni, p. 11 and p. 147, n. 86.

2 For the sacrifice see Arbman, E. 'Rudra', *Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift, Filosofi,* **2**, 1922, Uppsala: Akademiska Bokhandeln, 1922.

3 The *udahāryaḥ* are certainly not the clouds as is Eggeling's opinion: Eggeling, J. *The*

Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, **IV**, *The Sacred Books of the East*, **XLIII**, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897, p. 151.

4 For the Rudras see also Agrawala, V.S. *Matsya-Purāṇa*, Varanasi: All-India Kashiraj Trust, 1963, p. 64.

5 For the importance of being the year, the full time cycle, a form of totality, see Gonda, J. *Die Religionen Indiens*, **I**, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960, p. 190–197.

6 As already observed by some of my predecessors this passage points to a six year's period of intercalation.

7 For variants and other differences between these schools see Keith, A.B. *The Veda of the Black Yajus School entitled Taittirīya Sanhitā*, Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard University Press, 1914, p. 353–362.

8 The Taittirīyas prefer the form Śatarudrīya with ī.

9 Cf. also ŚB. 9, 1, 2, 10; 13; 20.

10 See Caland, W. 'Altindische Zauberei', Amsterdam, *Proceedings Royal Dutch Acad., Lett. N.R.* **X**, 1, Amsterdam: J. Müller, 1908, p. 78.

11 For a complete translation see Gelder, J.M. van. '*The Mānava Śrautasūtra*,' *Śatapiṭaka Series* **27**, New Delhi. The Intern. Acad. of Indian Culture, 1963, p. 319.

12 For the divine name in general see Gonda, J. 'Notes on Names and the Name of God in Ancient India'. *Proceedings Royal Dutch Acad., Lett. N.R.* **LXXV**, 4, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publ. Comp., 1970.

13 Similarly in the *śravaṇaphala* of the Mahā-Upaniṣad in the text used by Deussen (see the following note), p. 746.

14 Deussen, P. *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda,* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1921), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963, p. 776.

15 See e.g. Deussen, Ibid., p. 535.

16 See also Deussen, Ibid., p. 730–734; 537–539.

17 For this passage see also Bhattacharji, S. *The Indian theogony*, Cambridge: The University Press, 1970, p. 149; for Rudra-Śiva and the snakes Arbman, Rudra, p. 250–253.

18 See PB. 21, 2, 3; GGS. 3, 2, 54.

19 For this expression used in connexion with the Śatarudrīya see also Mbh. 13, 146, 23.

20 In the Vedic liturgy the Śatarudriya is divided into three parts accompanying the

offerings according as the sacrificial ladle is held knee high, navel high, or face high; then follow the ten so-called *avatāna* offerings and the *anvārohas* with the last thirteen stanzas. See e.g. ĀpŚS. 17, 11, 4 f. Nīlakaṇṭha's re-interpretation is *caturvidhaṃ śuddhaśabalasūtravirāṭbhedena bhagavadrūpasya cāturvidhyāt stotram apy asya caturvidham.*

[21] See *The Śāntiparvan*, being the twelfth Book of the Mahābhārata, III, B, ed. by Belvalkar, Sh. K. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1954, p. 2058 (line 160).

[22] See also Nīlakaṇṭha's comment.

[23] Compare Bhagavadgītā 10, 22 (and 9, 17). In ChUp. 1, 1, 2 the Sāmaveda receives special honour as being the essence of the Ṛgveda from which almost all its verses are derived.

[24] For other translations of this compound see Dumont, P.E. *L'Īśvaragītā*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press and Paris: P. Geuthner, 1933, p. 139.

[25] Eliot, Ch. Hinduism and Buddhism, II, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, p. 183.

[26] See also Chaudhuri, Roma, *Doctrine of Śrīkaṇṭha*, **I**, Calcutta: J.B. Chaudhuri, Inst. of Oriental Learning, 1962, p. 70; 95; 160 f.; 164 f. etc.

[27] See e.g. Aufrecht, Th., in *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenl. Gesellschaft*, **27**, p. 51; Keith, A.B. *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, 3rd ed. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1948, p. 344; Gerow, E. 'Indian poetics'. *History of Indian Literature*, edited by J. Gonda, V, 3. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1976, p. 220.

[28] *Stotrasamuccaya. A collection of rare and unpublished stotras*, ed. by Pandit K. Parameswara Aithal, I. Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1969, p. 222–239.

[29] Thus in the final stanza (65); also Aruṇagiri; he seems to have been a member of the family of the Aruṇagirināthas of Mulluṇḍrum.

[30] As is well known Sāmba, the son of Kṛṣṇa and Jāmbavatī, is said to have promoted the cult of the sun (see Stietencron, H. v. *Indische Sonnenpriester*. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1966. In course of time however the Sūrya cult was completely absorbed by Śivaism so that Sāmba became one of the names of Śiva.

[31] Aithal, Ibid., p. 305.

[32] However, the end of a stanza usually coincides with the end of a stanza or subsection in the Vedic text.

[33] Compare also st. 5; 6; 7; 9; 50 etc. The second half of the stanzas 56–60 is repeated from stanza 55.

[34] See 3; in 13 *annānāṃ pataye namaḥ; puṣṭānāṃ pataye namaḥ*; in 17 *stanānāṃ pataye*; in 53 *sumanā bhava / parame vṛkṣa āyudhaṃ nidhāya* (*s. bh. atha p. v. n. ā.*); in 54 *bāhvos tava hetayaḥ.*

[35] Cf. 5 *śambho*; 37 *rudrāya*; notice also a superfluous *asmābhiḥ* in 7 etc.

[36] Not all stanzas are successful; see e.g. 5; 10.

[37] Notice the reinterpretation *satvanām* (*sattvānām*).

[38] Similarly: 26 *pātre paśūnām* replacing *paśupataye* (TS. 4, 5, 5 b); 27 *ākāśān mahate* standing for *bṛhate* (TS. 4, 5, 5 i); 28 *vegavaty ambhasi* for *śībhyāya* (TS. 4, 5, 5 n).

[39] For this word see Gonda, J. *Aspects of early Viṣṇuism*, 2nd ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1969, p. 106.

[40] See e.g. also st. 19: TS. 4, 5, 3 ik; 21 *pariṣadāṃ rūpāya tubhyaṃ namaḥ*: TS. 4, 5, 3 q *namaḥ sabhābhyaḥ sabhāpatibhyaś ca vo namaḥ.*

[41] See e.g. also 13 *rudrāyāttaśarāya* instead of *rudrāyātatāvine*; 18 *svāmine* instead of *pataye*; 21 *vājināṃ svāmine* instead of *aśvapatibhyaḥ*; 29 *mūlasthāya* instead of *budhniyāya*; see also 25! In 23–24 etc. *ānatiḥ* or *natiḥ* replace *namaḥ.*

[42] See also 30; 35 *bhītiṃ kalpayate* instead of *bhīmāya.*

[43] Rudra is Śiva's devastating form, as Śarva he is often identified with Agni.

[44] For Gaurīśa etc. see Hopkins, E.W. *Epic mythology*, Strassburg: K.J. Trübner, 1915, p. 225; on the moon and Śiva, Ibid., p. 222.

[45] For the literal meaning of the term see e.g. KS. 24, 10: 102, 5; for *kṣetrajña* compare Yājñ. 3, 178; BhG. 13, 1 f. etc.

MINORU HARA

HINDU CONCEPTS OF TEACHER SANSKRIT *GURU* AND *ĀCĀRYA*[1]

The Sanskrit words *ācārya* and *guru* both have the meaning of 'teacher'. The etymology of *ācārya* is not certain. It is generally supposed to derive from *ācāra*, right conduct, or from *ācarati*, to approach, to go to as for instruction, or from *ācinoti*, to accumulate knowledge, wealth or merit.[2] *Guru* derives from an Indo-european word for 'heavy', its semantic development being from heavy to important, awesome, thus, an elder, a teacher.[3] However, it is not with etymologies that we are here concerned, but with the finished product. In Sanskrit commentaries and versified texts the two words are freely interchanged, as though they were exact synonyms.[4] However, the two words had separate origins, and to attribute equal semantic value to these apparently synonymous words may efface the subtle nuance attached to each.[5] In the pages which follow, we shall examine briefly the passages where these words occur, bring to the light the aspects in which the two words distinguish themselves from each other, and ascertain several distinctive connotations of both words. It is with gratitude and respect toward my *guru*, who is at the same time a great *ācārya* in Indological Studies, that I here take up the Hindu concepts of teacher, and dedicate this small contribution to the *guru-pūjā-kaumudī* of Professor Daniel H.H. Ingalls.

I

As a word used in the sense of teacher, *ācārya* is older than *guru*. In Atharvaveda 11.5, which praises the Brahmacārin the *ācārya* is said to seek out a vedic student (*brahmacārin*),[6] to take (a student) as a pupil (*upanayamāna*), to bring about the rebirth of this student,[7] and to fashion both earth and sky.[8] In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Śāṇḍilya and Sāptarathavāhini are called *ācārya* and *antevāsin*.[9] Here the manner of the initiation-ceremony (*upanayana*) is described.[10] That is, upon the arrival of Brahmacārin, the student, the *ācārya* asks him his name,[11] and takes his right hand with the words "Indra's disciple thou art; Agni is thy teacher

M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 93–118.

(*ācārya*). I am thy teacher (*ācārya*)."[12] Taking him as a pupil the *ācārya* teaches the Savitṛ hymn.[13]

The Upaniṣads show this same tradition.

> *ācārya-kulād vedam adhītya yathāvidhānam* (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.15.1).
> "Having learned the Veda from the house of a teacher according to rule."
> *vedam anūcyācāryo 'ntevāsinam anuśāsti: satyaṃ vada dharmaṃ cara* (Taittirīya Upaniṣad 1.11.1).
> "Having taught the Veda, the teacher instructs the pupil. Speak the truth, practise virtue."

This characteristic feature of the *ācārya* coincides exactly with the definition given by Manusmṛti and Amarakoṣa.

> *upanīya tu yaḥ śiṣyaṃ vedam adhyāpayed dvijaḥ*
> *sakalpaṃ sarahasyaṃ ca tam ācāryaṃ pracakṣate* (Manusmṛti 2.140).
> "They call that Brahmin who initiates a pupil and teaches him the Veda together with the Kalpa and Rahasya, the teacher (of the latter)."
> *mantra-vyākhyā-kṛd ācārya ādeṣṭā* (Amarakoṣa 2.7.7).
> "He who explains the mantra is *ācārya* and guide."[14]

But the *ācārya*'s instruction is not limited to Vedic knowledge. He may impart to his student knowledge in general. The verb *vid*-(to know) and its substantive *vidyā* appear often in connection with the *ācārya*.

> *ācāryādd haiva vidyā viditā sādhiṣṭhaṃ prāpayatīti* (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 4.9.3).
> "That the knowledge which has been learned from teacher best helps one to attain his end."
> *athādhividyam: ācāryaḥ pūrva-rūpam, antevāsy uttara-rūpam, vidyā saṃdhiḥ pravacanaṃ samdhānam ity adhividyam* (Taittirīya Upaniṣad 1.3.3).
> "Now as to knowledge: the teacher is the prior form, the pupil is the latter form, knowledge is their junction, instruction is the connection. Thus, with regard to knowledge."[15]

From these passages, one may say that in Brāhmaṇical texts the *ācārya* functions as a teacher especially of vedic knowledge and in the Upaniṣads as a teacher especially of philosophical and metaphysical knowledge, but sometimes of knowledge in general. In both sorts of text, he is a teacher at whose house a young Brahmin should live (*ācārya-kula*)[16] during his first

stage of life, the stage of studentship. The *ācārya* gives to his pupils a second birth (*dvitīya janma*). In the Upaniṣads the pupil approaches his *ācārya* with fuel in his hands[17] and makes the formal request: *śādhi mām*, "instruct me."[18] The *ācārya* in turn guides his pupil to final liberation by granting him esoteric knowledge. We might say that he is an institutional instructor of intellectual and objective knowledge. In other words that which mediates (*saṃdhi*)[19] between the *ācārya* and the pupil is knowledge of an intellectual and objective character.

Furthermore it is worth noting that *ācārya* is often mentioned together with other respectable elders in the non-versified Upaniṣadic texts.

> *prāṇo ha pitā, prāṇo ṃātā, prāṇo bhrātā, praṇaḥ svasā, prāṇa ācāryaḥ, prāṇo brāhmaṇaḥ* (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.51.1).
> "The vital breath is father, the vital breath is mother, the vital breath is brother, the vital breath is sister, the vital breath is teacher, the vital breath is Brahmin."
> *mātṛ-devo bhava, pitṛ-devo bhava, ācārya-devo bhava, atithi-devo bhava* (Taittirīya Upaniṣad 1.11.2).
> "Be one to whom the mother is a god, be one to whom the father is a god, be one to whom the teacher is a god, be one to whom the guest is a god."[20]

Parents, grandparents, Brahmins, elder brothers and sisters, and fathers-in-law are placed in the same category with the *ācārya*. One could hardly expect such juxtaposition in the case of *guru*, for the word itself signifies these respectable elders in its broader sense, as we shall see later.[21]

Next in Epic and Classical Sanskrit literature we meet many *ācārya*s who are proficient in various departments of arts and sciences. Thus, there is an abundance of cases where the word *ācārya* is preceded by the words indicative of these arts, such as *vīṇa*-(lute), *nṛtta*-(dance), *yuddha*-(warfare), *dhanus*-(bow), and so forth.[22] The case could be best illustrated by a passage from the Daśakumāracarita in which are enumerated the curricula for the royal princes to be mastered.

> *tataḥ sakala-lipi-jñanaṃ nikhila-deśīyabhāṣā-pāṇḍityaṃ ṣaḍaṅga-sahita-veda-samudāya-kovidatvaṃ kāvya-nāṭakākhyānakākhyāyiketi-hāsa-citrakathā-sahita-purāṇa-gaṇa-naipuṇyaṃ dharma-śabda-jyotis-tarka-mīmāṃsādi-samasta-śāstra-nikara-cāturyaṃ kauṭilya-kāmandakīyādi-nīti-paṭala-kauśalam vīṇādy-aśeṣa-vādya-dāksyaṃ saṃgīta-sāhitya-hāritvaṃ maṇi-mantrauṣadhādi-māyā-prapañca-cuñcutvaṃ mātaṅga-turaṅgādi-vāhanārohaṇa-pāṭavaṃ vividhāyudha-*

prayoga-caṇatvaṃ caurya-durodarādi-kapaṭa-kalā-prauḍhatvaṃ ca tat-tad-ācāryebhyaḥ samyag labdhvā. . .(Daśakumāracarita, p. 23, line 11–p. 24, line 4).
"Then, having acquired properly from such and such teachers (*ācārya*) the whole knowledge (*jñāna*) of writing, erudition (*pāṇḍitya*) in entire local dialects, proficiency (*kovidatva*) in the mass of the Vedic texts with the six ancillary sciences, cleverness (*naipuṇya*) in poetry, drama, short tales, romances, *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* furnished with wonderful stories, skill (*cāturya*) in the whole collection of treatises (*śāstra*) such as law, grammar, astronomy, logic and philosophy, skillfulness (*kauśalya*) in the mass of political science as taught by Kauṭilya, Kāmandaka and others, skill (*dākṣya*) in all sorts of musical instruments such as the lute, the charming mastery (*hāritva*) over the arts of singing with music and dancing, the skill (*cuñcutva*) in mysterious application of gems, magical spells, herbs and others, dexterity (*pāṭava*) in riding upon elephants, horses and other carriages, reknown skill (*caṇatva*) in the various weapons and the adeptness (*prauḍhatva*) in cheating arts such as thievery, gambling and others. . ."

Here are enumerated the various departments of arts and sciences in which the young princes are supposed to be trained by their respective teachers (*ācārya*). We have here a list of *ācārya*s who represent authority in the art of writing (*lipi*), in various vernaculars (*deśīya-bhāṣā*), in Vedic lore, in the various arts such as *kāvya, nāṭaka, ākhyānaka*, etc., in the treatises (*śāstra*), in music (*vādya*), in the applied sciences (*maṇi, mantra, auṣadha*), in the horse-ride and archery, and even in the craft of treachery (*kapaṭa-kalā*). Those who are proficient in these arts and sciences and are considered as authorities in their respective fields are called *ācārya*.[23] We have a list of the *ācārya*s also in the Bāṇa's Kādambarī, where these arts and sciences are collectively called *vidyā*,[24] or sometimes *kalā-vijñāna* and *vidyā*.[25]

In the Pāli Jātakas *ācarya* is the teacher from whom a young boy is expected to learn *sippa*,[26] while staying at teacher's house (*ācariya-kula*) for some period of time. Young boys are sent by their fathers to Taxila,[27] where the famous Professor (*disāpāmokkhācariya*)[28] gathers around himself a multitude of pupils (*māṇava-parivuta*). Some of these pupils bring with them their teacher's fee (*ācariya-dhana, ācariya-bhāga*)[29] and stay with the teacher as full-time students, while others who are unable to afford the teacher's fee work for the teacher (*ācariyassa kammaṃ katvā*) in day time, and get instructions from him only at night.[30] The former kind is called *ācariya-bhāga-dāyaka*, and the latter kind is termed *dhammantevāsika*.

Since these *ācariya*s run a sort of educational institution, receiving young boys one after another from various parts of the country, it is natural for these pupils to have a sense of group-belonging among themselves (*ekācariya-kule uggahita-sippa bāla-sahāya*).[31] We have also here such titles as Professorship (*ācariya-ṭṭhāna*)[32] and tutorship (*piṭṭhi-ācariya*).[33]

Occasionally the word *ācariya* in the Pāli Jātaka is used synonymously with *purohita*, royal priest.[34] Although in the Epic and Smṛti literature *ācārya* and *purohita* are enumerated separately,[35] it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the one from the other.[36] A reader of the Mahāummaggajātaka (546) will notice that Kevaṭṭa, who is said to be the *purohita* of the king Cūḷanī-Brahmadatta, is addressed repeatedly by the king as *ācariya*.[37] It is the case also with Khaṇḍahāla, who is the *purohita* of Candakumāra (542),[38] and we have the same examples in the Chavaka-jātaka (309)[39] and Ruhaka-jātaka (191).[40]

Sometimes again the Pāli Jātaka juxtaposes *ācariya* and *upajjhāya*. It is especially the case with the introductory part of the Jātaka stories.[41] The Vinaya-commentaries define *ācariya* as teaching and interpreting the holy texts, and *upajjhāya* as exercising disciplinary authority.[42] Of these two the *upajjhāya* had a more prominent part than the *ācariya* especially at the time of *upasampadā* service.[43] The greater importance which is attached to the disciplinary authority (*upajjhāya*) over the academic authority (*ācariya*) seems to have an echo in the pseudo-epic portion of the Mahābhārata wherein the *upādhyāya* is worthy of ten *ācārya*,[44] for generally in Smṛti literature the *ācārya* is deemed to be higher than the *upādhyāya*.[45]

In the commentary to the Vinaya-piṭaka, Samantapāsādikā, four and sometimes five kinds of *ācariya* are enumerated by Buddhaghosa: *pabbajjācariya*, *upasampadācariya*, *nissayācariya*, *uddesācariya* and *ovādācariya*.[46] He further classifies *ācariya* into two categories, primary (*pubbācariya*) and secondary (*pacchācariya*). Of these two the first is one's parents (*mātā-pitara*) and seven belong to the second group. These seven are the *ācariya*s who teach horse-riding, archery and others, who receive a pupil as the pupil's refuge (*saraṇa*), who give him discipline (*sīla*), who initiate him (*pabbājenti*), who teach the Buddha's word (*buddhavacana*), who give him ordination (*upasampādenti*), and who lead him to the way to conversion (*sotāpatti-magga*).[47] A similar division of *ācārya* into *uddeśanācārya* and *vācanācārya* is also found in the Jaina community.[48]

Next, in scientific literature we often meet cases where the views advocated by one's predecessors are introduced by the plural form (*ity ācāryāḥ*). This usage occurs in the Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra more than fifty times, and this has been discussed by H. Jacobi,[49] J.J. Meyer,[50] P.V. Kane,[51]

and recently by F. Wilhelm.[52] Though few in number, *ācāryāḥ* of this kind make their appearance in such texts as Nirukta, Dharmasūtras, grammatical treatises,[53] Kāmasūtra and Bṛhatsaṃhitā.[54] These *ācāryāḥ* are not the direct teachers of the authors of these works, but simply famous scholars of the past. Thus, it is not necessary for these authors to follow faithfully the doctrine taught by these *ācāryāḥ*.[55] Rather, these *ācāryāḥ* are the figures introduced in Indian polemic tradition with the intention of emphasizing one's superiority over these predecessors.[56]

Finally, let us look at two instances of the occurrence of the word *ācārya* in a farce, the Mattavilāsa. The first instance is found in the comic remark of Devasomā, Kapālin's wench. When the Kapālin sings of a tippler's dance, she addresses him: *aho rasio khu āayyo* (what a racy Professor you are, *TSS*. 55, p. 9 line 7). The second is in Kapālin's suggestion to his wench to give the remnant of some brandy to a Buddhist monk: *śeṣam ācāryāya pradīyatām* (give the remnant to this Professor, p. 16, line 2). We notice here that the word *ācārya* is used in an ironical and pejorative way with the intention of evoking comic response in the audience.

II

Now, let us examine the word *guru*. Originally *guru* meant 'respectable elders' in general. It is sometimes difficult in Classical Sanskrit literature to ascertain whether the word conveys the specific meaning of teacher, or refers to elders in general.[1] In Smṛti literature *guru* is defined as a Brahmin who performs the rites, the *niṣeka* (the ceremony performed upon the conception of a child) and so forth, and who brings up the child by giving it food.[2] In commentary literature *guru* often refers to one who gives young people beneficial instruction (*hitopadeśa*).[3] However, in the following passages *guru* has its specific meaning, which one may contrast with that of *ācārya*. For the sake of clarity we shall first give a list of the words which are either associated or compounded with the word *guru*.

bhakti *yasya deve parā bhaktir yathā deve tathā gurau*
tasyaite kathitā hy arthāḥ prakāśante mahātmanaḥ (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.23).
ko vā gurur yo hi hitopadeṣṭā, śiṣyaś ca ko yo guru-bhakti-pūrṇaḥ
ko dīrgharogo 'sata eva saṅgaḥ, kiṃ auṣadhaṃ sādhu-samāgamo hi (*BIS*. 1944).[4]

śuśrūṣā *guru-śuśrūṣayā vidyā puṣkalena dhanena vā*
atha vā vidyayā vidyā caturthaṃ nopalabhyate (*BIS.* 2178).
yathā khanan khanitreṇa naro vāry adhigacchati
tathā guru-gatāṃ vidyāṃ śuśrūṣur adhigacchati (*BIS.* 5095).[5]

nam- etc. *dharmam atulam adhigamya muner munaye nanāma sa yato gurāv iva* (Saundarananda 3.27).
vāñcchā sajjana-saṃgame para-guṇe prītir gurau namratā
vidyāyāṃ vyasanaṃ svayoṣiti ratir lokāpavādād bhayam (*BIS.* 6031).[6]

mānana *jantūnām avanaṃ jineśa-mahanaṃ jaināgamākarṇanam*
sādhūnāṃ namanaṃ madāpanayanaṃ samyag guror mānanam (*BIS.* 2329).
abhyanandac ca svāgata-girā gurum ivābhyāgataṃ bahu manyamānaḥ svenāsanenāsaddhvam atreti nimantrayāṃ cakāra (Harṣacarita p. 238, lines 17–19).

sevā *svarga-cyutānām iha jīva-loke catvāri nityaṃ hṛdaye vasanti*
dāna-prasaṅgo madhurā ca vāṇī devārcanaṃ sadguru-sevanaṃ ca (*BIS.* 7315).
kiṃ bhuṣaṇād bhūṣaṇam asti śīlaṃ tīrthaṃ paraṃ kiṃ svamano viśuddham
kiṃ astị heyaṃ ca kāntā sevyaṃ sadā kiṃ guru-vedavākyam (*BIS.* 1777).[7]

Besides these words of devotion, veneration and service,[8] words for honouring (*pūj-, pūjana*)[9] and worship (*upās-, upāsana*)[10] are associated with *guru* as well as *ācārya*. Furthermore, among other words for emotion which appear in context with *guru* we can enumerate those indicative of affection (*sneha, vatsala*), shame (*lajjā, trapā*), and regard (*apekṣ-*), although the *guru* here refers in most cases to respectable elders rather than to the teacher.

sneha *yauvanāvatāre hi śaiśavenaiva saha galati gurujana-snehaḥ* (Kādambarī p. 496, lines 9–10).
utsaṅga-vardhitānāṃ guruṣu bhavet kīdṛśaḥ snehaḥ (Vikramorvaśīya 5.10).

vatsala *guṇair ārādhayāmāsus te guruṃ guru-vatsalāḥ* (Raghuvaṃśa 10.85).

lajjā *lajjāmi kkhu ajjautteṇa saddhaṃ guruaṇa-samīvaṃ gantuṃ* (Śakuntala 7.25.16, *HOS.* 16).
bhartṛdārike, kiṃ lajjayā gurujanāpekṣayā vā (Kādambarī p. 299, line 7).[11]

trapā *anavarata-mukta-jvālena madanahutabhujāntardahyamāno 'pi gurujanatrapayā na sadyaḥ-samuddhṛtārdrāravinda-śayanam abhajata* (Kādambarī p. 434, line 9–p. 435, line 1).
apekṣ- *api ca dūragate 'pi hi śoke nanv idānīm apekṣaṇīya evāyam jyeṣṭhaḥ pitṛkalpo bhrātā bhavatyā guruḥ* (Harṣacarita p. 255, lines 16–17).
yad-arthaṃ kula-kramo na gaṇitaḥ, guravo nāpekṣitāḥ, dharmo nānuruddhaḥ (Kādambarī p. 536, lines 1–2).[12]

Careful observation of the words which modify the word *guru* here will show that the *guru* is an object of honour (*mānana, pūjana*), veneration (*nam-, praṇāma*), sincere devotion (*bhakti*) and personal attendance (*sevā, śuśrūṣā*), and that these attitudes toward the *guru* are tinged very much with emotion rather than characterized by a mediation of intelligence, the distinctive feature of the relationship between the *ācārya* and his pupil, as we have seen above.

In addition to those words compounded with *guru* expressing veneration and devotion, the word (*vacana, vākya*, etc.) of the *guru* is considered as an imperative, and the order (*ājñā*) of the *guru* is categorial.

na mayā guru-vacanam atikrānta-pūrvam (Pratimānāṭaka 3.4 prose *TSS*. 42, p. 58, line 10).
ity uktas tena sa prītas tārkṣyo bhūtānukampinā
tatheti pratipede tad-vākyaṃ tasya guror iva (Kathāsaritsāgara 22.244).[13]
sa ca putraḥ so 'pi śiṣyo ya ājñaṁ pālayed guroḥ
na kṣemaṃ tasya mūḍhasya yo guror avacaskaraḥ (*BIS*. 7608).
ājñayā saha gurur babhūva bhujaśikhara-deśaḥ (Kādambarī p. 152, lines 6–7).[14]

The instruction (*upadeśa*) of the *guru* rectifies errors, while illuminating the right way, and he who does not follow the *guru*'s instruction ought to be a subject of derision (*hasanīya*).

haraty atimalinaṃ andhakāram iva doṣajātaṃ pradoṣa-samaya-niśākara iva gurūpadeśaḥ (Kādambarī p. 197, lines 1–2).
vinā gurūpadeśaṃ yo yathā-dṛṣṭi pravartate
sa eva hasanīyaḥ syāj jaṭino mūrkha-śiṣyavat (*BIS*. 6134).[15]

The *guru* remains as the authority to his pupil, regardless of how ignorant and immoral he might be.

avidyo vā savidyo vā gurur eva janārdanaḥ
mārgastho vā vimārgastho gurur eva sadā gatiḥ (Saurapurāṇa 15.33).

The seat (*āsana*) of the *guru* should not be traversed,

mānanīyaṃ ca guruvan nollaṅghanaṃ arhati guror āsanam (Harṣacarita p. 105, lines 20–21).

One must not tread upon the *guru*'s shadow (*chāyā*),

na cākrāmed guroś cchāyāṃ na tathājñāṃ guroḥ sadā (Saurapurāṇa 18.31).

One must never despise the *guru* (*avajñā*),

na kena cana vṛttena hy avajñeyo gurur bhavet
na ca mātā na ca pitā tādṛśo yādṛśo guruḥ (MBh.12.109.24).[16]

When one hears of censure (*parivāda, nindā*) against his *guru* by others, he is supposed either to shut his ears with his hands, or leave the place.

guror yatra parīvādo nindā vāpi pravartate
karṇau tatra pidhātavyau gantavyaṃ vā tato 'nyataḥ (Manusmṛti 2.200).[17]

We have seen above that the word *ācārya* appears in an ironical and pejorative context, but such is never the case with *guru*. It is prescribed for the pupil never to ridicule the *guru* (*parihāsa*),

paradārān paradravyaṃ parivādaṃ parasya ca
parihąsaṃ guroḥ sthāne cāpalyaṃ ca vivarjayet (*BIS*. 3924).

Again, as we have mentioned above, while one can criticize and even dissent from the views advocated by the *ācārya*, it is impossible for the pupil to oppose (*vivad-*) his *guru*, the object of the pupil's due respect.

guruṃ dṛṣṭvā samuttiṣṭhed abhivādya kṛtāñjaliḥ
naitair upaviśet sārddhaṃ vivaden nātma-kāraṇāt (Kūrmapurāṇa 2.12.29).

Those who dissent (*vipratipad-*) from the *guru* with hatred (*dveṣa*), and abandon (*tyaj-*) the *guru* are destined to die or to live in hell.

pratipannaṃ guruṃ yaś ca mohād vipratipadyate
sa janma-koṭiṃ narake pacyate puruṣādhamaḥ (Saurapurāṇa 15.34)
jīvitārtham api dveṣād gurubhir naiva bhāṣaṇam

> *udito 'pi guṇair anyair guru-dveṣī pataty adhaḥ* (Kūrmapurāṇa 2.12.30).
> *guru-tyāgī labhen mṛtyuṃ mantra-tyāgī daridratām*
> *guru-mantra-parityāgāt siddho 'pi narakaṃ vrajet* (Saurapurāṇa 68.11).[18]

When one happens to displease his *guru* and the latter curses the former, this *guru-śāpa* (teacher's curse) would be a mortal blow to the pupil. Urvaśī, who had incurred a curse from Bharata, lost her mind and trod upon the forbidden garden (*kumāra-vana*),

> *tado bhattuṇo aṇuṇaaṃ appaḍivajjamāṇā guru-sāva-saṃmūḍha-hiaā visumaridadevadā-ṇiamā ammakā-jaṇa-pariharaṇijjaṃ kumāra-vaṇaṃ paviṭṭhā* (Vikramorvaśīya 4.2.21–23, *NSP.* p. 88, lines 3–4).[19]

III

Let us summarize here the result of our above investigation. Although there is an overlapping semantic field wherein *ācārya* and *guru* are used as synonyms, we can enumerate the following points which clearly distinguish the one from the other.

First, *ācārya* is preceded by words indicative of various sorts of *śilpa* (Pāli *sippa*) and *kalā*. Thus, *ācārya*s represent authority in various departments of arts and sciences.[1] The word *guru*, on the other hand, is never compounded with the words indicative of these *śilpa*s.

Second, the word *ācārya* often stands in the vocative case. It sometimes means the *purohita*, especially when addressed by the king. But *guru* is rarely used in the vocative case.[2]

Third, *ācārya* is often preceded or followed by proper names. We have such examples as Bhairavācārya,[3] ācariya-Kevaṭṭa[4] and ācārya-Viṣṇugupta.[5] In these examples *ācārya* is used as a title and we can translate them as 'Professor such as such.'[6] However, we have no such use in the case of *guru*.[7]

Fourth, *ācārya* often appears in the plural form as representing authority in the various departments of arts and sciences. The word *ācāryāḥ* is used in introducing views advocated by teachers of the past. One can hardly expect *guru* to appear in the plural form, except when the word means 'respected elders' in general (*guru-jana, guravaḥ = mātā-pitarau, bhrātṛ,* etc.).

Fifth, *ācārya* can be used in the pejorative and even ironical way. Its use in the Mattavilāsa evokes a humourous response from the audience. But the word *guru* never appears in such a comic and pejorative context.

Sixth, an emotional and personal value is attached to *guru*. Words like *bhakti, śuśrūṣā, pūjana*, etc. are more often associated with *guru* than with *ācārya*.

Finally, a curious distinction in the use of *ācārya* and *guru* appears in connection with the notion of crime. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the murder of one's *ācārya* (*ācārya-han*) is considered a crime equal to the murder of one's father or mother, etc. In all the passages I have been able to collect it is the word *ācārya* that is here used. On the other hand, the word *guru* is invariably used in the context of the crime of *guru-talpaga*[9] (incest with one's teacher's wife), a crime which the Smṛti-writers categorize as one of the five mortal sins.[10] This distinction between *ācārya-han* and *guru-talpaga* may indicate another connotational difference of *ācārya* and *guru*, the former being objective and institutional, and the latter subjective and personal.

One may notice one more point of distinction in the usage of these words. That is to say, the classical writers use the two words separately, while pointing to the one and same person: *ācārya* in the narrative portion and *guru* in conversation. In the last chapter of the Harṣacarita where Bāṇa delineates the meeting of the king Harṣa with the Buddhist master Divakaramitra (pp. 240–253), Divakaramitra is addressed by Harṣa and others as *guru*,[11] and described in the narrative portion as *ācārya*.[12] The same distinction is seen also in the meeting of the king Puṣpabhūti with the great Śaiva master Bhairavācārya (p. 105, lines 13–23).[13] Another example can be taken from the versified passages of the Kathāsaritsāgara, in which Somadeva gives an account of how Purūravas incurred a curse from Tumburu, the dancing teacher of *apsara*s Rambhā, when the former laughed at Rambhā's art and mocked her teacher.[14] This distinction, that is, the use of *ācārya* in the objective, narrative portion and of *guru* in the subjective, conversational portion, may also indicate that *guru* has a more personal and subjective connotation (*yuṣmad-guru, mama guru*), while to *ācārya* is attached a more impersonal objective value.

A small text on which I have been working lately, the *Ratna-ṭīkā*, furnishes a fairly precise distinction between *ācārya* and *guru*. The *Ratna-ṭīkā* is a manual of Pāśupata Śaivism written by Bhāsarvajña in the tenth century. In this text the *guru* is often called *anugrahakārin* (he who favours the pupil with instruction).[15] This epithet is never applied to the *ācārya*. On the other hand, the *ācārya* is often called *apavarga-gantṛ* (he who goes to final liberation),[16] but this is never said of the *guru*.

Secondly, the word of a *guru* should be believed (*guror vākyāni ca śraddheyāni*).[17] One should ascertain the *guru*'s intention and do his good

even if it is something not mentioned in scripture (*jñātvā tad-abhiprāyam aśāstroktam api tad-dhitaṃ kartavyam*).[18] His intention or injunction is sometimes superior even to scripture,[19] whereas the words of an *ācārya* may be accepted or not as the pupil wishes. The pupil should have the ability to distinguish right and wrong in what the *ācārya* says, and should take the former and abandon and latter (*ācārya-deśīyair uktārthānāṃ yuktāyukta-pravi-bhāgena pratipatti-tyāga-sāmarthyam apohaḥ*).[20]

Third, the *guru* is a teacher who by interview and conversation destroys the sins of, and begets merit in large measure in respectable persons who come to him with faith (*śraddhāvatām āśramiṇāṃ darśana-saṃbhāṣaṇ-ādibhir api pāpaghnaḥ puṇyātiśayakārin*).[21] One should attend upon him with *utthāna* (standing up as a sign of respect) etc.[22] The *ācārya*, on the other hand, is the cause of knowledge (*satām ācāryo jñāna-hetuś ca*)[23] and by satisfying the *ācārya* with the pronunciation of the proper words, one attains to knowledge, whereupon false knowledge disappears (*nirduṣṭa-śabdoccāraṇenācāryam paritoṣayato mithyājñāna-mala-nivṛttau vidyābhivyaktir bhavati*).[24]

Fourth, several qualifications are prescribed for the *ācārya*. The *ācārya* should be a Brahmin who himself wishes to attain final liberation, and he must know the eight categories of Pāśupata.[25] It is required of him to have knowledge of the meaning of scripture and to have faith in it.[26] On the other hand, I have come across no such qualifications for the *guru*. It is sufficient for the pupil to serve the *guru* properly, obey him and devote himself to him. The words *śuśrūṣā* and *bhakti* appear as second members of *tatpuruṣa*-compound exclusively with *guru*.

Through these contrasts above, we may be justified in saying that *guru* is a personal and subjective master and that the relation between *guru* and pupil (*śiṣya*) is a rather emotional one. Devotion and obedience are the media which tie one to the other, whereas the *ācārya* is an objective and institutional teacher and the relation between *ācārya* and pupil (*antevāsin*) is purely an intellectual one. One is more emotional, the other is more intellectual. One has emotional subjective warmth and the other has intellectual objective coldness. Emotional-intellectual, warmth-coldness, subjective-objective, personal-institutional, these contrasts can be seen between *guru* and *ācārya*, who are comparable to French *maître* and *professeur*. It is established that *ācārya* is a teacher against whom one may have an objection and from whom one may vehemently and emphatically dissent. The personal and emotional attachment is somewhat foreign to the idea of teacher as indicated by the word *ācārya*. *Guru*, on the other hand, is a spiritual master to whom one must always be obedient and to whom one

devotes himself. To have an objection against one's *guru*, to criticise him, or to dissent from him would be quite impossible for a true pupil. Originally the word *guru* meant 'heavy' or 'awesome' as an adjective, and 'the elders' in general as a substantive, and it is not entirely unthinkable that the idea of the Polynesian *mana* could be attributed to this word *guru*.[27] This original meaning or connotation is still preserved in the concept of *guru* as a teacher who is an important and awesome personality in the pupil's mind.

NOTES

[1] This is a revised and enlarged edition of my previous communication, which was originally submitted to Ann Arbor Conference of the American Oriental Society, April, 1959. I would like to express my thanks to Mr. Ruben L.F. Habito, a graduate student at the University of Tokyo, who took trouble to read through my original manuscript and to correct my English.

Abbreviations used in this paper are as follows, *ABORI: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* (Poona), *AO: Acta Orientalia* (Copenhagen), *ASS: Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series* (Poona), *BEFEO: Bulletin de l'Ecole francaise d'extrême-orient* (Paris), *BIS:* O. Böhtlingk, *Indische sprüche* (Osnabrück, Wiesbaden, 1966, second ed.), *BSOS: Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, University of London, *ChSS: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series* (Banaras), *CPD: A Critical Pāli Dictionary* begun by V. Trenckner (Copenhagen), *GOS: Gaekwad's Oriental Series* (Baroda), *H.: Harivaṃśa* (Poona Critical Edition), *HOS: Harvard Oriental Series* (Cambridge, Mass.), *IIJ: Indo-Iranian Journal* (Dordrecht), *J: The Jātaka*, ed., by V. Fausboll (*PTS:* texts, London), *MBh.: The Mahābhārata* (Poona Critical Edition), *NSP: Nirṇaya Sagar Press* (Bombay), *PTS: Pāli Text Society* (London), *SBE: The Sacred Books of the East*, edited by F. Max Müller (London), *R.: The Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* (Baroda Critical Edition), *TSS: Trivandrum Sanskrit Series* (Trivandrum), *ZDMG: Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, Wiesbaden), *WZKS: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* (Leiden, Wien).

[2] Cf. for example,

ācāryaḥ kasmāt?/ācārya ācāraṃ grāhayati/ācinoty arthān/ācinoti buddhim iti vā (Nirukta 1.4)
yasmād dharmān ācinoti sa ācāryaḥ (Āpastambadharmasūtra 1.1.1.14)
ācāryas tu vāyu-prokte kṛta-lakṣaṇaḥ
"ācinoti ca śāstrārtham ācāre sthāpayaty api
svayam ācarate yasmād ācāryas tena cocyate" (Vācaspatimiśra ad Yogasūtra 2.24).
ācāre sthāpayan śiṣyān yasmād ācarati svayam
ācinoti ca śāstrārthān ācāryas tena kīrtyate (Ratnaṭikā, *GOS.* 15, p. 9, lines 8–9).
ācariyan ti ācāra-samācāra-sikkhāpanakam. . .(Samantapāsādikā, *PTS.* ed., 1966, p. 985, lines 5–6).
ācariyo ti kuṭumbiya esa mayhaṃ ācāra-sikkhāpako ācariyo (J.4.372.21–22).
Cf. also, *CPD.* vol. 2, p. 30.

Other intentional juxtaposition of *ācāra* and *ācārya* for alliteration's sake are found in Bāṇa's writings,

ācārasyācāryakam iva kurvāṇam. . .(Harṣacarita, *NSP.* 1925, p. 24, line 11).
anuvartamāno laukikam ācāram ācārya-vacanam. . .(Harṣacarita p. 249, line 21).
gurur guṇānām, ācārya ācārāṇām. . .(Kādambarī, *NSP.* 1928, p. 113, line 7).

For similar intentional juxtapositions of *ācārya* with *car-*, *vicārya*, *āścarya* and *ācakṣ-*, one may refer also to the following passages:

kāma-caryāsu kuśalo bhikṣu-caryāsu viklavaḥ
paramācārya-viṣṭabdho brahmacaryaṃ cacāra saḥ (Saundarananda 11.4).
dhīra-dhiṣaṇāvadhīrita-vibudhācārya-vicārya-kārya-sāhityāḥ. . .(Daśakumāracarita, *NSP.* 1951, p. 4, line 5).
svapna-darśanāścaryāṇy ācāryāṇāṃ ācacakṣe (Kādambarī p. 130, line 5).
aparimeyāścaryam ācāryakaṃ bhagavatyāḥ (Mālatīmādhava 3.7 prose, *TSS.* 170, p. 163, line 3).

[3] Cf. J. Pokorny, *Indo-germanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* I (Bern-München, 1959) pp. 476 ff. (**gu̯er-, *gu̯era-, *gu̯eri-*, etc. cf. Gk. βαρυσ, Lat. *gravis*, Goth. *kaúrjōs*, Lith. *gùrstu, gùrti*, etc.), and M. Mayrhofer, *Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen* (Heidelberg, 1956), p. 340.
An imaginative etymological analysis (*gu-* and *ru-*) is found in a passage of Saurapurāṇa (*ASS.*18), explaining *guru* as the destroyer of darkness,

gu-śabdas tv andhakāraś ca ru-śabdas tu nirodhakaḥ
andhakāra-nirodhatvād guru-śabdo nigadyate (Saurapurāṇa 68.10).

[4] For example, Kullūkabhaṭṭa ad Manusmṛti 2.191 (*codito guruṇā*. . .*ācāryeṇa pretito*. . .), and Mallinātha ad Śiśupālavadha 7.37 (*sa eva gurur ācāryas*. . .). Cf. also Ratnaṭīkā ad Gaṇakārikā (*GOS.* 15) p. 3, line 13 and p. 9, line 3 (*gurur ācāryaḥ*) and Maṇibhadra ad Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (*ChSS.* 27) p. 18, line 4 (*ācāryo gurur adhyāpakaḥ*). As for an example from versified text, see,

atītya bandhūn avalaṅghya mitrāṇy ācāryam *āgacchati śiṣya-doṣaḥ*
bālaṃ hy apatyaṃ gurave *pradātur naivāparādho 'sti pitur na mātuḥ* (Pañcarātra 1.21, *TSS.* 17, p. 15).

For a similar idea, cf. *BIS.* 5767 and 5769 (*śiṣya-pāpaṃ gurāv api*)

[5] Cf. L. Renou, *Histoire de la langue sanskrite* (Lyon, 1956), p. 173.

[6] *brahmacáryeṇa tápasā rā́jā rāṣṭrám ví rakṣati*
ācāryò brahmacáryeṇa brahmacāríṇam icchate (Atharvaveda 11.5.17)
"By vedic-studentship, by asceticism, a king defends his kingdom, a teacher by vedic-studentship seeks a vedic student."

[7] *ācāryà upanáyamāno brahmacāríṇaṃ kṛṇute gárbham antáḥ*
táṃ rā́trīs tisrá udáre bibharti táṃ jātáṃ drá̄ṣṭum abhisáṃyanti devā́ḥ (Atharvaveda 11.5.3)

"The teacher, taking (him) in charge, makes the vedic student an embryo within; he bears him in his belly three nights; the gods gather unto him to see him born."

[8] *ācāryas tatakṣa nábhasī ubhé imé urvī́ gambhīré pṛthivī́ṃ dívaṃ ca té rakṣati tápasā brahmacārī́ tásmin devā́ḥ sáṃmanaso bhavanti* (Atharvaveda 11.5.8)
"The teachers fashioned both these envelopes, the wide and profound (namely) earth and sky; then the vedic student defends it by his asceticism; in him the gods become like-minded."

[9] *tádd haitac chā́ṇḍilyaś ca sā́ptarathavāhaniś ca/ācāryāntevāsínau vyūdāte rūpám evāsyaitad íti ha smāha śā́ṇḍilyo lómānī́ti sā́ptarathavāhaniḥ* (Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 10.1.4.10)
"Now on this point Śāṇḍiya and Sāptarathavāhani are teacher and pupil respectively; and they are once disputing with one another; "this is his form" said Śāṇḍilya, "his hair" said Sāptarathavāhani."

[10] Cf. Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 11.5.4.1–2.

[11] Cf. story of Satyakāma in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 4.4.3–5.

[12] Cf. Pāraskara Gṛgyasūtra 2.2.17 ff., Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra 1.20, Śāṃkhyāyana Gṛhyasūtra 2. 1–6. For details, cf. R.B. Pandey, *Hindu Saṃskāras* (Banaras, 1949), pp. 187–240.

[13] For the Savitṛ hymn, cf. Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 11.5.4.6, Manusmṛti 2.38, 148, and 170.

[14] Cf. also Yājñavalkyasmṛti 1.34 (*upanīya dadad vedam ācāryaḥ sa udāhṛtaḥ*). Other given definitions of *ācārya* are as follows,

jñāna-vijñāna-saṃpannaḥ priyavādī jitendriyaḥ
samyag-vidyopadeśī ca śucir ācārya ucyate (Cāṇakya 400, L. Sternbach, *Cāṇakya-Nīti Text Tradition*, vol. 2, pt. 2, Hoshiarpur 1967, p. 254)
abhiṣekārtha-tattvajñaḥ sphuṭa-vākyo guṇodadhiḥ
pīṭhasevā sadā nityam ācāryaḥ sa 'bhidhīyate (Saṃvarodayatantra 18.5–6, text edited by S. Tsuda, Tokyo, 1974).

[15] Other examples are as follows,

evam evehācāryavān puruṣo veda. . .(Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.14.2)
ācāryas tu te gatiṃ vakteti (Vhāndogya Upaniṣad 4.14.1): Here Śaṅkara comments *gati* as *vidyā-phala-prāptaye.*
nāham etad veda/hantācāryaṃ pṛcchānīti (Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad 1.1).

[16] One also gets the impression that in Sūtra and Smṛti literature *ācārya* is very often replaced by *guru*, especially when these prescribe the Brahmacārin's behaviour toward his teacher during his stay in his teacher's house (*guru-kula,* or *ācārya-kula*).

[17] The phrase *samit-pāṇi* does not always occur with *ācārya*. In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 1.12 this appears together with *guru* (*sa gurum evābhigacchet samit-paṇiḥ*).

[18] Cf. Bhagavadgītā 2.7 (*śiṣyas te 'haṃ śādhi māṃ tvāṃ prapannam*).

[19] There is an interesting synopsis constructed with respect to *loka, jyotis, vidyā, prajā* and *ātman* (Taittirīya Upaniṣad 1.3),

	pūrvarūpa	*uttararūpa*	*saṃdhi*	*saṃdhāna*
adhilokam:	pṛthivī	div	ākāśa	vāyu
adhijyautiṣam:	agni	āditya	ap	vaidyuta
adhividyam:	ācārya	antevāsin	vidyā	pravacana
adhiprajam:	mātṛ	pitṛ	prajā	prajanana
adhyātma:	adharā hanu	uttarā hanu	vāk	jihvā

[20] Cf. also Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.1.2 (*yathā mātṛmān pitṛmān ācāryavān...*), Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.15.2–3, Bhagavadgītā 1.26 and 34.

[21] Cf. Kūrmapurāṇa 2.12.26–27, where those who are regarded as *guru*, both male and female, are enumerated,

upādhyāyaḥ pitā jyeṣṭho bhrātā caiva mahīpatiḥ
mātulaḥ śvaśuras trātā mātāmaha-pitāmahau
varṇa-jyeṣṭhaḥ pitṛvyaś ca puṃso (?) *'tra guravaḥ smṛtāḥ* (26)
mātā mātāmahī gurvī pitur mātuś ca sodarāḥ
śvaśrūḥ pitāmahī jyeṣṭhā dhātrī ca guravaḥ striyaḥ (27, Text edited by A.S. Gupta, Varanasi 1971). Cf. also R. 2.103.2–3 (*BIS*. 4146–7).

[22] *dhanus-*: *bho ācārya, dharme dhanuṣi cācārya!* (Pañcarātra 1.29 prose, *TSS*. 17, p. 23, line 9).
kṣatra-: *kṣatrācāryo yatra vipro daridraḥ* (Pañcarātra 1.30).
yuddha-: *pakṣiṇāṃ poṣako yaś ca yuddhācāryas tathaiva ca* (Manusmṛti 3.162).
vīṇā-: *asmin praviṣṭe pradhyānānantaraṃ svādavo danta-vīṇopadeśācāryāś cyotanti* (Harṣacarita p. 215, lines 9–10). Cf. also Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa 2.6 prose (*TSS*. 16, p. 51, line 9–p. 52, line 5).
nṛtta-: *dardura-giri-taṭa-candanāśleṣa-śītalānilācārya-datta-nānā-latā-nṛtta-līle kāle...*(Daśakumāracarita p. 242, lines 3–4).
kaiśika-: *carite kaiśikācāryair airāvata-niṣevite* (R. 5.1.158).
śṛṅgāra-nṛtta-: *śṛṅgāra-nṛttācāryeṇa bhagavatā...*(=Kāma) (Kādambarī p. 430, line 3).

As for a similar use of *ācariya* in Pāli, cf. *CFD*. vol. 2, p. 31 (*ācariya* in smiths, ivory-works, elephant-training, lute, art of stealing and also in acrobatic arts).
In these contexts *upādhyāya* sometimes appears in the place of *ācārya*. For example,

aneka-surata-samāgama-lāsya-līlopadeśopādhyāyo makara-ketur...(Kādambarī p. 271, line 5).
sakala-durnayopādhyāyaḥ kāmatantra-karṇadhāraḥ kumārasevako vihārabhadro nāma...(Daśakumāracarita p. 257, line 6–7).

[23] Cf. Kāmasūtra 1.3.14, where six women are called *ācārya*s, who are entitled to initiate young maidens to the sixty-four *kalā*.

ācāryās tu kanyānāṃ pravṛtta-puruṣa-saṃprayogā sahasampravṛddhā dhātreyikā/tathābhūtā vā niratyaya-saṃbhāṣaṇā sakhī/savayāś ca mātṛ-ṣvasā/ visrabdhā tatsthānīyā vṛddha-dāsī/pūrvasaṃsṛṣṭā vā bhikṣukī/svasā ca viśvāsa prayogāt.

[24] *sarva-vidyācāryāṇāṃ ca saṃgrahe yatnam atimahāntam anvatiṣṭhat* (Kādambarī p. 149, lines 4–5).
candrāpīḍo 'py ananya-hṛdayatayā. . . .yathāsvam ātma-kauśalaṃ prakaṭayadbhiḥ pātravaśād upajātotsāhair ācāryair upadiśyamānāḥ sarvā vidyā jagrāha (Kādambarī p. 149, lines 9–10).

[25] *evaṃ ca krameṇa. . .parisamāpta-samagra-kalā-vijñānam adhītāśeṣa-vidyaṃ cāvagamyānumoditam ācāryaiś candrāpīḍam ānetum. . .*(Kādambarī p. 152, lines 8–9).

For other lists of sciences, cf. Kādambarī p. 102, lines 2–4, p. 25, lines 1–5, p. 149 line 11–p. 150, line 8, Daśakumāracarita p. 205, lines 1–4. As for the "Catalogue of sciences in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad (VII.1.2)," cf. B. Faddegon, *AO.* 4 (1926), pp. 42/54.

However, we have instances where the word *guru* (in *guru-kula* or *guru-gṛha*) is also associated with *vidyā*. For example,

vīra-kṣetram iti śastopajīvibhiḥ, guru-kulam iti vidyārthibhiḥ (Harṣacarita p. 97, lines 14–15).
vidyārthinā guru-gṛhe nibhṛtena bhāvyam (*BIS.* 3711).

Cf. also Uttararāmacarita 2.4 (=*BIS.* 6066), *BIS.* 2626, and 6083, and Rāmāyaṇamañjarī 1.636 (*jagrāha sakalāṃ vidyāṃ gurubhyo vimalāśayaḥ,* Kāvyamālā 83, p. 52), which is quoted in H. Jacobi, *Das Rāmāyaṇa* (Darmstadt, 1970), p. 15.

[26] For example,

Takkasilaṃ gantvā disāpāmokkhācariyassa santike sabba-sippāni uggaṇhitvā ācariyena anuññāto Takkasilato nikkhamitvā. . .(J. 3.235.7–8).

Cf. also 3.221.4–6, 4.50.28–29, 4.298.15–16, 4.391.9–12, 5.127.31 ff., 5.457.6–7.

Occasionally, however, the *ācariya* imparts pupils the Vedas besides the *sippa.*

disāpāmokkhassa ācariyassa santike tayo vede aṭṭhārasa sippāni ca uggaṇhitvā (J. 2.87.8–9).

Cf. also 2.421.14–15, 4.200.15–16, 4.298.14–20, 4.379.5–6.

ācariya also gives his pupil *manta* (magical spell),
disāpāmokkhācariyo hutvā pañcasata mānave mante vāceti (J. 3.232.23–24).

Cf. also, 1.402.14–15, 3.28.9–11, 4.201.15–18, 4.457.1. We have also an example where *manta* is associated with *guru* in the Ratnāvalī 4.9 (*taṃ taṃ dāvemi ahaṃ guruṇo manta-ppahāveṇa*).

Sometimes, the word *sippa* is compounded with *samaya,*

Takkasilato nikkhamitvā sabba-samaya-sippam sikkhanto vicari (J. 3.235.8–9).

[27] It seems to have been a custom of the royal family to send the young princes to a famous teacher in a far off place in order to let them receive training and attain experience (J. 2.277.19–23).

[28] For the phrase *disāpāmokkha ācariya*, cf. 1.402.14, 2.87.8, 2.137.21–22, 2.138.25, 2.277.21–22, 2.278.25, 2.421.15, 3.221.4, 3.235.7, 4.50.17 and 28, 4.200.15, 4.203.8, 4.298.16, 4.391.11, 4.456.29, 5.128.1, 5.457.6, 6.32.30, etc.

[29] For *ācariya-bhāga*, cf. 2.278.11–14, 4.298.15, 5.457.7, and for *ācariya-dhana*, cf. 4.224.20–22, 27, 4.225.5, 4.227.19. For an expression *ācariyassa dhana*, cf. 4.227.5 and 25–26. Cf. also *CPD.* vol. 2, pp. 32–33 (*ācariya-dakkhiṇā, ācariya-dhana* and *ācariya-bhāga*).

[30] *dhammantevāsikā divā ācariyassa kammaṃ katvā rattiṃ sippaṃ ugganhanti, ācariya-bhāga-dāyakā gehe jeṭṭha-puttā viya hutvā sippam eva ugganhanti* (J. 2.278.14–16).

[31] Cf. J. 3.454.25–26, 3.475.6, 3.515.1, 4.79.24–25.

[32] *so yeva tesaṃ paññāya aggo, ath 'assa te sannipatitvā ācariya-ṭṭhānaṃ adaṃsu* (J. 4.298.22–23). Cf. also *CPD.* s. v.

[33] *ti vatvā Brahmadattakumāram eva gantvā tassa piṭṭhi-ācariyo hutvā khippaṃ sikkhāpesi* (J. 5.458.1–2). Cf. also 5.473.23, 5.501.22.

[34] For the concept of *purohita*, cf. J. Gonda, "Purohita," *Studia Indologica* (Festschrift für W. Kirfel, Bonn, 1955), pp. 107–124.

[35] For example,

> *athāntarikṣe duḥṣantaṃ vāg uvācāśarīriṇī*
> *ṛtvik-purohitācāryair mantribhiś cāvṛtaṃ tadā* (MBh. 1.69.28)
> *ṛtvik-purohitācāryair mātulātithi-saṃśritaiḥ*
> *bāla-vṛddhāturair vaidyair jñāti-saṃbandhi-bāndhavaiḥ* (Manusmṛti 4.179)

Cf. also MBh. 12.60.4, 12.92.39, 12.97.17, 12.130.9, 12.235.12, 13.37.6, 13.58.24, H. 115.6, R. 2.70.12, and Yājñavalkyasmṛti 1.332.

[36] In the Mahābhārata the same *purohita* is also called *upādhyāya*. Cf. E.W. Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India* (New Haven, 1920), p. 380.

[37] The fact that Kevaṭṭa is the *purohita* is attested to in J. 6.391.13 and 392.28.

[38] *Khaṇḍahālo nāma brāhmaṇo* purohito *ahosi*. . .(J. 6.131.13–14).
"ācariya-*Khaṇḍahālassa āgata-velāya*. . ." (J. 6.132.4–5), "*kiṃ kathesi* ācariya," (J. 6.133.27).

[39] *tadā Bārāṇasirājā* purohitassa *santike mante gaṇhāti, so uyyānaṃ pavisitvā ambarukkha-mūle uccāsane nisīditvā* ācariyaṃ *nīcāsane nisīdāpetvā mante gaṇhi* (J. 3.28.9–11).
tato paṭṭhāya ca pana rājā tass 'ovāde ṭhatvā ācariye *gāravaṃ katvā nīce āsane nisinno mante gaṇhi* (J. 3.30.10–12).

[40] *tassa Ruhako nāma* purohito *ahosi* (J. 2.113.22).

ye ye passanti te te parihāsaṃ karontā "sobhati ācariyo" *ti vadiṃsu.*
Rājā pana naṃ "kiṃ ācariya *pittan te kupitaṃ. . ."* (J. 2.114.11–13).
Rājā taṃ kāraṇaṃ ñatvā purohitaṃ *pakkosāpetvā* "ācariya *mātugāmassa nāma doso hoti yeva. . ."* (J. 2.114.19–20).

[41] For example,

so ācariy-upajjhāye upasaṃkamitvā "bhante mayhaṃ nāmaṃ avamaṅgalaṃ, aññaṃ me nāmaṃ karothā" ti āha (J. 1.402.3–5).

Cf. also, J. 2.271.8, 3.461.21, 4.200.5, and Yājñavalkyasmṛti 3. 15 (*ācārya-pitr-upādhyāyān. . .*).

[42] Cf. *CPD.* vol. 2 p. 31 (cum lit.). P.B. Bapat and A. Hirakawa in their *Shan-Chien-P'i-P'o-Sha, A Chinese version by Sanghabhadra of Samantapāsādikā* (Poona, 1970) translate *upajjhāya* as "preceptor" (p. 29), "spiritual teacher" (p. 408 and p. 494) and *ācariya* into "wordly teacher," (p. 29) "secular teacher" (p. 408). We have also an example in Sanskrit where *upādhyāya* is associated with *vinaya* (Harṣacarita p. 239, line 25, *asya tv īdṛśe śaiśave vinayasyopādhyāyaṃ dhyāyann api na saṃbhāvayāmi bhuvi*).

[43] Cf. T.W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg's note on the *Vinaya Text* (*SBE.* 13) p. 178. *CPD.*'s quotation "*SBE.* 13, p. 78" should be corrected into p. 178.

[44] Cf. *daśācāryān upādhyāya upādhyāyān pitā daśa*
gurutvenābhibhavati nāsti mātṛ-samo guruḥ (MBh. 12.109.15–16 and 13.108.14–15, *BIS.* 2731–32).

For an interpretation of these Epic passages, cf. E.W. Hopkins *loc cit.*

[45] Cf. *upādhyāyān daśācārya ācāryāṇāṃ śataṃ pitā*
sahasraṃ tu pitṝn mātā gauraveṇātiricyate (Manusmṛti 2.145 = *BIS.* 1300).

Cf. also Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra 3.21–22 and 13.48, and Yājñavalkyasmṛti 1.35.

The question of what *upādhyāya* actually means in Classical Sanskrit literature cannot be answered in a facile manner. *Upādhyāya* is defined in Smṛti literature as one who possesses partial knowledge (*ekadeśa*) about the Veda and Vedāṅga, and earns his livelihood (*vṛtti*) by means of teaching (Manusmṛti 2.141 and Yājñavalkyasmṛti 1.35), but it is sometimes used synonymously with *ācārya* and *guru.* Two passages of the Kādambarī call Kāma, a teacher in amorous arts and dancing, *upādhyāya* as well as *ācārya:*

aneka-surata-samāgamalāsya-līlopadeśopādhyāyo makaraketur. . .(p. 271, line 5).
śṛṅgāra-nṛttācāryeṇa bhagavatā manobhavena. . .(p. 430, lines 3–4).

Rāma calls Sudhanvan, his teacher in weapons, *upādhyāya:*

iṣv-astra-vara-saṃpannam arthaśāstra-viśāradam
sudhanvānam upādhyāyaṃ kac cit tvaṃ tāta manyase (R. 2.94.9).

Passages of the Vikramorvaśīya replace *upādhyāya* freely for *guru* in designating Urvaśī's dancing teacher, Bharata:

sattā uvajjhāeṇa/mahindreṇa uṇa aṇugihīdā (3.0.19, *NSP.* 1925).
. . .tti uvajjhāassa saāsādo sāvo (3.0.22).
tado ahaṃ guru-sāva-saṃmūḍha-hiaā. . .kumāravaṇaṃ paviṭṭhā (4.70.9–11, cf. 4.2.21–22, 5.15.5).

Other examples where *guru* is replaced by *upādhyāya* can be noted: for example, MBh. 1.71.21 (Śukra by Kaca), 12.314.36 (Vyāsa by his five pupils), 14.57.41 (Gautama by Uttaṅka), 12.109.23–26, and Pratimānāṭaka 3.4 prose (*upādhyāyās tu bhavantam āhuḥ . . .na mayā guru-vacanam atikrānta-pūrvam, TSS.* 42, p. 58, lines 5–9).

As *ācariya* is used synonymously with *purohita* in the Pāli Jātaka, so in the Epics *upādhyāya* is similarly used with *purohita.* In MBh. 1.3 Somaśravas, who is chosen by Janamejaya as his *purohita,* is called *upādhyāya.*

sa taṃ purohitam upādāyopāvṛtto bhrātṝn uvāca/mayāyaṃ vṛta upādhyāyaḥ (MBh. 1.3.17, cf. 1.3.10 and 13–14).

Although the word *purohita* itself does not appear, the royal priest (*ṛtvij*?) who performs sacrifice for the king is often termed as *upādhyāya*, and the word appears often in the ritual contexts. Cf. for example, MBh. 12.311.23 (Bṛhaspati), 12.323.5 (Bṛhaspati), 14.6.9 (king Mārutta and Bṛhaspati), 5.13.15, 13.90.9, 13.95.62; 14.90.25; H. 10.4, 115.30 and 2.83.4 (Poona ed.); R. 1.11.14, 1.60.9, 2.94.5, 5.31.14, etc.

In contrast to the oft-recurring Epic compound *ṛtvik-purohitācārya*, we meet the compound *ṛtvig-upādhyāya* in R. 2.4.36 and its negative form *anṛtvig-anupādhyāya* in MBh. 13.90.31. At the same time, however, we have another set of compounds where *upādhyāya* is enumerated separately from *purohita*, *sopādhyāya-purohita*, which is found only in the first book of the Rāmāyaṇa (1.29.8, 1.67.4, 1.69.11 and 1.49.9 *sopādhyāyapurodhasaḥ*). In this connection one must note the fact that the compound *sopādhyāya. . .*, which appears often in the Rāmāyaṇa, hardly occurs in the Mahābhārata. As regards the *upādhyāya*'s presence at a wedding, cf. Harṣacarita p. 147, lines 19–20, Karpūramañjarī 4.20.9–10 (*HOS.* 4, p. 112), and Avimāraka 6.14 prose.

[46] Samantapāsādikā p. 1085, lines 3–5, and p. 1379, lines 32–34.

[47] Cf. Manoratha-pūraṇī vol. 2, p. 204, lines 22 ff. The second part of the text reads as follows,

athāpara-bhāge aññe ācariyā hatthisippa-assasippa-rathasippa-dhanusippa-tharusippa-muddāgaṇanādīni sikkhāpenti, aññe saraṇāni denti, aññe sīlesu patiṭṭhāpenti, aññe pabbājenti, aññe buddha-vacanaṃ uggaṇhāpenti, aññe upasampādenti, aññe sotāpattimaggādīni pāpenti. Iti sabbe p'ete pacchācariyā nāma honti (p. 204, line 27–p. 205, line 6).

Compare also Manoratha-pūraṇī vol. 2, p. 194, lines 8 ff., where the eight *ācariyas* are enumerated: *saraṇadāyaka, sotāpattimaggasampāpaka, arahattamaggasampāpaka, pabbajjādāyaka, buddhavacanadāyaka, kammavācācariya, sakadāgāmimaggasampāpaka, anāgāmimaggasampāpaka.*

[48] L. Renou, *Etudes védiques et pāṇinéennes* 6 (Paris, 1960) p. 79, addenda ad paragraph 25 (cum lit.).

[49] H. Jacobi, 'Über die Echtheit des Kauṭilīya,' *Kleine Schriften* **I** (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 527 ff.

[50] J.J. Meyer, *Über das Wesen der altindischen Rechtsschriften* (Leipzig, 1927), p. 261 and *Das altindische Buch vom Welt- und Staatsleben* (Leipzig, 1926), p. XLIX.

[51] P.V. Kane, 'The Meaning of ācāryaḥ,' *ABORI*, **23**, pp. 206–213.

[52] F. Wilhelm, *Politische Polemiken im Staatslehrbuch des Kauṭalya* (Wiesbaden, 1960), p. 4 and pp. 79 ff.

[53] B. Ghosh, 'Pūrvācāryas in Pāṇini,' *D.R. Bhandarkar Volume* (Calcutta, 1940), pp. 21–24.

[54] Besides the passages quoted in these studies, *pūrvācāryā*s appear in the Kāvyādarśa 2.2 and 3.106, *anye ācāryāḥ* in the Bṛhatsaṃhitā 32.2, and *ācārya-samaya* in the Kāmasūtra 3.5.14. Other occurrences of *ācārya* in the plural form in non-scientific literature are as follows,

> *mūlaṃ hi prāhur ācāryā dīrghasūtratvam āpadām* (Pañcatantra, 3.23, F. Edgerton ed., Poona 1930).
> *bahūnām ācāryāṇāṃ prajāpati-bhūtaḥ kathaṃ na jñāyate* (Pūrṇabhadra's Pañcatantra, *HOS*. 11, p. 104, lines 4–5).
> *kiṃ tv iha hi manu-bṛhaspati-bhṛgu-parāśara-śālaṅkāyana-cāṇakya-prabhṛtibhir ā-cāryair yāni nīti-śāstrāṇi gaditāni* (Tantrākhyāyikā, *HOS*. 14, p. 90, line 24–p. 91, line 1).
> *samaṣṭi-vyaṣṭi yad rūpaṃ samaṣṭi-vyaṣṭi-kāraṇam*
> *vadanti ke cid ācāryāḥ śivaṃ parama-kāraṇam* (Saurapurāṇa 64.8).

[55] In addition to the scholars mentioned above (notes 50–53), I can mention the names of two other scholars on this subject (*pūrvācāryāḥ!*): H. von Stietencron (*ZDMG*, **119**, 1969, p. 216) and A. Wezler ('Zur Identität der Ācāryāḥ und Vyākhyātāraḥ in Jayantabhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī,' *WZKS*, **19**, 1975, pp. 135–146).

[56] Cf. F. Wilhelm, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

II

[1] Cf., for example, S.K. Belvalkar's remark: "a word almost impossible to render by one English word. It is applied to any one to whose authority deference is due, parents, elderly relatives, teacher, and persons of piety and learning" (*HOS*, **21**, p. 16, note 6), and also E.H. Johnston's remark: "*guru*. . .is used through all this passage in the double sense of 'spiritual guide' and 'elder brother'." (*The Saundarananda or Nanda the Fair*, Oxford, 1932, p. 22, note on 4.30). Cf. also Cāṇakya 352 (L. Sternbach, *op. cit.* p. 223).

[2] *niṣekādīni karmāṇi yaḥ karoti yathāvidhi*
saṃbhāvayati cānnena sa vipro gurur ucyate (Manusmṛti 2.142).

sa gurur yaḥ kriyāḥ kṛtvā vedam asmai prayacchati (Yājñavalkyasmṛti 1.34).
niṣekādi-kṛd guruḥ (Amarakoṣa 2.7.7).

[3] *hitopadeśa-dāyin* (Kādambarī p. 198, lines 3–4).
hitāhitopadeṣṭṛ (Kādambarī p. 497, line 15).
hitāhita-prāpti-parihāropadeṣṭṛ (Kādambarī p. 125, line 12, p. 196, line 35, p. 536, line 16). Cf. also Daśakumāracarita p. 263, line 1 (*nanu hitopadeśād guravo bhavantaḥ*) and *BIS*, 1944 (*ko vā gurur, yo hi hitopadeṣṭā*).

[4] Cf. also Raghuvaṃśa 2.63 (*bhaktyā gurau*), MBh. 14.55.2 (*guru-bhakta*), Saurapurāṇa 5.8 (*praṇipatya guruṃ bhaktyā*).
Other examples of *bhakti* in construct with *guru* in the sense of respectable elders are as follows,

adhikāṃ kuru devi guruṣu bhaktim (Kādambarī p. 125, line 1).
gurujanasyopari bhaktir asādhāraṇā sarvā (Kādambarī p. 182, line 11).
kva sā gurujanasyopari bhaktir. . .(Kādambarī p. 533, line 1).
kva sā gatā te guru-bhaktiḥ (Kādambarī p. 573, line 10).

Occasionally *bhakti* is associated also with *ācārya,*

ācāryaṃ pūjayed bhaktyā (Saurapurāṇa 43.5).
sa rājā. . .bhairavācārye. . .garīyasīṃ babandha bhaktim (Harṣacarita p. 101, lines 4–6).

[5] Cf. Manusmṛti 2.233 (*guru-śuśrūṣayā tv eva brahmalokaṃ samaśnute*), MBh. 1.71.55 (*santo viprāḥ śuśruvāṃso gurūṇām*), Kūrmapurāṇa 1.2.43 (*bhikṣācaryā ca śuśrūṣā guroḥ svādhyāya eva ca*). Cf. also *BIS*, 787.

We have an example of *śuśrūṣā* compounded with *upādhyāya* in MBh. 12.66.10 (*tathopādhyāya-śuśrūṣā*), and associated with *ācārya* in Pañcatantra 1.88 (F. Edgerton ed., Poona, 1930),

ācāryā narapatayaś ca tulya-śīlā na hy eṣāṃ paricitir asti sauhṛdaṃ vā śuśrūṣāṃ
ciram api saṃcitāṃ prayatnāt saṃkuddhā raja iva nāśayanti meghāḥ

[6] Cf. *BIS*. 1543 (*guru-pāda-praṇamanam*), 5046 (*guruṃ prati natiḥ*). Other examples of *nam-* and its derivatives found in construct with *guru* in the sense of respectable elders are as follows,

namratā gurujane (*BIS*. 4813).
vetasa-mayīva guruṣu (Harṣacarita p. 122, line 10).
guru-praṇāmeṣv api stambhitam iva śiraḥ katham api nanāma (Harṣacarita p. 127, lines 17–18).

Cf. also Vikramorvaśīya 5.9 prose.

[7] Cf. *BIS*. 176 (*sevyā madhyama-bhāvena rāja-vahni-guru-striyaḥ*). An example of *sevana* compounded with *guru* in the sense of respectable elders is found in Raghuvaṃśa 18.30 and *pratipatti* (in *gurūcita-pratipattiḥ*, Kādambarī p. 581, line 8) is paraphrased by the commentator as *sevā*.

[8] An example of *paricāra* associated with *guru* is met in MBh. 5.33.62 (=*BIS*. 3864).

[9] Examples with *guru* are found in Bhagavadgītā 11.43 (*pūjyaś ca gurur garīyān*), 17.14 (*deva-dvija-guru-prājña-pūjanam*) and Saṃvarodayatantra 18.17 (*guru-pūjā*). Cf. also P. Thieme, 'Indische Wörter und Sitten,' *Kleine Schriften* **I**, (Wiesbaden, 1971), pp. 353-354. The examples with *ācārya* are found in MBh. 12.66.10 (*kṣamāthācārya-pūjanam*) and Saurapurāṇa 43.5 (*ācāryaṃ pūjayed bhaktyā*). Cf. also *CPD*. **2**, p. 33 (*ācariya-pūjaka*).

[10] Examples with *guru* are found in *BIS*. 2943 (*deva-pūjā gurūpāstiḥ*), 2441 (*caraṇa-kamalopāsanaṃ sad-gurūṇām*), and Kirātārjunīya 6.34 (*mṛgās tam upāsate gurum ivāntasadaḥ*). An example with *ācārya* is found in Bhagavadgītā 13.7 (*ācāryopāsanaṃ śaucam*...).

[11] Cf. Kādambarī p. 599, line 5 (*maraṇād apy abibhyato gurubhyo 'py apeta-lajjasyātmany api vigalita-snehasya*...).

[12] Cf. Kādambarī p. 299, line 7 (*kiṃ lajjayā gurujanāpekṣayā vā*), p. 424, line 3 (*yo 'līka-gurujanāpekṣī*), and p. 533, line 1 (*kva sā gurujanasyopari bhaktir yad evam anapekṣya prayāsi*).

[13] Cf. also *BIS*. 2452 (*guru-vākyaṃ na laṅghayet*), 4526 (*kim upādeyam, guru-vacanam*), and Harṣacarita p. 67, line 14 (*paruṣaṃ roma-viṣaye, guruṃ mukhe, sacchiṣyaṃ vinaye*...).
Other examples of *guru-vacana*, where the word *guru* is used in sense of respectable elders, are met in Harṣacarita p. 182, line 10, Kādambarī p. 196, line 10, p. 205, lines 3–4, p. 325, lines 9–11, p. 330, line 2, and Vikramorvaśīya 5.12 prose (p. 132, line 6). As for the reprimand by the elders, cf. Kādambarī p. 413, line 3 (*api ca me gurujana-vaktavyatāṃ nītāya*...), and p. 208, line 2 (*na nindyase sādhubhiḥ, na dhikkriyase gurubhiḥ*...). We have also an example of *vacana* compounded with *ācārya* in Harṣacarita p. 249, line 21 (*atha bhūpatir anuvartamāno laukikam ācāram ācārya-vacanam*) with the intention of alliteration.

[14] Other examples of *gurv-ājñā*, where the word *guru* is used in the sense of respectable elders, are met in Raghuvaṃśa 14.46 (*ājñā gurūṇāṃ hy avicāraṇīyā*) and Kādambarī p. 391, line 8 (*garīyasī guror ājñā*). We have another example where *niyoga* appears in place of *ājñā* in Raghuvaṃśa 14.51 (*guror niyogād*...).

[15] Other examples of *gurūpadeśa*, in which the word *guru* is used in the sense of respectable elders are met in Kādambarī p. 197, lines 6–7 (*gurūpadeśaś ca nāma puruṣāṇām akhila-mala-prakṣālana-kṣamaṃ ajalaṃ snānam*), p. 275, line 9 (*kva te gurūpadeśāḥ*...), line 12 (*nirupakārako gurūpadeśa-vivekaḥ*), p. 289, lines 5–6 (*kim idaṃ gurubhir upadiṣṭam*).

[16] Cf. *BIS*. 1773 (*kaḥ paṇḍito vivekī, kiṃ viṣam avadhīritā guravaḥ*) and MBh. 12.109.26, where the word *upādhyāya* replaces *guru*.

[17] This verse is quoted by the commentators on the Kumārasambhava 5.83 (cf. *BIS*. 2181 and *TSS*. 32, pp. 279–280) and by Kauṇḍinya ad Pāśupatasūtra *TSS*. 143, p. 28, lines 9–10 (cf. my review, *IIJ*, **16**, 1974, p. 64).

[18] For the evil effects which result from having slighted one's *guru*, cf. *BIS*, 1400 (*śvāna-yoni-śata*), 6083 (*bhrūṇahatyāviśiṣṭa*) and 7581 (vinaśyanti).
On the other hand, some passages recommend abandoning the *guru*, and blaming him, when the *guru* is not qualified to be such.

tyajed dharmaṃ dayā-hīnaṃ vidyā-hīnaṃ guruṃ tyajet (*BIS*. 2629).
śatror api guṇā grāhyā doṣā vācyā guror api (*BIS*. 6384).

[19] Cf. also Vikramovaśīya 4.70.9–11, *NSP*. p. 118, lines 6–8 and 5.15.5–6, *NSP*. p. 133, lines 12–13.

III

[1] Harivaṃśa makes use of the compound of *yogācārya* in several instances, 13.22–23, 13.46 and 48, 15.12, 90.5. In the Poona edition (Chitrashāla Press 1936) we have *yogācārya* and *sāṃkhyācārya* (3.14.4), and *sarva-bhūtāgamācārya* (3.32.48). For *vedāntācārya*, cf. Śaṅkara ad Bhagavadgītā 18.16.

[2] As regards the manner of addressing one's *guru* (elder brother), see E.W. Hopkins, 'Hindu Salutations,' *BSOS*, **6** (1930–32), p. 376, and his *The Great Epic of India*, p. 26, note 1.

[3] Harṣacarita p. 105, lines 4, 5, 22, p. 106, line 18 etc.

[4] J. 6.407.13 and 408.16.

[5] Daśakumāracarita p. 258, line 9.

[6] For the enumeration of the names of scholars, cf. Tantrākhyāyikā (*HOS*. 14), pp. 90–91 (*manu-bṛhaspati. . .-cāṇakya-prabhṛtibhir ācāryair yāni nītiśāstrāṇi gaditāni*).

[7] We may refer to the expressions like *guru-nānak* and *guru-buddha* (Hevajra-tantra 2.9.3, D.L. Snellgrove ed., London 1959 p. 90), which convey a meaning entirely different from *ācārya*-such and such. As regards the cult of *guru*, cf. E.-M. Esnoul, 'Le Courant affectif à l'intérieur de Brahmanisme ancien,' *BEFEO*, **48** (1956) p. 151.

[8] Cf. Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.15.2–3.

[9] Also there exist the expressions *guros talpam āvasan* in Chāndogya Upaniṣad 5.10.9 and *gurv-aṅganā-gama* (*BIS*. 4492).

[10] Smṛti-writers consider the *guru-talpaga*, or *guru-talpin* as one of the *Mahāpātaka*s together with *brahmahan, surāpa* and *stena* (Manusmṛti 9.235, cf. also 11.54 and *BIS*. 4495). Punishment for them is prescribed in Manusmṛti 9.237, their expiation in 11.251 and 11.104–105, their reward in 11.49, their next birth 12.58, the sins equal to *guru-talpaga* are given in 9.63.

[11] *"kathayatu ca* gurur *api yadi kadā cit kā cit kutaś cid vana-carataḥ śrutipatham upagatā tad-vartā"*. (p. 240, lines 20–22).
"mama hi gurur *apara iva bhagavān sugataḥ samīpa-gata eva..."* (p. 245, line 10).
"so 'ham upagatya tvaramāṇo vyatikaram imam...atrabhavate gurave *niveditavān."* (p. 245, lines 15–17).

[12] *śanair* ācāryas *tu tathā harṣa iti vijñāya...* (p. 249, line 6).
"kalyāṇini, kuru vacanam agrajasya guroḥ" ity ācāryeṇa *yācyamānāpi...* (p. 248, lines 25–26).
...rāja-duhitari...ānīta-netrāmbhasi namantyām ācāryaḥ*...dīrghaṃ niḥśaśvāsa* (p. 249, lines 14–16).
atha bhūpatir anuvartamāno laukikam ācāram ācārya*-vacanaṃ ca...* (p. 249, line 21).
...rājānam ācāryaḥ *samupasṛtya śanair āsāṃ cakre* (p. 250, line 4).
ācāryas *tu tām uddhṛtya...* (p. 252, line 9).
*athā*cāryaḥ *sudhīram abhyadhāt* (p. 253, line 7).
...ācāryeṇa *saha svasāram ādāya...pratyājagāma* (p. 257, lines 6–7).

[13] "*...ayaṃ śīlāparādho draviṇa-daurātmyaṃ vā yad evam ācarati mayi* guruḥ..." (p. 105, lines 17–18).
"mānanīyaṃ ca guruvan *nollaṅghanam arhati guror āsanam"* (p. 105, lines 20–21).
ācāryo *'pi – "āgaccha, atropaviśa" iti...* (p. 105, lines 13–14).
bhairavācāryo *'pi prītyānatikramaṇīyaṃ nṛpa-vacanam anuvartumānaḥ...* (p. 105, lines 22–23).

[14] *tataś ca rambhāṃ nṛtyantīm* ācārye *tumburau sthite*
calitābhinayāṃ dṛṣṭvā jahāsa sa purūravāḥ (20)
jāne divyam idaṃ nṛttam kiṃ tvaṃ jānāsi mānuṣa
iti rambhāpi tat-kālaṃ sāsūyaṃ tam abhāṣata (21)

> *jāne 'ham urvaśī-saṅgāt tad yad vetti na tumburuḥ*
> *yuṣmad-*gurur *apīty enām uvācātha purūravāḥ* (Kathāsaritsāgara 17.22).

Another example where *ācārya* and *guru* point to the one and same person is found in Kathāsaritsāgara 19.75–76: *ācārya* in public proclamation with the intention of dignifying one's scholarship, and *guru* among the colleague-ascetics in disguise,

> *teṣāṃ ca kuhakābhijño jñānitvam upadarśayan*
> *śiśriye* gurutām *ekaḥ śeṣās tac-cchiṣyatāṃ yayuḥ* (75)
> ācāryo *'yaṃ trikālajña iti vyāja-*guruṃ *ca tam*
> *śiṣyās te khyāpayāmāsur bhikṣāśinam itas tataḥ* (19.76).

[15] R(atna) Ṭ(īkā), p. 6, line 2.

[16] RṬ. p. 3, lines 15–16

[17] RṬ. p. 6, line 6.

[18] RṬ. p. 6, line 4.

[19] RṬ. p. 6, lines 5–6.

[20] RṬ. p. 17, lines 17–18.

[21] RṬ. p. 3, lines 13–14.

[22] RṬ. p. 6, line 3 and p. 17, line 21.

[23] RṬ. p. 9, line 6.

[24] RṬ. p. 17, lines 20–21.

[25] RṬ. p. 3, lines 15–20.

[26] RṬ. p. 4, lines 1–2. He who lacks either one of these (*jñāna* and *śraddhā*) is called *ācāryābhāsa* (*pseudo-ācārya*).

[27] Cf. J. Gonda, 'À propos d'un sens magico-religieux de skt. guru-,' *BSOS*, **12** (1947–48), pp. 124–131, and his *Some Observations on the Relations between 'gods' and 'powers' in the Veda* ('s-Gravenhage 1957), p. 9.

FRITS STAAL

RITUAL SYNTAX

Combining grace and thoroughness with the love of Sanskrit, Professor Ingalls has contributed to many diverse areas of Indology. Though more recently known for his literary researches, his first pioneering work was in the field of Indian logic. In a different context, Ingalls once observed that there are two kinds of religiosity in the Ṛgveda:

> "The Agni hymns are reflective, mythological; they seek for a harmony between this world and the sacred, but are always aware of the distinction"..."The Soma hymns, on the other hand, concentrate on an immediate experience. There is no myth, no past, no need for harmony. It is all here, all alive and one" (Ingalls 1971, 23).

The following pages may show that in due course a spirit of logic infused both Agni and Soma. Since a kindred spirit has infused all his work, I think that this will not surprise or displease the eminent scholar to whom these pages are offered as an expression of friendship and esteem.

When faced with ritual, we find it unintelligible, and so we naturally assume that it should have hidden meaning. But whatever our assumptions, we cannot fail to be struck by the fact that ritual has manifest structure. Accordingly there is scope for an inquiry into ritual structure, which I shall call *ritual syntax*. Whether there is also a *ritual semantics*, and how it is related to ritual syntax if it exists, is discussed elsewhere (Staal 1979 b).

Modern scholarship would seem to be ideally suited to the study of an object with manifest structure and hidden meaning. For about a century there has been uneasiness about meaning. Meaning has been regarded as mysterious and metaphysical, a thing best avoided. In recent decades it has become fashionable to stress that the meaning is in the use, in the medium, or in the structure. So one would expect that much attention had been given to the structural aspects of ritual. What we find instead is on the one hand descriptions of rituals, and on the other hand investigations into the relationships between ritual and other things – mainly myth and social structure. We do not find ritual syntax which is a branch of science in which ritual structure is studied in terms of itself.

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That meaning need not be mysterious or metaphysical, and not something we can easily do without, is obvious from the study of language. When language is used, meaning is at least sometimes conveyed. In human language there are levels of semantics as there are levels of syntax. The question is to what extent do they depend on each other, and to what extent can any of them can be said to be independent. This continues to be a controversial question in contemporary linguistics, to which I shall return. Now just as it is undeniable that language often expresses meaning, meaning is primarily expressed by language. Asking for the meaning of ritual, for example, means asking for an explanation in language. The question about ritual semantics is the question whether ritual is perhaps unlike language and like dancing, about which Isadora Duncan said: "If I could tell you what it meant, there would be no point in dancing it." A similar sentiment is expressed in *Nāṭyaśāstra* 4.260: *atrocyate na khalv arthaṃ nṛttaṃ kañcid apekṣate/kiṃ tu śobhaṃ janayatīty ato nṛttaṃ pravartitam* "We say that dance does not require any meaning. It has come into being simply because it creates beauty."

To be frightened of meaning is cowardice, and to construct it where it is not, is fantasy. If we wish to avoid both pitfalls, it is helpful to assume an outsider's point of view and look at things a little bit more *sub specie aeternitatis*. From such a point of view, ritual and language share a certain compulsiveness. This, when used of an activity, suggests that it possesses features we do not understand and which do not seem functional to us, but which the performers regard as very important, on which they spend much time and energy, and which they take great care to execute properly. In brief, they seem to us to be obsessed by it.

The compulsiveness of ritual is apparent to us, partly because of the fact that we are no longer used to ritual. We easily observe that ritualists are at pains to execute their rituals exactly as they think this should be done. They faithfully carry out repetitions, do not tolerate interruptions, and once started, they have to continue until they have finished. In Sanskrit, the term *satyam*, which generally means 'truth,' is used in the brāhmaṇa literature to refer to the correct execution of ritual (Lévi 1898; 1966, 164; cf. Silburn 1955, s.v. Satya). In the Ṛgveda this term and its precursor, *ṛta*, refer to the truth and correctness of ritual recitations (*Kultlied:* Lüders 1959, 420 sq.). The importance of the correct execution of Vedic ritual is reflected in the numerous penalties and expiation rites which must be performed when mistakes have been made, and which are performed by way of insurance even if it is not certain whether they have been made. Ritual errors have also been regarded as punishable offences. During the Confucian state rituals,

canes and whips were kept at hand for that reason. (I owe this information to Professor D.L. McMullen, who referred to the work of Lui Tsung-yüan of about 800 A.D.) Freud, who has directed attention to the similarities between ritual and neurotic obsessive acts, speaks about the fear of pangs of conscience following their omission (Freud 1907, 27).

The compulsiveness or obsessiveness of language is less obvious to us, but this is largely due to the fact that we are so completely immersed in it. It becomes apparent when we are surrounded by speakers of a language we don't understand. However, even if we observe people with whom we share a language with some measure of detachment, for instance by keeping silent for some time before returning to the company of talkers, we cannot fail to be struck by the compulsive character of language. Often the use of language does not help to convey any meaning. Not rarely, it does not contribute to communication. And yet it is obvious that men as well as women find it difficult to refrain from talking. Though this is especially true of academics, and though there are persons we single out as compulsive talkers, the fact remains that man is not merely a talking animal (ζῷον λόγον ἔχον)[1], but also a talkative animal.

The compulsiveness of language is manifest in a variety of speech acts and situations – in greetings, talks, questions, speeches, meetings of various kinds, and 'language policy.' In many verbal exchanges there is no communication: each side merely waits for the other party to stop, so that he can continue. Public speakers are more upset by interruptions than by refutation.[2] In the same manner, the compulsive and ritualistic repetition of lies (whether by government, by the press or in commercials) turns falsehood into truth, by paying attention only to the continuation of language: "the state is content to lose each debate, while winning the propaganda war" (Chomsky 1973, xi–xii).

Ritualistic rigidity characterizes not only the uses and abuses of language, but also its structure. Though syntax provides the instrument for the creative use of language, there is little that is free and spontaneous about its rules. We are compelled to say: "I gave it to him." Under certain conditions, "I gave him it" is tolerated. We should never say: "I gave it to he," "I gave it him to" or "I gave it he to." In most situations any of these five expressions would carry the intended meaning or serve the purpose of communication just as well. But we have to confine ourselves almost entirely to the first. There are serious and non-obvious restrictions in the domain of language, as every linguist knows. These structural restrictions, which we must observe in order to speak properly, have no clear or immediate function. When observed from without, they are just as puzzling

as is the need of the Vedic priest to spin round once before he makes a certain oblation.

We might place these facts in a historical (though not necessarily evolutionary) perspective by assuming that Early Man was just as obsessed by ritual as Later Man is by language. I shall return to this later, but will for the time being adopt in the study of ritual syntax a synchronistic perspective. This has proved fruitful in the linguistic study of syntax, and also in the few sociological studies of ritual from which we can derive inspiration. Two other methods, which in general supplement each other, have also been found useful. The first is to concentrate on complex rituals and not look for paradigms among simple ones. The second is to pay attention to existing descriptions of rituals provided by practising ritualists. In both respects, Vedic ritual offers the most promising source material. Not only is it the richest, most elaborate and most complete among the rituals of mankind. It is also the ritual for which we possess the richest, most elaborate and most complete descriptions. This completeness is a characteristic of Indian religion in general: there are hardly any features found among the religions of mankind which are not also found in India. These reasons led Hubert and Mauss in their pioneering *Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice* of 1897 to select the Vedic sacrifice, to be precise, the Vedic animal sacrifice, as source material for the construction of a ritual paradigm. They amplified this choice as follows:

> Nous ne pouvons évidemment songer à dessiner ici un schème abstrait du sacrifice qui soit assez complet pour convenir à tous les cas connus; la variété des faits est trop grande. Tout ce qu'il est possible de faire, c'est d'étudier des formes déterminées de sacrifice, assez complexes pour que tous les moments importants du drame y soient réunies, et assez bien connues pour qu'une analyse précise en puisse être faite. Le sacrifice qui nous paraît le mieux répondre à cette condition est le sacrifice animal hindou védique. Nous n'en connaissons pas, en effet, dont le détail soit mieux expliqué. Tous les personnages sont très nettement présentés, au moment de leur introduction et de leur sortie aussi bien que dans le cours de l'action. De plus, c'est un rite pour ainsi dire amorphe; il n'est pas orienté dans un sens déterminé; il peut servir aux fins les plus diverses. Il n'en est pas qui se prête mieux à la recherche que nous voulons entreprendre. C'est pourquoi nous en ferons le fonds de notre étude, sauf à grouper autour de cette analyse d'autres faits, empruntés soit a l'Inde elle-même, soit à d'autres religions (Hubert & Mauss, 1897–1898, 47).

Hubert and Mauss' subsequent analysis of this ritual structure has not shown much more than that there is a beginning, a middle and an end to each rite (thus J. van Baal in a letter of April 21, 1976). In the following pages I shall try to go further, but it is important to bear in mind that my method is similarly synchronistic: the Vedic ritual of the late Vedic period, which is used as the main source for the analysis, is not the oldest known ritual but is the result of a long development. However, it is not my aim to unveil or reconstruct an 'original ritual' – just as linguistics should not be construed as the attempt to unveil or reconstruct an 'Ursprache'.

In the study of Vedic ritual we shall derive some inspiration from linguists and sociologists, but our basic materials are provided by Sanskrit scholars. Sanskritists have been singularly unaffected by fashion. They have also neglected the study of ritual syntax. We are compensated for this loss by a wealth of information on Vedic ritual in the form of texts, translations, monographs, surveys, dictionaries and encyclopedias. In this respect, too, Vedic ritual offers the richest resources. There is such abundance that we have to restrict even our choice of primary sources.

There are in this domain, roughly in chronological order and if we exclude commentaries, texts belonging to the following categories: brāhmaṇa, śrauta- and gṛhya-sūtra, pariśiṣṭa, prayoga and paddhati. The characteristics of the first two have been formulated by Tsuji as follows. The brāhmaṇa-writers "endeavoured to interpret the meaning of mantras and to explain the origin and mysterious significance of ritual proceedings, and in doing so they happened to give, often rather briefly or vaguely, prescriptions as to this or that action of a rite which they presupposed to be well known to the initiated." The sūtra-writers, on the other hand, "aimed at a systematic description of each Vedic ritual in its natural sequence" (Tsuji 1952, 187). It is clear that both brāhmaṇas and śrauta-sūtras presuppose knowledge of the ritual. But while the brāhmaṇas interpret, the śrauta-sūtras describe. Our sources in the present context should therefore be the śrauta-sūtras and not the brāhmaṇas. I shall moreover exclude the gṛhya-sūtras which deal mainly with *rites de passage* and which exhibit less clearly the free and unhampered development of ritual construction we meet with in the śrauta-sūtras. I shall briefly refer to prayogas and paddhatis.

A prime concern of the authors of descriptive ritual texts was the organization and classification of the enormous amount of material with which they were familiar. In this respect too, Hubert and Mauss took their point of departure from the Sanskrit authors. They substituted for a tentative German subdivision of rituals into *Sühnopfer* (expiation rites), *Dankopfer* (rites of thanksgiving), *Bittopfer* (rites of request), etc., the

Sanskrit subdivision into "sacrifices constants (*nityāni*) ou mieux périodiques" and "sacrifices occasionnels" (*kāmyāni*) (Hubert & Mauss 1897–1898, 42–43). But here, I think, we should not follow their lead.

If we look for distinctions between the śrauta-sūtras, the later prayoga texts, and contemporary scholarly monographs on Vedic ritual, a more basic contrast of organization comes to light. It is true that we find in the śrauta-sūtras descriptions of each Vedic ritual in its natural sequence. In fact, the major śrauta-sūtras deal with all the major Vedic sacrifices in sequence. They do not however offer complete descriptions. Each śrauta-sūtra is attached to a specific Vedic school, and is a manual for the priests belonging to that school. There may be brief references to the duties of other priests, but these remain in the background and are clearly secondary. Thus, if we wish to know, for a certain ritual, what the duties of the *ādhvaryava* priests are, we should consult, for example, the Baudhāyana-śrauta-sūtra which is attached to the Taittirīya branch of the Kṛṣṇayajurveda. If we wish to know the duties of the *hautra* priests we should consult, for example, the Śāṅkhyāyana-śrauta-sūtra which is attached to the Ṛgveda, even though the Baudhāyana-śrauta-sūtra may also, in the case of some rituals, have a brief section for *hautram*, and *brahmatvam*, as it has for *yājamānam* (e.g., BŚS III.15–31).

The prayoga texts continue on the whole to be attached to single Vedic schools. But there are a few among these texts which deal with a single ritual from the point of view of several schools, combining the tasks of the various groups of priests. This tendency is common in other domains, for example in philosophy or in grammar (cf. *sarvavedapāriṣadam hīdaṃ śāstram*: "this discipline – i.e., grammar – pertains to all the Vedas"). In the ritual realm, Hillebrandt referred to one such prayoga for the darśapūrṇamāsa (full and new moon rites), and another for the agniṣṭoma (Hillebrandt 1897, 38; see also Kashikar 1968, 28, 42 note 60). Modern scholars have followed this lead. Among textual editions, B.P. Sarma published an Agniṣṭoma-paddhati by combining *ādhvaryava, audgātra* and *hautra* paddhatis (1934–37). Hillebrandt (1880) for the darśapūrṇamāsa, Schwab (1886) for the paśubandha or animal sacrifice, Caland & Henry (1906) for the agniṣṭoma, Dumont (1939) for the agnihotra, Heesterman (1957) for the rājasūya, and Dandekar, Kashikar and others (in progress since 1958) for all the śrauta rituals in their *Śrautakośa*, have provided descriptions which include the tasks of all the priests and which are based upon ritual texts from all the Vedas. Such descriptions are no longer like the music printed separately for violonists, flutists and other musicians who make up a full orchestra. They are like the conductor's score.

There is however one important difference. While a musical score is two-dimensional, and places simultaneous events one below the other, all these ritual descriptions are one-dimensional and describe rites in sequential or linear fashion. Simultaneous activities have therefore to be juxtaposed. More important, recurrent rites, or rites which are embedded in others, are referred to by means of elaborate cross-references. Since Vedic ritual is multi-dimensional, this straitjacket is surely uncomfortable. To realize this is to divine the heart of our problem. In order to explicate the structures described in the ritual manuals, I shall have to use more abstract formulations and expressions, which will in turn place the various kinds of existing description in better perspective. For this we need illustrations and so I shall first briefly recapitulate a few selected and simplified facts about the Vedic *śrauta* ritual.

The śrauta-sūtras describe the main rituals in a particular order. Among these we have, for example:

D: darśapūrṇamāsa
P: paśubandha
A: agniṣṭoma
C: agnicayana.

This sequence is not arbitrary. There is increasing complexity. A person is in general only eligible to perform a later ritual in the sequence, if he has already performed the earlier ones. Each later ritual presupposes the former and incorporates one or more occurrences of one or more of the former rituals. Sometimes these embedded rituals are abbreviated. In general, they undergo modifications. We find the following embeddings, among others (from Staal, forthcoming):

In *P*, performances of *D* are embedded when a cake of eight potsherds is offered to Agni and when a cake of eleven potsherds is offered to Agni-Viṣṇu;

In *A*, two performances of *P* (*agniṣomīyapaśu* and *savanīyapaśu*) and several performances of *D* (e.g., *dīkṣaṇīyeṣṭi, prāyaṇīyeṣṭi, avabhṛtheṣṭi, udayanīyeṣṭi, udavasānīyeṣṭi*, not to mention performances of *D* embedded in *P*) are embedded;

In *C*, a performance of *A*, fourteen performances of *P* and numerous performances of *D*, some of which already embedded in *A* and *P*, are embedded.

This enumeration is by no means complete, but it may serve to illustrate the 'embedding' feature of the underlying structure.

Now for the modifications which rituals undergo when they are

embedded, and, more generally, in different contexts. First of all, the deities to which rites on different occasions are dedicated are often different, which induces differences at least in the names which occur in many of the recitations. Even within D itself, one of the main oblations is for Agni-Soma at full moon, but for Indra-Agni at new moon. Similarly, the different deities to which the different animals in performances of P are dedicated, induce differences in recitation. But apart from these substitutions there are numerous more complex modifications which are induced by embedding. I shall give one simple example. In the regular performance of D, there are *fifteen* sāmidhenī verses, recited when the twigs of firewood are put on the fire. But at the performance of D which is embedded in P when a cake of eleven potsherds is offered to Agni-Viṣṇu, there are *seventeen* sāmidhenī verses. Such examples can be multiplied almost indefinitely.

Though all these rituals involve embeddings and modifications, it does not follow that there is a unique description in terms of these for each particular ritual. For example, C may be analysed differently as an Atirātra, viz., a modification of A, in which the construction of the uttaravedi altar is modified. Such an alternative analysis would necessitate a different structural analysis; what is important in the present context is only that it would involve embeddings and modifications.

In order to get an inkling of the syntax of these structures, we have had to enter into some complexity even though I have made several simplifications. In order to explicate the structure, I shall have to simplify differently and construct a model of a ritual – a more formal representation corresponding to what Hubert and Mauss called a "schème abstrait du sacrifice." In order to make this precise, a series of artifical assumptions will be made, redefining D, P and A. The reason for these artificial assumptions and definitions is merely that they constitute a model which exhibits specific structures of the ritual. This model is similar with respect to these structures to the really existing rituals, but is much less elaborate than the latter. Because of this simplification, the model is in some respects symmetrical – but this, too, is arbitrary. What counts is that the existing rituals can be analysed in the same manner as the model with regard to the structures in which we are here interested.

Let us assume, then, that there is an agniṣṭoma A in which three occurrences of D and two occurrences of P are embedded. In each P, furthermore, two occurrences of D are embedded. Let us fix the order by assuming that in the performance of A, there is first a performance of D_1, then of P_1, then of D_4, then of P_2 and finally of D_7. In P_1, let there be occurrences of D_2 and D_3 and in P_2, of D_5 and D_6, in that order. Next we

assume that each *ritual* consists of a sequence of *rites*. We shall adopt the convention, that each ritual marked by a capital letter (such as A, D, P) will consist of rites denoted by small letters, indexed with single numerals if the governing ritual is not indexed with a numeral (e.g., $a_1, a_2, \ldots; d_1, d_2, \ldots$), and indexed with double numerals if the governing ritual is already indexed with a numeral (e.g., ritual D_3 will consist of rites $d_{31}, d_{32}, \ldots$; P_2 of $p_{21}, p_{22}, \ldots$). Now we can give a precise description of A if we know the exact number and order of these constituent rites. Let us assume that ritual D always consists of three rites. Let us assume that P always consists of nine rites. Since these include the rites of D, a simple assumption would have the rites of P which are not rites of D at the beginning, in the middle and at the end; and the rites of the two occurrences of D in between the beginning and the middle, and the middle and the end. For A, we assume a sequence of thirty-three rites including the rites of P. A simple assumption would again be that, within A, the rituals P and D are always separated by a single rite a.

A *linear* description of agniṣṭoma model A will now look like this:

$$a_1\, d_{11}\, d_{12}\, d_{13}\, a_2\, p_{11}\, d_{21}\, d_{22}\, d_{23}\, p_{12}\, d_{31}\, d_{32}\, d_{33}\, p_{13}\, a_3\, d_{41}\, d_{42}$$
$$d_{43}\, a_4\, p_{21}\, d_{51}\, d_{52}\, d_{53}\, p_{22}\, d_{61}\, d_{62}\, d_{63}\, p_{23}\, a_5\, d_{71}\, d_{72}\, d_{73}\, a_6. \qquad (1)$$

It should be apparent that not only the artificial model A can be represented by such a sequence of rites, but that the real agniṣṭoma can also be represented by such a sequence of rites – only a longer sequence. In addition we would need more letters, more indices, and also longer indices. What are the advantages of such a representation? The answer is: none. A *linear* representation of this type is not only extremely cumbersome, but it obscures all the elements of structure we have been so eager to detect.

At this stage it should be noted that most of the modern descriptions of Vedic ritual are basically *linear* representations of precisely this type. This verdict is exaggerated, because Caland & Henry refer back to Schwab and Hillebrandt, Schwab refers back to Hillebrandt, etc. The verdict is even less applicable to the *Śrautakośa*, which adopts a type of description which is closer to that of the śrauta-sūtras. But to the extent that all these works deviate from the śrauta-sūtras, their deviation is in the direction of linear description. It is precisely for this reason that these works obscure to some extent the structures which it has been our aim to make explicit.

How then do we arrive at a representation which reveals these structures? This can only be done by adopting a non-linear method of description. We can arrive at such a description by gradually transforming the representation (1). I shall first replace (1) by a series of expressions in which

each ritual is rewritten (which will be symbolized by a single arrow) as a sequence of rites and rituals, as follows:

$$A \rightarrow a_1\ D_1\ a_2\ P_1\ a_3\ D_4\ a_4\ P_2\ a_5\ D_7\ a_6 \tag{2}$$

$$P_1 \rightarrow p_{11}\ D_2\ p_{12}\ D_3\ p_{13} \tag{3}$$

$$P_2 \rightarrow p_{21}\ D_5\ p_{22}\ D_6\ p_{23} \tag{4}$$

$$D_1 \rightarrow d_{11}\ d_{12}\ d_{13} \tag{5}$$

$$D_2 \rightarrow d_{21}\ d_{22}\ d_{23} \tag{6}$$

$$D_3 \rightarrow d_{31}\ d_{32}\ d_{33} \tag{7}$$

$$D_4 \rightarrow d_{41}\ d_{42}\ d_{43} \tag{8}$$

$$D_5 \rightarrow d_{51}\ d_{52}\ d_{53}. \tag{9}$$

In these expressions there is still a great deal of repetition and redundancy. In order to eliminate this, we simply delete all indices of rituals, and omit the first numeral of indices with double numerals. We replace (2)–(9) accordingly by (10)–12):

$$A \rightarrow a_1\ D\ a_2\ P\ a_3\ D\ a_4\ P\ a_5\ D\ a_6 \tag{10}$$

$$P \rightarrow p_1\ D\ p_2\ D\ p_3 \tag{11}$$

$$D \rightarrow d_1\ d_2\ d_3 \tag{12}$$

At this point we have arrived at a representation of model A which clearly exhibits the underlying structure and is as perspicuous as the material allows. The reader can verify that the assumptions we made when constructing A are precisely expressed by (10)–(12).


An equivalent representation of this same information can be given with the help of trees:

A

a_1 D a_2 P a_3 D a_4 P a_5 D a_6 (10′)


P

p_1 D p_2 D p_3 (11′)



(12′)

The embedding of P and D in A, and of D in P, is represented in (13).



(13)

The structure of (13) can also be expressed by making use of parentheses:


$$A \rightarrow a_1\ (d_1\ d_2\ d_3)\ a_2\ (p_1\ (d_1\ d_2\ d_3)\ p_2\ (d_1\ d_2\ d_3)\ p_3)\ a_3\ (d_1\ d_2\ d_3)\ a_4\ (p_1\ (d_1\ d_2\ d_3)\ p_2\ (d_1\ d_2\ d_3)\ p_3)\ a_5\ (d_1\ d_2\ d_3)\ a_6. \quad (13')$$

At this stage it may be noted that representations of the form (10)–(12) are basically equivalent to the organization of the material adopted by the authors of the śrauta-sūtras. A śrauta-sūtra would convey the information contained in (10)–(12) as follows. First it would have a section in which D is described as $d_1\ d_2\ d_3$ – corresponding to (12). The next section, corresponding to (11), would provide the description of P, referring to D whenever it occurs, but without repeating the information given in the first section. The next section, corresponding to (10), would provide the description of A, referring to P and D whenever they occur, but without repeating the information given in the earlier sections. Only the modifications which the rituals undergo when they are embedded, are always specified.

How can we handle the modifications? Let us try to represent the one example which I gave before. We can introduce this into our model by assuming that in ritual D, the first rite, d_1, represents the recitation of fifteen sāmidhenī verses. Let us further assume that in the second occurrence of D in P, rite d_1 has to be replaced by a rite d_1^*, in which seventeen sāmidhenī verses are recited. We cannot simply represent this transformation by adding an expression:

$$d_1 \rightarrow d_1^*, \tag{14}$$

for the effect of this would be that all occurrences of d_1 are replaced by occurrences of d_1^*. What we must do is, replace by d_1^* only the d_1 in the second occurrence of D in P. This can be done by introducing a different kind of rule which can be effected by means of an expression which uses a different symbol instead of the single arrow $\rightarrow$, for example a double arrow $\Rightarrow$. We have to represent the entire configuration in which d_1 occurs since it is not otherwise possible to single out the d_1 we wish to single out. This can be done as follows:



Another example of this kind of transformation is the following. When I wrote that A and fourteen occurrences of P are embedded in C, I was simplifying. Actually, A and two occurrences of P are embedded in C. Two occurrences of P are embedded in A. But in the occurrence of A which is embedded in C, the second occurrence of P is modified: it involves the sacrifice of eleven goats instead of one.


To represent this, we start with the following two expressions (in which irrelevant rituals and rites are represented by dots):

$$C \rightarrow \ldots P \ldots A \ldots P \ldots \tag{16}$$

$$A \rightarrow \ldots P \ldots P \ldots \tag{17}$$

Here P is the animal sacrifice of one goat. Now let us write P^* for the ritual which involves eleven goats. Then, abstracting from all the other modifica-

tions which A undergoes when it is embedded in C, the required transformation can be represented as follows:



These examples may suffice to represent two features of the structure of the descriptions of the śrauta-sūtras, and indeed of the *śrauta* rituals themselves: embedding and modification. What is astonishing about this structure is that it is exceedingly similar to the syntax of a natural language (see, e.g., Chomsky 1965). As linguists will long have recognized, expressions of the form (10)–(12), (16) and (17) are *phrase structure rules*. (The rites represented by small letters, which I have introduced tentatively, correspond to some extent to lexical items). Expressions of the form (15) and (18) are *transformations*. The phrase structure rules are *recursive*, because the same symbols occur to the right and to the left of the single arrows: P, which occurs on the right in (10), occurs on the left in (11); and D, which occurs on the right in (10) and (11), occurs on the left in (12).

The ritual modifications have another property, which is quite common in the Vedic ritual as Professor Heesterman reminded me (in a letter of January 9, 1976): an embedded ritual may be interrupted, once or several times, by the ritual in which it is embedded, to be continued or completed afterwards. For example, the embedding of P in A assumes the following form: some rites of P are performed, followed by rites belonging to A, after which subsequent rites of P continue, etc. (in a linear description the sequence has to be interrupted: see, e.g., Caland and Henry 1906, pp. 125–8, 186, 188).

For some time it seemed to me that this alternation was a characteristic of the ritual without a linguistic parallel. Several linguists whom I contacted could not provide a similar structure in a natural language. But when I phoned Professor J.R. Ross at M.I.T., he immediately produced a simple example from English. Let us embed the sentence:

($S1$) Harry is sad

into another sentence, as follows:

($S2$) It seems to me that [Harry is sad].
$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad S1 \qquad S1$

Applying several transformations we can derive the following sentence, in which constituents of the original sentences alternate:

Harry seems sad to me.
$S1 \quad S2 \quad S1 \quad S2$

The recursive features of the ritual allow the construction of rituals of indefinitely increasing complexity. Such recursiveness is exploited in some of the *sattra* rituals ("Communistic Sacrifices" in the terminology of Jha 1942, 318–320). These are rituals – most of them never performed and purely theoretical, viz., belonging to the grammar of ritual – which are extended indefinitely by modifying and embedding existing rituals and rites. There is no mention or trace of an upper limit. Hillebrandt is eloquent on this: "Diejenigen Sattra's welche länger als zwölf Jahre dauern, heissen mahāsattra's . . .und hier versteigt sich Mythus und Phantasie der Yājñika's zu den sechsunddreisigjährigen Opfern der Sāktya's, den hundertjährigen der Sādhya's, den tausendjährigen der Viśvasṛj" (Hillebrandt 1897, 158). Patañjali, the grammarian, when discussing the infinity of language which grammar must describe by finite means (cf. Staal 1969, 501–502 = 1976, 104–105), refers to these *sattra* rituals: "There are indeed linguistic expressions which are never used. . . Even though they are not used, they have of necessity to be laid down by rules, just like protracted *sattras*" (*santi vai śabdā aprayuktāḥ. . .yady apy aprayuktā avasyaṃ dīrghasattravallakṣaṇenānuvidheyāḥ: Mahābhāṣya* ed. Kielhorn I.8, 23; 9, 15).

Though ritual recursiveness is very similar to recursiveness in the syntax of a natural language, there is one difference. We can embed D in P, A and C; P in A and C; and A in C. But we cannot embed C in A, P or D; A in P or D; P in D; or any of the rituals in itself. In natural language, on the other hand, sentences can be embedded in sentences. In the standard systems of generative syntax this is expressed by recurrence of the sentence symbol S in rules such as:

$$\left.\begin{array}{r} S \rightarrow NP\text{–}VP \\ VP \rightarrow V\text{–}NP\text{–}S \\ NP \rightarrow Det\text{–}N\text{–}S. \end{array}\right\} \qquad (19)$$

(See, e.g., Chomsky 1965.) In the ritual rules we do not find such a struc-

ture. There is a specific order of category symbols such as *D–P–A–C*, which determines the order of embeddings and causes the generative capacity of the ritual system to be restricted in a manner the generative capacity of a natural language is not.

The recursiveness of the ritual system is not confined to the ritual phrase structure rules. We find it elsewhere too. As Hubert and Mauss had already observed (1897–1898, 85–87) many of the rituals are preceded by introductory rites and followed by final rites, which are often each other's counterpart or correspond to each other in a certain manner. Here follow some examples.

The agniṣṭoma ritual starts with a procession from the house of the sacrificer to the sacrificial enclosure, and ends with his return from the sacrificial enclosure to his house. The sacrificial enclosure which is first built up is in the end burnt down. At the *dīkṣā* or consecration, the sacrificer bathes and is then provided with an antelope skin, a turban and an antelope horn, among other things. In the course of subsequent rituals, the turban is removed. Later, the antelope horn is discarded. At the *avabhṛtha* or final bath, the antelope skin is thrown into the water after which the sacrificer himself bathes. Similarly, the priests enter into an alliance with the sacrificer on the second day at the *tānūnaptra* ritual, and dissolve this alliance on the last day at the *sakhyavisarjana* ritual. The concluding oblation of *udayanīyeṣṭi* corresponds to the introductory oblation of the *prāyaṇīyeṣṭi*. (In fact, the *puronuvākyās* of the one are the *yājyās* of the other, and vice versa: Caland and Henry 1906, p. 405.) Lastly, the *udavasāna* or departure ritual is the counterpart of the *adhyavasāna* or entrance ritual.

The introductory and final rites may also be the same. The *vrātyastoma*, for example, was celebrated before and after the raiding expeditions of the Vrātyas. This shows, if Heesterman is right, that this recursive feature occurred also in the pre-classical ritual (Heesterman 1962, 7).

In the agniṣṭoma, the interplay of all these rituals with each other and with numerous other rites is complex. Let us confine ourselves to the order in which the main rituals are executed. During the first two days of the ceremonies, the introductory rituals, which I shall denote by $A_1, \ldots, A_5$, occur in the following order:

A_1: introductory procession
A_2: *adhyavasāna*
A_3: *dīkṣā*
A_4: *prāyaṇīyeṣṭi*
A_5: *tānūnaptra*.

Now let us denote each corresponding final rite by the same symbol, adding an asterisk, as follows:

A_1^*: return home
A_2^*: *udavasāna*
A_3^*: *avabhṛtha*
A_4^*: *udayanīyeṣṭi*
A_5^*: *sakhyavisarjana.*

The order in which these rites are gone through in the agniṣṭoma is in fact the following:

$$A_1 A_2 A_3 A_4 A_5 \ldots A_5^* A_3^* A_4^* A_2^* A_1^*.$$

This suggests a tendency, not quite successful, to establish a regular 'mirror-image' pattern, viz.:

$$A_1 A_2 A_3 A_4 A_5 \ldots A_5^* A_4^* A_3^* A_2^* A_1^*.$$

The nesting of rites which is exhibited here is found to some extent in numerous other rituals and rites. Within D, the main oblation (*pradhānahoma*) is preceded by *ājyabhāga* oblations and followed by a *sviṣṭakṛt* oblation. The *ājyabhāgas* are in turn preceded by fore-offerings (*prayāja*) and the *sviṣṭakṛt* is in turn followed by after-offerings (*anuyāja*). In the Soma sacrifices, each *śastra* recitation is preceded by *puroruk* and followed by *ukthavīrya*. The *puroruk* is in turn preceded by *āhāva*, and the *ukthavīrya* is followed by *śastradoha* (all of these are recitations). Similarly, there are recitations preceding and following each *stotra* chant. These examples can be extended almost indefinitely.

All these nesting or self-embedding structures can be represented by recursive rules of the form:

$$B \rightarrow A \;\; B \;\; A, \tag{20}$$

which generate structures *AABAA, AAABAAA, AAAABAAAA,* ... by applying the rule again and again to its own output.

Such self-embedding rules are found in the syntax of natural languages. However, their use is restricted by limitations which are probably not linguistic but psychological: limitations imposed upon our capacity to process information. Thus it is a fact, but not a linguistic fact, that few people can manage more than two self-embeddings (see, e.g., Miller 1964, 36–37). These restrictions are confined to the processing of short-term memory. They do not apply over longer spans of time, as in the ritual. The

mirror-image strings with their limited occurrence in language may therefore be rudiments which point to a ritual origin.

In actual speech, we find self-embedding structures of the type generated by (20) rejected in favor of right-recursive structures such as *AB, AAB, AAAB, AAAAB*, . . . generated by:

$$B \rightarrow A\ B, \tag{21}$$

or left-recursive structures such as *BA, BAA, BAAA, BAAAA*, . . . generated by:

$$B \rightarrow B\ A. \tag{22}$$

Since there are no restrictions on self-embedding structures in ritual syntax, there was no need for such right- or left-recursive structures to arise.

If the self-embedding structures are indeed earlier, it is not surprising to find that they are also more common in poetry than in common speech. In Sanskrit poetry there is such a figure of speech, which is called *parivṛttiyamaka* (Gerow 1971, p. 229–30).

Before discussing possible explanations for the similarities between structures in ritual and in language, it should be emphasized that the occurrence of such structures does not imply that the ritualists were any more aware of their precise form than language users are conscious of the syntactic rules which they employ. In linguistics, this has been often misunderstood and Chomsky has repeatedly emphasized that "the structure of particular languages may very well be largely determined by factors over which the individual has no conscious control" (Chomsky 1965, 59). The same applies in the domain of ritual. It is not invalidated by the fact, that we have based our analysis largely upon descriptions of ritual provided by the ritualists themselves. The structures which I have discussed should therefore be distinguished from such structures as Lévi-Strauss found in a native Yoruba theory, about which he says: "But, as theories go, the Yoruba seem to have been able to throw more light than ethnologists on the spirit of institutions and rules which in their society, as in many others, are of an intellectual and deliberate character" (Lévi-Strauss 1966, 133). In the domain of Vedic ritual, the descriptions by the authors of the śrauta-sūtras, too, have thrown more light on the subject than any modern author could do without their aid. However, this does not imply that the deeper structures which underlie many ritual constructions have at any time been conceived deliberately.

Despite the specific difference in recursiveness which we have found, the occurrence in the syntax of both ritual and language of very specific and

unobvious rules, viz., *phrase structure rules, transformational rules* and *self-embedding rules*, is sufficiently striking to demand an explanation. It would be premature to offer such an explanation at this early stage of the investigation. One reason is that the data upon which these similarities are based are asymmetrical. On the language side, the relevant structures have been shown to be in all likelihood universal. On the ritual side, our data have been confined to Vedic ritual. Though this is most probably the best point of departure, we are only beginning to explore a domain of ritual syntax which appears to be as complex as the syntax of language. Even in the domain of Vedic ritual we have taken into account only a few structures. For example, we have not so far explored the fact, briefly referred to before, that the ritual is executed by combining the contributions of different groups of priests with distinct ritual systems. This is comparable to a language which exhibits the rules of several distinct grammars. Also, we have not studied the meta-rules which are required when different rules, apparently inconsistent with each other, have to be combined (cf. Staal 1975b). Similarly, the structure of *saṃpad* 'numerical congruence' (Heesterman 1957, 35, 53) awaits syntactic treatment. Since there is so much left undone, I can by way of conclusion only offer speculation.

The similarities which we found may require elaborate explanations. But they might alternatively be explained by one of three basically simple explanations: either language is the cause, or ritual is the cause, or there is a common cause for both. I shall discount the third which could be almost anything about which we know little – ranging from the 'essence of man' to the structure of his brain. It would seem plausible, then, to opt for the first explanation. In its support it could be argued that it would not be surprising for man, who has a specific structure of language somehow anchored in his brain, to exhibit in due course this same structure in his rituals. I think this is quite possibly correct, but I wish to point out that it is not the only plausible view. First of all, it smacks of prejudice. It is we who are obsessed by language and who have (despite survivals) lost touch with ritual. Hence it is only natural that the view that language is primary, would appeal to us. But for Early Man, ritual was at least as important as language is for us. Ritual, after all, is much older than language. Unlike language, it can originate on all fours. It is common among animals.

Since we have now returned to the historical and evolutionary perspective we abandoned at the beginning of our investigation, it would be relevant to consider animal systems of communication or 'animal language.' From the point of view of syntax, evidence for an animal syntax which is at all like human appears to be meagre or nonexistent. As for monkeys and apes, their

communication systems "have little relationship with human language, but much with the ways human beings express emotion through gesture, facial expressions, and tone of voice" (Lancaster 1968, 446). In a study which pays some attention to syntactic problems, Reynolds, partly following Altmann, has shown that in the communication among Macaques, "a sequence of displays will determine the probability of the next display" (I quote from Hill 1972, 314). But Hill has rightly pointed out that this would precisely be a communication system with the properties of a Markov process model, "which Chomsky (1957) so convincingly demonstrated was not the sort of system represented in human language." Hill has in fact suggested that a basic distinction between animal communication and human language is that the former lacks recursiveness (Hill 1972, 313–315; cf. Revzin 1974, 25).

To complete the investigation we would require detailed studies of the syntax of animal ritual. Little seems to be available in the otherwise impressive work of scholars like Crane, Huxley, Lorenz and Tinbergen (see, e.g., Huxley 1966). Such information however, when available, may clench the argument. If there is no recursiveness in the syntax of animal ritual, the issue would remain inconclusive. But if there is, and if Hill is right, this would seem to suggest that the recursiveness which is the main characteristic of the syntax of human language has a ritual origin. As we have seen already, it seems likely that the restricted occurrence of self-embedding in language may be a rudiment of the unrestricted self-embedding which we find in ritual. The view that the syntax of language derives from ritual syntax would in turn be consistent with the view that many features of human civilization derive from ritual.[3]

Another hypothesis is consistent with the view that syntax has a ritual origin: the hypothesis that syntax is older than semantics. This is precisely what I suspect to be the case. The contrary view, that structured systems of meaning developed first, seems to be accepted implicitly by many scholars. It is certainly more logical (hence the appeal of generative semantics, which denies that there is an independent level of syntax). In addition to the emphasis on synchronistic structure, this view would help to explain the readily accepted taboo which the *Société de linguistique* of Paris imposed upon investigations into the origin of language: for meaning was held to be mysterious and inaccessible to scientific treatment. The rhetorical question which seems to lurk behind such a view is something like this: why should people wish to establish language if not for the sake of communication? But such an idea rests on very flimsy grounds. Language was not deliberately and consciously established by anybody, its emergence and growth need not

be due to pragmatic needs, and it clearly exhibits a great deal of structure which plays no role in communication. Nature, in brief, is not always logical.

There are many facts, on the other hand, which seem to support the view that syntax is older than semantics. The Vedic ritual itself provides such evidence. Vedic ritual is replete with recitation and chant. These recitations and chants are comprised of a highly structured mixture of natural language and meaningless sound. But whether or not portions of this mixture are meaningful in other contexts, in their ritual use the only things which matter are the sounds and their precise configurations. According to the ancient ritualist Kautsa, all *mantras* are meaningless, and this view is indeed applicable to the occurrence of *mantras* throughout Indian culture (see, e.g., Staal 1975a, s.v. *Mantra*). In Vedic ritual, as in *mantra* meditation, the function of language is phonetic and syntactic, not semantic.

Other facts support this in a negative way. During performances of Vedic rituals, the participants are not supposed to communicate with each other through ordinary language. In later times, such communication is restricted (and effectively eliminated) by prohibiting the use of any language other than Sanskrit. Linguistic communication of an ordinary sort is also excluded when ritual recitations are prescribed as *anirukta*, 'not enunciated', *upāṃśu*, 'inaudible', or when the rites are executed *tuṣṇīm*, 'in silence' (Renou and Silburn 1954). In the ritual of the chanters, *aniruktagāna* 'unenunciated chant' is a protracted chant of *o* with the same structure and pitch variation as the original *mantra*, which is represented mentally. In meditation, linguistic meaning is also excluded. The meditation *mantras*, which are elsewhere recited, increasingly come to consist of meaningless syllables, which tend to become mental or vanish altogether. Thus phonetic structure disappears and syntactic structure is reduced to mere repetition, expressible by the single syntactic rule $A \rightarrow AA$.

I am inclined to believe that what we witness here is not a curious collection of exotic facts, but a remnant or resurgence of a pre-linguistic stage of development, during which man or his ancestors used sound in a purely syntactic or ritual manner. This would be supported by the generally archaic features of ritual as well as of mysticism, and the claim that there was a golden age when ritual practices and mystical insights were common (cf. Staal 1975a, 58). The *locus classicus* is Ṛgveda 1.164.50 = 10.90.16:

yajñéna yajñám ayajanta devā́s
tā́ni dhármāṇi prathamā́ny āsan

"With the sacrifice the gods performed the sacrifice.
These were the first ordinances" (transl. Brown 1965, 32; 1968, 218).

Into the ritual syntactic structures, referential meaning could have been introduced at a later stage, for example through the emerging ability to use names. It seems that an anatomical basis for this ability exists only in the brain of man (Geschwind 1965; Lancaster 1968; for further speculation see Staal 1975b and 1979a). Had there been no ritual, meaning could have been attached to sound in a more direct fashion. In particular, composite meanings could have been represented by composite sounds in a straightforward manner, as is indeed the case in some systems of logic and as is significantly absent from natural language. As things stand, syntax has complicated matters and still survives as the ritual part of language.

In his presidential address to the 1974 meeting of the *Linguistic Society of America*, Morris Halle has expressed a similar view – the conception of language not as a means for communication but as playful activity, as a kind of game. He quotes in this connexion from Novalis' *Sprachwissenschaftlicher Monolog* of 1798:

> Das rechte Gespräch ist ein blosses Wortspiel. . .Wenn man den Leuten nur begreiflich machen könnte, dass es mit der Sprache wie mit den mathematischen Formeln sei. – Sie machen eine Welt für sich aus – sie spielen nur mit sich selbst, drücken nichts als ihre wunderbare Natur aus, und eben darum sind sie so ausdrucksvoll – eben darum spiegelt sich in ihnen das seltsame Verhältnisspiel der Dinge. . .so ist es auch mit der Sprache. . ." (Halle 1975, 527–528; since this paper was addressed to linguists, Halle added an English translation).

The view that syntax has a ritual origin and is older than semantics would explain why there is a syntax in ritual, why there is an independent level of syntax – if there is one – in linguistics, why language is so unlogical and – *pace* Novalis – why language pictures the world in such a roundabout fashion.

Berkeley

NOTES

[1] This Greek definition of man is quite different from its Latin translation by *animal rationale*, as rightly pointed out by Heidegger (1953, 165).

[2] There are numerous variations. After University of California President David Saxon had declared that he would not ban CIA recruitment on campus, San Diego students forced him to cancel his scheduled address to the faculty. Back in Berkeley, Saxon said about this incident and about the CIA: "I abhor the recently revealed reprehensible activities carried out

by members of that agency in the name of national security, but I abhor even more the violence done to reasoned discussion on the San Diego campus in the name of righteousness." (*Berkeley Gazette*, Nov. 27 and 28, 1975). In other words, the speaker was more upset by interruptions of his speech than by cases of attempted murder.

[3] In a study on the ritual origin of geometry, partly based upon Vedic materials, Seidenberg has quoted the view of Lord Raglan, which seems to be the most radical of its kind: "We have seen that many of the principal discoveries and inventions upon which our civilization is based can be traced with considerable probability to an area with its focus near the head of the Persian Gulf, and such evidence as there is suggests that they were made by ingenious priests as a means of facilitating the performance of religious ritual. It is at least possible that animals were first domesticated for convenience in sacrifice and that the first use of the plough was as a method of symbolically fertilizing the soil; the first wheel may have been a labor-saving device for keeping the sun on its course, and metal working may have started with the making of imitation suns in gold; the first bow and arrow may have insured victory by symbolically destroying enemies at a distance; mummification kept the dead king ritually alive, and the kite conveyed his spirit to the sky. There is *some* evidence to support all these suggestions, and its cumulative effect strengthens the theory as a whole; the theory, that is, that civilization originated in ritual, though of course a great deal more evidence would be required to establish it. Alternative theories have no evidence to support them at all" (Raglan 1949, 176 in Seidenberg 1962, 490).

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DAVID PINGREE

THE *KHEṬAMUKTĀVALĪ* OF NṚSIṂHA

One of the most distinguished families of jyautiṣis in India was that whose first member was Keśava, the son of Kamalākara of the Kauśikagotra.[1] He and his descendants resided at Nandigrāma (modern Nandod in Gujarāt, north of Rajpipla and on the south bank of the Narmadā near its mouth) from the late fifteenth till the mid seventeenth centuries. Keśava, who studied under Vaidyanātha, wrote an astronomical karaṇa entitled *Grahakautuka* or *Kheṭakautuka*, whose epoch is Śaka 1418 = A.D. 1496. The *Kheṭasāraṇī* mentioned in *Kheṭamuktāvalī* 3 was presumably a set of tables intended to accompany the *Grahakautuka*, though more than the text's fifty years had passed in Śaka 1488 = A.D. 1566, which is Nṛsiṃha's epoch. The number was not meant to be precise.

Keśava had three sons: Gaṇeśa,[2] Ananta,[3] and Rāma. The first wrote, among many other works, a *Grahalāghava*, which became the standard textbook of the school of astronomers known as the Gaṇeśapakṣa.[4] He claims to have utilized his father's work; and the parameters used by Nṛsiṃha are related to his.[5]

Nṛsiṃha,[6] the son of Rāma and the pupil of Gaṇeśa, was born, according to *Grahakaumudī*[7] IV 12, in Śaka 1470 = A.D. 1548. He is the author of several astronomical works, including a commentary on his uncle's *Grahalāghava*, the *Harṣakaumudī*; the *Grahakaumudī*, which has as epochs 31 March 1588 and 31 March 1603; and the *Kheṭamuktāvalī*, whose epoch is Sunday 31 March 1566 and which is edited here. Gaṇeśa's great-grandson Gaṇeśa[8] quotes Nṛsiṃha's *Bhagaṇopapatti* in his commentary, *Śiromaṇiprakāśa*, on Bhāskara's *Siddhāntaśiromaṇi*.[9]

There are three manuscripts of the *Kheṭamuktāvalī*. MS. 1461 in the Indian Museum in Calcutta[10] mentions no author. MS. 4502 in the Anup Library in Bikaner, consisting of 38ff., is the only manuscript accompanied by the set of tables computed by Nṛsiṃha; it was copied by Kṛṣṇaśāmati Mala in Śaka 1587 = A.D. 1665. I have not been able to consult either of these, but have used MS. 54 in the Harvard College Library.

The manuscript consists of two parts, A and B, of 4ff. and 9ff. respectively; both were written by the same hand in the last century. The text occupies ff. 1v–4r of A; it is followed, on ff. 4r–4v, by these two inept verses, of which the second has as epoch Śaka 1275 = A.D. 1353:

M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 143–157.

sveṣṭāś ca avadhī kheṭā antarālakalādikam |
gatabhakte dinādyaiś ca gṛhe saṅkramaṇo bhavet ||
śāke bāṇādrisūryone tryaśvaghne 'bdhyaṅgasaṃyute |
nāgabāṇahṛte labdhaṃ vārāḥ śeṣās tu nāḍikāḥ ||

Part B contains a ṭīkā which breaks off, on f. 9v which is left mostly blank, at the beginning of the commentary on verse 12. In the commentary on verses 5–7 and 9–11 are examples for Śaka 1737 = A.D. 1815, which must be the approximate date of the composition of this ṭīkā. The commentary on verse 2 utilizes the word turaka (*cf.* Hindī turra, Marāṭhī turā) to explain avataṃsa: puno gaṇakavaryakulāvataṃsaḥ | gaṇakeṣu jyotirvitsu ye varyāḥ pūjyās teṣāṃ kule 'vataṃsaḥ prākṛtabhāṣayā turakaḥ || The only other indication of the provenance of the ṭīkā is in the commentary on verse 8, where in the example given the locality is 32 yojanas or 2;24° west of the prime meridian: rekhāsvadeśamadhyasthayojanāni 32 | eṣām abhrebhabhāgo ghaṭikādiḥ 0 | 24 | ayaṃ svadeśasya paścimasthitatvād abdapanāḍīṣu 5 | 48 | 5 rahitaḥ 5 | 47 | 41 | ayaṃ spaṣṭābdapo jātaḥ || The longitudinal difference between Ujjayinī and Nandigrāma is 2;10°.

In the commentary on verse 6 the ṭīkākāra computes the following true sidereal longitudes of the planets for 7 April 1815 from the tables of the *Kheṭamuktāvalī*, which are here compared with modern computations of their true tropical longitudes.

	Kheṭamuktāvalī	Modern	Difference
Saturn	4,48;13,0°	5,10°	-22°
Jupiter	2,44;29,0°	3,3°	-19°
Mars	4,48;33,16°	5,5°	-16°
(Sun	0°)	17°	-17°
Venus	27;45,20°	43°	-15°
Mercury	5,35;16,0°	5,51°	-16°

śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ ||
kṣitibhṛtsutayā tu kāmado 'sau
budhavidyādhararamyapādapadmaḥ |
kṛpayārdramanā gurur gaṇeśo
jayati śrīsukhadolla⟨sa⟩ttrimūrtiḥ ||1||

1d śrīsukhadollasattrimūrtiḥ comm.

smṛtvā gaṇeśaguruvaryapadāravindaṃ
tatprāptadhīr gaṇakavaryakulāvataṃsaḥ |
śrīrāmacandratanayo grahavit sukheṭa-
muktāvalīṃ prakurute sa nṛsiṃhanāmā ||2||
śrīkeśavo 'karot kheṭasāraṇīṃ prasphuṭāṃ tathā
tāṃ kiṃci⟨c⟩chithilāṃ dṛṣṭvā pañcāśadgatavatsare ||3||
kheṭamuktāvalī seyaṃ dṛṣṭipratyayakāriṇī |
rājate daivavitkaṇṭhe caināṃ paśya⟨n⟩tu sajjanāḥ ||4||
nāgebhaśakronaśakaḥ samaughas
tadghnā guṇāḥ kṣepayutā grahāḥ syuḥ |
kharāmabhaktaḥ śaradāṃ samūhaḥ
śeṣe 'bdapādyāḥ phalagair yutā vā ||5||
iti varṣapādimadhyagrahasiddhiḥ ||

nijagṛhamitapaṅktyāṃ saṃskṛtā svāṃśanighnā-
ntarakhaguṇalavena prasphuṭāḥ khecarāḥ syuḥ |
gatir udayakamauḍhyāvakravakrāṇi tadvad
bhagaṇapatitarāhuḥ svāṃśahīnaḥ sphuṭaḥ syāt ||6||
gatir iha viparītā ced viśuddhānyathā syād
yadi khalu khagacāro vyastaśuddho 'nyathā syāt |
sthira iha ravir ītiś cājasaṅkrāntikālā-
bdapadina iha cāntāḥ śakraghasrair bhaveyuḥ ||7||
rekhāsvadeśamadhyasthayojanābhrebhabhāgakam |
varṣādhipatināḍīṣu prāk paścāt svam ṛṇaṃ kuru ||8||
ity abdapādīnāṃ sphuṭīkaraṇam ||

gajavasumanuhīno yaḥ śako hāyanaugho
gaganakhavasubhaktaḥ saptakhābhrendunighnaḥ |
bhavati sa ca paleṣu tryabdhihṛdvarṣayukto
dyumukha iha sameśaḥ khākṛtisvargayuktaḥ ||9||
svatithyaṃśayuktaḥ samaugho daśaghnaḥ
samāyuk paleṣv aṅkabhaktābdahīnaḥ |
bhave⟨c⟩ chuddhir atrābhrarāmaiś ca taṣṭā
yutāṅkaiś ca bāṇatribhiḥ saptabhiś ca ||10||
rasabhaṃ viṣame same kham abde
śivanighnābdalavāḥ svabhāṃśayuktāḥ |
kṣitijo gṛhapūrvakaḥ samādau
guṇadhiṣṇyāṅkayuto bhavet sa madhyaḥ ||11||

4d paśyantu comm. | 8b °bhāgakaḥ MS | col. iti abda° MS

svaguṇalavānvitavarṣam atra bhāni
⟨manu⟩hatavarṣasañcayo 'ṃśakāś ca liptāḥ |
vidhuguṇanighnasamāyutāḥ samātrya-
ṃśayug iha dikkhabindubāṇayug bu⟨dha⟩ś ca ||12||
samācayas tu rāśayo lavās trihṛtsamācayaḥ |
samācayaḥ kalā guruḥ śarātidhṛtiśakrayuk ||13||
viṣame rasabhaṃ same kham abde
sadalasamaughayutaṃ tu bhādi śukraḥ |
śivanighnasamāḥ kalā⟨ś⟩ ca liptā-
⟨rdham⟩ api yutas tu śarair yugair yugākṣaiḥ ||14||
bhaumejyayor yutiḥ śukras trighnābdayuktabhāgakāḥ |
ṣaḍyamaghnābdayugliptāḥ khadasraghnaviliptikāḥ ||15||
lavāḥ syur arkaghnasamāś ca te kalā
vidiglavābdā vikalāḥ kham ṛkṣam
yuto yugaiḥ saptabhir aṅgarāmair
mandaḥ samādau bhavatīha madhyaḥ ||16||
khanetranighnāḥ śarado 'bdahīna-
yuktāḥ krameṇāṃśakaliptikāḥ syuḥ |
dvihṛtsamāḍhyāḥ kalikā yutaṃ yugais
tridṛgbhir arhair bhagaṇacyutaṃ tamaḥ ||17||
pūrvopakaraṇebhyo 'tra kadācid kiṃcid anyathā |
tathāpy ebhyo gṛhādyaṃ ca tulyam evāgamiṣyati ||18||
iti prakārāntareṇopakaraṇasādhanam ||
atha granthoktabhraṣṭāṅkajñānārthaṃ kiṃcid ucyate ||
dhanarṇabhāgāntarasaṃskṛto 'vadhi-
sthito graho yo gatarāśipaṅktibhāk |
bhāgāntaraṃ hi svam ṛṇaṃ grahe gata-
kṣetrodbhave syād adhike ca hīne ||19||
gatiś ca gatyantarayuktahīnā
syād agrarāśiprathamāvadhisthā |
gatāgatarkṣasthitakhecarāntaraṃ
svarṇaṃ ca hīne 'bhyadhike grahe 'tra ||20||
saṃjñāsāmye bhaved evaṃ vibhinnatve yutiḥ kṣayaḥ |
evaṃ gatyantare prājñair viśeṣo 'yam udāhṛtaḥ ||21||

12d ṃśaja inba (?) yuto digindu 10 yukta yug iha dikkhabāṇa 50 yug buś ca MS | 14 c kalā viliptā MS | 14d api ca MS | 15b °yugabhāgakāḥ MS | 15d vedeśarkṣaviyuk ca vā MS | 17a 'bdahīnā MS | 17c yuto MS | 17d °cyutas MS

gatāgatarkṣasthajavāntaraṃ syāt
svarṇaṃ kramād agrajave 'dhikone |
cārāntaraṃ syāt svam ṛṇaṃ tu cāre
gamyarkṣaje nyūnatare 'dhike ca |
cārāntareṇonayutaś ca cāraḥ
syād gamyarāśiprathamāvadhisthaḥ ||22||
atha sūryodayagrahasi⟨d⟩dhyarthaṃ kiṃcid ucyate ||
deśāntarakhāṣṭalavaḥ
khāṅgāgnyaṃśe phalaṃ kalāntaṃ ca |
caradalaghaṭikādyuhayajam
eṣām aikyāntaraṃ svaikyam ||23||
dhanādhanasvaikyavihīnayukta-
varṣeśanāḍya⟨s tv⟩ ṛjuvakra⟨ga⟩tyā |
nighnās tathā saṣṭihṛtā ṛṇaṃ svaṃ
grahe vidadhyāt sa khagodaye syāt ||24||

atha pakṣāntaragrahasādhanam āha ||
svacālanaviniryuktā varṣādāv abdapādikāḥ |
te ca svapakṣajātāḥ syus tebhyaḥ spaṣṭās tathaiva ca ||25||
atha saptāhe grahasādhanam ||
eṣyātītaviyaccaraikyaśakale saṃyojyam ṛjvos tathā-
nṛjvor vā vivaraṃ vibhinnajavayor vaikyaṃ nagāṅghryāhatam |
ṛjv⟨or v⟩ā pracurādhikā ⟨x x⟩tarānṛjvor vibhede tathā
vakraiṣyetarathā viyojyam ucitaḥ syāt saptamāhe grahaḥ ||26||

nandigrāma ihāparodadhitaṭe śreṣṭhadvijāgryair yute
satpūgāmraśirīṣavṛkṣanikara⟨c⟩chāyāvitāne vasan |
śrīrāmaḥ khagavit tu tatsuta iha śrīmadgaṇeśād guroḥ
prāptaśrīr akaron nṛsiṃhakhagavit tāṃ kheṭamuktāvalīm ||27||
iti śrīrāmadaivajñasutanṛsiṃhadaivajñaviracitā
kheṭamuktāvalī samāptā ||

COMMENTARY

5a–b. Śaka 1488 began on Sunday 31 March 1566. The mean yearly motions (guṇas) and mean sidereal longitudes at epoch (kṣepas) are listed in verses 9–17.

5c–d. The tables that accompanied the *Kheṭamuktāvalī* evidently

24b °nāḍyo ṛjuvakratyā MS | 26c ṛjvā MS | 26d grahāḥ MS

belonged to the 'true-linear' arrangement.[11] The mean motion tables were for 1 to 30 years (śeṣa) and for periods of 30 years (labdha).

6a–b. This rule for linear interpolation between the true longitude tables (gṛha = rāśi = ṛkṣa) and the example in the ṭīkā indicate that $\Delta\lambda = 30°$ as in the *Khecaradīpikā* of Kalyāṇa,[12] whose epoch is 1649.

6c. Each true longitude table contains five lines as in the *Mahādevī* of Mahādeva:[13] 1. argument of 1–27 avadhis, each of 14 days; 2. true longitude at the beginning of each avadhi; 3. difference (bhāgāntara) between the true longitudes in table N (gata) and in table N + 1 (eṣya); 4. true daily motion (gati); and 5. difference (gatyantara) between the true daily motions in table N and in table N + 1. In the margin are given the longitudes of first visibilities (udaya), last visibilities (mauḍhya = asta), first stations (vakra), and second stations (avakra = mārga).

6d. The longitude of the ascending node of the Moon increases linearly in retrogression.

8. A nāḍī of time equals 80 yojanas along the terrestrial equator, so that that equator extends 4800 yojanas. Local time is correspondingly corrected by means of the local longitudinal difference (deśāntara).

9–17. These verses give the mean yearly motions and the mean positions at epoch. The mean yearly motions are almost all identical with those of *Grahakaumudī* I 9–11.

Lord of the year	1007/800 = 1;15,31,30[14] civil days
Epact	(11 + 1/15) tithis − 0;1/9 = 11;3,53,20[15] tithis
Mars	6 signs + 11° + 11°/27 = 3,11;24,26,38, . . .°[16]
Mercury's anomaly	1-1/3 signs + 14° + 14′ + 31′ + 1′/3 = 54;45,20°
Jupiter	1 sign + 1°/3 + 1′ = 30;21°
Venus' anomaly	6 signs + 1-1/2 signs + 11′ + 1′/2 = 3,45;11,30°
Venus' anomaly	3,11;24,10° + 30;21° + 3° + 26′ + 20″ = 3,45;11,20°
Saturn	12° + 12′ + (1 − 1/10)″ = 12;12,54°
Ascending node	− [(20 − 1)° + (20 + 1)′ + 1′/2] = −19;21,30°

The epoch mean positions are almost consistent with the two sets in *Grahakaumudī* I 12–13 and IV 2–9; that is, they can be approximately computed by adding algebraically to any set the guṇakas multiplied by the years intervening till another set.

31 March 1566 + 22 years = 31 March 1588 + 15 years = 31 March 1603

Lord of the year	0;22,22	0;3,33[17]	4;56,25
Epact	9;35,7	12;59,28[18]	28;57,49
Mars	1,57;9°	8;0,40°[19]	5,59;3,20°
Mercury's anomaly	5,0;50°	1,5;26,53,20°[20]	2,46;46,53,20°

Jupiter	2,49;14°	1,56;55°[21]	3,32;10,53,20°[22]
Venus' anomaly	2,34;54°	1,9;8°[23]	3,27;0,26,40°[24]
Saturn	2,7;36°	36;18,53,20°[25]	3,39;32,13,20°[26]
Ascending node	−2,23;24°	−3,29;16,53,20°[27]	−2,19;39,20°[28]

A more precise match is obtained when one compares the kṣepakas of the *Kheṭamuktāvalī* with the mean positions computed by the ṭīkākāra on verse 5 for Friday 7 April 1815.

	March 1566	+ 249 years	= 7 April 1815
Lord of the year	0;22,22	+ 1;15,31,30·4,9	= 5;48,5,30
Epact	9;35,7	+ 11;3,53,23·4,9	= 4;43,39,27
Mars	1,57;9°	+ 3,11;24,10°·4,9	= 4,16;26,30°
Mercury's anomaly	5,0;50°	+ 54;45,20·4,9	= 4,14;58°
Jupiter	2,49;14°	+ 30;21°·4,9	= 2,46;23°
Venus' anomaly	2,34;54°		1,6;15,30° [29]
Saturn	2,7;36°	+ 12;12,54°·4.9	= 4,49;8,6°
Ascending node	− 2,23;24°	− 19;21,30°·4.9	= −4,43;37,30°

19–22. These verses give rules for the application of interpolation-results with the correct algebraic sign.

23–24. The computation of the effect on the mean longitude of a planet of the difference between mean sunrise at Laṅkā and true local sunrise.

25. The cālana is the mean motion of a planet in 14 days.

26. The computation of the true longitude of a planet at the beginning of each period of 7 days.

APPENDIX. THE *GRAHAKAUMUDĪ* OF NṚSIṂHA

Though the tables accompanying this work have already been described elsewhere,[30] it seems useful here to edit the text because of its connections, verbal and astronomical, with the *Kheṭamuktāvalī* and because of the evidence it offers for Nṛsiṃha's career in the 37 years following 1566.

The text of the *Grahakaumudī* is preserved uniquely in MS. 2083d in the India Office Library in London,[31] of which it occupies ff. 1v–3v. It contains four adhyāyas. I 9–11 give the guṇakas and I 12–13 the kṣepakas for 31 March 1588 as on *SATE* 119 (both guṇakas and kṣepakas of the planets must be multiplied by 13;20°); IV 2–9 repeat the guṇakas and add the kṣepakas for 31 March 1603 as on *SATE* 120. It appears that, after the lapse of 15 years, Nṛsiṃha felt it to be useful to provide a new set of epoch positions. As has been demonstrated in the comments on *Kheṭamuktāvalī* 9–17, they differ but little from those computed for the later date with the elements of the *Grahakaumudī*. Because of the awkwardness of their expression, I explain these guṇakas in the following table.

Lord of the year	1007/800	= 1;15,31,30
Epact	11 + 66/1000	= 11;3,57,36
Mars	14 + 14/40 + 0;5/16	= 14;21,18,45
Mercury's anomaly	4 + 4/40 + 0;2/5	= 4;6,24
Jupiter	34/15 + 0;23/40	= 2;16,34,30
Venus' anomaly	16 + 16/18 + 0;0,21/12	= 16;53,21,45
Saturn	1 − 1/12 + (0;1 − 0;1/31)	= 0;54,58,3,52,...
Ascending node	− (1 + 1/2 − 77/1600)	= −1;27,8,57,45

śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ ||
svabhajanaratavighnadhvāntavidhvaṃsabhānuḥ
kamalajakamaleśādyais tataḥ sveṣṭasiddhyai
vilasadalaghuśuṇḍādaṇḍasantāḍitārir
diśatu girisutāyā nandano maṅgalaṃ vaḥ ||1||
vidhiharigiriśādyair arcito yas trisandhyaṃ
gaganarucirakārī viśvabhṛtyāntakartā |
śrutigaditaguṇaugho dhvāntavidhvaṃsakārī
bhavatu paramatattvaṃ bhūtaye candrabhānuḥ ||2||
bhakteṣv abhīṣṭavaradā vidhimukhyapūjyā
yanmohamohitam idaṃ jagad ādibhūtā |
devīkulasya karavīrapurasthitā me
citte sadaiva kamalā kamalālaye syāt ||3||
sakalanigamasaṃvit prāptatattvāvabodhaḥ
kṣititalatatasujñānekaśiṣyapraśiṣyaḥ |
jayati vibudhavṛndair vandito cārukīrtir
gaṇapatisamamūrtiḥ śrīgaṇeśo gurur naḥ ||4||
yavamatsyakajādicihnayukte
sukumāratvajitābjakesaraughe |
nijatātapadāravindayugme
mama mūrdhā bhramarā yato 'stu nityam ||5||
nikhilagaṇitajātapārago yo
nijagurusatkaruṇāptabodhaleśaḥ |
sugaṇakavararāmajo nṛsiṃho
gaṇakamude grahakaumudīṃ prakurve ||6||
vidhiravipramukhaiḥ kṛtatantrakair
bahuvidhair gahane gaṇanārṇave |
khacarakarmajale parimajjatāṃ
prataraṇāya tariṃ grahavedinām ||7||

1b tutaḥ MS | 2b viśvabhṛtyanta° MS | 5b °kesarogha MS | 7b guṇanārṇave MS

śāko 'bhrabhūśaramahīrahito 'bdavṛndas
tam tāḍayen nijaguṇair guṇakaiḥ krameṇa |
svakṣepakaiś ca yutayed ravivatsarānte
madhyāḥ samādhipatiśuddhikujādikāḥ syuḥ ||8||
bhūmiḥ śarakṣmāḥ kuguṇāḥ kharāmā
vārādiko 'sau guṇako 'bdapasya |
śuddher mṛdās trīṇi guṇāḥ śarāś ca
rāmāśvinaḥ syāt tithipūrvako 'yam ||9||
saṅkrandanā bhūmiyamā dhṛtiś ca
bāṇābdhayo 'yaṃ bhamukhaḥ kujasya |
vedāṅgaśuddhā vidhujasya sūrer
dasrau nṛpā vedaguṇāḥ kharāmāḥ ||10||
śukrasya bhūpās triśarātikṛtyaḥ
pañcābdhayas tv arkasutasya śūnyam |
śrutīṣavo nāgaśarās trayaś ca
rāhoḥ kubhāṅgāniṣṭaṣaṭkavedāḥ ||11||
syā⟨t⟩ kṣepako haripadaṃ tritayaṃ tv amartyā
abdādhipe 'tha mihirā navapañca piṇḍāḥ |
śuddhau viyad rasakṛti⟨ḥ⟩ śrutayo mahīje
ratnākarā yugaśarāḥ kuguṇā budhe syāt ||12||
nāgā rasāmbunidhayas tapanāḥ surejye
bāṇeśaṣaḍ bhṛgusute 'tha dineśasūnau |
dasrau guṇāmbunidhayo 'kṣayamās tu rāhau
tithyo mahījaladhayo rasavārdhayaḥ syāt ||13||
manudināntaritā uḍusaṅkhyakāś
capalamandaphalair asakṛt sphuṭāḥ |
sagatikā bhapuṭeṣu paristhitā
iha kṛtā ravivarṣasamāptitaḥ ||14||
kramaśo bhapuṭeṣu saptaviṃśā-
vadhisaṃsthāḥ sphuṭakhecarāś ca santi |
tadadho 'ntarabhāgakā dhanarṇaṃ
khacare gamyabhapaṅktige 'dhikone ||15||
javāḥ sphuṭā vakragamārgagās tad-
adho 'tha gatyantarakaṃ kalādi |
saṃjñāsamatve grahavad dhanarṇaṃ
bhede tu gatyor yutir asvam atra ||16||

8b gaṇakaiḥ MS | 10b bhamukhāḥ MS | 11a triśarā vikṛc ca MS | 11b paṃcabdhayo kṣo rka° MS | 13a nāga MS | 13b °ṣaṭ MS | 16c grahavarddhanarṇaṃ MS

astādicārās tadadhas tathaiṣyāś
cārāntaraṃ syāt tadadho dināni |
dhanarṇam eṣyarkṣapuṭāvadhisthe
cāre 'dhikone kramaśo dinair yaiḥ ||17||
bhaumavākpatimandānāṃ
niyamena lavāntaram |
bhavet svam kvacid asvaṃ svaṃ
bhṛguputrenduputrayoḥ ||18||
cārāntaradināni svaṃ
śanivākpatibhūbhuvām |
anyeyor asvam asvaṃ svaṃ
sarveṣāṃ tu javāntaram ||19||
iti śrīsakalāgamācāryaśrīnṛsiṃhasāṃvatsaraviracitāyāṃ
grahakaumudyāṃ madhyamādhikāraḥ ||

spaṣṭīkaraṇam ||
khacarabhāṅkapuṭasthitakhecarā
nijaghaṭaiś ca guṇitaiś ca lavāntaraiḥ |
gaganaṣaḍvihṛtaiḥ parisaṃskṛtāḥ
sphuṭatarāḥ kramaśo hi bhavanti te ||1||
nijanijāntarakair grahavad gatiḥ
sphuṭatarā kuṭilāstamukhā tathā
yadi na śudhyati śodhyakam anyathā
kuru tadā nijanāmaviparyayam ||2||
manudināntaritāpi ravisphuṭā
gatir athābjaripur yugatāḍitaḥ |
khacarahṛd bhamukho raviśuddhito
'nvavadhisārdhayugābdhikalonitaḥ ||3||
diṅnāgadigvinihatā rucis tridhā tā
tryāptā carasya ca dalāny atha sāyanārkāt |
dorbhir mitārdhayutir aṃśahataiṣyakhāgnyā-
ptyāḍhyā caraṃ kriyaghaṭādiravau dhanarṇam ||4||
evaṃ pratyavadhisthārkāc
caraṃ yāvad dvisaṃskṛtiḥ |
likhitā prāk pare svarṇaṃ
vipādāntarayojanam ||5||

1b nijaghaṭīś MS | 1c °ṣaṭ° MS | 3c °hṛt° MS | raviśucyuto MS | 4c daurbhir MS | 5b yāvad yad vi° MS

tadantaraikyena yutonitāni
svarṇena varṣeśapalāni kuryāt |
śuddheḥ samāsannasameśavāre
tannāḍikotthāḥ khacarā bhavanti ||6||
bhaumasya cāstād udayo 'bdhimāsair
digbhis tu vakraṃ dvimitair ṛjutvam |
digbhis tato 'staṃ tu guror bhuvā ca
sāṅghryabdhivedāṅghriyugābdhibhiś ca ||7||
śanes tu sāṅghricandreṇa
māsair abdhiguṇais tathā |
dalāḍhyaiḥ syāt krameṇaivaṃ
jñeyaṃ vakraṃ tu bhaumavat ||8||
pūrvāstāt syād udgamo dantaghasraiḥ
paścād dantair vakrakaṃ paścimāstam |
ghasrair bhūpair udgamaḥ prāk tu mārgo
ghasrair dantaiḥ pūrvato 'staṃ budhasya ||9||
bhṛgoḥ satryaṃśanetrābhyāṃ
gajair vyaṅghribhir vyaṅghriṇā |
māsena vyaṅghribhir nāgair
jñeyaṃ vakraṃ tu saumyavat ||10||
iti śrīsakalāgamācāryavaryaśrīrāmadaivajñātmaja-
śrīnṛsiṃhadaivajñasāṃvatsarikaviracitāyāṃ graha-
kaumudyāṃ spaṣṭagrahādhikāraḥ ||

atha saṅkṣepeṇa prāguktam api bhraṣṭāṅkajñānaṃ
ślokāntarair vyaktīkrīyate ||
dhanarṇabhāgāntarakeṇa yukto
vihīnakasyordhvagatonabhogaḥ |
tadagryatārāvadhisaṃsthito 'sau
syād anyathā saṃskaraṇena pūrvaḥ ||1||
gatāgatarkṣāvadhisaṃsthakheṭā-
ntaraṃ lavādy antarakaṃ bhave⟨t⟩ tat |
dhanarṇakaṃ vai kramaśo vicintyam
eṣyāvadhisthe khacare 'dhikone ||2||
evaṃ jñeyau paribhraṣṭau
gaticārau tathāntaram |
bhede tu gatyo⟨r⟩ yogo 'sau
bhaved gatyantaram ṛṇam ||3||

9c ghasrair] rāmair MS | 9d ghasrair] rāmair MS | 10b vyaṅghribhuvāṅghriṇā MS | 10c vyaṅghriṇā MS

athābhīṣṭagrahānayanam ||
śuddhiḥ svanāḍīrahitābdapasya
nāḍīyutā svā ghaṭikā yadālpāḥ |
vyekātha caitrāt tithayo gatarkṣa-
śuddhyūnitā iṣṭadinadyupiṇḍāḥ ||4||
dyupiṇḍaḥ sunāsīrabhaktaṃ phalaṃ yan
mahīyuktam etat samānāvadhisthaḥ |
sphuṭaḥ khecaraḥ śeṣanighnasvagatyāḥ
kalāsv anvito 'bhīṣṭakāle 'bhavat saḥ ||5||

athavā ||
kuryān madhyaga⟨ta⟩rkṣapaṅktigakhagaṃ spaṣṭaṃ kramāc cālayet
svīye 'theṣṭakharāṃśujāvadhigataṃ prāg agrato buddhimān |
iṣṭāsannaravīṣṭatigmakarayor liptīkṛtaṃ cāntaraṃ
bhuktyādyaṃ lavavāsarair avadhikā nyūnādhike bhāskare ||6||
vaiṣamyaṃ yadi dṛśyeta
gataiṣyajavayor mahat |
sādhyas tanmadhyagaḥ kheṭas
tadā saptadinodbhavaḥ ||7||
ṛjvor anṛjvor viyutir gataiṣya-
gatyor vibhede tu yutir nagaghnā |
vedair hṛtā labdhakalādhikaṃ svam
ṛjvoś caye 'gre 'pacaye tv anṛjvoḥ ||8||
vibhede vāparā vakrā
cānyathā ṛṇasaṃjñakam |
tatsaṃskṛtaṃ grahaikyārdhaṃ
grahas tanmadhyago bhavet ||9||
athavā prakārāntareṇopakaraṇasādhanam āha ||
śakas tattvatithyūnitaḥ syāt samaugho
nabhovedahṛd vāvaśeṣe 'bdapādyāḥ |
yutā labdhapaṅktisthitaiḥ śuddhitithyāḥ
samāsannavarṣeśavāre kujādyāḥ ||1||

athavā ||
samaugho 'drikhābhrendubhis tāḍito 'sau
nabhobhrāṣṭabhaktaḥ phalaṃ vāsarādi |
bhaved abdapo vārdhibhiḥ ṣaṭpṛṣaṭkair
marullocanaiḥ saṃyutaḥ saptataṣṭaḥ ||⟨2||⟩

4a °rahito MS | 4b nāḍīyutāḥ MS | 4c gatartu Ms | 5c śeṣanighnyā svagatyā MS | 6b 'lpeṣṭa° MS | 8a anajvor MS | 8b nagaghnyā MS
1c labdhi° MS

samāḥ śivaghnā nijaṣaṭsahasrā-
ṃśakānvitā varṣadināṃśayuktāḥ |
piṇḍair nagākṣair navavārdhibhir yuk
kharāmataṣṭā tithipūrvaśuddhiḥ ||3||
svakhābdhyaṃśayuktendranighnā samā syān
mahībhojapūrvo 'kṣanighnābdakebhyaḥ |
nṛpāṃśena nāḍīyutaś coḍutaṣṭo
'ṅganetraiḥ śarākṣair yutaḥ pañcavedaiḥ ||⟨4||⟩
yugaghnāḥ samāḥ svābhravedāṃśayuktā
budhas tārakādyo ghaṭīṣv anvitaḥ syāt |
dvinighnābdabāṇāṃśakenātha sūryaiḥ
kharāmaiḥ kurāmair yutaś coḍutaṣṭaḥ ||⟨5||⟩
vedatrinighnāḥ śarado 'kṣacandrair
bhaktā gurus tridvihatābdakebhyaḥ |
khābdhyāptanāḍīsahito 'kṣacandrair
vedeṣubhir nandayugair yutaḥ syāt ||⟨6||⟩
nṛpāhatābdāḥ svagajendubhāga-
yutā kaviś coḍumukhaḥ kunetraiḥ |
nighnābdasūryāṃśayuto ghaṭīṣu
yuto 'kṣacandraiḥ kuguṇair dvirāmaiḥ ||⟨7||⟩
svārkāṃśakonaśarado bhamukhaḥ śaniḥ syāt
svendutribhāgarahitābdayuto ghaṭīṣu |
tarkendubhis turagalocanakaiḥ pṛṣaṭka-
bāṇair yutas turagalocanaśeṣitaś ca ||⟨8||⟩
sāmā nijārdhena yutās tamo 'bdair
nakṣatrapūrvaṃ nagasaptanighnaiḥ |
vyomābhrabhūpair vihitair vihīnaṃ
digbhiś ca piṇḍair uḍubhir yutaṃ vā ||⟨9||⟩
pūrvād abdeśaśuddhyādi
kadācit kiṃcid anyathā |
tathāpy ebhyo grahāḥ sarve
prāgvat sāmyaṃ bhavanti te ||⟨10||⟩
sahyādrer adharāparāntaviṣaye kṣārāmbudheḥ prāktaṭe
grāmo nandipadādime sukadalīsaśīrṣapūgānvite |
āsīt kauśikavaṃśabhūṣaṇamaṇiḥ śrīkeśavo daivavin
nānāśāstrakalākalāpacaturaḥ saujanyaratnākaraḥ ||⟨11||⟩

3b °ṃśakonita MS | 4a svakhābdhyāṃśa° MS | 6c khābdhyāpti° MS | 6d vadekṣubhir MS | 7c paṣṭheṣu MS | 8a svāṃśāṃśa° MS | 10a pūrvād abde bdeśa° MS | 11b °chīrṣa° MS

tatputro vividhāgamārthakuśalo rāmo grahajñāmaṇis
tatputro 'jani khādrivāsavamite śāke nṛsiṃhābhidhaḥ |
sadbuddhiḥ svapitṛvyato guruganeśāt prāpya bodhāṃśakaṃ
teneyaṃ grahakaumudī viracitā daivajñasantuṣṭaye ||12||
iti śrīsakalāgamācāryavaryarāmadaivajñātmajaśrīnṛsiṃha-
daivajñaviracitāyāṃ grahakaumudī samāptā ||
col. °dī samāptā corr, to °dyāṃ caramādhikāraḥ by a later hand.

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NOTES

[1] D. Pingree, *Census of the Exact Sciences in Sanskrit* (hereafter *CESS*), Philadelphia 1970–, A 2, 65b–74a, and A 3, 24a.

[2] *CESS* A 2, 94a–106b, and A 3, 27b–28a.

[3] *CESS* A 1, 40b.

[4] D. Pingree, 'History of Mathematical Astronomy in India', *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, vol. 15, New York 1978, pp. 533–633, esp. 624–625.

[5] D. Pingree, 'On the classification of Indian planetary tables,' *JHA*, **1**, 1970, 95–108, esp. 99–101.

[6] *CESS* A 3, 202b–204a.

[7] See the Appendix.

[8] *CESS* A 2, 106b–107a.

[9] On *Grahagaṇitādhyāya* 1, 2, 1–6 and 11, 7, ed. D.V. Āpaṭe, *ASS*, 110, 2 vols., Poona 1939–1941, vol. 1, pp. 20–25, and vol. 2, p. 123.

[10] *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. 5, Madras 1969, 190a.

[11] *JHA*, **1**, 1970, 103–104.

[12] D. Pingree, *Sanskrit Astronomical Tables in the United States* (hereafter *SATIUS*), Philadelphia 1968, 61b–62b.

[13] O. Neugebauer and D. Pingree, 'The astronomical tables of Mahādeva,' *PAPS*, **111**, 1967, 69–92.

[14] To this is added in the *Kheṭamuktāvalī* 1/43 palas or 0;0,0,1,23,43 civil days, so that a year equals 6,5;15,31,31,23,43 civil days. This is an approximation to 6,5;15,31,31,24 civil days, the year-length of the Saurapakṣa.

[15] The *Grahakaumudī* has 11;3,53,23 tithis.

[16] The *Grahakaumudī* has 3,11;24,10°, as does also the ṭīkā on the *Kheṭamuktāvalī*.

[17] But 0;22,22 + 1;15,31,30·22 = 0; 3,55.

[18] But 9;35,7 + 11;3,53,20·22 = 13;0,40.

[19] This is based on a kṣepaka of 0;36,3 instead of 0;36,4.

[20] But 5,0;50° + 54;45,20°·22 = 1,5;27,20°.

[21] But 2,49;14° + 30;21°·22 = 1,56;16°.

[22] But 1,56;55° + 30;21°·15 = 3.32;10°.

[23] But 2,34;54° + 3,45;11,30°·22 = 1,8;7°.

[24] But 1,9;8° + 3,45;11,30°·15 = 3,27;0,30°.

[25] But 2,7;36° + 12;12,54°·22 = 36;19,48°.

[26] But 36;18,53,20° + 12;12,54°·15 = 3,39;32,23,20°.

[27] But −2,23;24° − 19;21,30°·22 = − 3,29;17°.

[28] But − 3,29;16° − 19;21,30°·15 = − 2,19;39,23,20°.

[29] But 2,34;54° + 3,45;11,30°·4,9 = 1,7;37,30°.

[30] D. Pingree, *Sanskrit Astronomical Tables in England* (hereafter *SATE*), Madras 1973, 118–123.

[31] *SATE* 27–28.

MUSASHI TACHIKAWA

A LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE *MŪLAMADHYAMAKAKĀRIKĀ*

I. THE PROFANE WORLD AND ULTIMATE TRUTH

It is the general view of Buddhism that one should escape from the world of transmigration (*saṁsāra*) and obtain enlightenment (*nirvāṇa*) by means of the path (*mārga*) of religious practices.[1] Buddhists call transmigration the cause of enlightenment; enlightenment, the effect of religious practices. Nāgārjuna, who not only established the Mādhyamika philosophy but also determined the fundamental direction of Mahayana Buddhism, was also one of those Buddhists who endeavored to leave the world of transmigration by means of religious practices. He calls the world of transmigration the profane world (*saṁvṛti*); enlightenment, ultimate truth (*paramārtha*).

Tradition has ascribed a vast number of texts to Nāgārjuna. At present we have Chinese translations of twenty works ascribed to him. In the Tibetan Tripitaka he is the supposed author of ninety-five works.[2] It is impossible that Nāgārjuna wrote all of those twenty or ninety-five works. Modern scholarship attributes about ten works to him. Among them the most important work is the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*MMK*), which consists of about four hundred fifty verses (*śloka*), and contains twenty-seven chapters. *MMK* seems fragmentary because each chapter deals with a separate topic and one might easily receive the impression that the entire work does not treat one coherent theme. In fact, some scholars have even held that the arguments given in *MMK* lead to a mere nihilistic sophism. I believe, however, that a close examination of the arguments given in *MMK* will demonstrate that *MMK* does indeed deal with a coherent theme by means of a consistent method. The theme of *MMK* is religious. This work, which is the first theoretical consolidation of Mahayana Buddhism, shows us how the Enlightened One has left the world of transmigration, attained enlightenment, come back to the world of transmigration, and now proceeds to lead others to enlightenment.

II. THE PROFANE WORLD

Human deeds (*karman*) produce their own effects and cause other deeds to

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arise. Such a chain of deeds ties human beings to the profane world, i.e., the world of transmigration. According to Buddhist tradition, mental defilements (*kleśa*) such as desire, ignorance, and anger, torment both the body and mind of human beings, and pull down people floating on the surface of the ocean of transmigration to its bottom. In order to obtain enlightenment one must subdue one's deeds and mental defilements. Nāgārjuna says:

> One obtains final liberation when deeds and mental defilements have been subdued. (Ch. 18, v. 5a)

According to Nāgārjuna, deeds and mental defilements arise from mental constructs (*kalpanā*). He goes on:

> Mental constructs arise from the *prapañca*. (Ch. 18, v. 5b)

The term '*prapañca*,' originally meaning 'manifoldness' or 'expansion,' here means a sort of multiplicity which is necessarily involved in making a statement.[3] The *prapañca* in turn assumes that a statement needs more than one concept. For instance, the statement "The chalk is white" presupposes the concepts 'chalk' and 'white.' Here the chalk is the qualificand, i.e., that which is to be qualified; the color white, the qualifier. Thus, that statement is expressed in terms of the qualificand-qualifier relationship, which is a kind of relationship between something passive and something active. Now, let us note that the statement "The chalk is white" is mentioned in the affirmative form. That statement implicitly presupposes the existence of its negative form: The chalk is not white. Here it should be added that the concept 'white' is possible in relation to what is not white. To conclude, we may say that the verbal activities necessary to make a simple statement, such as "The chalk is white," are pursued in terms of dichotomies of *A* and non-*A*, and the passive aspect and the active aspect.

By '*prapañca*' Nāgārjuna understands that those dichotomies are necessarily part of our verbal activities. Those dichotomies are suggestive of the original meaning of the term '*prapañca*.'

III. From the Profane World to Ultimate Truth

a. Two Entities Dealt with in MMK

Nāgārjuna concludes the fifth verse of the eighteenth chapter as follows:

> The *prapañca* is subdued in Void-ness (*śūnyatā*).

Void-ness, which is nothing but ultimate truth (*paramārtha*), waits for the religious practices of human being. Ultimate truth in Nāgārjuna's thought is not independent of human practices. Although the *prapañca* inevitably appears in our verbal activities, it is an obstacle to obtaining enlightenment. Until the *prapañca* has been subdued, one cannot realize ultimate truth. The arguments given in *MMK* aim at leading people to the state in which the *prapañca* has been subdued. That is to say, Nāgārjuna in *MMK* is trying to show the path of religious practices leading to ultimate truth.

How, then, can one be free from the *prapañca*? The method Nāgārjuna takes in *MMK* is to cause the *prapañca* to be subdued through a special kind of analysis of our verbal activities. It is this analysis which I shall examine in this paper.

Buddhists hold that nothing can come into being without depending on other things. For instance, a pot cannot come into existence without depending on its causes, such as clay, the potter, and instruments. Other conditions, non-physical ones, such as time and need, were also necessary in order that the pot exist. Hence, it would be possible to say that a pot cannot exist in itself. The theory that things, being dependent upon other things, come into existence and do not possess the grounds for their existence in themselves, has been called that of Dependent-origination (or Dependent co-arising, *pratītyasamutpāda*), one of the fundamental theories of Buddhism. Nāgārjuna's thought is similarly based.

According to this theory, the *pratītyasamutpāda* is a sort of relation. In order that a relation be possible, at least two factors are needed. Frequently, Nāgārjuna in *MMK* posits a pair of entities which are inseparably connected, and expresses the relation between those two entities in a syntactical connection. For instance, Chapter 8, v. 12ab reads as follows:

Example 1. *pratītya kārakaḥ karma*
taṁ pratītya ca kārakam/ karma pravartate. . .//
(Dependent upon the action there arises the actor. Dependent upon the actor there arises the action.)

In that verse Nāgārjuna picks up the two entities: the actor (*kartṛ*) and the action (*karman*), and mentions them as well as the relation between them. As we shall see later, this is the first step of Nāgārjuna's arguments in *MMK*. The assumption here is that those two entities are found in the *pratītyasamutpāda* relationship. The theme of the eighth chapter is the mutual dependence of the actor and the action. The above-mentioned verse concludes the arguments in the eighth chapter. In this way Nāgārjuna deals with the relation between two – and sometimes three – entities in each

chapter.[4] Hence one can see various pairs of entities dealt with in *MMK*. Table I is a list of those pairs of entities the relation of which Nāgārjuna deals with in each chapter.

TABLE I

Chapter; Verse (Poussin edition)		Two Entities	
1;	1	things (*bhāva*)	arising (*utpāda*)
	4	function (*kriyā*)	that which possesses conditions (*pratyayavat*), or that which possesses non-conditions (*apratyayavat*)
		condition (*pratyaya*)	that which possesses functions (*kriyāvat*), or that which possesses non-functions (*akriyāvat*)
	6	condition	an existent entity (*sadartha*), or a non-existent entity (*asadartha*)
	11	effect (*phala*)	condition
	14	effect	that which is produced by conditions (*pratyayamaya*), or that which is produced by non-conditions (*apratyayamaya*)
2;	1	the action of traversing (*gamana*)	that which has already been traversed (*gata*), or that which is not yet traversed (*agata*), or that which is being traversed (*gamyamāna*)
	8	the action of traversing	the traverser (*gantṛ*), or the non-traverser (*agantṛ*)
	12	the beginning of the action of traversing (*gamikriyārambhana*)	the traversed (*gata*), or the non-traversed (*agata*), or that which is being traversed (*gamyamāna*)
	15	the action of standing still (*sthiti*)	the traverser, or the non-traverser
3;	5	the action of seeing (*darśanakriyā*)	the visual organ (*darśana*), or that which is not the visual organ (*adarśana*)
	6	the action of seeing	the seer (*draṣṭṛ*)
	7	the visual organ and matter	consciousness (*vijñāna*)
4;	1,4	the cause of matter (*rūpakāraṇa*)	matter (*rūpa*)
	6	cause (*kāraṇa*)	a similar effect (*sadṛśakārya*), or a dissimilar effect (*asadṛśakārya*)
5;	1,7	defining character (*lakṣaṇa*)	that which is to be defined (*lakṣya*)
	3	the presence of defining character (*lakṣaṇapravṛtti*)	that which possesses defining character (*salakṣaṇa*), or that which does not possess defining character (*alakṣaṇa*)
	7	existent things (*bhāva*)	non-existence (*abhāva*)

6;	2,10	passion (*rāga*)	the impassioned (*rakta*)
7;	20	arising (*utpatti*)	that which exists (*sat*), or that which does not exist (*asat*), or that which exists *and/or* does not exist (*sadasat*)
	21	arising	that which is being extinguished (*nirdhyamāna*), or that which is not being extinguished (*anirdhyamāna*)
	22	the action of standing still	that which has stood still (*sthitabhāva*), or that which does not yet stand still (*asthitabhāva*), or that which is standing still (*tiṣṭhamānabhāva*)
	26	extinction (*nirodha*)	that which has been extinguished (*niruddha*), or that which is not yet extinguished (*aniruddha*), or that which is being extinguished (*nirdhyamāna*)
	27	extinction	that which has stood still, or that which does not yet stand still
	28	extinction	the state of being [*x*] (*avasthā*)
	30,31	extinction	that which exists (*sadbhāva*), or that which does not exist (*asadbhāva*)
8;	1,9–12	the actor (*kartṛ*)	the action (*karman*)
9;	8–9	sensory faculties such as the visual organ (*darśanādi*)	the pre-existent (*pūrva*)
10;	12	fuel (*indhana*), i.e., that which is burned	fire (*agni*), i.e., that which burns something
11;	4,5	birth (*jāti*)	growing old and dying (*jarāmaraṇa*)
12;	1	suffering (*duḥkha*)	that which is created (*kṛta*)
13;	5	alternation (*anyathā-bhāva*)	a thing ('*tasya*'), or an other thing ('*anyasya*')
14;	7	other-ness (*anyatva*)	an other (*anya*)
16;	1	transmigration (*saṁsāra*)	permanent things (*nitya*), or impermanent things (*anitya*)
	6	bondage (*bandhana*)	one who has appropriation (*sopādāna*), or one who is without appropriation (*anupādāna*)
	8	final liberation (*mukti*)	the bound (*baddha*), or the unbound (*abaddha*)
17;	28	living beings (*jantu*)	the actor
	29	the action	that which is originated from conditions (*pratyayasamutpanna*), or that which is not originated from conditions (*apratyayasamutthita*)
18;	1	the self (*ātman*)	constituent elements of body and mind (*skandha*)

(*Contd.*)

	7	reality (*dharmatā*)	arising (*utpāda*), or extinction (*nirodha*)
	8	everything (*sarva*)	that which is true (*tathya*), or that which is not true (*atathya*), or that which is true and not true (*tathya-atathya*), or that which is neither true nor non-true ("*na tathyaṁ na atathyam*")
19;	1,3	the present time (*pratyutpannakāla*) and the future time (*anāgatakāla*)	the past time (*atītakāla*)
20;	17	the non-void effect (*aśūnyaphala*)	arising, or extinction
	18	the void effect (*śūnyaphala*)	arising, or extinction
	19	effect	cause
	24	effect	that which is produced by the conjunction of cause and conditions (*sāmagrīkṛta*), or that which is produced by the non-conjunction (*asāmagrīkṛta*)
21;	1	coming into being (*saṁbhava*)	dissolution (*vibhava*)
	7	coming into being	that which is destructible (*kṣaya*), or that which is not destructible (*akṣaya*)
	8	dissolution	that which is destructible, or that which is not destructible
	9	dissolution and coming into being	void things (*śūnya*), or non-void things (*aśūnya*)
	10	coming into being	dissolution
	12,13	existent things	origination (*jāti*)
22;	1	Tathāgata (one who has realized reality)	constituent elements of body and mind
23;	3	the self	existence (*astitva*), or non-existence (*nāstitva*)
	9	that which is like a phantom man (*māyāpuruṣakalpa*)	purity (*śubha*), or impurity (*aśubha*)
		that which is like a reflection (*pratibimbasama*)	purity (*śubha*), or impurity (*aśubha*)
	10,11	purity	impurity
	17–18	error (*viparyaya*)	one who has erred (*viparīta*), or one who does not yet err (*aviparīta*), or one who is at present in error (*viparyamāna*)
	20	things	arising

25;	10	enlightenment (*nirvāṇa*)	existent things, or non-existent things
	19	enlightenment	transmigration (*saṁsāra*)
27;	8	the self	appropriation

b. Statements Mentioning Two Entities

The next question is: How does Nāgārjuna treat these various pairs of entities? What kind of method shall we take in order to examine the way Nāgārjuna deals with those various sets of two entities? We have already seen how often Nāgārjuna in *MMK* mentions a pair of entities and the relation between them in a verse. Example 1 (Ch. 8, v. 12ab) was an instance of such verses. Examinations of those kind of verses seem to give us a clue to understanding the structure of Nāgārjuna's arguments. Let us examine the following six similar verses (Examples 2–7).

Example 2. . . .*na bhāvo nābhavo*. . .*ākāśam*. (part of Ch. 5, v. 7, the *Prasannapadā*, the Poussin edition)
One can rewrite that Sanskrit sentence without any change of the meaning as follows:
na ākāśaṁ bhāvo na ākāśam abhāvaḥ.[5]
(Space is not existence, and space is not non-existence.)

When we put 'Xnom' for '*ākāśam*' (space); 'Ynom' for '*bhāvaḥ*' (existence); and '$\tilde{Y}$nom' for '*abhāvaḥ*' (non-existence), we can derive the following formula:

$$\sim(X\text{nom } Y\text{nom}) \cdot \sim(X\text{nom } \tilde{Y}\text{nom}).$$

'$\sim$' is the negation sign, and '$\cdot$' is the conjunction sign. 'Xnom' indicates that the term X is in the nominative. Similarly, 'Ynom' indicates that the term Y is in the nominative. '$\tilde{Y}$' stands for the compound of the negative prefix '*a-*' and the term Y. '$\tilde{Y}$nom' is the symbol of the term '*abhāvaḥ*' (non-existence). In example 2 the two entities are space and existence (or non-existence). Let us note the following three features in this formula:

(1) *Bhāva* (existence), which is referred to by 'Y,' and *abhāva* (non-existence), which is referred to by '$\tilde{Y}$,' are complementary to each other. The union of existence and non-existence is the entire universe.

(2) The relation between the two entities: the reference of 'X' and that of

'*Y*' (or '$\tilde{Y}$'), is expressed by the syntactical connection between the nominative and the nominative.

(3) The two statements '(*X*nom *Y*nom)' and '(*X*nom $\tilde{Y}$nom)' are false.

Example 3. *sataś ca tāvad utpattir asataś ca na yujyate /*
na sataś cāsataś ceti. . .// (Ch. 7, v. 20abc)
(It is impossible that there is arising of that which exists, of that which does not exist, and of that which exists and does not exist.)

The verse can be rewritten:

sato notpattiḥ
asato notpattiś ca
sadasato notpattiś ca.

(There is no arising of that which exists, and there is no arising of that which does not exist, and there is no arising of that which exists and does not exist.)

One can easily see that *utpatti* (arising) and *sat* (that which exists) stands in the *dharma-dharmin* relation, i.e., the relation between a property and its possessor. This relation is also found between *utpatti* and either *asat* (that which does not exist) or *sadasat* (that which exists and does not exist). Let us put '*X*nom' for '*utpattiḥ*,' '*Y*gen' for '*sataḥ*,' '$\tilde{Y}$gen' for '*asataḥ*,' and '$Y\tilde{Y}$gen' for '*sadasataḥ*.' Then, the content of Example 3 may be put into the following formula:

$$\sim(X\text{nom } Y\text{gen})\cdot\sim(X\text{nom } \tilde{Y}\text{gen})\cdot\sim(X\text{nom } Y\tilde{Y}\text{gen}).$$

As in the previous case, we can point out the three features in this formula:

(1) The union of that which exists and that which does not exist is the entire universe. The concept "that which exists and does not exist" (*sadasat*) seems to need some explanation. Logically speaking, there cannot be such a thing. That something exists and at the same time does not exist is nothing but a contradiction. Commentators on *MMK*, such as Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, were aware of the fact that a thing cannot be existent and at the same time non-existent.[6] On the other hand, it is quite possible to take '*sataś ca asataś ca*' for referring to the union of the set of *sat* and the set of *asat*, which is the entire universe. No matter how the third alternative '*sadasat*' is understood, the arguments given in that verse are eventually done in the first two statements: $\sim$(*X*nom *Y*gen) and $\sim$(*X*nom $\tilde{Y}$gen). The third statement adds nothing new. When we take '*sadasat*' for meaning 'that which exists and at the same time does not exist,' '$Y\tilde{Y}$' indicates a contradiction. We may neglect this case, and concern ourselves only with the first two statements.

When we take '*sadasat*' to mean 'the union of *sat* and *asat*,' (which is eventually equal to 'that which is existent or non-existent'), '$Y\tilde{Y}$' indicates the union of the set Y and and the set $\tilde{Y}$ $(Y \cup \tilde{Y})$, that is to say, that entire universe. Nāgārjuna in this verse is using the first three alternatives of the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*), which is a traditional "piece of Buddhist dialectical apparatus."[7] The formula of the typical tetralemma may be given as follows:

> (x is A) $\vee$ (x is not A) $\vee$ (X is A *and/or* non-A) $\vee$ (x is neither A nor non-A).[8]
> ['$\vee$' is the disjunction sign.]

(2) The relation between the two entities, which are indicated by 'X' and 'Y' (or '$\tilde{Y}$' or '$Y\tilde{Y}$'), is expressed by the syntactical connection between the nominative and the genitive.

(3) The three statements found in the formula are all false.

Example 4. *na cāpi viparītasya saṁbhavanti viparyayāḥ /*
na cāpy aviparītasya saṁbhavanti viparyayāḥ //
na viparyamānasya saṁbhavanti viparyayāḥ / (Ch. 23, v. 17–18ab)
(Errors of someone who has erred cannot come into existence.
Neither can errors of someone who does not yet err come into existence.
And errors of someone who is at present in error cannot come into existence.)

As in the case of Example 3, the verse can be rewritten:

na viparītasya viparyayāḥ.
na aviparītasya viparyayāḥ.
na viparyamānasya viparyayāḥ.
(Errors of someone who has already erred do not come into existence.
Neither do errors of someone who does not yet err come into existence.
And errors of someone who is at present in error do not come into existence.)

The two entities Nāgārjuna deals with in this verse are an error (or errors) and someone who has already erred (or someone who does not yet err, or someone who is at present in error). Those two entities stand in the *dharma-dharmin* relation. When we put 'Xgen' for '*viparītasya*;' 'X'gen' for '*avipari-*

tasya;' 'X''gen' for '*viparyamānasya*;' '*Y*nom' for '*viparyayāḥ*,' we can derive the following formula:

$$\sim(X\text{gen } Y\text{nom})\cdot\sim(X'\text{gen } Y\text{nom})\cdot\sim(X''\text{gen } Y\text{nom}).$$

(1) Nāgārjuna distributes someone who commits errors in terms of the three times: past, future, and present. Time is represented as a continuum, which may be divided into two parts by a given point. The past and the future are the two parts of the line; the present is the point. Hence, one could compare one of the two parts divided by the point to someone who has erred (*viparīta*); the other part, to someone who does not yet err (*aviparīta*); and the point, to someone who is at present in error (*viparyamāna*). '*Viparīta*' is the past participle of *vipari* $\sqrt{i}$. '*Aviparīta*' is the compound of the negative prefix '*a*-' and '*viparīta*.' '*Viparyamāna*' is the present participle, middle of *vipari* $\sqrt{i}$.

(2) The relation between errors and someone who has erred (or someone who does not yet err, or someone who is at present in error) is expressed by the syntactical connection; the genitive + the nominative [+the verb].

(3) The three statements found in the formula are all false.

In the last three examples, either of the two entities is directly distributed into a complementary relationship. In the following two examples, on the other hand, one of the two entities is indirectly distributed. In other words, the complementary distribution is carried out by means of the modifier of the term *X* or of the term *Y*.

Example 5. *na kāraṇasya sadṛśaṁ kāryam ity upapadyate* /
na kāraṇasya asadṛśaṁ kāryam ity upapadyate // (Ch. 4, v. 6)
(A cause cannot possess a similar effect.
A cause cannot possess a dissimilar effect.)

Here the words '*sadṛśa*' (similar) and '*asadṛśa*' (dissimilar) modify the word '*kārya*' (effect). As in the previous cases, the content of this verse may be put into the following formula:

$$\sim(X\text{gen } M.Y\text{nom})\cdot\sim(X\text{gen } \tilde{M}.Y\text{nom}).$$

Xgen = *kāraṇasya* (a cause possesses. . . .)
$M.Y$nom = *sadṛśaṁ kāryam* (a similar effect)
$\tilde{M}.Y$nom = *asadṛśaṁ kāryam* (a dissimilar effect)

In this case also one can point out the same three features:

(1) The similar effect, which is indicated by '$M.Y$,' and the dissimilar

effect, which is indicated by '$\tilde{M}.Y$,' stand in a complementary relationship. If there is an effect, it must be either similar to or dissimilar from its cause. In this verse Nāgārjuna holds that there is no third possibility such as a similar and dissimilar effect (*sadṛśāsadṛśakārya*). The union of the similar effects and the dissimilar ones is the totality of all the effects in the universe.

(2) The relation between cause and effect is expressed by the syntactical connection between the genitive and the nominative.

(3) The two statements found in the formula are false.

Example 6. *na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate /*
na svataḥ paratas ceti. . .// (Ch. 23, v. 20abc)
(Things arise neither from themselves, nor from others, nor from both themselves and others.)

Here the words '*svataḥ*' (from themselves), '*parataḥ*' (from others), and '*svataḥ paratas ca*' (from both themselves and others) qualify the function of the verb '*jāyate*' (arise) which refers to one of the two entities, i.e., *jāti* (origination). The Sanskrit sentence "*na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ*" (Things do not arise from themselves) may be rewritten without any change of the meaning as "*na svajātir bhāvasya*," which has the following form: the nominative + the genitive. The two entities Nāgārjuna is dealing with in that verse are a thing and its arising or coming into existence.

Let us examine the relations between *sva* (own) and *para* (other) and *svapara* ('own-and-other'). '*Svapara*' (or '*svataḥ paratas ca*') here refers to the union of the set of something 'own' and the set of something 'other.' One may hold that Nāgārjuna in this verse considered *sva* and *para* as complementary. Hence, we can put 'M' for '*sva*;' '$\tilde{M}$' for '*para*;' '$M \cup \tilde{M}$' for '*svapara*.' Then, the content of the verse may be put into the following formula:

$$\sim(X\text{nom } M.Yv)\cdot\sim(X\text{nom } \tilde{M}.Yv)\cdot\sim(X\text{nom } M \cup \tilde{M}.Yv).$$

$M.Yv =$ *svato jāyate* (arise from themselves)
$\tilde{M}.Yv =$ *parato jāyate* (arise from others)
$M \cup \tilde{M}.Yv =$ *svataḥ paratas ca jāyate* (arise from both themselves and others)

(1) M and $\tilde{M}$ are complementary. The third statement "$\sim(X\text{nom } M \cup \tilde{M}.Yv)$" does not add anything new. Nāgārjuna holds that, in order to negate the statement "$(X\text{nom } M \cup \tilde{M}.Yv)$," it is enough to repeat the reasons why the statements "$(X\text{nom } M.Yv)$" and "$(X\text{nom } \tilde{M}.Yv)$" are false.

(2) The relation between the two entities is expressed by the syntactical connection between the nominative case and the verb.

(3) The three statements found in the formula are all false.

In the following example, the relation between the two entities is distributed into a complementary relationship.

Example 7. *apekṣya indhanam agnir na*
na anapekṣya agnir indhanam /
apekṣya indhanam agnim na
na anapekṣya agnim indhanam // (Ch. 10, v. 12)
(Reliant upon fuel there is no fire.
Not reliant upon fuel there is no fire.
Reliant upon fire there is no fuel.
Not reliant upon fire there is no fuel.)

In this verse the relation between fuel (x) and fire (y) is distributed into the following two cases: (1) x (or y) is dependent upon y (or x), and (2) x (or y) is independent of y (or x). Nāgārjuna does not hold that there is a third possibility. As in the previous cases, the conent of this verse may be put into the following formula:

$\sim(M\text{ger } X\text{acc } Y\text{nom})\cdot\sim(\tilde{M}\text{ger } Y\text{nom } X\text{acc})$.
$\sim(M\text{ger } X\text{nom } Y\text{acc})\cdot\sim(\tilde{M}\text{ger } Y\text{acc } X\text{nom})$.
Mger = *apekṣya* (reliant upon). ('Mger' indicates that M is given in the form of gerund. '*Apekṣya*' is the gerund of *apa* $\sqrt{}$*īkṣ*.)
$\tilde{M}$ger = *anapekṣya* (not reliant upon)
Xnom = *indhanam* (fuel)
Xacc = *indhanam* (fuel)
Ynom = *agnir* (fire)
Yacc = *agnim* (fire)

(1) 'M' and '$\tilde{M}$' indicates a complementary relationship.

(2) The relation between the two entities is expressed by the following syntactical connection: the gerund + the accusative (or the nominative) + the nominative (or the accusative).

(3) The four statements found in the formula are all false.

In examining the six verses, I have pointed out three salient features of each. Those three features were as follows:

Feature 1. Either of the two entities, or the relation between them, is distributed into a sort of complementary relationship. One may call this 'the complementary distribution.' This distribution is done sometimes directly as seen in the cases of Examples

2–4, sometimes indirectly, i.e., through modifiers, as seen in the cases of Examples 5–6. In Example 7 the relation between the two entities is distributed into a complementary relationship.

Feature 2. In each verse the relation between the two entities is expressed by some kind of syntactical connection.

Feature 3. The statements comprising the content of each verse are all false.

In that all the statements found in Examples 2–7 are false or negated, we can see the *prapañca* being subdued. The statement "A cause possesses its effects," for instance, was to be negated; that sentence is based upon the *prapañca*, no matter how widely and frequently it is stated and is admitted to make perfect sense by common people in everyday life.

On the other hand, *MMK* also contains several verses in each of which a pair of entities and the relation between them are mentioned in an affirmative statement. Example 1, which we have already examined, was an instance of such a verse. To repeat Example 1:

pratītya kārakaḥ karma
taṁ pratītya ca kārakam/ karma pravartate. . .//
(Dependent upon the action there arises the actor.
Dependent upon the actor there arises the action.)

The verse can be rewritten:

pratītya karma kārakaḥ [pravartate].
pratītya kārakaṁ karma [pravartate].
[The word 'pravartate' (arises) may be omitted.]

As in the previous cases, we can derive the following formula:

$(M\text{ger } X\text{acc } Y\text{nom } [Zv])\cdot(M\text{ger } Y\text{acc } X\text{nom } [Zv]).$
Mger = *pratītya* (dependent upon)
Xacc = *karma* (the action)
Ynom = *kārkaḥ* (the actor)
Yacc = *kārakam* (the actor)
Xnom = *karmā* (the action)
Zv = *pravartate* (arises)

In this formula let us note two closely related facts: (1) a complementary relationship is neither found nor presupposed, and (2) the two statements found in that formula are true.

Having roughly examined the so-called 'three features,' I shall present a list showing how those three features appear in each of those verses on Table II.

ABBREVIATIONS AND SIGNS FOR TABLE II

nom. = nominative	acc. = accusative	inst. = instrumental
abl. = ablative	gen. = genitive	loc. = locative
v. = verb	ind. = indiclinable	gr. = gerund

F indicates that the statements are false.
T indicates that the statements are true.
*indicates that the complementary distribution is shown already on Table I.
'*A* and non-*A*' indicates that the complementary distribution found in that verse belongs to the category of the distribution into *A* and non-*A*. '*A* and non-*A* and *A*-and-non-*A*' may be considered in a similar way.

c. The Complementary Distribution of Either of Two Entities

Examinations of these three features will be helpful in understanding the structure of Nāgārjuna's language analysis. Let us examine the first feature (Feature 1). Table I and Table II show us how often the complementary distribution appears in *MMK* (at least, sixty times). The patterns of the complementary relationship are, however, not so manifold. As the two lists show, the most fundamental pattern is the distribution into *A* and non-*A*. In Example 2 we have the distribution into existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*), which may be considered to be a sort of distribution into *A* and non-*A*. One can easily see that 'similar' (*sadṛśa*) and 'dissimilar' (or 'non-similar') (*asadṛśa*) [Example 5], or 'reliant upon' (*apekṣya*) and 'not reliant upon' (*anapekṣya*) [Example 7] stand in the relation between *A* and non-*A*. As Table II shows, the distribution into something identical and something different (or non-identical), which is also a sort of distribution into *A* and non-*A*, appears quite often and plays an important role in the arguments given in *MMK*.

The distribution into *sat* (that which exists) and *asat* (that which does not exist) and *sadasat* (that which exists *and/or* does not exist), which is seen in Example 3, shall be tentatively formulated as the distribution into '*A* and non-*A* and *A*-*and/or*-non-*A*.' We have already seen that this type of distribution also has the pattern: *A* and non-*A*, in the final analysis.

As I mentioned above, '*A*-*and/or*-non-*A*' is the third alternative of the tetralemma. Until we have succeeded in understanding the structure of the

TABLE II

Chapter; Verse	Feature 1		Feature 2	Feature 3
1; 1	own (*sva*), other (*para*), both (*dvaya*), without cause (*ahetu*)	(cf. Example 6)	nom. + ind. + v.	*F*
4	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
6	*	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + nom.	*F*
11	particular (*vyasta*), general (*samasta*)	*A* and non-*A*	loc. + nom. + v.	*F*
14	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
2; 1	* (Example 8)	*A* and non-*A* and 'not *A* nor non-*A*'	nom. + v.	*F*
8	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + v.	*F*
12	*	(cf. Example 8)	loc. + inf. + v.	*F*
15	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + v.	*F*
3; 5	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + v.	*F*
6	apart from (*tiraskṛtya*), not apart from (*atiraskṛtya*)	*A* and non-*A*	acc. + gr. + nom. + v.	*F*
7	(no complementary distribution)	————	loc. + gr. + nom.	*T*
4; 1	apart from (*nirmukta*), not apart from (*anirmukta*) (Although the second alternative does not appear in this verse, obviously we can supply it.)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
4	when *x* exists (*sati*), when *x* does not exist (*asati*)	*A* and non-*A*	loc. + loc. + nom.	*F*
6	* (Example 6)	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + nom.	*F*
5; 1	before (*pūrvam*), after (*paścāt*) (Although the second alternative does not appear in this verse, obviously we can supply it.)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + ind. + nom.	*F*

(*contd.*)

	3	*	*A* and non-*A*	loc. + nom.	*F*
	7	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + v.	*F*
6;	2cd	when *x* exists (*sati*), when *x* does not exist (*asati*)	*A* and non-*A*	One can rewrite the text as: *sati vā asati vā rāge na raktaḥ*, which has the following form: loc. + loc. + nom.	*F*
	10ab	together (*saha*), not together (*asaha*)	*A* and non-*A*	inst. + ind. + nom.	*F*
7;	20	* (Example 3)	*A* and non-*A* and '*A*-and/or-non-*A*'	gen. + nom.	*F*
	21	*	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + nom.	*F*
	22	*	(cf. Example 8)	nom. + v.	*F*
	26	*	(cf. Example 8)	nom. + v.	*F*
	27	*	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + nom.	*F*
	28	because of this state ('*tayā avasthayā*'), because of a different state ('*anyayā avasthayā*')	*A* and non-*A*	inst. + inst. + nom. + v.	*F*
	30, 31	*	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + gen. + nom.	*F*
8;	1	real (*sadbhūta*), non-real (*asadbhūta*)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + acc. + v.	*F*
	9–11	real, non-real, 'real-and-non-real'	*A* and non-*A* and '*A*-and-non-*A*'	nom. + acc. + v.	*F*
	12	(Example 1) (no complementary distribution)	———	acc. + gr. + nom.	*T*
	8ab, 9ab	identical ('*sa eva*'), different ('*anya*')	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
10;	12	* (Example 7)	*A* and non-*A*	gr. + acc. + nom.	*F*
11;	3ab, 4ab, 5ab	prior (*pūrvam* or *āditaḥ*), posterior (*uttaram* or *paścāt*), simultaneous (*saha*)		3ab implies that *pūrvaṁ jātir jarāmaraṇam uttaram ity na*	

				yujyate. The passage before *ity* has the form: ind. + nom. + nom. + ind. 4ab may be considered in a similar way. 5ab has the form: inst. + nom. + ind. + v.	
12;	1	own (*svaya*), other (*para*), both (*dvaya*), without cause (*ahetuka*)	(cf. Example 6)	The basic form is: nom. + nom.	*F*
13;	5	*	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + nom.	*F*
14;	7	*	*A* and non-*A*	loc. + nom.	*F*
16;	1	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + v.	*F*
	6	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + v.	*F*
	8	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + v.	*F*
17;	28	identical, different	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
	29	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
18;	1	identical, different	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom., and	*F*
				nom. + abl. + nom.	*F*
	7cd	* (In this case arising and extinction are complementary.)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
	8	* (Every alternative of the tetralemma is affirmed.)		nom. + nom.	*T*
19;	1ab, 3	reliant upon (*apekṣya*), not reliant upon (*anapekṣya*)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + gr. + acc.	*F*
20;	3ab, 4ab	existent ('*asti*'), inexistent ('*nāsti*')	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + loc. + v.	*F*
	17	* (In this case arising and extinction are complementary. cf. Ch. 18., v. 7cd.)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom. + v.	*F*
	18	* (cf. Ch. 18, v. 7cd)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom. + v.	*F*

(contd.)

	19	same (*eka*), other (*anya*)	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + gen. + nom.	*F*
	24	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
21;	1	with (*saha*), without (*vinā*)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + inst. + ind.	*F*
	7	*	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + nom.	*F*
	9	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom. + gen.	*F*
	12	existent things (*bhāva*), non-existence (*abhāva*)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + ind. + v.	*F*
	13	own (*sva*), other (*para*)	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + ind. + v.	*F*
22;	1ab	identical, different	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
23;	3	*	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + nom.	*F*
	9	*	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + nom.	*F*
	10ab, 11ab	reliant upon (*apekṣya*), not reliant upon (*anapekṣya*)	*A* and non-*A*	acc. + gr. + nom.	*F*
	10c, 11c	(no complementary distribution)	———	acc. + gr. + nom.	*T*
	17–18	* (Example 4)	(cf. Example 8)	nom. + gen.	*F*
	20	own, other, both (Example 6)	*A* and non-*A* and '*A*-and-non-*A*'	nom. + ind. + v.	*F*
25;	10cd	*	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*
	19	identical, different (Although the first alternative does not appear in this verse, obviously we can supply it.)	*A* and non-*A*	gen. + abl. + nom.	*F*
27;	8	identical, different	*A* and non-*A*	nom. + nom.	*F*

tetralemma thoroughly, we shall be unable to realize the significance of the third alternative.

In Example 6 we have seen the distribution into *sva* (M) and *para* ($\tilde{M}$) and *svapara* (M-and-$\tilde{M}$). Diagram 1 will be helpful to understand that kind of distribution.




Diagram 1

The distribution into the three times, which is found in Example 4, is somewhat different from the distribution into A and non-A and 'A-and-non-A.' The distribution into the three times appears in Ch. 2, v. 1 for the first time in *MMK*. That verse reads as follows:

Example 8. *gataṁ na gamyate tāvad agataṁ naiva gamyate /*
gatāgatavinirmuktaṁ gamyamānaṁ na gamyate //
(That which has already been traversed is not being traversed.
Neither is that which is not yet traversed being traversed.
That which is being traversed, being apart from both the traversed and the non-traversed, is not perceived.)

The latter half of this verse declares that the 'extension' distributed to the present time, i.e., that which is being traversed (*gamyamāna*), is not perceived or existent. In other words, Nāgārjuna in this verse considers the present time as a point on which anything can have no space to stand.[9] Therefore, the distribution into the three times, which is seen in Example 8 (Ch. 2, v. 1), is eventually a distribution into X (the traversed, *gata*) and $\tilde{X}$ (the non-traversed, *agata*), the third one apart from the traversed and the non-traversed being impossible. Hence, it will be possible to say that *gata*

(X) and *agata* ($\tilde{X}$) are complementary. Then, *gamyamāna* will be that which is apart from both X and $\tilde{X}$, i.e., the complementary set of the union of X and $\tilde{X}$, which may be represented by '$(X \cup \tilde{X})^c$.' This formula eventually refers to the same thing as '$(X \cap \tilde{X})$,' which indicates the intersection of X and $\tilde{X}$, i.e., the empty set ($\emptyset$). As in the previous cases, the content of Example 8 may be put into the following formula:

$$\sim(X\text{nom } Yv)\cdot\sim(\tilde{X}\text{nom } Yv)\cdot\sim((X \cup \tilde{X})^c\text{nom } Yv).$$

Xnom = *gatam* (the traversed)
$\tilde{X}$nom = *agatam* (the non-traversed)
$(X \cup \tilde{X})^c$nom = *gamyamānam* (that which is being traversed)
Yv = *gamyate* (is being traversed, or, is perceived) (The verb $\sqrt{gam}$ has the two meanings: (1) to traverse, and (2) to perceive. '*Gamyate*' is the passive form of $\sqrt{gam}$.)

Diagram 2 will be helpful to understand the structure of the distribution into the three times.




Diagram 2

In a similar way we can deal with the distribution into the three times, which is found in Example 4. In my previous examination of Example 4, I used 'X' for *viparīta*; 'X′' for *aviparīta*; 'X″' for *viparyamāna*. Through analogy to Example 8 we can replace 'X'' by '$\tilde{X}$;' 'X''' by '$(X \cup \tilde{X})^c$ (or by '$(X \cap \tilde{X})$.') Then, the content of Example 4 may be put into the following formula:

$$\sim(X\text{gen } Yv)\cdot\sim(\tilde{X}\text{gen } Yv)\cdot\sim((X \cup X)^c\text{gen } Y\text{nom}).$$

The distribution into the three times, which is found in other verses, may be treated in a similar way.

Here let us re-examine Example 5, which shows one of the most typical arguments given in *MMK*. To repeat Example 5:

> A cause cannot possess a similar effect.
> A cause cannot possess a dissimilar effect.

In this verse we have already been given the complementary distribution into similar and dissimilar effects. But in the very beginning of Nāgārjuna's analysis, such a distribution must have not yet come into question. In other words, he must have been trying to deal with the statement "A cause possesses its effect," which had been declared by his opponents. Then, doubting the validity of the statement, he undertook to disprove it.

The eventual first step of his refutation is "the complementary distribution." Nāgārjuna thinks: If the statement "A cause possesses its effect" is true, then there are two and only two cases: (1) A cause possesses a similar effect, and (2) a cause possesses a disimilar effect. Next, he undertakes to disprove both of them, which implies that the antecedent "If a cause possesses its effect," is false. If, however, we consider the proposition "A cause possesses an effect y" to be a function of y, i.e., $f(y)$, then, the proposition "A cause possesses a similar effect" may be formulated as "$f(m)$" ($m =$ a similar effect); the proposition "A cause possesses a dissimilar effect," as "$f(\tilde{m})$" ($\tilde{m} =$ a dissimilar effect). This logical procedure may be formulated as follows:

$$(y)f(y) \supset \cdot (m)f(m) \vee (\tilde{m})f(\tilde{m})$$
$$\sim(m)f(m) \cdot \sim(\tilde{m})f(\tilde{m})$$

$$\sim(y)f(y)$$ 10

(If, for every $y, f(y)$ is true, then for every $m, f(m)$ is true or for every non-$m, f(\tilde{m})$ is true. But for every $m, f(m)$ is false and at the same time for every non-m, $f(\tilde{m})$ is false. Therefore, for every y, $f(y)$ is false.)

Relations between y, m, and $\tilde{m}$ may be formulated as follows:

$y \in Y$ (y is a member of the set Y.)
$m \in M$ (m is a member of the set M.)
$\tilde{m} \in \tilde{M}$ ($\tilde{m}$ is a member of the set $\tilde{M}$.)
$M \cup \tilde{M} = Y$ (The union of M and $\tilde{M}$ is Y.)
$M \cap \tilde{M} = \emptyset$ (The intersection of M and $\tilde{M}$ is the empty set.)

We can deal with the rest of Examples 2–8 in a similar way. It is easy to see that Example 2 may be treated almost in the same way we have dealt with Example 5. Although Examples 3, 4, 6, and 8 have the third alternative, we

have already seen that it has not been given a logical value in substantial arguments in *MMK*. Therefore, what we have eventually in those Examples is the complementary distribution into A and non-A, which implies that those Examples may be treated in a way similar to our treatment of Example 5. Example 7 might need more explanation:

> Reliant upon (*apekṣya*) fuel there is no fire.
> Not reliant upon (*anapekṣya*) fuel there is no fire.

In this verse it is possible to hold that all the bodies of fire in the universe are distributed into the following two sets: (1) the bodies of fire which are reliant upon fuel, and (2) the bodies of fire which are not reliant upon fuel. These two sets are complementary. Therefore, we can also deal with Example 7 in the same way we have dealt with Example 5. Here it should be added that the verses other than Examples 2–8, which have been listed in Table I, can be dealt with in a similar way.

It is important to note that $f(m) \vee f(\tilde{m})$ is very much different from $f(m) \vee \sim f(m)$. $f(m)$ and $\sim f(m)$ are complementary. If one of them is true, the other must be false, and vice versa. Both of them cannot be false at one time. Therefore, $f(m) \vee \sim f(m)$ is necessarily true. But $f(m)$ and $f(\tilde{m})$ are not complementary. That is to say, both of $f(m)$ and $f(\tilde{m})$ can be false at one time. As we have seen in Examples 2–7, Nāgārjuna negates both of $f(m)$ and $f(\tilde{m})$ at one time. The negation of both $f(m)$ and $f(\tilde{m})$ leads to the negation of $f(y)$, which means that a type of verbal activity, such as represented by $f(y)$, will cease to be.

Then, the next question is: How does Nāgārjuna prove both $(m)f(m)$ and $(\tilde{m})f(\tilde{m})$ to be false? Let us remember that the predicate f of the function $f(m)$ always contains a syntactical connection between the term X and the term Y. In order to realize how Nāgārjuna negates both of $(m)f(m)$ and $(\tilde{m})f(\tilde{m})$, we must go into close examinations of the syntactical connection by which the relation between the two entities (x and y) is expressed. I will examine this syntactical connection (Feature 2) at another time.

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NOTES

[1] Cf. M. Tachikawa, 'The Tantric doctrine of the Sa skya pa according to the *Śel gyi me loṅ*,' *Acta Asiatica*, no. 29 (1975), p. 95.

[2] M. Saigusa, *Indo Bukkyō Shisōshi* (*A History of Indian Buddhist Thought*), Regulus Library, no. 46 (Daisan Bunmeisha, Tokyo, 1975), p. 180.

[3] Y. Kajiyama, *Kū no ronri* (*Logic in Void-ness Thought*) (Kadokawa Shoten, Tokyo, 1970), p. 61.

[4] The seventh verse of the third chapter, for instance, mentions the following three entities: the visual organ, matter, and consciousness. They are, however, divided into two groups. One group consists of the first two entities; the other, of the third. Since the group of two members is treated as one factor or *entity* in this verse, one can hold that this verse eventually deals with two entities. cf. the first verse of the nineteenth chapter.

[5] The original Sanskrit passage has the following word-order: negative particle + predicate 1 + negative particle + predicate 2 + subject. The rewritten sentence, however, has the following word-order: negative particle + subject 1 + predicate 1 + negative particle + subject 2 + predicate 2. This difference in word-order, however, does not affect the meaning; in Sanskrit sentences word-order is not strict at all. One may notice that the subject 'space' (*ākāśa*) is repeated twice in the rewritten sentence. And it should be added that, in rewriting that Sanskrit sentence, I was not following *sandhi* rules. Had I followed *sandhi* rules, I should have written "*nākāśaṁ bhāvo nākāśam abhāvaḥ*." In quoting Sanskrit sentences in this paper, I sometimes do not follow *sandhi* rules in order that the structure of the sentences may be more clearly seen.

[6] Cf. *Buddhapālita. Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, ed. by Max Walleser, *Bibliotheca Buddhica* XVI (S.-Petersburg, 1913), p. 23, 1.2; *Prasannapadā*, ed. by Poussin, *Bibliotheca Buddhica* IV (St.-Petersburg, 1913), p. 83, 1.11.

[7] R. Robinson, 'Some logical aspects of Nāgārjuna's system,' *Philosophy East and West*, **VI**, no. 4 (1957), p. 301.

[8] Ibid., p. 302 (modified).

[9] From the third verse to the fifth verse of the second chapter, however, the term '*gamyamāna*' has a different meaning. In those verses, the *gamyamāna* possesses some distance or extension, if very small. Then, someone might argue that, in that case, the distribution into the three times will be a distribution into three parts, each of which possesses real extension. But it will not be so, because, in that case, we have a distribution into the *gamyamāna* and the non-*gamyamāna*, which is a sort of distribution into *A* and non-*A*. cf. Ch. 2, v. 21, where we have the distribution into the *nirdhyamāna* (that which is being extinguished) and the non-*nirdhyamāna*.

[10] According to De Morgan's laws, $(m)f(m) \vee (\tilde{m})f(\tilde{m})$ is equivalent to $\sim(m)f(m)\cdot\sim(\tilde{m})f(\tilde{m})$. Hence, when we put '$q$' for '$(m)f(m) \vee (\tilde{m})f(\tilde{m})$,' we can put '$\sim q$' for '$\sim(\sim(m)f(m)\cdot\sim(\tilde{m})f(\tilde{m}))$.' Then, we can conclude $\sim(y)f(y)$ by *Modus Tollens* ($p \supset p$ and $\sim q \cdot \therefore \sim p$).

KARL H. POTTER

WAS GAUḌAPĀDA AN IDEALIST?[1]

I

Considering the amount of work that has been done by scholars attempting to interpret Śaṃkarācārya's philosophy, the disparity among the various interpretations is rather remarkable. Confining ourselves to epistemology, we may note that on such a basic point as to whether Śaṃkara was an epistemological realist or an idealist one can find noteworthy authority for both views – or rather, for a variety of views spanning the full spectrum between the extremes. One purpose of this paper is to try to make a bit of headway toward identifying factors contributing to the disagreement.

More consistency can be found among Advaita scholars concerning the place of Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*s in the development of Advaita epistemology. Practically all take Gauḍapāda as pioneering whatever may seem to be epistemological idealism in Advaita thought. Granted that much controversy has arisen over the relative influence of Buddhism on the *kārikā*s, on their status as scripture and on several other concerns, it is generally agreed that by insisting that nothing is ever really born, by likening the world to the objects seen in a dream, or to the snake mistakenly cognized in a rope, Gauḍapāda gave to Advaita its characteristic flavor.

This characteristic flavor has been termed 'illusionism' by one of the most influential of modern Advaita scholars, Paul Hacker. In a recent series of important papers[2] Hacker suggests that Śaṃkara perhaps began as a follower of Pātañjala Yoga, and that his conversion to Advaita was occasioned by his being exposed to Gauḍapāda's thought. Hacker considers it likely that Śaṃkara first wrote a commentary on the *Yogabhāṣya*, then a commentary on Gauḍapāda's *kārikā*s; he finds a comparable stage of illusionism expressed in certain portions of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, and he suspects further development of Śaṃkara's thought away from the extreme illusionism of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* through a transitional period characterized by his *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* to his mature thought, more conservatively realistic, as propounded in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.*

It is not my primary concern here to support or to dispute these speculations concerning the possible order of Śaṃkara's writings and the origins of his thought. I am, however, puzzled by certain assumptions which seem to me to underly Hacker's thinking on the matter, assumptions of a

M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 183–199.

philosophical rather than a historical nature. The plausibility of the picture of Śaṃkara's development which Hacker paints rests to some extent on shrewd stylistic analysis, but also to some extent on our taking for granted certain connotations or implications of the term 'illusionism', which he considers a proper way of characterizing Gauḍapāda's philosophy. These connotations make it natural for Hacker to assume that Śaṃkara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's *kārikā*s catches the full flavor of Gauḍapāda's 'illusionism', that that flavor was contributed to Advaita by Gauḍapāda rather than by Śaṃkara himself (or someone else altogether), and that Śaṃkara accepted it here only to modify it somewhat later on in his development.

Specifically, I wish to suggest that Gauḍapāda may have held views in epistemology which, if 'illusionistic', were in no way idealistic, and that proper attention to Gauḍapāda's language makes it likely that Gauḍapāda intended to use, e.g., the rope-snake analogy to make a point quite different from the one the author of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* takes it to be used to make.

Unlike others, who have examined Gauḍapāda's text with closest attention to occurrences of the critical term '*māyā*', I want to take my lead from passages in which certain terms are used which derive from the root $\sqrt{k\d{l}p}$, words which are found throughout Indian philosophy – Buddhist as well as Hindu – to indicate factors which regularly play their part in exposition of an idealist world-view.

II

My method in this section will be to examine the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*s in order to gauge the extent to which a certain hypothesis can be substantiated. The hypothesis is this: that Gauḍapāda practices a consistent distinction in usage between *kalp(anā)(ita)* and *vikalp(a)(anā)(ita)*,[3] using the former to mean the process of producing the appearance of something, while the latter is used to indicate the wrong interpretation of something. The distinction may be akin to the one, drawn regularly in later Advaita, between projective (*vikṣepa*) and veiling (*āvaraṇa*) *avidyā*. However, whereas later Advaita viewed projection and veiling as twin functions of the same thing, viz., *avidyā*, I shall try to show that Gauḍapāda may not have viewed *kalpanā* and *vikalpanā* as twin functions at all. Indeed, if my suspicions are correct, it was the author of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* who identified the locus of the two functions and led the way toward the later view. I shall discuss the implications of this after reviewing the relevant passages.

There are some 21 passages where Gauḍapāda uses $\sqrt{k\d{l}p}$ or *vi* + $\sqrt{k\d{l}p}$

in a way pertinent to our concerns. Here are the passages, together with indications of what they seem to me to be saying.

I.7: "...svapnamāyāsvarūpeti sṛṣṭir anyair vikalpitā."

Gauḍapāda is in the course of mentioning a variety of views about the origin of the universe, and here he is referring to a view, clearly not his own, according to which creation (*sṛṣṭi*) is wrongly-interpreted (*vikalpita*) as dream (*svapna*) and *māyā*.

I.17–18: "Prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṃśayaḥ
Māyāmātram idaṃ dvaitam advaitaṃ paramārthataḥ.
Vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit
Upadeśād ayaṃ vādo jñāte dvaitaṃ na vidyate."

If the world were to exist then no doubt it could cease to exist; but this duality is merely *māyā* (i.e., wrong-interpretation); really there is (only) non-duality. A wrong-interpretation would disappear if it were created as appearance by someone; but this is only a way of speaking for the purposes of instruction; when it is understood, duality does not exist at all.

II.9: "Svapnavṛttāv api tv antaś cetasā kalpitaṃ tv asat
Bahiś cetogṛhītaṃ sad dṛṣṭaṃ vaitathyam etayoḥ."

In dreams the unreal (*asat*) is created as an appearance (*kalpita*) in internal awareness (*antaścetas*), while what seems to be real (*sad dṛṣṭa*) is grasped as external awareness; actually both are erroneous (*vaitathya*).

II.10: "Jāgrad vṛttāv api tv antaś cetasā kalpitaṃ tv asat
Bahiś cetogṛhītaṃ sad yuktaṃ vaitathyam etayoḥ."

Likewise in waking (*jāgrad*) the unreal is created as appearance in internal awareness, while what is understood as real is grasped as external awareness; actually both are erroneous.

II.11: "Ubhayor api vaitathyam bhedānāṃ sthānayor yadi
Ka etān budhyate bhedān ko vai teṣāṃ vikalpakaḥ."

If the different things in the two states are erroneous, who is aware of the variety of things, who is the one-who-makes-the-wrong-interpretation of them?

II.12: "Kalpayaty ātmanātmānam ātmā devaḥ svamāyayā
Sa eva budhyate bhedān iti vedāntaniścayaḥ."

It is the self (*ātman*), the god (*deva*), who creates the appearance of a self by

(or from) himself through his own *māyā*. It is he (that self) alone who is aware of the various things – that is the Vedānta doctrine.

II.13: "Vikaroty aparān bhāvān antaś citte 'vyavasthitān
Niyatāṃś ca bahiś citta evaṃ kalpayate prabhuḥ."

God (*prabhu*) manifests (*vikaroti*) various *bhāva*s (states?) in internal awareness, and likewise produces the appearance of fixed states in external awareness.

II.14: "Cittakālāś ca ye'ntas tu dvayakālāś ca ye bahiḥ
Kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣo na anyahetukaḥ."

States which are internal and *cittakāla* (private?), as well as those which are external and *dvayakāla* (public?), are both merely apparent productions; no such distinctions have another thing as their cause.

II.15: "Avyaktā eva ye 'ntas tu sphuṭā eva ca ye bahiḥ
Kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣas tv indriyāntare."

These (states) which are 'internal' are just unmanifest (*avyakta*), while the 'external' ones are merely vivid (*sphuṭa*); all such states are only apparent productions, distinguished according to the sense-organs involved.

II.16: "Jīvaṃ kalpayate pūrvaṃ tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān
Bāhyān adhyatmikāṃś caiva yathāvidyās tathā smṛtiḥ."

Jīva is the first to be apparently-produced; after that (come) the different states, external and internal, for just as (one's) knowledge (*vidyā*) (is), so (his) memory (is).

II.17: "Aniścitā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā
Sarpadhārādhibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ."

Just as a rope, not fully ascertained in the dark, is wrongly-interpreted to be a snake, a stream, etc.; so the self is wrongly-interpreted as states.

II.18: "Niścitayāṃ yathā rajjvāṃ vikalpo vinivartate
Rajjur eveti ca advaitaṃ tadvad ātmaviniścayaḥ."

Just as the wrong interpretation ceases when the rope is fully ascertained as merely rope, so the self is ascertained as non-duality.

II.19: "Prāṇādibhir anantais tu bhāvair etair vikalpitaḥ
Māyaiṣā tasya devasya yayāyaṃ mohitaḥ svayam."

But it (i.e., the self) is wrongly-interpreted as endless states such as life

(*prāṇa*), etc. This is the *māyā* of the god (*deva*); this same one is bewildered by that (*māyā*).

II.30: "Etair eṣo 'pṛthagbhāvaiḥ pṛthag eveti lakṣitaḥ
Evaṃ yo veda tattvena kalpayet so 'viśaṃkitaḥ."

This (self) is characterized (*lakṣita*) as "merely separate" from these states which are (really) non-separate (from it?). One who knows thus may without hesitation produce appearances according to (his) nature (*tattvena*).

II.33: "Bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitaḥ
Bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā śivā."

This (individual self) is apparently-produced by the non-dual as non-existent states only. The states also (are apparently-produced) just from the non-dual. Therefore non-duality is the most auspicious thing (*śivā*).

II.35: "Vītarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ
Nirvikalpo hy ayaṃ dṛṣṭah prapañcopaśamo 'dvayaḥ."

Wise men (*muni*) free from passion, fear and anger and who are well-versed in the Vedas see this non-dual cessation of the world (*prapañca*) free from wrong-interpretation.

III.32: "Ātmasatyānubodhena na saṃkalpayate yadā
Ātmanastāṃ tadā yāti grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt."

When, through experiencing the truth of the self, there is no imagining (*na saṃkalpayate*), then comes quiescence of perception, since one cannot grasp something in the absence of anything graspable.

III.33: "Akalpakam ajaṃ jñānaṃ jñeyābhinnaṃ pracakṣate
Brahma jñeyam ajaṃ nityam ajenājaṃ vibudhyate."

III.34: "Nigṛhītasya manaso nirvikalpasya dhīmataḥ
Pracāraḥ sa tu vijñeyaḥ suṣupte'nyo na tatsamaḥ."

The manifestation of the internal organ (*manas*) when it is restrained, pure consciousness free from wrong interpretations, should be understood as different from that in deep sleep, not similar to it.

IV.73: "Yo 'sti kalpitasaṃvṛtyā paramārthena nāsty asau
Paratantrābhisaṃvṛtyā syān nāsti paramārthataḥ."

Whatever exists as concealed (*saṃvṛtyā*) through having been produced as an appearance does not really exist. According to other theories it may (be said to) exist, but in reality it does not.

IV.74: "Ajaḥ kalpitasaṃvṛtyā paramārthena na apy ajaḥ
Paratantrābhiniṣpattyā saṃvṛtyā jāyate tu saḥ."

The unborn, having its nature concealed by having been an apparent production, is not even unborn really; what is dependent is (only) 'born' as an appearance, with its nature concealed.

What sort of metaphysics do these passages suggest? It seems to be this. On Gauḍapāda's assumptions whatever has its nature 'concealed' (*saṃvṛtya*) or 'internal' (*antas*) is non-existent (*asat*) by comparison with what is responsible for the concealing. Common sense supposes that dream objects are internal and concealed or limited in the sense that they are dependent upon the dreaming state and have no existence outside of our dreams. By contrast we normally suppose that the objects of our waking experience exist as external to our awareness, since they are not taken to be limited to waking experience. But common sense is mistaken. The objects of the waking world are only apparent productions and so limited to waking experience just as dream-objects, being apparent productions, are limited to dreaming. Thus they are internal to waking experience and concealed by it, and are therefore non-existent by comparison with what is responsible for the concealing.

Now, what *is* responsible for the concealing in the two cases? It is we dreamers who are responsible for the concealment of our dreams – we produce the appearances which constitute our dream experiences, 'we' being understood as our empirical selves, technically called '*jīva*'. Analogously, God is responsible for the concealment of our waking experience – He produces the appearances which constitute the objects experienced in the waking state.

Now we are not normally aware that all this is so; we wrongly-interpret waking objects as independent, thinking that these objects in the form confronting us have an existence which transcends the bounds of waking experience. It is this wrong interpretation which makes us think, for instance, that we *really* create dream-objects and that God *really* creates waking objects. In fact, nothing is ever really created, for to 'really create' something would be to foster another thing, an effect, which was independent of and thus as real as its cause, and this violates the monistic insights of the Upaniṣads. To suppose that causality operates as it is ordinarily supposed to, by producing an independent effect, is a wrong-interpretation. Indeed, any imputation of difference is a wrong interpretation.

The logic of this last thought has paradoxical results. It must lead us to conclude that even an apparent-production is not what it seems, since it involves difference and so is a result of wrong-interpretation. So not only is

it the case that "the unborn is not really unborn", as IV.74 asserts, but it is even the case, as I.17–18 implies, that when it is taught that there is only apparent-production (rather than real production) that too is ultimately a wrong-interpretation indulged in only for the purpose of teaching (*upadeśa*).

These implications of Gauḍapāda's *ajātivāda* have been noted before, and in themselves would not require reiteration. I think they have been too easily construed, however, as requiring something akin to what in Western thought has been called 'subjective idealism'. And indeed, subjective idealism would follow from *ajātivāda* if the one who apparently-produces things were held to be the very same one who wrongly-interprets them. If the mechanism by which an agent A apparently-produces something x is that A, by distinguishing x from something else, wrongly-interprets it, then the world of waking experience is dependent on our misinterpreting it just as the world of dream experience is dependent on our misinterpreting it. That this position is a possible one, and consonant with some things in the Upaniṣads, I do not deny; the question is whether it was Gauḍapāda's view.

My contention is that there is little in Gauḍapāda's language to suggest that he held subjective idealism, and some reason to think he did not. The major reasons which lead me to think he did not are (1) that Gauḍapāda never uses *vi* + √*kḷp* in speaking of the relation between a type of experience and what (or who) is commonsensically taken as its cause, and (2) that he specifically identifies (in II.12–13) the one who *kalpayati* the world as God.

In II.12 and 13 the one who *kalpayati* the world is identified as *deva* and *prabhu*. In the succeeding verses (II.14–16) where the causal origins of temporal and other states are under discussion those states are referred to as *kalpita*, not *vikalpita*. In II.16 *jīva* is explicitly said to be *kalpita*, not *vikalpita*, in a context where it is relevant what is 'earlier' or 'first' (*pūrva*) so that origins are once again clearly under discussion. In II.30, in a remarkable statement, it is said that one who knows the truth may *kalpayet* according to his nature. It would be odd to have the text advise him to wrongly-interpret according to his nature!

To be sure, other passages are more ambiguous. Nevertheless, I believe a consistent and sensible reading has been found for them by sticking with the distinction I propose. For example, II.9–10 finds a thing unreal (*asat*) because *kalpita*. Couldn't one understand *kalpita* here as meaning 'wrongly-interpreted'? Well, it is clear enough that a wrong-interpretation (*vikalpa*) is always unreal on Gauḍapāda's view, but it seems more consistent with the passages mentioned above that the unreality is a result of their *kalpita* status. The connection between being *kalpita* and being unreal lies in the notion that things are 'concealed' when *kalpita*; the notion seems to be, not

that anything which is misinterpreted is concealed, but rather that what is concealed is enclosed within the limits of, and so dependent on, the kind of experience in which it occurs.

An apparent counterinstance to my theory is contained in II.11–12. II.11 asks a question – "who is the *vikalpaka*?", and II.12 appears to answer that it is God. If this were correct, Gauḍapāda would be saying that God projects the appearance of differences by making wrong-interpretations, and if we add the premiss that God is a self, an idealistic interpretation of the *Gauḍapādakārikās* will result.[4] But attractive as that interpretation may be it is not the only one that may be proposed. An equally plausible explanation is that Gauḍapāda is here answering a question with a different point, a challenge to monism which recurs in Advaita writings over and over again. Advaita teaches monism; the questioner propounds the following puzzle:

> you say that differences (*bheda*) are apparently-created by a self, viz., God, but surely it is not God but we (*jīvas*) who wrongly-interpret things by ascribing these differences to reality. So mustn't you hold that there are at least two things – God and (at least one) *jīva* – and doesn't that conflict with your alleged monism?

And Gauḍapāda answers in the traditional Advaita manner by explaining that ultimately God and the *jīvas* are one and the same self, that the distinctions among them, like all the others, are erroneous (*vaitathya*). The reader may say at this point "yes, you see, the apparent-producer and the wrong-interpreter are the same, contrary to Potter's reading", but Potter's reply is likewise firmly based in Gauḍapāda's own words – "of course, ultimately they are the same, but we are here interpreting the teaching (*upadeśa*), not the truth, which cannot be 'interpreted' but can only be directly realized without words."

This leaves us the puzzling stanzas I.17–18 to consider. I.18a is the only passage in the work where "*vi* + $\sqrt{}$*kḷp*" and "$\sqrt{}$*kḷp*" are found used together in the same sentence, and it may be thought that the meaning clearly refutes my thesis, since the passage appears to imply that *vikalpa* is *kalpita*, though not by anyone. But only a little thought will suggest that that is not by any margin the most plausible reading of the passage. What Gauḍapāda is saying here, as I see it, is precisely that neither the world (*prapañca*) nor wrong-interpretations of it (*vikalpa*) have independent existence, and so neither can be destroyed in the way we think pots, etc., are normally destroyed. In other words, this is another way of teaching *ajātivāda*, but it carries that doctrine's implications to an extreme length. Being

apparently-created (*kalpita*) is rightly contrasted with being actually created in that things which are actually created are independent of their cause and so subject to decay and destruction independently of their cause while things apparently-created do not have existence independent of their cause and so are not subject to destruction independently of their cause. But I.18 then goes on in a different manner to apply the logic of this to things apparently-created. If those things are supposed to be apparently-created by someone different from his apparent-creation, then that is a wrong-interpretation; and *that* apparent-creation *would* be subject to destruction since it involves postulating actual difference between the producer and what he produces. But in fact wrong-interpretations (*vikalpa*) are not subject to destruction in the way that pots, etc., are commonly supposed to be, and this is added evidence for the view Gauḍapāda is propounding. The wrong-interpretation of apparent-production, namely that it is someone producing something independent of himself, is a way of speaking (*vāda*) we can hardly avoid, but it is only made necessary because of the necessity of teaching (*upadeśa*).

These passages featuring occurrences of $\sqrt{}$*kḷp* or *vi* + $\sqrt{}$*kḷp* comprise a large number of the stanzas in the *Gauḍapādakārikās* which bear on the question of idealism. Turning briefly to consider how Gauḍapāda's use of *māyā* relates to this, it is evident that *māyā* is used ambiguously, but that in the great majority of its occurrences it is used synonymously with *vikalpa*, 'wrong-interpretation'. In a few cases, though, it is used to suggest the power of the Lord (e.g., II.12; II.19; III.10). Of the majority of passages, where *māyā* = *vikalpa*, let me cite only those not previously quoted.

II.31: "Svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaraṃ yathā
Tathā viśvam idaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vedānteṣu vicakṣanaiḥ."

Just as dreams, wrong-interpretations and the city of the Gandharvas are seen (in the mistaken way they are seen by us), so all this (world) is seen (in a mistaken way) – this is the view (set forth) in the Vedānta (i.e., in the Upaniṣads).

III.19: "Māyayā bhidyate hy etān na anyathājaṃ kathañcana
Tattvato bhidyamāne hi mṛtyatām amṛtaṃ vrajet."

Because, this unborn is differentiated in no other way than through wrong-interpretation; for, if it were really differentiated the immortal would become mortal.

III.24: "Neha nāneti ca āmnāyād indro māyabhir ity api
Ajāyamāno bāhudhā māyayā jāyate tu saḥ."

From scriptural authority in texts such as "neha nānā..." (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.9 = Kaṭha Upaniṣad IV.11) and "indro māyabhir..." (Ṛgveda CI.47.18 = Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.5.9) (we know that) that which has not been born is wrongly-interpreted in many forms.

III.27: "Sato hi māyayā janma yujyate na tu tattvataḥ
Tattvato jāyate yasya jātaṃ tasya hi jāyate."

The existent is joined with birth through wrong-interpretation, but not actually; for that (if anything) which is really born should be born (again?).

III.28: "Asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate
Vaṃdhyapūtro na tattvena māyayā vā api jāyate."

Non-existents are not in reality joined with birth through wrong-interpretation, for the son of a barren woman is not thought really to be born even in wrong-interpretation.

III.29: "Yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṃ spandate māyayā manaḥ
Tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsaṃ spandate māyayā manaḥ."

Just as in dream the internal organ vibrates in seeming duality by wrong-interpretation, so in the waking state (also) the internal organ vibrates in seeming duality by wrong-interpretation.

IV.58: "Dharmā ya iti jāyante saṃvṛtyā te na tattvataḥ
Janma māyopamaṃ teṣāṃ sā ca māyā na vidyate."

The *dharma*s which are said to be born are not actually born; their birth is like wrong-interpretation, and wrong-interpretation does not occur (at all, and so cannot be born.)

IV.59: "Yathā māyāmayād bījāj jāyate tanmayo 'ṅkuraḥ
Nāsau nityo na ca ucchedī tadvad dharmeṣu yojanā."

Just as from seeds constructed from wrong-interpretations are (seemingly) born sprouts constructed from wrong-interpretations, so that neither are eternal or non-eternal, so it is with respect to the *dharma*s.

IV.61: "Yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṃ cittaṃ calati māyayā
Tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsaṃ cittaṃ calati māyayā."

Just as in dreams the internal organ moves in seeming duality by wrong-interpretation, so in the waking state it does so likewise.

IV.69: "Yathā māyāmayo jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca
Tathā jīva āmi sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca."

Just as the *jīva* as wrongly-interpreted (seems to be) born and dies, so all the *jīva*s (seem to) both exist and not to exist.

The translations (or paraphrases) of these passages are intentionally made consistent with the interpretation I am defending. Some, perhaps all of them are capable of being read idealistically as well. My concern is only to suggest that they do not require abandonment of the distinction between apparent-production and wrong-interpretation.

A final textual matter. The one passage where Gauḍapāda makes use of the rope-snake analogy is at II.17–18, already quoted. Note that it is explicitly the term *vikalpita* and not *kalpita* that is used in describing *both* how the snake is 'made' *and* how the *bhāva*s are 'made'. The distinction I am arguing Gauḍapāda adheres to renders this choice of words significant. If to be *vikalpita* is different from being *kalpita* then certain things follow which do not follow if we take him to use the two terms interchangeably. Specifically, if the distinction is adhered to this passage says that just as we *jīva*s wrongly-interpret the rope as snake, so we *jīva*s wrongly-interpret the Self as *bhāva*s. On that reading, II.18 very appropriately adds that when we ascertain the nature of a rope (realizing it cannot be a snake) the wrong-interpretation ceases, just as when we ascertain the nature of the Self the wrong-interpretation of states (*bhāva*s) ceases. Read thus, the passage says nothing about the epistemological status of the world, other than to indicate through an illustration what Gauḍapāda is fond of saying more straightforwardly over and over again, namely that we wrongly-interpret what is actually one as plural, as having various forms.

The rope-snake analogy is a remarkably fertile one. Consider the following uses it might be put to:

1. Just as we (*jīva*s) wrongly-interpret there to be snake in the rope, so we (*jīva*s) wrongly-interpret there is to be a rope, etc. in the non-dual (Brahman.)

2. Just as we (*jīva*s) wrongly-interpret there to be snake in the rope, so God wrongly-interprets there to be rope in Brahman.

3. Just as we (*jīva*s) apparently-create a snake in the rope, so we (*jīva*s) apparently-create a rope in Brahman.

4. Just as we (*jīva*s) apparently-create a snake in the rope, so God apparently-creates a rope in Brahman.[5]

I suggest that Gauḍapāda only uses the analogy to make the first point. He doesn't wish to say, as I read him, that God wrongly-interprets things, and I see no reason to impute to him the notion that we apparently-create ropes or snakes, since he explicitly denies this in other passages, as we have seen.

III

To summarize what I have been trying to suggest, Gauḍapāda's views seem to me to come to this:

1. God apparently-creates the world; we do not.
2. We apparently-create our dream-world(s).
3. Whatever is apparently-created is 'concealed', 'unborn' and 'unreal'.
4. We (*jīvas*) regularly wrongly-interpret and find differences and multiplicity where none actually exists, in both dream and waking states.
5. When one discovers the truth (by *asparśayoga*, Vedantic wisdom, etc.) one's wrong-interpretations cease, analogously to the way one ceases to see a snake in the rope after investigation.
6. However, after realization one may still apparently-create according to one's true nature (just as God does).
7. And after realization one still is aware of something positive (it is not like deep sleep).
8. So, creation of the world is not by wrong-interpretation; the creation of the world by God is *not* analogous to our wrong-interpretations, nor is it the case that we apparently-create the objects of the waking world.

I submit that if these are Gauḍapāda's views he is not an idealist. What is an idealist? I take him to be someone who holds that the objects of veridical (waking) knowledge are dependent for their existence on someone's thinking of them. I see no reason to suppose that Gauḍapāda holds such a view. As I have argued, the passages seem capable of being construed naturally in a way quite contrary to idealism.

If Gauḍapāda is properly termed as 'illusionist' (as Hacker, Vetter and others term him) that would be in virtue of his teaching of *ajātivāda*. But one cannot infer idealism automatically from illusionism. The fact that no 'real' creation occurs, that objects common-sensically assumed to be real creations and therefore to have a kind of existence which transcends the limits of human awareness are not such, does not entail that anyone produced their appearance by merely thinking of them. We do not produce the appearances in our dreams that way: our dreams arise in us from the material provided by *vāsanā*s, traces of past experiences. Likewise, God does not create the objects of waking experiences merely by thinking about them; He too utilizes the traces of past experiences laid down in transmigrating bodies as the material for His creation, presumably to provide occasions for us to work off our stored-up *karma*. And the resulting apparent objects that He produces, though not 'real' in the sense of transcending the limits of waking experience, *are* real in the sense that we must deal with them seriously and cannot merely think them out of existence or into some other form.

However, we are habituated to regularly wrongly-interpret these matters, and to find the wrong kind of 'reality' in the multiplicity of subjects and objects with which we deal. We believe that the objects we see in our waking life, and in our dream life as long as we are dreaming, are such that they would exist even if we were not experiencing them, and thus that if we wish to destroy them we must do them violence of some sort. This is wrong-interpretation, because it takes difference as fundamental and proposes to seek the improvement of things by generating more plurality through smashing things into their constituent parts, etc. Our mistake is not that we think seriously of these things – that would be a mistake if they didn't exist at all, but as we have seen, the fact that God produced them does not entail their complete mind-dependence – but that we think seriously about them in a perverse way. It would be even more perverse to think about them idealistically, to suppose that we could make the things go away merely by wishing. This would be not to think seriously about them at all.

Then how should we think about them? Gauḍapāda seems to answer this by pressing the *ajātivāda* teaching to an extreme, though logical, conclusion. Even to think of God as creator of waking appearances is to be guilty of a wrong-interpretation, since it involves drawing distinctions between God and His creation, between God and oneself, between the objects created by God and one's self, etc. It is, to be sure, a wrong interpretation which is essential as a stage in instruction. It would be virtually impossible to instruct a pupil in the right way of thinking without being able to explain the wrong way and then to contrast it with the right way. But once the pupil has seen that things are not 'real', i.e., transcendent of their experiential limits, and has appreciated why they are not 'real' – because they are not born at all in the way we normally think things are born – then by pointing out the paradoxically far-reaching implications of that insight one can root out all temptation to wrongly-interpret, all ways of thinking and talking that involve reference to duality. Learning to think non-dualistically (and probably not to speak at all except in a playful way) does not in itself destroy the objects which God creates the appearance of. These continue to appear as long as there are *vasanā*s, (i.e., *prārabdha karma*) occasioning His exercise. But it does preclude the laying down of further traces, so that when the *prārabdha karma* has been exhausted God has nothing further to work with, and no further experiences of objects accrue.

IV

One may naturally ask, then, why has scholarship almost universally held

Gauḍapāda to be an idealist? I can see several reasons, each of them interesting.

1. Though Gauḍapāda does not think that the world is dependent for its existence on our thinking about it, he probably held (as a standard reading of the *karma* doctrine) that some of the properties we impute to things are wrong-interpretations for which we are ultimately responsible through the *vāsanās* laid down in the past. If so, those characteristics we find in the world *are* dependent on us, or at least on our pasts, and it is easy to conflate this kind of dependence with the mind-dependence associated with idealism, according to which latter the properties of our experiences are merely the projections of our present desires and expectations. However, though this conflation is natural it is ultimately irrelevant, since it is one thing to say that the properties we attribute to the world are our constructions, and quite another to say that the world has no properties other than those we wrongly attribute to it. I take it, for example, that Gauḍapāda wants us to believe that *God* apparently-created the world, that we did not, and that *this* property of the world belongs to it not merely in virtue of our thinking it so.

2. An added source of complexity is the Advaita thesis that ultimately we *jīvas* are in some sense non-different from God and all of us non-different from Brahman. If I am non-different from God, for example, and if the world depends on God for its existence, then doesn't it follow logically that the world depends on me for its existence? I think it is clear that Gauḍapāda does not sanction this inference, at least "for the purpose of the teaching". As long as he is explaining something to us there are some distinctions he needs; he must teach us how to think rightly by teaching us to progressively reject distinctions, but in order to do that he must get us to identify and discriminate the distincions he wants us to reject. That in the end we should come to reject all distinctions should not be allowed to become an obstacle to our being able to understand and accept the teaching at some intermediate stage. If I am being addressed as a bound *jīva* I don't help myself by responding as if I were God!

3. Nevertheless, it is tempting to conflate the process of apparent-production with wrong-interpretation, since the resulting view is so much simpler. If every erroneous judgment is literally a construction, that is, a projection of a content into an imagined world which is thus completely mind-dependent insofar as it is entirely comprised of those projected contents, it will of course follow that all imputations are equally groundless, and one can escape to an easy ineffabilism in which no instruction need be taken seriously. Since there is a strong sympathetic streak in most of us for anti-intellectualism, it is not surprising that this mystical world-view is so

attractive that it is easily mistaken by most amateurs as the Advaita views, if not the view of all Indian philosophy.

4. The author of the most famous commentary on Gauḍapāda's *kārikās* is traditionally taken to be Śaṃkarācārya. In the authentic works of Śaṃkara, the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* most prominent among them, he shows a tendency to identify the processes of apparent-production and wrong-interpretation under his own theory of superimposition (*adhyāsa*), a theory which appears destined in the end (though perhaps not in Śaṃkara's handling itself) to assimilate the metaphysical role of *māyā* with the epistemological role of *ajñāna* or *avidyā*. The result of the assimilation is not fully idealistic, however; Śaṃkara insists that every superimposition requires a ground to which the superimposed characters are imputed, a ground which is not mind-dependent, although it turns out to be nothing but pure consciousness. The resulting account holds that all imputation of any character is erroneous – strictly speaking, even the imputation of non-duality, etc. The fact that Brahman, or pure consciousness, is required as the ultimate ground of superimposition does not provide all that much of a distinction of his view from idealism, however, especially in the eyes of philosophical scholars (Indian or Western) whose epistemological training has been through the works of the British empiricists and Kant. In this way a slight misinterpretation of Śaṃkara may have been turned into a greater misinterpretation of Gauḍapāda.

5. The author of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* (=*Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa*), whoever he may have been,[6] is also responsible for extending the implications of the rope-snake analogy in such a way as to make it seem that Gauḍapāda was an idealist. Whereas Gauḍapāda only invokes the analogy in one passage and for a single purpose, as we have seen, the author of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* invokes it frequently and in such a way as to conflate *kalpanā* with *vikalpanā*. He uses it over and over in the first Book to help explain the process of realization, and in doing so implies that the complete removal of the dream state (*taijasa*), for example, is accomplished by discovering the nature of the true Self, just as the discovery of the nature of the rope removes the snake completely. Did Gauḍapāda think that dreaming as a type of experience would be completely destroyed when one realizes that nothing is ever really born, etc.? It would seem that at least he thought that the complete rooting out of the dream state takes a kind of training, some kind of yoga based upon the intuition of non-duality, whereas the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* seems to suggest that the intuition immediately demolishes all mundane experience, dream or waking. Again, where Gauḍapāda seems to me to suggest that dream and waking alike

contain wrong-interpretations such as the rope-snake, the author of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* uses the rope-snake to develop a theory of epistemic levels, of dream-objects depending on waking-consciousness as waking-objects depend on a higher consciousness. By II.14 he is clearly assuming that the doctrine being defended is that "everything is *parikalpita* by *citta*, like dreams",[7] and in the commentary to II.17 he uses the fact that the snake is *vikalpita* as an analogy for talking about the *kalpanā* which produced *jīvas*(s).[8] Thus the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* uses the rope-snake to help demonstrate the idealistic thesis, #3 in our list on p. 15, rather than merely the neutral #1 in that list.

None of my arguments make the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* reading of Gauḍapāda an impossible one. And there are ways of taking Gauḍapāda historically which would seem to corroborate the idealistic interpretation – e.g., Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya's notorious theory that at least Book IV, if not all of the *Gauḍapādakārikās*, is a Buddhist treatise.[9] Hacker's recent work, alluded to at the beginning of this paper, would seem to suggest a greater affinity for the young Yogin Śaṃkara on his way to a more mature Advaita.[10] Hacker is properly cautious on these matters, but one does get the impression that he finds a certain plausibility in the young Śaṃkara's turning from the Pātañjala Yoga realism to his own later quasi-idealism by way of a reading of the *Gauḍapādakārikās*. That plausibility most naturally stems from a reading of Gauḍapāda's work as idealist itself. What I have been endeavoring to show is that it is not necessary to construe Gauḍapāda idealistically, that it is uncritical to infer idealism from his *ajātivāda* alone, and that Gauḍapāda need not be supposed to have been more inclined to idealism than Sāṃkhya or Yoga are. Even so, it remains perfectly possible that Śaṃkara was first a Yogin, wrote a *Vivaraṇa* on the *Yogabhāṣya*, then read Gauḍapāda and prepared a commentary on it. misunderstanding the text and finding in it an idealism that was in fact not intended by its author. Nevertheless, the plausibility of Hacker's acceptance of Śaṃkara's authorship of the *Yogabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, as well as of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya*, seems lessened somewhat by these considerations. If Gauḍapāda did not provide Śaṃkara with the clues to his idealism, who did? Did Śaṃkara come to the characteristic views of his maturity by way of mistakenly finding idealism in a text which sets forth a position no more idealistic than that found in the *Yogabhāṣya*, a text which in turn he was closely-enough acquainted with to have written a commentary on himself, then subsequently modifying the idealism by returning in his mature works to a position closer to his youthful Yoga? Or are we in these matters dealing with more than one author? I have no answers to these questions, but suggest that the whole truth may not yet be known.

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NOTES

[1] I wish to thank Professor Allen W. Thrasher for his help in improving a number of aspects of this paper. He is of course not responsible for my mistakes.

[2] See, especially, Paul Hacker, 'Sankara der Yogin und Sankara der Advaitin: Einige beobachtungen', in *Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner*: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens, 12–13, 1968–69, pp. 118–146; also 'Notes on the Mandukyopanisad and Sankara's Agamasastravivarana' in *India Maior* (Congratulatory Volume presented to J. Gonda) (Leiden, Netherlands, 1972), pp. 115–132.

[3] A quirk of Sanskrit usage rules out a third variation: we find 'vikalpa' meaning (on the proposed reading) the result of wrong-interpretation, but not 'kalpa', which word means things entirely different in the *Māṇḍūkyakārikās* and elsewhere. This disparity might be construed as further evidence for my hypothesis, viz., that the two roots $\sqrt{k\d{l}p}$ and *vi* + $\sqrt{k\d{l}p}$ were not necessarily thought interchangeable.

[4] Though not a 'subjective' idealism.

[5] Not to speak of a whole series of further variations, e.g., "Just as we (*jīvas*) wrongly-interpret a snake in the rope, God apparently-creates a rope in Brahman", etc.

[6] That Samkara wrote the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* is argued by Hacker in the second article cited in note 1, as well as by Tilmann Vetter in the Frauwallner Festschrift (cited in note 1), pp. 407–423.

[7] "Svapnavac cittaparikalpitaṃ sarvam..." *Works of Shankaracharya* (ed., H.R. Bhagavat), Volume II, Part 1 (Poona, 1927), 2nd. edition p. 445.

[8] Ibid., p. 446.

[9] Cf. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943).

[10] Hacker does not deny Buddhist influence, however; cf. p. 121 of the second article cited in footnote 1.

WENDY DONIGER O'FLAHERTY

DEATH AS A DANCER IN HINDU MYTHOLOGY

1. THE DANCE OF ŚIVA IN POETRY AND MYTH

The carrion-eater dances:
he produces day and night by successive opening and closing of his eyes.
he covers heaven with his quill-like hair that flies in all directions from the openings of the skull he holds within his hands.
He breaks our eardrums with his mighty roar.[1]

"Pretty eyebrows, put your arm like this
and take your posture so.
Stretch not too high, but bend your toes.
See? Just look at me."
Thus Śambhu teaches Pārvatī
With voice-drum sweet as thunder.
May what he adds for rhythm of her dance,
The clapping of his hands, protect you.[2]

Śiva is the dancer in both of these verses, yet how different the two dances are. The first is the dance of death, the *tāṇḍava*, appropriate to Śiva in his destructive aspect; the second is the dance of creation, a gentle, erotic dance (*lāsya*). Are they two aspects of the same dance, or two different dances? Daniel H.H. Ingalls perceives a problem missed by almost everyone else, when he remarks,

> While the image makers represent several different dances, it is almost always to the *tāṇḍava* that the poets of our anthology refer.... While our poets speak of Śiva as creator of the world (30, 48) they seem not to associate this function with the dance. In one verse (58) the *lāsya* dance is mentioned, which should be a gentle dance, but the poet actually gives it symptoms as violent as the *tāṇḍava*. Only when teaching the dance to the mountain princess (60) does the divine dancer grow mild.[3]

In classical mythology as well as in poetry, the *tāṇḍava* prevails overwhelmingly. Yet the image of Śiva as the graceful, creative dancer is far

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more frequently encountered in late medieval and modern Indian literature and in works of Western scholarship. The present paper attempts to explain this development.

In his discussion of the dance of Śiva, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy notes that the basic image is representative of the activity of god.[4] In this view, the two dances (and many sub-variants as well) are manifestations of a single force. Coomaraswamy discusses three variants: the dance performed in the midst of the gods at twilight, the *tāṇḍava*, and the dance of Śiva Naṭarāja in Cidambaram. The latter, as we shall see from the underlying mythology, is clearly a dance of aggression and destruction. The twilight dance, too, is a dance of death:

> May the hurricane protect you
> stirred up by the whirling, dancing arms
> of the terrible god magnificent
> in his twilight dance.
> By force of its commotion
> the serried ranks of mountains fly from earth again
> and Indra looks anew upon his thunderbolt.
>
> May the god of tangled locks protect you,
> at whose dance of madness in the fullmoon twilight
> the golden mountain sways with leaping woods,
> as sway the sun and moon, to the rhythmic motion;
> as if the earth, of head resplendent,
> with hair and earrings flying,
> did nod in admiration.[5]

Another significant aspect of the twilight dance is that it frightens Śiva's wife, Bhavānī, who watches it with eyes paralyzed with terror, and is grateful when a red cloud takes the place of the usual gorey skin of the flayed elephant.[6]

The attitude of Bhavānī or Pārvatī, which Ingalls mentions as the decisive factor in the aspect of the dance depicted by the poets of the anthology, is also a key to the treatment of the dance in classical mythology: only when Śiva is in loving union with Pārvatī (or with another woman) does he perform a gentle, graceful dance. Thus Śiva dances to assuage Pārvatī's anger, and when Menā, the mother of Pārvatī, hesitates to allow her daughter to marry Śiva, he appears to Menā as a charming dancer:

> Śiva danced before Menā and Pārvatī, and when Pārvatī heard his beautiful song she fainted, and in her heart she saw Śiva smeared with

> ashes and garlanded with bones. She chose him for her husband, and the vision passed. Then Menā, who saw only the graceful dancer, was enchanted by him and offered him jewels, but he refused them and asked for Pārvatī as alms, and then he began to sing and dance again. Menā was enraged, and she abused him and tried to throw him out, but no one could touch the beggar, who blazed like a great fire. He changed his form into Viṣṇu and then into the sun, and into Śiva and Pārvatī, and finally turned back into a beggar asking for Pārvatī as alms. When this request was refused, the beggar vanished, and then Menā and her husband Himālaya realized that this had been Śiva, and a great devotion to him was born in them.[7]

Here Śiva's Dionysian aspect appeals to Menā when she fails to be won by any rational argument; yet even here his dance has an edge of terror to it, and when he changes to this other, darker side, Menā fears him again. Superficially, Menā sees the graceful dancer before her while Pārvatī has the inner vision of the graveyard dance; ultimately, however, Pārvatī sees him as the handsome dancer, while Menā sees the doomsday dancer blazing against her. And another in-law of Śiva, Dakṣa, the father of Satī, is similarly troubled by the anti-social side of Śiva epitomized by his wild dance; when Satī marries Śiva, Dakṣa takes Satī upon his lap and complains, "Śiva always wanders about dancing and singing and doing other despicable things, and this embarrasses me."[8]

Even Śiva's mild dance with Pārvatī or with his little boy, Skanda, arouses scorn:

> When the gods were harrassed by the demons they sought refuge with Śiva, who agreed to slay the demons. But just then the Goddess said to him, "See how Skanda is playing," and Śiva embraced Skanda and danced with him, crying, "My son, my son," and the little boy danced and played, and all the world danced, and Pārvatī was full of joy. But the gods stood beside the door in misery, and though they praised Śiva they looked at each other as if to say, "But. . . . ." And they said, "We are unlucky. The demons have all the luck." Aloud they said, "Honor to Śiva," but they honored him less in their hearts.[9]

Śiva dances here in joy rather than in anger or lust, but the dance still frustrates the purposes of the cosmos. The gods take exception not to his dancing per se but to his delay in fighting, his neglect of his social duty; so too he is said to be the laughing-stock of the gods for dancing and singing to please Pārvatī.[10] Śiva's uxorious nature may be satirized in an episode in

which he dances with the celestial nymphs (*apsarases*) and becomes sexually aroused, whereupon he sends for Pārvatī and becomes very cross when she delays too long in putting on her jewelry.[11] As the dance arouses Śiva, the creative Naṭarāja is often depicted on icons in his ithyphallic form.[12]

Yet another variant of the *tāṇḍava* which is both deadly and erotic is the dance with the corpse of Satī:

> When Satī had killed herself, Śiva took up her corpse on his head and danced fervently with it. The earth trembled and the tortoise and serpent supporting the earth could not bear it, but Śiva kept dancing in mad joy, his eyes whirling. All the gods wondered how he could be made to calm down, and then Viṣṇu cut the body of Satī into pieces with his discus, and as Śiva continued to dance he felt the body become light, and he realized that all the limbs had been cut off, and he stopped dancing.[13]

This is an example of a destructive *tāṇḍava*, the inverse of the erotic, for Śiva is separated from the living Satī, though he embraces her dead body in necrophiliac frenzy. Thus the general rule for the older layer of Sanskrit mythology applies: with Pārvatī, the dance is graceful; without her, it is destructive. The two dances, erotic and deadly, are often interchangeable from a cosmic point of view, and in the classical texts they are both inauspicious: excessive energy, whether overtly destructive or purely erotic, endangers the universe.[14] Moreover, the scorn expressed toward the dancing Śiva in several texts cited above stems from a deep-seated fear of and aversion toward dancing which is characteristic of the majority of the ancient texts, based upon Upaniṣadic attitudes of ascetic misogyny.

2. FEAR OF THE DANCE IN ANCIENT TEXTS

Dance is closely associated with death in the earliest post-Vedic texts. A vivid example appears in the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa:*

> Prajāpati and Death were competing in sacrifice. Prajāpati's weapons were praise, recitation, and ritual; Death's weapons were song accompanied by the lute, dance, and what is done for no point [i.e., no ritual point, or art for art's sake]. They were equally great, and after many years there was no victory. Then Prajāpati wished to conquer Death, and he saw numerical equivalence and computation in the sacrifice [i.e., the precise formula of the ritual]. With that he conquered Death, who retreated for refuge. The parts of the sacrificial ritual – praise, ritual, the

> instruments of sacrifice – became the music of the lute, and dance, and what is done for no point, and the various parts of the lute [i.e., musical instruments became ritual instruments; Prajāpati absorbed Death].[15]

This is the Apollonian aspect of religion typical of the Brāhmaṇas, a static, ritualized sublimation of the creative spirit. The secular arts (for dance in the Vedic period was not yet a part of formal religion) are conquered and absorbed by the priestly crafts.

In the Upaniṣads, too, death is a dancer. When Naciketas visits the world of Death in order to obtain knowledge about dying, Death tempts him with many boons and, finally, offers him lovely women with musical instruments, but Naciketas scorns them as objects that cause one's powers to wear out with age (*jarayanti tejas*), and he says to Death, "Dance and song are yours."[16] This association of the dance with ageing as well as with death persists in later texts, as we shall see, when Indra in place of Death sends dancing girls to destroy would-be immortals.

In Epic mythology, Śiva appears in the role of the ascetic opposed to the dance (though he also appears as an erotic dancer):

> The sage Maṅkaṇaka, seeing some vegetable sap fallen from his hand, began to dance. To stop his dancing, Śiva broke off his own finger, which turned to ashes. Seeing this, the sage realized, "One's own body is only made of ashes." Thus, Śiva is called Bhasmabhūta ["Made of Ashes"].[17]

This is the typical Upaniṣadic view of the dance as the epitome of emotional chaos, the greatest obstacle to the Apollonian spirit of classical Indian religion. The significance of the dance in this brief myth is clarified and emphasized in a Purāṇic variant which adds another dance and an erotic dancer to offset the ascetic Śiva:

> The sage Maṅkaṇaka set out to bathe in his bark garment, and the celestial nymphs bathed there with him. Then the ascetic sage became excited and shed his seed in the water, and seven sages were born from it. One day, the sage Maṅkaṇaka was wounded in the hand by a blade of sacred grass, and plant sap flowed from that wound, and he was filled with joy, and he began to dance. And then everything that was moving or still started to dance; the universe started to dance, for it was bewitched by his energy. The gods asked Śiva to do something about the sage so that he would stop dancing. When Śiva saw that the sage was filled with joy to excess, he struck his own thumb with the tip of his finger, and from that wound ashes shining like snow came forth. When

> the priest saw this he was ashamed, and he fell at Śiva's feet and begged him to let his ascetic power be preserved, and Śiva granted this.[18]

When Indra wishes to destroy an ascetic, he sends a celestial dancer to seduce him;[19] here this seems to take place without the agency of Indra, for Maṅkaṇaka's own Dionysian frenzy is sufficient to destroy his ascetic power. As the god of ascetics, Śiva is the enemy of dancers, the enemy of Maṅkaṇaka; but, at the same time, Śiva is also the benefactor of ascetics, the benefactor of the contrite Maṅkaṇaka. Śiva's role as god of dancers comes from a very different source, as we shall see.

In Purāṇic mythology, the image of death as a dancer is encountered in a striking example of the recurrent conflict between Indra and the ascetic. In this text, King Yayāti has become free from old age and has made all men immortal (the usual goal of ascetics). Indra must therefore act in order to destroy this power:

> Indra summoned Kāma and the Gandharvas, and the noble god brought Spring, and the goddess Rati. Indra said, "Make the king come to heaven. Go to earth now, by my command." Kāma said, "I will do what is best for you. Watch me and the king locked in combat." And so saying, they all went where the king lived, and all of them, Kāma and the others, took the form of mimes. Greeting the king with salutations, they spoke of an excellent drama. Hearing their speech, the wise and discriminating king made an assembly hall and met there with his pandits. And as the king watched their drama, as the actors danced the story of the dwarf who took the form of a Brahmin, Old Age took the form of a woman of unsurpassed beauty, sweetly singing a supreme song. The king was enchanted by her song and her graceful dance and her laughter and her amorous gestures, and by the magic of Kāma who murmured sweetly, and by the divinely evoked emotion and by the action of the play, the story of how the demon Bali was trapped long ago. Kāma took the form of the dwarf, and Kāma himself was the stage-manager. Spring was the stage-hand, and Rati wore the costume of a dancer, and all of them moved upon the stage in that ritual of drama, and the wise Kāma shook the king. And as the king kept watching the dance and listening to the song, gradually that mighty king was overpowered by the magic of the dancer who was Old Age. Deluded by the graceful song of Kāma in the form of a dancer and by the laughter and gestures, the king forgot to purify himself after urinating and defecating, and at that very moment, Old Age reached the king and entered him. Thus Kāma performed his duty for the sake of

> Indra. And when the dance had ceased, and the dancers had gone, the virtuous king was overcome by Old Age, for his mind was sullied by desire.[20]

Despite certain textual problems, the myth emerges clearly: by succumbing to the demonic charms of dance and song, the king is overpowered by emotion and loses the powers of self-control that have kept him immortal. Here the dancer is neither Death nor Śiva, but Kāma; yet Kāma is death for an ascetic, and Kāma and Death combine in the character of Śiva.[21]

The image of Death as a dancer occurs in two Baiga myths; these tribal tales, though technically non-Hindu, show strong Hindu influences. In the first myth, Death takes the form of a dancing-girl, the equivalent of the celestial nymph in the Sanskrit texts:

> In Koeli-Kacchar lived a Baiga and a Baigin. When Bihi Mata saw that nobody was dying she was troubled; she made from the dirt of her body a Sahis and his wife and sent them to the Baiga, saying, 'Make a drum of earth and go and dance in front of these Baiga.' The Baiga could not help it, he fell in love with the Sahis woman. Now, before that time, man and woman had never been to one another and that was why there was no death in the world. But when the Baiga met the Sahis woman alone in the forest there was an earthquake. Mother Earth trembled and the Baiga died immediately. From that time there has been death in the world.[22]

The dance is here equivalent to sexual intercourse, as in the Sanskrit texts; the image of the earthquake translates the dangerous act into the epitome of violent, dangerous movement. Death is a drummer as well as a dancer, a role that he also assumes in Tamil texts.[23] In a second Baiga myth, a demon is tricked into dancing himself to death, like the ballerina in 'The Red Shoes':

> [A demon had a magic amulet that burnt people to ashes. He was in love with Pārvatī and tried to seduce her. Viṣṇu took the form of Pārvatī and said, 'My Mahārāja first dances, then he does it.' The demon danced, and Viṣṇu told him to place his hands on his head. The demon did so and burnt himself to ashes.][24]

Again the dance is a substitute for sexual activity, and again, as in the myth of Maṅkaṇaka, it is associated with ashes, the stuff of death.

3. Positive Attitudes to the Dance in Non-Classical Texts

In the light of this background, where can one look for the source of the medieval Hindu myth of Śiva as the beautiful dancer, the creative dancer? The usual fall-guy in this frequent quest for religious phenomena which cannot be traced back to Vedic texts is the ancient non-Āryan—Dravidian, Tamil-speaker, Southerner, or what you will. Thus, Coomaraswamy states that "the *tāṇḍava* dance is in origin that of a pre-Aryan divinity, half-god, half-demon."[25] It is tempting to refer in this context to a statue of a so-called dancing girl found in the Indus Valley Civilization and to the torso which has been identified as a prototype of Naṭarāja himself – but this is a temptation which the serious scholar must resist with the fortitude of an ascetic resisting the blandishments of Kāma, for the evidence is simply insufficient to support (or reject) any developed hypothesis; all we have are two fascinating small statues, tantalizingly veiled by our own ignorance of their possible religious significance.

One might also attempt to "solve" the problem by linking it to another unsolved problem, the larger problem of the origins of Śiva himself. If religious dance in India originates outside Vedic culture and is hated and feared by the authors of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, as well as by later texts which developed out of this corpus, one might simply observe that this pattern is also applicable to the worship of the god Śiva; when he was absorbed into the pantheon, then, dance became acceptable through its association with him. Even if this hypothesis should prove valid, however, it merely joins two areas of shadow without illuminating either; and it is all annoyingly broad and hypothetical. Yet if one narrows the Śaiva phenomenon to Tamil Śaivism, the picture brightens considerably; for here is precisely where the institution of sacred dancing first appears on the historical Indian scene. Ecstatic dancing was common in Tamil worship as recorded in early texts and survived in Tamilnad.[26] Dancing girls were usually courtesans, and "music and dancing had religious significance in ancient Tamilnad. It seems natural therefore that dancing girls, who continued to be courtesans, should later come to be associated with temples."[27]

Once dance was accepted in Hindu ritual, it took back some of the functions that had been specifically stolen from it in early Brāhmaṇa texts such as the one cited above, in which Death is conquered by Prajāpati. For the purpose of the Hindu liturgy was to ritualize death in a sacrifice that Jan Heesterman has described as "controlled catastrophe".[28] It was precisely in order to ensure this element of control that the priests banished the

Dionysian elements of music and dance, replacing them with dry, precise rituals. But in Tamil religion, "music and dance are highly ordered and can help keep under control the forces of disorder. . . . It is important that such behavior [as dancing in trance] did and does not take place at random, but rather in carefully controlled situations."[29]

This same elaborate control, this rationalization of ecstasy, as Max Weber has put it,[30] is clearly visible in the Tamil theology of the dance of Śiva: Śiva's dance represents his five activities (creation, preservation, destruction, illusion, release); he dances to destroy the fetters that bind the soul; the burning ground that is his stage represents the state where illusion and deeds are burnt away.[31] Śiva dances souls into action,[32] and the dance is even identified with the five syllables of the prayer "Hail to Śiva" (śivāya namaḥ),[33] an academic equation worthy of the most prosaic author of a Brāhmaṇa text.

It is thus quite likely that the positive attitude to the dance of Śiva, the concept of a graceful, beneficial dance, stems from Tamil religion. This hypothesis is further supported by the history of the third and most widespread form of the dance of Śiva – the dance of Naṭarāja before the assembly of gods and sages in the forest of Taragam. In Sanskrit texts, Śiva dances together with the forest women, but never alone; he enters the Pine Forest as a beautiful dancer and seduces (or is seduced by) the wives of the sages there; they castrate him, are terrified by the consequences of this act, recognize the god and worship his *liṅgam* ever after.[34] This is the usual version of the myth as it appears in Sanskrit texts and it is implcit in the earliest variant of all, in the *Mahābhārata* (albeit rejected by the critical edition): Śiva laughs, sings, and dances charmingly, sporting in phallic nakedness with the wives of the sages.[35] Although the Pine Forest is not mentioned here by name, the pattern is clearly apparent; here is an early example of the erotic dance of Śiva, mentioned in a hymn of praise and therefore regarded as a positive aspect of the god.

When the Pine Forest myth appears in Tamil texts, however, a notable change takes place: Śiva is not castrated (which was the point of the myth in the Sanskrit texts); rather, when the sages attack him, he dances in such a way that their attacks are useless, and the sages and the gods witness the dance and worship him.[36] In these texts, Śiva is not usually said to dance with the women at first; but at the end, in place of the castration episode of the Sanskrit texts, he dances all alone, and it is a dance of aggression and danger, as violent as the castration that it replaces. As Śiva dances, he presses the tip of his foot upon an evil dwarf sent to kill him; he breaks the creature's back so that it writhes upon the ground.[37] This is the image

depicted on the famous South Indian bronzes.[38] Thus the history of the Pine Forest myth demonstrates a Tamil tendency to translate a purely sexual image of violence into an image of the solitary dance. (It is significant that the image of the ithyphallic Naṭarāja appears in Orissa but not in South India). In the Tamil myth and icon, the dance is used to control enemies (the sages), precisely the function of the dance in ancient Tamil culture as interpreted by George Hart. The basic paradigm still holds true in the Southern variants of the Pine Forest myth: when Śiva dances with women, his dance is beautiful; when he dances alone, it is terrible.

One might therefore surmise that the woman herself represents a calming influence, but this is not the case. For the goddess, in her aspect of the blood-thirsty Kālī, is represented (particularly in Bengal) as dancing a dance of death among the ashes in the burning-ground.[39] Kālī dances in wild frenzy, inviting her devotees to dance with her; she endangers the world when she dances out of control.[40] She dances over the corpse of Śiva as he danced with the corpse of Satī, a typical Tantric reversal. Another reversal occurs in two texts of the same myth; in the first, the Goddess Kālī is said to have made a body out of the poison in Śiva's neck, in order to kill a demon, but after she killed him she went mad; Śiva became a little boy in order to drink away her anger with her milk; she suckled him and thus was made calm, and then he danced to please her, and she danced with him.[41] A variant of this myth reverses the sexes and their powers:

> A female demon threatened the gods until Pārvatī created from her own substance a black maiden who destroyed the demoness. Śiva appeared as an infant in a cemetery, and when Kālī took him up and gave him her breast he sucked but became angry; to divert and pacify him, Kālī clasped him to her bosom and danced until he was pleased and happy.[42]

The gender of the demon and of the source of the black goddess is changed from male to female, and Śiva appears as deadly rather than charming; so she must dance to calm him, as he had danced to calm her.

In South India, Śiva and Kālī are often said to compete in a dance contest, and Śiva is always victorious;[43] when she goes mad, he dances with her to keep her from killing.[44] But the dance itself is dangerous and destructive, a dance of battle rather than an Indian version of the tango. The dance contest is often said to take place in Cidambaram;[45] thus the dance conflict between Kālī and Śiva follows the pattern of the dance conflict between Śiva and the Pine Forest sages. In all of these instances, the union of the two mad dancers ultimately results in the domination of male over

female and the subsequent restoration of peace, though the dance itself is not peaceful.

Another important South Indian dance tradition centers around Tiruvālaṅkāṭu:

> Kālī drank a demon's blood and became intoxicated, madly devouring living creatures until Śiva engaged her in a dance contest; when he began a fierce dance, with one foot lifted in the air, the worlds shook, constellations fell to earth, and Kālī fainted upon the ground; then she revived and shyly acknowledged defeat, but Śiva continued to dance violently until the gods asked Pārvatī to help them calm him.[46]

This is yet another variant of the Pine Forest myth, for at the end Śiva remarks that he danced to give a vision to the sages in the forest, and again it is marked by a chain of violent dances, in this case two individual *tāṇḍavas* (first Kālī's and then Śiva's) bridged by a dance contest. As the dance is a metaphor for sexual intercourse, it is natural (and therefore safe and auspicious) when performed by male and female together, but it is twisted into a dangerous act of solitary ascetic destruction when danced alone. Only the intervention of the peaceful bride, Pārvatī, can break the rhythm of the dangerous dance and move Śiva to calm domesticity and the acceptance of worship. So too, in Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava*, when Kālī dances a mad *tāṇḍava* that threatens to destroy the triple world, her dance terrifies Pārvatī until Śiva comforts her.[47] Here, as in many of the Tamil myths, Kālī and Pārvatī are separated into two distinct personnae, the wild dancer and the peaceful spectator (as Śiva himself is often split), and once again the union of the god and his goddess relaxes the dangerous tension created by the dance.

One late and almost certainly Tamil-influenced Sanskrit text combines the Pine Forest myth with the motif of the dance that pacifies Pārvatī:

> One day, Pārvatī became mad at Śiva and shouted tearfully that he was immoral and reviled by the gods, that he disregarded *dharma* like an atheist and had no parents and was an untouchable because he ate poison and was adorned with bones and ashes and was an evil beggar who had no right even to talk to her. Then she cursed him to be attacked by Brahmins (i.e. by the Pine Forest sages). Śiva pacified her with sweet words, offering to do whatever she wanted; somewhat appeased, she replied, "If you take a vow of chastity and then dance the *tāṇḍava* before the gods, and then make half of your body into Viṣṇu's body, then I will revoke my curse." Śiva was pleased, and he took the

vow of chastity, and all the gods and sages assembled on Mount Mandara, eager to see the dance of Śiva, and Bhavānī came there surrounded by the her sixty-four female friends, rejoicing to see Śiva, and the goddesses with Pārvatī sat on golden chairs and looked on. The *rāgas* appeared incarnate, coming out of various parts of Śiva's body when he thought of them, for they were his five sons, and the wives of the *rāgas* came out of Śiva's head. Viṣṇu became the sixth dancer, Śiva's son. All the gods played upon various instruments: Brahmā played the *mṛdaṅga* drum, the winds blew on horns, Indra played a flute, and the Aśvins played the cymbals. Then Śiva assumed his terrifying form, loosing his matted locks, and he swung his ten arms and danced as he dances to destroy the universe. The Gandharvas and Apsarases sang, and everyone threw flowers, and the mountains whirled as his feet struck them, and the earth shook. Then the daughter of the mountain was pleased, for Śiva had completed his vow, and she said to him, "When the Brahmins curse you so that your *liṅgam* falls, everyone will worship that *liṅgam*." Then she praised Śiva and asked him to forgive her for having been angry, and he was pleased by her. He made the left side of his body Viṣṇu's, and Pārvatī embraced him: half his necklace was a garland of headless torsoes, half was of pearls; he wore an animal skin on one side and on the other side a silk cloth; he rode a fish on one side and and a bull on the other. When the gods saw him in this form and realized that Śiva and Viṣṇu were one, they rejoiced and went home rejoicing.[48]

This is a marvellous pot-pourri of previous variants. It combines the myth in which one goddess curses Śiva to be castrated and then another promises him that his *liṅgam* will be worshipped,[49] and the South Indian myth in which Śiva and Viṣṇu join in one body after Viṣṇu appears as a female dancer to trick the demon into dancing himself into ahses[50] or to assist Śiva in the Pine Forest,[51] and the many myths about the quarrels between Śiva and Pārvatī, usually arising from the same bourgeois concerns that animate Dakṣa, Menā and Pārvatī – Śiva is an untouchable, a beggar, even an atheist (a nice trick for a god).[52] At first, as in the other South Indian variants in which the dance replaces the castration, Pārvatī curses him merely to be attacked by the sages, not castrated; later she says that they will castrate him, as in the Sanskrit texts. In any case, he must be chaste, for he dances alone.

In this text, Śiva has two forms, first the fierce *tāṇḍava* form and then the peaceful, half-Viṣṇu form; and of course this second form is in itself two in

one, the visual embodiment of ambivalence. The goddess also appears in two forms, for though it is Pārvatī, the gentle goddess, the wife, who requests the *tāṇḍava* and watches it on a golden chair with the other wives of the gods, the fierce Bhavānī appears with her entourage of sixty-four *yoginīs*; this is the dark goddess. Finally, the dance itself appears in its full ambivalence, for though it is clearly destructive and is even said to be the universe-destroying dance, no one seems worried about it at all; they just throw flowers, as if Śiva were a ballet-dancer executing the Bluebird variation with extra *panache*. The dark dance is at last fully integrated into the classical Indian tradition; Dionysos has merged with Apollo.[53]

NOTES

[1] Daniel H.H. Ingalls, *An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry* (translation of the *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa*), Harvard Oriental Series no. 44 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965), verse 1541, page 401.

[2] *Ibid.*, verse 60, page 81.

[3] *Ibid.*, page 73.

[4] Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *The Dance of Shiva* (New Delhi, 1971, revised edition), page 67.

[5] Ingalls, verses 50 and 52.

[6] Kālidāsa, *Meghadūta*, verse 36.

[7] *Śiva Purāṇa* (Benares 1964), 2.3.30.25–54; *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa* (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series no. 102, Poona, 1935), 4.40.71–111. Cf. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, *Asceticism and Eroticism in the Mythology of Śiva* (Oxford, 1973), p. 216.

[8] *Padma Purāṇa* (Calcutta, 1958), 1.5.41.

[9] *Liṅga Purāṇa* (Calcutta, 1890), 1.71.119–141. Cf. O'Flaherty, pp. 301–302.

[10] *Padma Purāṇa* (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series no. 131, Poona, 1893) 6.11.7.

[11] *Śiva Purāṇa* 2.5.51.35–45. Cf. O'Flaherty, p. 146.

[12] Cf. the image at the Vaital Deul temple of Bhubaneshwar (9th century), depicted in Alain Danielou, *L'érotisme divinisé* (Paris, 1962), p. 29.

[13] *Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa* (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1888–1897) 2.40.18–54; *Devībhāgavata Purāṇa* (Benares, 1960) 7.30.44–50; *Mahābhāgavata Purāṇa* (Bombay,

1913) 11.32–118. Cf. O'Flaherty (1973), p. 297; cf. also Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, *Hindu Myths* (Harmondsworth, 1975), pp. 249–251.

[14] O'Flaherty (1973), pp. 296–313.

[15] *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* (Sarasvatī Vihāra Series 31, Nagpur, 1954), 2.69–70. Cf. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, *The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology* (University of California, Berkeley, 1976), pp. 219–220.

[16] *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 1.25–26.

[17] *Mahābhārata* (Poona, 1933–1959) 13.17.92; cf. Nīlakaṇṭha's commentary on the Bombay edition, 13.17.95. Cf. O'Flaherty (1973), pp. 245–246.

[18] *Vāmana Purāṇa* (Benares, 1968), Saromāhātmya 17.2–23. Cf. O'Flaherty (1975), pp. 173–174. Cf. also *Mahābhārata* 3.81.

[19] Cf. O'Flaherty (1973), pp. 87–89.

[20] *Padma Purāṇa* 2.76.18–30; 2.77.1–4. All the published texts of this myth are badly corrupt. I have used readings from the Ānandāśrama edition, the Calcutta edition, and some rejected by both editors.

[21] O'Flaherty (1973), pp. 169–171; (1976), pp. 213. ff.

[22] Verrier Elwin, *Myths of Middle India* (Oxford, 1949), p. 414; cf. O'Flaherty (1976), p. 244.

[23] E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India* (Madras, 1909), VI, p. 116. Cf. O'Flaherty (1976), p. 226. Śiva himself is often depicted carrying a drum.

[24] Elwin, p. 348. O'Flaherty (1973), p. 297.

[25] Coomaraswamy, p. 68.

[26] George L. Hart, III, *The Poems of Ancient Tamil, Their Milieu and Their Sanskrit Counterparts* (Berkeley, 1975), p. 29.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 142.

[28] J.C. Heesterman, "Veda and Dharma", in *The Concept of Duty in South Asia,* edited by Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty (New Delhi, 1978), p. 87.

[29] Hart, p. 135.

[30] Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (London, 1963), p. 158.

[31] Coomaraswamy, pp. 70–73, citing *Uṇmai Viḷakkam*, verses 32–39; *Civañāṉa Cittiyār, Cupakkam*, 5.5.

[32] Kaṭavuḷ Māmuṉivar's *Tiruvātavūrarpurāṇam, Puttarai vātil vēṉṟa carukkam*, stanza 75.

[33] *Uṇmai Viḷakkam*, cited in Coomaraswamy, p. 72.

[34] O'Flaherty (1973), pp. 172–209; (1975), pp. 145–149; (1976), pp. 310–317.

[35] *Mahābhārata*, 13, appendix 1, #4, lines 55 and 66–67.

[36] Herman Kulke, *Cidambaramāhātmya* (Wiesbaden, 1970).

[37] Coomaraswamy, pp. 68–70. See also T. Gopinatha Rao, *Elements of Hindu Iconography* (Madras, 1916, Delhi, 1968), II, 113–114, 235–236, 276–277, 304–307.

[38] Śiva as the Naṭarāja appears in sculpture, as in literature, first in the North, but this is an accident of cultural history, not a fact of actual history. Moreover, the image of Naṭarāja in the North (Elephanta, Ellora) depicts Siva's dance as witnessed by a number of spectators, among whom a woman (Parvati?) is prominent.

[39] Coomaraswamy, p. 74; cf. David R. Kinsley, *The Sword and the Flute, Kālī and Kṛṣṇa* (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 114–125; cf. also Edward J. Thompson and Arthur Marshman Spencer, *Bengali Religious Lyrics, Śākta* (London and Calcutta, 1923).

[40] Kinsley, p. 157.

[41] *Liṅga Purāṇa* 1.106.

[42] Cited in Colonel Vans Kennedy, *Researches into the Nature and Affinity of Ancient and Hindu Mythology* (London, 1831), pp. 337–338; cf. O'Flaherty (1976), pp. 338–339.

[43] *Tirupputtūrppurāṇam*, 115th *carukkam*; cited in M.A. Dorai Rangaswamy, *The Religion and Philosophy of Tēvāram* (Madras, 1958), book 1, p. 442; cf. Kinsley, p. 105.

[44] *Tiruvālankāṭṭuppurāṇam*, cited in Rangaswamy, pp. 444–445. Also *Tirukkūvap-purāṇam*, cited *ibid.*

[45] R.K. Das, *Temples of Tamilnad* (Bombay, 1964), p. 195.

[46] *Tiruvālankāṭṭuppurāṇam* 10.1–77, 11.1–32, 12.1–61, 13.1–35, cited by David Shulman, *The Mythology of the Tamil Śaiva Talapurāṇam* (Princeton University Press, 1980). I am indebted to Dr. Shulman not only for bringing this myth to my attention but for helping me to understand the relationship between the Sanskrit and Tamil myths of the dance.

[47] Bhavabhūti, *Mālatīmādhava* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series no. 170, Trivandrum, 1953), act 5, verse 23.

[48] *Skanda Purāṇa* (Bombay, 1897), 6.253.1–37, 6.254.1–104.

[49] *Padma Purāṇa* (ASS) 5.17.141; cf. O'Flaherty (1973), p. 301.

[50] Gustav Oppert, *On the Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarsha or India* (London, 1893), p. 508; cf. O'Flaherty (1973), p. 228.

[51] R. Dessigane and P.Z. Pattabiramin, *La légende de Skanda selon le Kāñchipurāṇam Tamoul et l'iconographie* (Publications de l'Institut Francais d'Indologie, no. 31, Pondichéry, 1967), pp. 84–85 (2.32.6–47). Cf. O'Flaherty (1973), p. 229.

[52] O'Flaherty (1973), pp. 221–225.

[53] Other aspects of this subject are discussed in Chapter 5 of my book, *Women, Androgynes, and Other Mythical Beasts* (University of Chicago Press, 1980), entitled 'The Dance of Śiva with Kālī and Pārvatī.'

GEORGE L. HART, III

THE LITTLE DEVOTEE: CĒKKIḺĀR'S STORY OF CIṞUTTOṆṬAR

The *Tiruttoṇṭar Purāṇam* – 'The Purāṇa of the venerable servants [of Śiva]' – was composed by Cēkkiḻār in the first half of the twelfth century A.D.[1] It contains the stories of the 63 Nāyaṉmārs, Tamil Śaiva saints. It is nowadays called simply the *Periya Purāṇam*, 'the great Purāṇa.'

One of the most interesting stories in all of Śaivism is certainly that of Ciṟuttoṇṭar, 'the little devotee,' that is translated here. It is important not merely because it is the most graphic Abraham and Isaac story I have ever encountered in India (or elsewhere, for that matter), but because it is one of the most popular stories in South Indian religion. There are many versions of it, not all in Tamil.

The earliest version is that given here, but it is followed very soon by the version of the thirteenth century Telugu writer Pālkuriki Sōmanātha in his *Bāsavaṇṇapurāṇamu*. This version has not copied Cēkkiḻār's Purāṇa, but is expressly said to be taken from oral sources. Thus it appears that even by the time of Cēkkiḻār, the story of the little devotee must have been spread over much of Southeastern India as an oral story and that even the Tamil poet must have drawn on oral sources for much of his material. It is interesting that the historicity of Parañcōti, who lived in the seventh century A.D., is confirmed by inscriptions, as is the fact that he was a general for the Pallava king and that he led an expedition that destroyed Vātāpi.[2] The story of Ciṟuttoṇṭar was also written by the great Telugu poet Śrīnātha in the fifteenth century in an account that is closer to Cēkkiḻār's than Pālkuriki Sōmanātha's, even though Śrīnātha evidently did not know Tamil. Even today the story of the Little Devotee is popular in the oral literature of Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh.[3] Curiously, there is no version of the story that I have been able to discover in Sanskrit.

Clearly, then, the story of the Little Devotee is not just a tale of interest to a few people. It is spread over most of South India even today and is one of the most important accounts of bhakti in that area. It follows that the story has much to reveal about the nature of bhakti and of religion in South India.

There has been a tendency among Sanskritists and Western Indianists to write of bhakti as if it were a religion entirely of sweetness and light. Those who have discussed it have lingered long on the stories of Krishna and other

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Vaiṣṇava figures. Indeed, even in Tamil the Vaiṣṇava Tirumaḻicaiyāḻvār said of Śaivism that its stories were not sweet to the ears in a reference that the commentators take to refer to the Ciṟuttoṇṭar story.[4] It remains to investigate the significance of this strange story for the religion of South India. Are we, like the Vaiṣṇava commentators, to find it off-putting and somewhat barbaric, or is it possible to find in it some high and lofty symbolism befitting a great religion?

The theme of renouncing one's family for religious purposes is quite old in India. For example, the Buddhist Jātaka about Viśvāntara describes how that prince gave away his wife and children to ascetics who needed someone to beg for them.[5] Yet in spite of superficial similarities, examination discloses that the present story is quite different from that of the Buddhist prince. First, it stresses the attachment that Ciṟuttoṇṭar had for his son. He is not, like the Buddhist, simply giving up something that no longer had meaning for him. Second, Ciṟuttoṇṭar cannot merely leave his son with someone and go off. He must kill him, rejoicing in his heart. Finally, Ciṟuttoṇṭar's aim is not to renounce family life. His sacrifice of his son comes as he upholds the dharma of a householder by serving a guest. Thus the story of the Little Devotee, in spite of outward resemblance to that of Viśvāntara and others of his ilk, is totally different. It is not a story of renunciation, but of sacrifice.

In this regard, it must be seen as an expression of indigenous South-Indian beliefs in the context of the Śaiva bhakti tradition. It takes the beliefs that are native to the area and almost universally held there and examines them in the light of what it's author feels to be a higher form of reality. The bhakti religion is delineated by consideration of which beliefs are ultimately valid and which are not.

It has already been pointed out that in this story, the role of the householder is preferred to that of the renunciant; after all, the author could have simply had Ciṟuttoṇṭar renounce his family and go to the forest like countless ascetics in Indian tradition. Rather, the entire piece hinges around the family, even to Śiva himself, who finally appears with his wife and son. This is in line with the basic orientation of South Indian culture around the family and the distrust of renunciants found in Tamil from the beginning.[6] The Tamils have always found the highest manifestation of the sacred in the family. They have always found a son, especially a young one, to be one of the highest expressions of human bliss. As the Caṅkam poet Pāṇṭiyaṉ Aṟivuṭainampi sings in *Puṟanāṉūṟu* 188,

> Even though a man is rich and owns many possessions,
> even though he eats with many,

if he has no children who come walking with small steps
in the midst of his meals,
stretch out their tiny hands,
put food on the floor,
smear their hands in it,
and eat it and stir it until they are covered with rice and ghee,
delighting him,
then for all his days there is nothing of any worth.

Similarly, the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* says of Yaśodā as she catches her naughty son in a typical South-Indian village milieu that she has attained the bliss that even yogis cannot reach. In the story of the Little Devotee, the son is more important even than his parents: the story would not be nearly so effective if the Little Devotee merely sacrificed himself. Throughout the story, moreover, the bhakti theme of contact with the divine in an ordinary setting rather than through renunciation is stressed. Even Śiva comes as a human being, not as a transcendent god, to remind the hearers that for the Śaiva the devotee of the god is as holy as God himself.

The Tamils believed that the taking of any life involves the taking on of a dangerous power and produces a condition in which the killer is vulnerable to the forces of death and chaos. If the life taken is human, then the killer is subject to the vengeance of the spirit of the killed person. It is for this reason that, after a battle, the victorious king performed a war sacrifice in which he had the flesh of his enemies cooked and served up (but, it would appear, not eaten) in an act whose purpose was to establish ritual identity between the victorious king and those whom he had caused to be killed, and hence to avoid their revenge. The war sacrifice was not obligatory, however: normally the king was, unlike other men, not subject to the vengeance of those killed. Indeed, he could impart protection also to those who killed under him.

If a man could assume a dangerous condition by killing in a way in which he had no protection (from the king or by having a fitting birth, such as that of a hunter), he could also reach such a state by coming into contact with dangerous things or objects that he was not fit by status to deal with. Such things include hair, blood, and anything contaminated with the mouth. Contact could be of two sorts: exterior, in which case it could be washed off, and interior, which could not be gotten rid of.[7] When a man has illicit sexual contact with a woman, his pollution is external, while hers is internal. This is one reason for the dual standard among Tamils whereby a man is allowed to have many women, but a woman can have only one man (unless she belongs to a certain community). Eating can produce internal, not external,

pollution: the consumption of dangerous food leaves one in a precarious condition that is almost impossible to rectify. What food is dangerous is different for different classes. For the highest, any dead flesh is dangerous.[8] Moreover, the dangerous charge is hard to contain: normally, it is perilous even to eat pure food in the presence of impure people.

This ethic of pollution[9] contrasts with the primary moral concern of the Tamils, generosity. For, as one can discern easily in this story, generosity manifests itself to a large extent in sharing food. Clearly, one cannot be generous in the expansive way that the society expects and at the same time conform to a system that demands such extreme care in the taking of food. Thus, each Tamil (especially each Tamil from a high class) is confronted with a dilemma that has no satisfactory solution. There are, in addition, many other areas in which the upper-class Tamilian is confronted with a choice between what seems moral and compassionate and what produces status.[10]

The present story shows how a bhakti tradition deals with these aspects and problems of Tamil society. The bhakti god was modeled in many ways upon the king.[11] Like the king, the god can keep away danger for those who kill human beings as part of their duty to the god: in this case, he can protect even those who kill their own son, something a king could never do, as his protection is limited to those who kill in battle, and his kingly status is dependent upon the presence of justice in his kingdom. For the warrior, his devotion to the king is what renders him fit for protection: he must be ready and willing to sacrifice himself for the king. In this story, it is not enough if the devotee is willing to die himself; he must be willing to kill his own son without qualms. The story takes the devotion that must be demonstrated on the human plane to a king and increases it to make it fit for the god.

Indeed, this transformation of human values is the key to the story. The position of the king is such that he can mediate to an extent the dilemma between compassion (generosity, consideration of human needs) and social order (avoidance of pollution, keeping order). For this reason, he is in a real sense a superhuman figure. In battle, for example, he is often compared to Death himself, or is said to make even Death afraid.[12] He is said to be unaffected by omens[13] and to put concerns of generosity above concerns of pollution.[14] This role is transferred to the god, who has even greater power. As long as one performs what the god wishes, no pollution is incurred, no moral standard is transgressed. Indeed, those who fully give themselves over to the god are, like the king, in a superhuman condition in which they are indifferent to death and killing.

Thus in this story the most extreme imaginable act of pollution is

metamorphosed into a holy and pure act of devotion. The destruction of a family becomes an act of merit. The ultimate moral act of giving food and being generous is perverted by the food's being unfit for human consumption and by the unreasoning nature of the generosity. Devotion to the god transcends and changes all social values, whether they are intended for the maintenance of social order and the avoidance of dangerous power, or whether they are concerned with compassion and personal morality. But the story does not end at this level; if it did, it would scarcely be worthy of a great religious tradition.

For in the end, Cīrāḷaṉ is restored to life and the importance of the family is affirmed as Śiva appears with his wife and his son. Moreover, throughout the story, it is precisely the maintaining of the social code of generosity and even of purity (for Ciṟuttoṇṭar is careful not to pollute his son before killing him) that earns the devotee his greatness. The story is an unsolved paradox that does not allow the hearer to come to any conclusions about proper conduct. It is not, in spite of first appearances, a didactic tale. Rather, it makes a statement about evil and the dilemma of theodicy: how can God be just if there is suffering in the world? It does not agree with Śaṅkara and other theologians that evil does not exist. Nor does it take the simplistic solution that suffering is merely the result of bad things done in former births. Rather, evil is produced by God himself to make life a test that can be won through devotion. It is part of God's play, but a play that is not one of lightness and joy. There is no code of conduct that can solve the difficulties of life or make its sufferings part of a coherent system. The solution the story offers is not logical, but emotional. If one can maintain a strong enough sense of devotion to god, then the human dilemma will come to a resolution. But the resolution will have no inherently logical or sensible order. The only order that can be imposed upon the world is emotional, not rational.

THE TEXT[15]

Bringing to an end the works that Kāma commits with his form,
the Lord has an eye in his forehead that emitted red fire. There is a city where He stays happily,
Ceṅkāṭṭaṅkuṭi. It shows forth the prosperity of the venerable land of the Kāvēri
where black-eyed Pariah women show their ecstasies [in dance].

In that venerable place, taking upon himself the high task

of protecting all lives that flourish in the world through the sacred ash of the Lord with long locks,
and bringing prosperity to the line of the Māmāttirars whose fame blossoms,
there came one Parañcōti whose name is praised by many.

He knew in all branches the art of medicine,
the measureless arts of Sanskrit books, and the business of untainted weapons.
In all the earth, he was best versed in the science of riding horses
and rutting elephants that leap.

He had learned entirely all the arts so his heart was full.
And with the thought, "May the lore I have culled carefully belong at Śiva's feet,"
he constantly practiced love for the feet of Him who struck down Death,
and that love came to him like water rushing through a ditch in a valley.

Doing service every day to the servants of the lord, he served close to the king of unblemished fame.
For him he led a troop of elephants in the front of fighting,
vanquished in battle, took many lands of opposing kings,
and found favor in the eyes of his charioted monarch.

For his king he took an army and, leading mountain-like elephants with long hollow trunks,
he made dust the ancient city of Vātāpi in the north.
He took many jewels, heaps of treasure, elephants, horses, and numberless things besides
and brought them before his just king.

The king whose crown glistens was amazed at his skill in leading elephants
and spoke of it in praise. His ministers, who knew [the truth], explained,
"Because he has strength given by his service to Him who wears the moon,
none can oppose him."

When the garlanded king heard that he was a servant of his Lord,
he exclaimed, "Not knowing he was a servant of the Lord of the other world,
I did a terrible thing. I let him go into a raging battle,"
and, despising himself, he begged, "My lord, forgive me for this."

Even before the king had finished begging him, he said,

"I simply did my proper work.
What evil is there in that?"
Then the just king gave heaps of treasure and all proper honors and said,

"You acted so I did not know your true stature.
Agreeing pleasantly to my purpose, and making your work of doing the truth shine,
act as you wish and do service in the excellent path."
And he dismissed him.

Taking of the leave of the king he came to his city.
And in Kaṇapatīccaram Parañcōti whose fame is renowned
worshipped the Lord in whose hair the cool moon lives
and lovingly performed service without falling from his previous state [of excellence].

He did the true service that the Author of the Vedas wished.
With his well-loved wife Veṇkāṭṭunaṅkai, who was born in a faultless family,
his purpose united with hers,
he lived the excellent life of a householder.

Every day they prepared food in a proper way
for the servants of Him who wears a full *koṉṟai* garland
and afterwards ate themselves. They observed this pure labor as a vow
without slipping from it in their full desire.

Pure rice, fruits, sugar, curries with the six tastes, ghee, yogurt, milk,
sweets, and drinking water – all these he had prepared in a fitting manner.
And the devotees who ate that food
rejoiced at the hand of him whom the vast world praises.

With devotion and love towards the servants of the Lord
who keeps tightly in His red matted hair the cool moon and a serpent,
he acted towards those worthy ones as a small person
and so he received the name in the world of Little Devotee [Ciṟuttoṇṭar].

Making his mind dwell on [the temple of] Kaṇapatīccaram of the Lord with an eye in his forehead,
he performed service with love that filled his soul.
Without ever missing [a meal], he made food for countless devotees
and lived in great joy. In those days,

through the grace of Him whose topknot of matted hair is filled with water,

to him who had great *tapas* and to Veṇkāṭṭunaṅkai
who shone as the source of their waxing household dharma
a son named Cīrāḷaṉ was born.

When that son was born, the relatives rejoiced at ornamenting him.
The father's joy at getting a gem of a son, so hard to get,
grew so his heart could scarcely hold it
as the people of Ceṅkāṭṭaṅkuṭi celebrated the rite of giving the child an oil bath.

Auspicious instruments played, the sound of the Vedas went up to the skies,
he gave unmeasured wealth to the devotees of the lovely-eyed One.
With happiness that waxed great, he performed the rites for ten days fit for their caste
and he put the wrist-string on the child.

The father gave so the faces of his relatives blossomed, full of affection.
He celebrated the rites for each age with happiness so great it overspread the earth.
On the tiny feet of his growing child he put *kiṇkiṇi* anklets, woven like garlands,
and so celebrated his son's first unsure steps.

The child had a *cuṭṭi* ornament on his forehead with its curling lock.
In both ears he had jeweled ornaments. On his neck he wore a chain, on his breast, the five weapons [of Viṣṇu],
on his arms, faultless diamond bracelets, around his waist a gold cord, on his ankles, rings.
As the light from these glittered, he was intent on his play in the street.

His father and mother celebrated the rite of hair-cutting when he was three.
Then, to make him versed in learning and to give him clearness of expression
and make his mind blossom, they put their son,
who had come to release them from bondage, in school.

In those days, Āṇṭakaiyār of Caṇpai city came graciously.[16]
The Little Devotee, who wore gold and a three-stranded thread on his breast, went out to receive him,
brought him, entered his house, praised the great-famed feet
of that lord of Pukali, and received merit in return.

The lord of Caṇpai stayed with the Little Devotee whose love cannot be blocked.

He put him in some of his verses, praised by the world,
exalted him, and gave him his friendship.[17]
And the Little Devotee was filled with love.

In those days his deeds of service went
and attained the venerable feet of the Lord who dwells on Kailāsa mountain.
That Lord who rides the bull, in order to experience his love that never fails,
came from the mountain as a fearful ascetic, His heart disposed to grace.

He made His long matted hair beautiful with *koṉṟai* whose petals glisten like
gems and whose leaves are rough.
Like the wisps of a monsoon cloud that arises after drinking from the sea,
He arranged His long hair in a series of tufts,
making it curled and dark, thick, without tangles, moving and dense.

In His lovely hair that looked as if it had been bathed in collyrium,
like stars appearing through a dark cloud,
fragrant *tumpai* flowers appeared here and there at the edge of the tufts
as honeybees, flies, and dragonflies hummed and swarmed nearby.

As if He had taken the young twilight moon that is fixed in His hair,
made it a small full moon with intense light, and moved it,
on his forehead that glistens, emitting the splendor of red coral,
a single *poṭṭu* [*tilaka*] of sacred ash shone forth.

As if He wore all together the circle of the hot sun, of the shining moon,
and the circle that fire makes, in His handsome ears
He wore twisting conch earrings
inside which were bright ornaments of red *arattam* flowers.

To hide the poison on His throat, as if He wore a pure white strand
glistening with light
of bubbles from the *amṛta* [churned up] in the sea,
so that the bodies and souls of those who take Him into their hearts melt,
on His shining neck a strand of white crystal glistened.

As the darkness growing at twilight spreads and engulfs the red light
given off by the sun as it sets in the sea,
He took an old elephant skin
and wore it on His lovely coral body as a shirt.

As if He took the love that rises in His devotees
and encircled His body with it, He wore ornaments of bone:
a victory garland, necklaces, chains, bracelets on His arms,

a belt on His waist, rings on His legs, all shining together.

"You will see what true grace is, as the Lord comes to the earth
and shows grace to His faultless devotees. And you too will desire His grace.
You too will stand on the path where His love comes." As if embracing the Vedas and proclaiming these words,
the anklets on His feet resounded through all the directions.

The trident, its three blades glistening, was resplendent on His shoulder,
supported by His left hand, in which He also held the skull of Brahmā.
From His shining right hand, the sound of the *tamaruka* drum resounded,
and the earth, receiving [the merit] of [her] austerities, supported His lotus feet.

The lovely smile on His grace-beaming face shone like moonlight,
the sharp trident that destroys the three delusion-bringing impurities shone with fiery light.
As His love grew, enlightening the true, the world praised Him
and He came to Ceṅkāṭṭaṅkuṭi in prosperous Tamilnad, where true knowledge flourishes.

As if He were insatiably hungry,
He asked those He saw for the house of the Little Devotee and quickly went there.
He said, "Is the Little Devotee, whose garland has flowers swarming with bees,
who always gives food to devotees, at home?"

The [foster mother] Cantaṉattār came out,
realized that He who had come was a great ascetic, and bowed at His feet.
"He has gone out searching for devotees whose goodness is endless.
Come in, my lord," she said.

He looked at the woman's face and said,
"I do not enter where women are alone."
When she heard that, Veṇkāṭṭunaṅkai, whose duty all the household affairs were,
fearing He was about to leave, came to the front of the house.

"He who makes food for the devotees of Śiva
did not find anyone [to give food to] today, my lord. He went to search someone out.

If he sees you, a Śaiva devotee, arrived suddenly,
he will rejoice at his great fortune. He will not delay.

"He will be back at once – please stay," she said.
"O you who perform the faultless duties of a householder, I come from the north.
I came to see the Little Devotee, whose excellence is hard to describe.
Under no conditions will I stay here without him," he said.

Then He who hid the eye in His forehead said,
"I will be sitting beneath the bright-flowered *ātti* tree in Kaṇapatīccaram.
When he comes, tell him I am there."
And so the Lord sat beneath the *ātti* tree.

Searching for devotees of Him whose hair streams with water and finding none anywhere,
the Little Devotee, whose austerities are excellent, came back to his prosperous house
and sadly told what had happened to his wife, who was of undiminishing sweetness for him.
Then she related how a devotee who shows love to the earth had come.

"I am saved! Where is he? Say!" he exclaimed, and she replied,
"He holds a sharp trident and a skull. He says he is from the north.
He is a Bhairava ascetic with a loud *tuṭi* drum in his hand. Even though I asked him to stay,
he would not but went to sit in the shade of the fragrant *ātti* tree in Kaṇapatīccaram."

Thus his wife spoke, and the Little Devotee, impelled by awakened desire, went swiftly,
saw Him, and stood bowing before His feet.
When He saw the devotee, [the Ascetic] said, "So you're the big [man who calls himself] 'Little Devotee.' "
And bowing before the Lord, [Ciṟuttoṇṭar] said,

"Though I am unworthy even to stand before those devotees who wear the sacred ash and utter praise,
through the grace of those who are servants of the Lord I received that name.
To make food for those whose love is faultless, I searched through this city of my clan eagerly,
but I found no one. Now through my [past] austerities I have found you.

"You should be gracious and eat in my house," he said.
But He whose form Viṣṇu could not know replied, "O you who have shining austerities,
I came to see you. I am from the north. It is not possible to feed me.
You cannot do it. It is impossible."

"I do not speak without forethought. Tell me how to make you food
so that I can do it at once, O you whose austerities fill your eyes with splendor.
To please servants of the One who has a cool chaplet in His hair,
I can do even the impossible. It is not difficult," he said.

When he heard, "It is not difficult," then the Lord in the form of a handsome Bhairava said,
"O loving devotee, once every three seasons
we kill and eat a [sacrificial] cow.
This is the day for that. You cannot feed us."

"Very good! I have three kinds of herds. I have all that is needed for you.
If you will just tell me what kind of cow you need, O you who love the God who drank poison,
then I will go and get it ready at once without wasting time,"
he said, making an *añjali* with his hands.

Seeing the love of the Little Devotee, who was so humble, the Bhairava said,
"Listen, you who are filled with love, the cow to be killed for me to eat is human.
It must be less than five years old, without blemish on its body – then I will eat it.
And there is one more thing I must say, like thrusting a spear in a festering wound."

"Nothing is impossible for me. Tell me quickly," he exclaimed,
and the Lord said, "It must be a good child in a good family, an only son.
The father must cut it as the mother holds it, and both must rejoice in their hearts.
Then if they make a curry, I will eat it."

The devotee, even after the Primeval One said this, replied,
"Even this is not difficult, if my lord will eat with us,"
and so he agreed to do the Lord's bidding. Taking leave,
the Little Devotee bowed with love and joy at His gentle feet, like pollen filled lotus flowers, and went home.

Veṇkāṭṭunaṅkai, like a goddess of chastity increased by love,
had come out to await the return of the Little Devotee. Standing there,
she saw his face blossoming, radiating joy, bowed at his feet,
and asked about the [guest] whose austerities are great.

That generous one looked at his wife and said,
"The great ascetic who came has agreed to eat with us, his heart rejoicing.
It must be an only son, fully five years old, without bodily defects.
The mother must hold the child, the father must cut him joyfully, and they must cook him and serve him."

His wife of great chastity looked at him and spoke,
"We will make food in the fitting way
so that this great Bhairava ascetic eats with us.
But how will we find an only son?"

Looking at his wife he replied, "Even if we gave a fortune, enough to make someone's heart full,
would anyone give this sort of son? And standing right there,
a father and mother would not kill their son.
At once we must call the son you bore, so that I may be true to my vow."

When her husband had spoken, she agreed.
"Without delay the servant of our Lord must eat today.
It is good that we should see his blossoming face here," she said with eagerness.
Then she who is like Śrī added, "Go and bring from school the gem-like son who came to protect us."

When his loving wife had spoken, the husband who loved her,
like someone who had been given everything he could ever desire,
went swiftly to bring his son, whose gentle talk was still like that of a baby,
home from school where he was reciting, so that he could make food faultlessly for the Lord.

As soon as he arrived at the school, his son, the anklet bells on his legs jingling,
came running and embraced him. He took the child, put him on his shoulder, holding him close,
and brought him back to the house. The mother of the family
came before her generous [husband], took the child,

straightened his hair, wiped his face, cleaned the dust from his waist cord and ear ornament,

fussed that the yellow color [of sandal] had been rubbed off, and pushed the collyrium to the sides of his eyes.
Then that woman, her feet even softer than cotton, lovingly bathed him in holy water,
dressed him up so he was fully ornamented, took him, and gave him into her husband's hand.

Afraid because the son would be food [and should not be polluted], he did not kiss his beloved son on the head.
He did not hold him to his breast or kiss him.
That faultless devotee, his mind intent on making food for the pure one,
did not take him to the kitchen but took him to another place.

The two of them, their hearts united, went to a hidden place so the world would not know
and the mother who had given birth to the boy washed the utensils well and took them.
The father, who had vanquished the world, took that good child
and held his head. Then quickly the mother,

holding his two feet whose anklets made a sweet gentle sound close in her lap,
took with her hands the two hands of her son whose mouth was like an unripen fruit.
The beloved child, thinking, "They are very joyful," laughed happily,
and the father cut off the head of his only son with a knife.[18]

He thought, "My son, his excellence faultless, has granted me the state of truth,"
and he found direct joy.
His wife thought, "He has given precious life to my husband," and blossomed in her heart.
Thus the two of them, finding great joy, did their difficult deed.

Considering the flesh of the head unsuitable for food,
she put it aside and gave it to the foster mother Cantaṉattār to take away and hide.
The flesh of the other bodily parts she carved off, cut, took out the marrow after opening the bones, and put everything in the pot.
And grinding the many spices needed for a curry, she added them, anxious to prepare it quickly.

The woman, her flower-filled hair redolent with fragrance, put it on the stove

and, rejoicing at heart, determined when it was ready and took it off.
In another pot she fried seasoning as the smoke rose.
And she made other curries, made rice ready quickly, and told her husband.

The eagerness he felt at making food for the lord as he had promised
grew even greater than before, and he was blissful.
The servant of the God on the bull went quickly to the Pure One
sitting beneath the *ātti* tree with bees humming around its soft flowers.

Bowing before that Lord the devotee spoke:
"I would do the service of having you come to the house of your servant to eat.
Though it is true that you had to wait here hungry, still I have prepared you food.
Please come so that my hopes will be fulfilled.

"Now my lord should arise and eat." As he besought Him,
the Ascetic, hiding the scar on His throat and not showing the eye in His forehead, said,
"O Little Devotee of waxing greatness, let us go." And like a poor man
who suddenly finds two fortunes, the Little Devotee took him and entered his house.

They entered and the wife went before the great Ascetic and bowed at His feet.
In that house that was fully decorated, the Little Devotee showed Him a seat spread with fragrant flowers,
with garlands of flowers and pearls hanging by it.
Then he took a pitcher of fragrant water, held it up, [and poured it on Him].

The Little Devotee washed the feet of the One of light with pure water,
sprinkled the water so purified on his and his wife's head in profusion,
sprinkled it all over his beloved house,
and bowed down to Him, doing *pūjā* to Him with soft fragrant flowers, sandal, and with suitable incense and a lamp.

The lovely woman and her husband bowed and asked the pure Bhairava
whose matted hair, thick with flowers and holding in it the cool white moon had been made into a tuft,
whether they should serve the rice and curry. He answered,
"Serve the sweet rice together with all the curries."

She cleaned the vessel, showing her excellence, put on the eating cloth,

and put before it so they would notice them rows of good rice and curries.
Then she spread a white cloth on a steady seat. The Pure One saw and, showing His grace,

asked, "Have you made ready a fine-tasting curry with all the parts of a sacrificial cow
prepared as I said?" He answered, "She who is like a swan felt that the flesh of the head would not be fit,
and so we left it out."
But the Lord who dispels suffering said, "I will eat that as well."

Their hearts distressed, the Little Devotee and his wife felt grief.
But Cantaṉattār the foster mother said,
"I thought that when the devotee eats he might happen to think of the flesh of the head,
and so I made it into a curry and put it aside." And she brought it and gave it, her face beaming.

After [his wife] had taken that and served it with happiness, the Highest One looked at the Little Devotee,
who was bowing to him [urging him to eat] and said graciously,
"We cannot eat here alone. Invite some servants of the Lord who may happen to be nearby."
And the Little Devotee, downhearted, thought, "I am lost: will this keep him from eating?"

He went out of the house, but by the grace [of the Lord] did not see [anyone] anywhere.
He returned and, his face filled with distress, he bowed and said to the Primal One,
"I did not see any of those who are pleasure in this world and the next.
But I am one who has seen those in this world who wear the sacred ash, and I follow their example."

He responded, "Are any who wear the sacred ash your equal? You eat with me."
And He said to Veṇkāṭṭunaṅkai, who had excellent chastity,
"Make ready [another] dish and serve the rice and heating meat to him also."
But as the Little Devotee was about to eat to make his guest eat, [the Lord] stopped him.

"We eat once in six months. You do not fast but eat rice every day.

Why are you eating before me? To eat with us you have a faultless
son – summon him."
But the [Little Devotee] replied to Him who has no beginning and no end,
"He can be of no help to us now."

"I will eat only if he comes. Find him and bring him," our Lord said.
[The Little Devotee] could not bear it. Saying, "What can we do to make
our lord eat here?"
he arose and [abiding in the Lord's] grace,
he went out with her whose hair was filled with soft flowers and began to call
his son.

He who is known all over the earth called, "Son, come."
And his wife, who was following the commands of the Lord, called also:
"My perfect gem, Cīrāḷaṉ, come. The devotee of Śiva
calls you to eat with him that we may be saved."

By the grace of the Highest One, that unequalled son of faultless beauty
came
as if he were running home from school. [She] took him, embraced him,
brought him before her with her hand,
and gave him to her husband, filled with joy that she had gotten the devotee
of the Lord who burned the three cities to eat [in her house].

[The Little Devotee] took his son and came, wishing to feed [the Guest].
But that Lord who had become a Bhairava ascetic had disappeared,
and [the Little Devotee], not seeing him, was distressed. He fell down, his
head whirled,
he did not see the heating curry in the dish, he did not know what to do.

"Where did the Bhairava disappear, his body reddish, his hair black, his
garment finely made?"
They searched for him. Distressed, they came outside,
and He who had disappeared came with the daughter of the mountain
[Pārvatī]
and the son [who was raised] in the thicket of reeds [Skanda].

On an incomparable white bull in the heavens, the Lord,
praised by the hosts of his attendants, by *munis*, by the gods and the
dwellers in the heavens, arose,
and as they who had prepared the sweet curry and rice looked on,
He bestowed a glance wide with compassion, His topknot swaying with the
cool white moon.

The devotee who vanquished with love, his wife, and his son,
saw the whole of the great bliss before them
and, transported, their hearts and bones melting, they fell down,
they arose, they praised. Then, because they were fit for it, the Lord showed His grace on those great ones.

The Lord with *konṟai* flowers in His hair, the noble woman who is part of Him,
and their son of the long victorious spear went, taking with them
the devotee, his wife, his famed son, and the foster mother, all of whom stood at their feet,
now to remain with them always bowing in obeisance.

NOTES

[1] M. Aruṇācalam, *Tamiḻ Ilakkiya Varalāṟu: Paṉṉiraṇṭām Nūṟṟāṇṭu* (Madras, 1973), I:122.

[2] *Tiruttoṇṭar Purāṇam Eṉṉum Periyapurāṇam,* comm. C.K. Cuppiramaṇiyamutaliyār (Coimbatore, 1953), VI:589.

[3] For information regarding the Telugu versions of this story, I am indebted to Velcheru Narayanarao. In the version of Pālkuriki Sōmanātha, the story is made subservient to another tale of even more unreasoning devotion. On Kailāsa after his assumption, the Little Devotee becomes proud and begins to tell everyone that he is the greatest of all devotees of Śiva. To humble him, Śiva takes him to earth and shows him Nimmavva, a woman who kills her son for tasting food prepared for the God. When Śiva offers to restore Nimmavva's son to life, she refuses, saying he does not deserve to live after polluting the food of God. Clearly, this story is a Telugu one, as Nimmavva is a Telugu name (unlike the names in Cēkkiḻār's story, all of which are Tamil). In both the versions of Pālkuriki Sōmanātha and of Śrīnātha, the mother's calling her son near the end of the story is made quite elaborate. In Śrīnātha, this part is extremely effective, as the hearer suddenly realizes how much Veṇkāṭṭunaṅkai loves her son as she uses one beautiful epithet after another to summon him. Another difference between Śrīnātha's version and the present one is that when the son returns miraculously, each part of him is said to smell of the spice used to cook that part. In Śrīnātha's work, the impact of the story is softened by such devices, with the result that it has charm and even whimsy – something that certainly cannot be said of Cēkkiḻār's version, which is as grim and serious as any work I know in Indian literature. As regards oral versions, Gene Roghair found the story of the Little Devotee still told as part of oral recitation of the *Palnāṭ-ivīracaritra* in Andhra. The Tamil *Ciṟuttoṇṭapattaṉ Katai* (Madras, R.G. Pati Company, n.d.) is either a modern oral version of the story or is based upon such a version.

[4] Tirumaḻicaiyāḻvār, *Tiruccantaviruttam,* comm. Periyavāccāṉpiḷḷai (Kāñcīpuram, 1915), p. 199 (verse 69). Periyavāccāṉpiḷḷai does not actually adduce the Ciṟuttoṇṭar story, but I am informed by Prof. K.K.A. Venkatachari, who told me of this passage, that the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition does connect the story with this verse.

[5] A.L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India* (New York, Grove Press, 1959), p. 287.

[6] George L. Hart, III, *The Poems of Ancient Tamil* (Berkeley, California, 1975), pp. 70–71.

[7] Nur Yalman, 'On the purity of women in the castes of Ceylon and Malabar,' *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute,* **93**, part 1 (1963), pp. 25–58.

[8] Most scholars have seen vegetarianism in South India as a vestige of Jaina and, to a lesser extent, Buddhist influence. This, I feel, is incorrect, as it fails to explain the connection between meat and dangerous power and it does not account for why Brahmins were vegetarians in South India already in the second century A.D., while in North India they ate meat long after that period (and, in some cases, still do). Bryan Pfaffenberger, in his still untitled dissertation that will be submitted to the University of California, Berkeley, points out that among the Tamils in Northern Ceylon, social status depends upon being isolated from dangerous powers that are viewed by the high classes as impure. These powers come from anything affected by death – including meat. Thus the highest classes must avoid eating meat to retain their status. Stephan Barnett told me that there is a class of Mutaliyars (high-caste non-Brahmins) in Madras that claims it is ritually higher than Brahmins because its members were vegetarians before the Brahmins were. While this claim is not accepted by the Brahmins, it is accepted to an extent by others in the society, who see this non-Brahmin caste as equal in ritual status with the Brahmins.

[9] Pollution is an unfortunate word, for it inevitably carries with it the world view of the Brahmins, not of the others in the society who greatly outnumber the Brahmins. For the Brahmin, power comes from purity, that is from insulation from dangerous forces. But for others, power comes from the manipulation of dangerous forces and containing them. Thus in the earliest times (and to an extent even today), the lowest castes (the so-called untouchables), who had as their function the control of dangerous forces, were wielders of power and were able to tell the future and do other acts that involve control over sacred forces. Much of the cultural history of South India involves the dialectic between the opposing views of the Brahmins and of others. To call these dangerous forces pollution is to simplify the issue in a misleading way.

[10] For example, social pressure and the dictates of social order ordain that a high-class man should keep his wife carefully under control at home, seriously restricting her life. A widow should stay at home and live a life of unrelieved asceticism. There is inevitably tension between these ideals and the moral consideration that a wife or widow deserves a fuller life and more social interaction than the society deems she should have. Another example that is tragically common is the young woman who wishes to marry outside of her caste or to someone not approved by her parents.

[11] I have investigated this in some detail in a paper on Tamil bhakti to be published in the *Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia.*

[12] *Puṟanāṉūṟu* 19, 41, 227.

[13] *Puṟanāṉūṟu* 20, 68, 105, 117, 124, 204, 384, 386, 388, 389, 395, 397.

[14] *Puṟanāṉūṟu* 50, 235; *Kuṟuntokai* 292.

[15] This is from *Tiruttoṇṭar Purāṇam Eṉṉum Periyapurāṇam*, comm. C.K. Cuppiramaṇiyamutaliyār (Coimbatore, 1953), VI:583–666 (verses 3660–3746).

[16] This Nāyaṉmār is usually called Tiruñāṉacampantar.

[17] These verses appear in Tiruñāṉacampantar's hymns to the god at Ceṅkāṭṭaṅkuṭi: *Tiruñāṉacampanta Cuvāmikaḷ Tēvāram* (Śrīvaikuṇṭam, Śrī Kumarakuruparaṉ Caṅkam, 1961), pp. 451–455. None of these verses mentions the Little Devotee's sacrifice of his son, though one (p. 454, no. 7) gives the name of Cīrāḷaṉ. There is nothing in any of the verses, or in any inscriptions of that date, to connect the Little Devotee with Parañcōti.

[18] To this may be compared *Puṟanāṉūṟu* 46, sung by the poet Kōvūrkiḷār when the king Cōḷaṉ Kuḷamuṟṟattut Tuñciya Kiḷḷi Vaḷavaṉ had the children of Malaiyamāṉ, whom he had defeated and killed, placed in front of elephants for execution:

> . . .These little ones,
> their heads scarcely covered with hair,
> forget their crying as they see the elephant.
> As they look around the field
> they feel terror they have never known before.
> If you have heard, do what you will.

EDWARD C. DIMOCK, JR.

ON IMPERSONALITY AND BENGALI RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY

In commenting on the lack of individual personality in Sanskrit poetry, Daniel H.H. Ingalls has written that

> impersonality appears in its extreme form in India only in Sanskrit.... As to how poetry could exist in the absence of individualism the answer is easier. It existed, just as Indian religion existed under the same circumstances, by making a virtue of its lack. To the Vedantin the advantage of stripping off the personality was that only thus could he arrive at what he considered to be real, at something permanent, unchangeable, and unitary. To the Sanskrit poet the advantage of abandoning personal idiosyncrasy and adventure was that the resultant character by being typical came closer to being universal.[1]

This thought has been very much with me in the course of study of various Bengali religious figures of the Vaiṣṇava persuasion, partially because in that tradition there is such an intimate blending of the poetic and the religious, partially because I think the statement is basically true not only of Sanskrit but of Sanskrit-derived thought and literature, and partially because the biography of the Vaiṣṇava revivalist Caitanya (1486–1533) presents in these terms something of a paradox: the biographies of Caitanya are poetry, and thus place their subject in the poetic world of the Vṛndāvana idyll of Kṛṣṇa; yet they are in some sense dealing with the life of an actual historical man.

In 1965, a Bengali scholar by the name of Amulyacandra Sen made a Schweitzerian effort, in a book called *Itihāser śrīcaitanya* (The Śrīcaitanya of History) to extricate the man who walked the soil of India from the web of myth, fancy, and profound religious belief that has surrounded him since his death. What Dr. Sen was trying to do for Caitanya was rid him of the "supernatural nimbus with which it was so easy to surround him," as Reimarus and Strauss had tried to do for Jesus so that, as Schweitzer says, "the supramundane Christ and Jesus of Nazareth. . .be brought together into a single personality at once historical and raised above time."[2] The book, as its author predicted it would be, was singularly unsuccessful. Bengali Vaiṣṇavas, showing themselves still to be a dominant social force in the community, were completely uninterested in historical personality, and

M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 237–242.

were, in fact, rather offended by the thought of it in connection with Caitanya.

In much the same way, Christians were for many centuries indifferent to the historical Jesus. The Gospel of John was enough. In time, of course, people took late 19th and early 20th century German scholarship seriously, and the grounds of controversy moved from abstract relationships within the Godhead to the meaning of the God-man who had walked the earth, and from there to eschatology; for there could be found, in the life and sayings of Jesus, and in the theology that preceded and surrounded him, a linear sequence culminating in the once-and-for-all resurrection, and the once-and-for-all salvation of the community of believers. Whether or not, several centuries hence, there will be equal attention paid the historical Caitanya, I cannot say. I can say that there is frustration in the search for him, for his biographies are religious poems, and the writing of them was the reflex of the perfected *bhakta*, the true devotee. Biography in their hands is for the most part not the recording of historical fact and personality, but revelation of the inner truth of the Caitanya-*līlā*, for the truth is that Caitanya is Kṛṣṇa. Thus, the fact that there are historians among us who are constantly pointing out that in the biographies Caitanya deputes people to go to Vṛndāvana to meet people who themselves had not yet been deputed is correct but dreary. Chronology has no meaning for these writers; time itself has no meaning. Caitanya was not imitating Kṛṣṇa, as Christian saints imitate Christ; he was merely following his, and Kṛṣṇa's, true nature. If, in this atemporal context, people are bothered by lack of 'proper' time sequence, they have not understood the revelation. The biographies present no process, but only existential fact.

What is troublesome for the analyst, however, is that there are smatterings of personal detail. When Caitanya went to Gayā, at age twenty-two, to perform there his father's funeral obsequies, he returned to his native place God-maddened, and he began from that time to lead the frenzied and ecstatic *kīrtana* in the courtyard of the house of his friend and neighbor Śrīvāsa. It would seem that this was an 'enlightenment' which would fit the paradigm of the human saint. But the texts will not quite let us believe it, for they tell us that as a baby he showed all the signs of Viṣṇu on his body; that in his childhood and youth he acted out all the spirited play of Kṛṣṇa in Vṛndāvana; that in his teaching of Sanskrit grammar his examples illustrated the Vaiṣṇava way of devotion; and that his madness, or whatever his withdrawal from the ordinary world might be called, was not a stage into which he passed, but was merely Kṛṣṇa's transcendance, for Kṛṣṇa is uninvolved with the world except through *līlā*. The burden is thus put on the

analyst: his transformation in Gayā was not enlightenment, but his choice to reveal his true nature to us.

Caitanya, it seems, was subject to three states of consciousness. Ramakrishna describes them:

> While conscious of the outer world, Chaitanya sang the name of God; while in the state of partial consciousness, he danced with the devotees; and while in the inmost state of consciousness, he remained absorbed in samadhi.

Whereupon Manomohan, an acute disciple, significantly observes: "Is the master hinting at the different states of his own mind? There is much similarity between Chaitanya and the master."[3] The biographies tell us too that he played, as a child, in a self-willed manner. But this is not the self-will of all children, it is the very definition of *līlā*. They tell us that Caitanya's assumption of *saṁnyāsa,* devastating to his mother and his friends, is the departure of Kṛṣṇa for Mathurā, leaving the gopīs desolate. Time and again Caitanya is described as jumping into a river, "knowing it to be the Yamunā", or running into a garden in Puri, "knowing it to be a meadow in Vṛndāvana". For when Kṛṣṇa appears, he appears with his whole *dhāman*, i.e. all the paraphernalia of the Vṛndāvana idyll – the cows and rivers and trees and gopīs and gopas. Thus everything that surrounds Caitanya, no matter what it appears to be, is actually Vṛndāvana. Caitanya's companions are the gopīs and gopas; his mother is Yaśodā. If one does not see it so, it is because he does not have the eyes of the perfected *bhakta*; elements of overt reality are only superimpositions which hide the true reality from all but devotees. Caitanya the man, by his own choice, looks and acts like a social being, but his true nature is of an order of reality unaffected by society. The Caitanya who lived and breathed in Bengal is identical with the Kṛṣṇa of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. And the Ramakrishna who walked the soil of Bengal in the 19th century is Caitanya – and therefore Kṛṣṇa – as well.

This is a non-view of time, or a view of non-time; time is completely collapsed. For the historian or the biographer this poses certain problems. It means that there is no process, and thus no true biograph. The fact is that Caitanya is Ramakrishna is Kṛṣṇa, and spans of intervening human years have no significance whatever.

This is not the usual view of time as cycles of *manvantaras* or days of Brahmā reckoned in incredible numbers, with final destructions and re-creations after which the whole vast thing begins all over again. It might be called 'cyclical' in the somewhat casual sense mentioned by Kṛṣṇa in *Gītā* IV: 7–8, where he suggests that he will appear in "age after age", whenever

a job needs doing. And in fact, that a job needed doing was the reason for Caitanya's appearance:

> But seeing everyone with faces averted from Kṛṣṇa, and seeing people immersed in worldly matters, [Advaita] felt pained, and he began to reflect on how to save these people. "If Kṛṣṇa makes an *avatāra* there will be the spread of *bhakti*, and all the people will be saved". So he shouted exhortations to Kṛṣṇa, and Vrajendrakumar was attracted by the shouts.[4]

The term *avatāra* is usually translated as 'incarnation'. That translation seems singularly inappropriate here, for incarnation seems to imply that that which had no physical form, no 'flesh', takes on such a form. The Vaiṣṇavas never found the form of God to be a problem: his true form is the dark colored, two-armed cowherd of Vṛndāvana. But Caitanya is described as being golden in color. This also was no problem, for Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā are in essence one, and his golden color is Caitanya's manifestation of Rādhā. Further, Kṛṣṇa can hold any form at any time, all forms at all times, even no form at no time, without his true essence, and thus his true form, being affected: "[Caitanya then] showed him his true form – Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā, these two as one form; and seeing it, Rāmānanda fainted in pure joy."[5] This would all be straightforward enough were it not for the fact that in a few areas the biographers cannot – or choose not to – make the theological fit. While we are told that Kṛṣṇa sported merrily and sensually with Rādhā and the gopīs, Caitanya became so angry with one of his followers for accepting food from a woman (though the food was begged as a special treat for Caitanya himself) that he drove the poor man to suicide by denying him his presence. The theologians try: when Caitanya is asked by a follower why he persists in keeping the guise of an ascetic when he is in truth the self-willed deity, Caitanya replies that the teachings of an ascetic are respected in the Kali Age, and that furthermore, if he revealed himself as Kṛṣṇa did in the *Gītā*, people would be so awestruck, as Arjuna was, that they would not hear.

So Caitanya was an ascetic, and to that extent socially and psychologically comprehensible. In fact, even as an ascetic he is not that easy to define. On the one hand, when he was in what Ramakrishna called his "outer state of consciousness", he would seem to remember his brahman heritage (itself peculiar for a *saṁnyāsin*): he would take his food only in the houses of brahmans. In his inner state of consciousness he was totally oblivious to all that. One day he went to the temple of Jagannātha to have *darśana* of the image. A low-caste woman was climbing on the temple wall,

to improve her own view, when she put her foot on Caitanya's shoulder. His companions were horrified. But Caitanya said: Do not be angry with her; she only wants to see the image, as we all do.

There are other hints of Caitanya the man, and of how the society saw him as defiant and threatening. The problem of course was that his teaching was antinomian: salvation stems from the presence of God in the heart. The brahmans saw this as rapidly putting things beyond social control. There was a tradition that the people of Navadvīpa (Caitanya's native place) were skilled archers; and in a text usually considered heretical this story is told:

> [These brahmans] went into the presence of the lord of Gauṛa and gave this false representation: The brahmans of Navadvīpa will create trouble for you. A brahman will become king in Gauṛa. So do not remain idle – the trouble is near. A brahman of Navadvīpa will certainly become king, for it is written by the Gandharvas that the king will be one skilled with the bow. This false information struck the mind of the king, and he gave the order: Destroy Navadvīpa.[6]

Which, in fact, was not done, though the local *qazi* got instructions to keep an eye on the place. And the texts suggest that not only was Caitanya's presence leading to religious chaos and perhaps political insurrection as well, but the street procession which he led, with their drums and cymbals and loud singing, were keeping the citizens awake at night as well:

> They woke up angrily, their peaceful sleep broken. . .and some said: What is all this madness? And some said: I cannot get to sleep at night. And others said: He is making me angry, with all those drums.[7]

Caitanya, then, it seems, is both a part of and not a part of ordinary reality. The problems posed by most of the biographies are not so different from those posed by the Gospel of John: for the historian, it is like trying to reconstruct the life of Jesus without the first three gospels. We see Caitanya the ascetic, set apart from society yet acting within it; we see Caitanya the half-man half-god, seeking solitude; and we see the Caitanya who is totally withdrawn, unconscious of the outside world. There is sequence, for people had watched Caitanya grow up, and become a *saṁnyāsin*, and disappear. But everything is potential all the time, and this is what the final resolution, the final withdrawal into the state of transcendance, says. God's body and God's spirit are identical. Śaṁkara melds with the lingam of Śiva. Kabīr leaves piles of flowers, to be divided among his Hindu and Muslim disciples. It is a problem for the western analyst that the spirit-flesh dichotomy does not exist; for we are used to seeing a tension here. The biography of

Caitanya, then reflects the whole theology: the principle at work is that of *bhedābheda*, simultaneous imminence and transcendance. To Vaiṣṇava thought it is also *acintya*, unknowable by cognitive means.

NOTES

[1] Ingalls, Daniel H.H., *An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry*. Harvard Oriental Series, 44. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 24–25.

[2] Schweitzer, Albert, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1910, pp. 4, 3.

[3] Nikhilananda, Swami, trans., *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*. New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1942, p. 330.

[4] Kṛṣṇadāsa kavirāja, *Caitanya-caritāmṛta*, ed. Rādhāgovinda Nātha. Calcutta: Bhakti-prācara bhāṇḍāra, 1355 B.S. I:13:67–71.

[5] Ibid., II:1:233–234.

[6] Jayānanda, *Caitanya-maṅgala*. Calcutta: Baṅgīya sāhitya pariṣad (?), n.d. p. 10.

[7] Vṛndāvana-dāsa, *Caitanya bhāgavata*. Calcutta: Gauḍīya maṭh, 448 Gaurābda. I:1:228.

MASATOSHI NAGATOMI

MĀNASA-PRATYAKṢA: A CONUNDRUM IN THE BUDDHIST *PRAMĀṆA* SYSTEM

Almost fifty years have passed since the first milestone was laid down for a critical study of the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system by Theodor Stcherbatsky with his publication of *Buddhist Logic* (2 vols., Bibliotheca Buddhica, XXVI, Leningrad, 1930-32). The intervening years have witnessed many significant publications providing fresh information on the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the founding fathers of the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system. These publications place us on much sounder ground than ever before for making an intellectual excursion into the inner sanctum of the system. It is also true, however, that new findings in scholarship sometimes lead to hitherto unnoticed problems and occasionally revive some of the old ones, with their complexities now articulated in a new fashion. One such case in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system is *mānasa-pratyakṣa* (mental perception) as a variety of *pratyakṣa* (perception). The question of why Dignāga deemed it necessary to postulate *mānasa-pratyakṣa* and just what he meant by it still remains as much a conundrum to us as it was to post-Dharmakīrti philosophers in classical India and to Buddhist academics in Tibet.[1] The aim of this article is merely to attempt to locate the proper place for a tiny missing piece of a huge jigsaw puzzle – a piece that has been shuffled and reshuffled over the centuries. It is written in a spirit of gratitude to Daniel H.H. Ingalls, Wales Professor of Sanskrit at Harvard University, who has patiently guided me on my venture into the maze of the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system.

I. INTRODUCTION

In discussing Dignāga's relation to Dharmakīrti, Ingalls observes, "Dignāga found an interpreter in the seventh century, Dharmakīrti, who covered the same ground in greater detail and on some points with greater precision, and who furnished arguments against the more formidable opponents of a later age."[2] Indeed it took Dharmakīrti's classification and elucidation of Dignāga's *pratyakṣa* as consisiting of four varieties to bring *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, one of the varieties, to the attention of a large number of later commentators. According to Dharmakīrti, the types of *pratyakṣa* intended

M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 243–260.

by Dignāga are *indriya-jñāna* (=*indriya-pratyakṣa*, sense-perception), *mano-vijñāna* (=*mānasa-pratyakṣa*, mental perception), *sva-saṃvedana* (self-awareness) of every cognition and *yogi-jñāna* (=*yogi-pratyakṣa*, yogin's perception).[3] Of these, Dharmakīrti defines *mānasa-pratyakṣa* as being produced by sense-perception (*indriya-jñāna*) which is the immediately preceding (homogenous) cause and which is contemporaneous with the object immediately following its (real) object. Dharmakīrti's good intention to dispel whatever ambiguities he thought might exist with respect to Dignāga's *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, however, had little effect in fully convincing post-Dharmakīrti academics, either Buddhist or non-Buddhist, of the legitimacy of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* in Dignāga's *pramāṇa* system. The less than enthusiastic reception Dharmottara and other post-Dharmakīrti followers accorded *mānasa-pratyakṣa* is evident in their basic attitude, which was "Let us retain it because it was postulated by our *mūlâcārya*, Dignāga. There is no harm in honoring its place in his *pramāṇa* system, although it cannot be proved by a valid means of cognition."[4]

We shall begin our investigation of the topic by introducing the text in which Dignāga's *mānasa-pratyakṣa* makes its official *début*. The text is his *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (hereafter abbreviated as PS) together with the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (hereafter abbreviated as PSV), his auto-commentary on PS. The translation of the text provided in the following is from Professor Masaaki Hattori's *Dignāga on Perception*, the most comprehensive and authoritative work to date on PS, Book I.

mānasaṃ cârtha-rāgâdi-
sva-saṃvittir akalpikā

mānasam apy rūpâdi-viṣayâlambanam
anubhavâkāra-pravṛttaṃ rāgâdiṣu ca
sva-saṃvedanam indriyânapekṣatvād
mānasaṃ pratyakṣam (PS, I. K. 6ab and PSV)

There is also mental [perception, which is of two kinds:] awareness of an [external] object and self-awareness of [such subordinate mental activities as] passion and the like, [both of which are] free from conceptual construction.

The mental [perception] which, taking a thing of color, etc., for its object, occurs in the form of immediate experience (*anubhava*) is also free from conceptual construction. The self-awareness (*sva-saṃvedana*)

> of desire, [anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain,] etc., is [also recognized as] mental perception because it is not dependent on any sense-organ.[5]

Hattori provides the above translation in the light of Jinendrabuddhi's reading of the text, which, he acknowledges, was clearly influenced by Dharmakīrti's elucidation of the text. Accordingly, what we have here is a translation which is faithful to and in accord with the reading of the text followed by post-Dharmakīrti academics. We are informed, as the translation reads, that Dignāga postulated two kinds of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*: (1) "awareness of an external object," and (2) "the self-awareness of desire, anger, etc." Of these two kinds of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* that *they thought* Dignāga postulated, it was the first that they found less than convincing as an acceptable *pramāṇa*. According to them, briefly put, *mānasa-pratyakṣa* that takes an external object and is directly experienced is hardly distinguishable from Dignāga's *indriya-pratyakṣa*. There would be no point, they speculated, in postulating both *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *mānasa-pratyakṣa* if the two were the same in content and function but under different designations; or, worse still, if the two were considered to be different *pratyakṣas* cognizing the same object – in which case the latter would become a case of re-cognition (*abhijñāna*), which Dignāga himself rejected as an improper *pramāṇa* (PS, I, k. $2d_2$–3a). There were some who ventured to offer their versions of the *raison d'être* of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, but none was successful enough to settle the problem.

In this paper we shall approach the conundrum of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* by recasting it in still another perspective to propose what seems to have been the real source of the problem and what appears to have been the intended meaning of Dignāga's *mānasa-pratyakṣa*

II. THE *PRAMĀṆA* SYSTEM (REASON) AND BUDDHISM (FAITH)

In composing PV, Dharmakīrti let the audience know in no uncertain terms that Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* was not a treatise composed simply as an intellectual exercise on the theme of *pramāṇa*, but was indeed a religious work intent on demonstrating the excellence of the Buddha's path to liberation by appropriating the then popular *darśanic* notion of *pramāṇa*. This he did by composing PV, Book II, *Pramāṇasiddhi*.[6] This entire chapter dwells on the introductory verse and corresponding section of PSV,[7] with which Dignāga begins his PS. It is a verse praising the Buddha as the "embodiment of *pramāṇa*" or "*pramāṇa* incarnate" (*pramāṇa-bhūta*), and

pronouncing Dignāga's own resolution to establish the right *pramāṇa*, viz. one that demonstrates the authenticity of the Buddha's words. Commenting on this introductory verse of PS, Hattori rightly observes, "Unlike his predecessors, Dignāga does not accept the unconditional authority of Scripture. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to critical test before they are accepted as valid. This critical attitude he inherited from the Buddha, who used to exhort His disciples not to accept any of His words merely out of reverence but to examine them carefully, just as people examine the purity of gold by burning it in fire, cutting it, and texting it on a touchstone."[8] This observation of Hattori's (which he shares with his predecessors such as Stcherbatsky) carries further noteworthy implications that merit our close attention.

The testing of the validity of the Buddha's words requires a tool which was for Dignāga and Dharmakīrti the *pramāṇa*, the valid means of cognition. Such a tool, at least in principle, may be expected to be one which is universally acceptable to all and free from dogmatic premises and presuppositions. Both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti struggled to achieve that end by polemically refuting the number and definitions of *pramāṇas* of the non-Buddhist schools which were contradictory to their own. We must note, however, that the final authority by which they calimed the validity of their *pramāṇa* system was none other than the Buddha's words[9] which they accepted as authentic by faith. Thus the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system and the authenticity of the Buddha's words stood, in reality, in a reciprocal relation: the structuring of the former was done within the limits of the latter, and the latter was meant to be supported by the former. In other words, the *pramāṇa* system which Dignāga initiated was a methodology that was built upon and in support of the Buddha's words. The methodology Dignāga chose was to articulate the nature of the Buddhist *ways of knowing* by translating their prototypes drawn from the Buddha's words into the vocabulary of epistemology, logic, and semantics. Consequently, in Dignāga's *pramāṇa* system, soteriological issues were kept backstage, so to speak, while in fact they comprised the core of the sources in which the system was grounded.

The post-Dharmakīrti followers of the system knew that Dignāga, in postulating *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, had recourse for their respective prototypes to *pañca-indriya-jñāna* and *mano-vijñāna*, well-known divisions in the Buddhist scholastic tradition. Their half-hearted admission of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, accordingly, was not due to insufficient canonical support of or reference to its prototype located in the Buddha's

words. Despite this, they did not extend their examination of the conundrum of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* to the soteriological context of the Buddha's words in which its prototype, *mano-vijñāna*, is made reference to.

The definition of *mano-vijñāna* is by no means uniform in the Buddhist tradition; it differs from school to school, from individual to individual. But all sources agree on one point: while *indriya-jñāna* comprises the initial stage of man's cognitive experience, it is in the form of *mano-vijñāna* that his cognition takes on concrete, multi-dimensional characteristics and is made manifest through his action. These characteristics of *mano-vijñāna* are, briefly classified, (1) religio-ethical, being good, evil or indeterminate; (2) emotive, involving sensations such as passion, hatred and so forth; and (3) capable of cognizing dharmas that are not amenable to *indriya-jñāna*. Underlying the listing of these characteristics of *mano-vijñāna* is an attempt to articulate, with scholastic elaboration, the time-honored Buddhist view that the reality one experiences is the making of one's own mind. What, then, accounts for the particularity of each agent's cognitive experience? Both the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavāda schools, with which Dignāga and Dharmakīrti identified themselves most closely, postulate a homogenous series or flow of consciousness existent in a latent state as the matrix of all cognitive experiences; it is *citta-santāna* (mind-continuum) for the Sautrāntika and *ālaya-vijñāna* (storehouse consciousness) for the Vijñānavāda. The main point of their theory is this: the mind-continuum (or *ālaya-vijñāna*), impregnated with the residual forces of past cognitions, manifests itself as *indriya-jñāna* and *mano-vijñāna*, its activated forms, which in turn implant their residual forces in the same mind-continuum to shape future cognitions. *Indriya-jñāna* and *mano-vijñāna*, viewed thus as activated forms of their latent matrix, are made translatable into soteriologically pratical terms whose implication it is that one can supress ethically and emotively impure aspects and intensify pure aspects of one's cognitive experience by metamorphosing the mind-continuum from which it derives. Any attempt such as Dignāga's, then, to develop a theory on the *Buddhist ways of knowing* out of the tradition of the Buddha's words, particularly out of the Sautrāntika-Vijñānavāda strand of it, would be expected to accord co-equal importance to both *indriya-jñāna* and *mano-vijñāna*, which were considered to comprise collectively and inseparably human cognitive experience in its activated form. What evidence do we have, one might ask, that such was the case with Dignāga's *mānasa-pratyakṣa* modeled after *mano-vijñāna* as its prototype? It comes from PV, II, of Dharmakīrti, which we shall observe in what follows.

III. SOTERIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MENTAL ACTIVITY

Dignāga furnishes five epithets for the Buddha in his introductory verse to PS. The second epithet is *jagaddhitaiṣin* (one who seeks the good of the world), which Dharmakīrti explicates thus:

> Compassion (*karuṇā*) is a proof (of the Buddha's authenticity), and thus (is completely natural to him) from long-repeated exercise (*abhyāsa*). If (the materialists) hold that long-repeated practice (of compassion) is impossible (because we have only one life), since thought (*buddhi*) is dependent on the body, we reply: not so, because we deny that (the body is) the source (*āśraya*) (of thought). [PV, II, 36]

The meaning of this rather elliptical verse becomes clearer with Dharmakīrti's later verses. But the main points are as follows: The teaching of the Four Noble Truths can be explained only as due to the Buddha's compassion (*karuṇā*). But this compassion of the Buddha is something quite beyond the powers of ordinary humans. It could not have been gained in one life-time, for we see how little we can accomplish ourselves in one life-time of practicing compassion. We may have moments of compassion for others, but this state of consciousness never becomes *svarasavāḥin* (completely natural, carried along by its own current). For compassion to reach this intensified degree of constancy requires many lives of long-repeated exercise of dedication to the good of the world. What Dharmakīrti sets forth here is the thesis that the compassion of the Buddha is to be understood as excellence or intensity manifested in the *citta-santāna* (mind-continuum), with each moment of mental exercise intensifying it toward eventual perfection. This, Dharmakīrti saw, stands in opposition to the materialists' thesis claiming that the body is the source (*āśraya*) of thought. He further dwells on this thesis as follows:

> (You may raise an objection as follows:) Granted that there may be excellence (or intensity) (*viśeṣa*) by repeated practice, this excellence cannot transgress one's inherent nature (*svabhāva*) as in leaping by repeated practice, one can never come to leap a mile), or in the heating of water (water cannot be brought to a flame). Then we reply: (The given two instances are not proper.) If an imposed excellence requires further effort (to be brought about again, as is the case with excellence in leaping), or if its substratum is inconstant (as is the case with the heating of water, for as the heat grows more intense the water boils away), then such an excellence or intensity does not increase nor is it 'natural'; because (in the former case) the causes (viz. physical strength

> and the particular exertion, etc.) which were capable of (forming the previous intensity) are incapable of forming the subsequent one; and (in the latter case) an intensity whose substratum is ever inconstant, even if this intensity increases, cannot be an 'inherent nature'. But if an imposed intensity does not require further effort because there is no 'inherent nature' pertaining to it, then (any) further effort (that may occur) produces (an increase of) intensity. Compassion, etc., when produced, acts by its own spontaneity (*svarasa*), just like (the variations) of wood, quicksilver, and gold produced by the application of fire and other (means). Accordingly, such an excellence (as compassion) appearing in those (who practice it) becomes the 'inherent nature' (of the practitioner's thought-continuum). Thus each further effort produces further intensity. Since such thoughts as compassion etc. grow intense by means of their preceding homogenous causes (*tūlya-jātīya-pūrva-bīja-pravṛddhi*), how should there be any limit (to their increase) when they are repeatedly practiced? [PV, II, 122–128]

Thus, Dharmakīrti explains, compassion, whether constant and perfect like the Buddha's or temporary and imperfect like the ordinary human's, is rooted in and manifests from its own causal seed (*bīja*), viz. the thought-continuum (*citta-santāna, citta-santati*). Compassion, however, is not the only mental activity that we witness; they are numerous – passion (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), ignorance (*moha*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and so forth. What has been said of compassion, then, should equally apply to all the other mental activities. Indeed Dharmakīrti grants that:

> Compassion as a natural quality derives from its repeated practice in the same manner as do pity (*ghṛnā*), indifference to wordly objects (*vairāgya*) and passion (*rāga*). [PV, II, 133ab]

Now this raises a question: If compassion and another mental activity, say, hatred (*dveṣa*), that is incompatible with the former should have the same natural tendency to grow intense by their repeated practice, the actual intensification of the one or the other would become a dubious proposition as they would offset each other. Dharmakrīrti obliterates this undesirable implication by showing the qualitative difference of their respective sources (*āśraya*). His point is that compassion and other mental activities of virtue manifest from the thought-continuum that properly conforms to truth and that truth prevails invariably over untruth and its derivatives.

> The Path has been taught (as characterized by the insight of the truth of selflessness). By the repeated practice (of that Path), the source (of

> continued existence) is transformed. If you say that vices (*doṣa*) would arise even in one who has identified himself with (the Path) just as the Path (arises when one is still identified with the vices), we reply: no, because (vices) are unable (to arise in the thought of one who is identified with the Path). [PV, II, 207cd–208ab]

> By nature (*svarasa*) thought (*citta*) shines clearly; its impurities are accidental. What power could these vices have in a person who has identified himself (with the Path) when they lack power even before he has reached that stage? Even though an entity had power, it cannot grow far in that within which its opposite can arise, just as fire (will not stay) on wet ground. (The truth of selflessness) that is not harmful, true and natural cannot be obstructed by its opposite even with effort, for thought will naturally take its part. [PV, II, 210cd–213ab]

> If you argue that (passion and the like) do not perish because they are (necessary) properties of living beings, like form, (your syllogism is) wrong, (the conclusion) being contrary to fact, for we see (these properties) depart on contact with their opposite (viz. the insight of the truth of selflessness). Nor do they recur like the solidity (of copper after the fire is removed) because the (truth of selflessness) which opposes them does not, by virtue of its own nature, go away, and because (your instance) is inconclusive as seen by (the contrary instance of wood which never reappears when reduced to) ashes. [PV, II, 217cd–219ab]

How, then, do passion, hatred and other vices derive from the belief in the self which is of fictitious nature as opposed to the truth of selflessness?

> In the person who believes in (lit. sees) the self, there arises constant attachment (*sneha*) to that (self) in the form of the self. From that attachment he craves for pleasures, and that craving hides the vices (from his sight). A person who sees virtues (in an object) will desire it and seek the means for making it his own. Thus, so long as one is infatuated with the self, one will remain in the state of *saṃsāra*. As long as (he believes that) there is the self, he will acquire the notion of others. And from distinguishing himself from others will arise his greed and hatred. Connected with these two do all the vices arise. [PV, II, 219cd–222ab]

In order to explain this causal relation between the belief in the self and its derivatives such as passion, hatred, etc. that characterize man's mundane state of existence, Dharmakīrti offers his own karma theory.

> The passing to this inferior condition, that is to say, birth (in the mundane), arises from a mental process (*cetanā*) consisting of craving (*tṛṣṇā*) and false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*) which is the source of craving. Accordingly, one who cuts these off is not subject to rebirth. For these two (viz. false knowledge and craving) alone are capable of producing it (viz. rebirth) since it arises from them only. These two mental processes are nothing but karma itself; therefore, there is only one unitary cause of rebirth. [PV, II, 262cd–264ab]

In PV, II, vs. 83 and again here, Dharmakīrti regards false knowledge (or nescience, *avidyā*) and craving (*tṛṣṇā*) as the unitary cause (*akhaṇḍa-kāraṇa*) of *saṃsāra* and claims it to be *cetanā* (mental process). Now, all the Buddhist schools speak of three types of karma which are mental karma (*cetanā-karma*), physical karma (*kāya-*) and verbal karma (*vāk-*). However, they vary in interpreting how these three karmas are interrelated and each characterized. The Sarvāstivāda school maintains that physical and verbal karmas alone are respectively subdivided into *vijñapti* (informative, manifest) and *avijñapti* (non-informative, latent), but not mental karma. Their account of that, to put it briefly, is as follows: Both physical and verbal karmas, when they arise as *vijñapti*, take the gross elements (*mahābhūta*) for their source and continue to exist as *avijñapti* through the continuum of the gross elements. The Sautrāntika school disapproves of such distinctions of *vijñapti* and *avijñapti* as attributed only to physical and verbal karmas. According to this school, the distinction of physical and verbal karmas is simply due to the different stations (*ālambana*) in the form of body and speech, upon and through which mental (*cetanā*) karma exercises its power. Thus it is *cetanā*, says the Sautrāntika, that constitutes the core of karmic force, and that karma continues on. In the light of this, it is clear that Dharmakīrti's karma theory is in alignment with the Sautrāntika's. There is more to this, however. It is that while conforming his karma theory to the Sautrāntika's, Dharmakīrti brings it to what is virtually the Vijñānavāda's. In order to observe this, let us go back to PV, II, 207cd as given above in translation. The text reads: *ukto mārgaḥ tad-abyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate.* Manorathanandin construes *āśraya* as *kleśa-vāsanā-bhūtâtmâlayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness characterized by the residual force of impurities), and *parivartate* as *pariṇamati.* Prajñākaragupta takes *āśraya* as meaning either *citta-santāna* or *ālaya.*[10] The assertion of Manorathanandin and Prajñākaragupta that *āśraya* here means *ālaya* (*-vijñāna*) does not necessarily tell us whether it is intended to refer to the *ālaya-vijñāna* in its highly technical sense of the term as used in

the Vijñānavāda. It is commonly held in modern scholarship that both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were indifferent to and/or silent on the *ālaya-vijñāna* doctrine of the Vijñānavāda. In fact only once does Dharmakīrti mention the term *ālaya* in PV (Book III, *Pratyakṣa*, vs. 522). Whatever the case may be, the term *āśraya* in the verse quoted above, if taken in the sense of thought-continuum (*citta-santāna*) is well construed with the verb *parivartate* (or *pariṇamati*) as following closely the Vijñānavāda tenet that all cognitive experiences are transformations of the thought-continuum.

In support of this, reference may be made to the opening verse of the *Triṃśikāvijñaptiprakaraṇa* of Vasubandhu:

ātma-dharmôpacāro hi
vividho yaḥ pravartate /
vijñāna-pariṇāme 'sau
pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā //[11]

> Indeed manifold figurative expressions are set forth with regard to the self and objective things. These (expressions) are (rooted) in the transformation of thought. That transformation is threefold.

From the above observation, Dharmakīrti's stand on mental activities that he presents in the general framework of the Sautrāntika-Vijñānavāda tenent may be summarized as follows:

Human activities are carried out as they derive from and are characterized by the force of mental activities. But the mental activities of those who are ensnared in the false belief in the eternal self are like dreams that appear real and continue to be experienced by them as though real until the awakening to the ultimate truth takes place. Accordingly, identifying oneself with the truth of selflessness, from which compassion and other mental activities of virtue such as the Buddha's manifest, does not mean the cancellation of one reality called *saṃsāra* and the attainment of another called *mokṣa* (liberation) in its literal sense; it means simply one's return to his true state (*svastha*) or the shining forth of the true nature of mind (cf. PV, II, 217cd).

> (One may object that) there is no (possibility of) liberation since we are in the world of *saṃsāra*; but this (argument) does not affect us, since we agree (that there is no liberation) because it is not proven (that we are in the world of *saṃsāra*). As long as one does not renounce attachment to the self, so long does one experience (suffering) falsely ascribing suffering (to oneself) and (so long) is one not in one's true state.

(Religious) effort is in order to renounce the false scription, this despite the fact that there is no one who is liberated. [PV, II, 193ab–194]

Now Dignāga, in systematizing into a *pramāṇa* system varieties of cognitions that had traditionally been known in the form of *indriya-jñāna* and *mano-vijñāna*, assigned them to two types of *pramāṇa*: *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anumāna* (inference). He used *avikalpika* (devoid of conceptual constructions) as the criterion of *pratyakṣa*. *Pratyakṣa*, according to him, is free from conceptual construction, takes the unconceptualized (hence unverbalized) particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) for its object, and is immediately experienced; *anumāna* takes the conceptualized (hence namable) universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) for its object, and it follows the experience of *pratyakṣa*. Of these two, the definition of *pratyakṣa* whose prototype was *indriya-jñāna* served his purpose very well. For it was comprehensive enough to subsume (1) ordinary perception by the (five) senses (*indriya-pratyakṣa*), (2) extra-ordinary perception such as the Buddha's insight of the Four Noble Truths (*yogi-pratyakṣa*), and (3) direct experience (*sva-saṃvedana*; self-awareness) of every cognition without requiring another cognition. Furthermore, by the inclusion of *yogi-pratyakṣa*, the soteriological implication of the traditional Buddhist cognition theory was able to be preserved. For Dignāga, however, the matter was not quite as simple with *mano-vijñāna*. *Mano-vijñāna*, as traditionally understood, is capable of cognizing objects that are not amenable to *indriya-jñāna*, and involves emotive and conceptual elements. Given the criterion of *pratyakṣa*, viz. *avikalpika*, then, no *mano-vijñāna* could be subsumed under *pratyakṣa*. If it were considered an *anumāna*, on the other hand, the implication would be that one could never experience *mano-vijñāna* in the mode of *pratyakṣa*. Such was not admissible according to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Passion of the unenlightened or compassion of the Buddha that is experienced toward an object, for instance, at the initial moment of its occurrence (*pravṛtti*), is expected to be as direct and non-conceptual as any of the (*pañca-*) *indriya-pratyakṣa*, and yet it is different from the latter because it does not depend on the five senses alone. How, then, is the initial, unconceptualized moment of such a mental activity to be construed in terms of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*? Dignāga's solution was to grant it as another variety of *pratyakṣa*, termed *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, by virtue of its being "free from conceptual construction."

Through recourse to the above observation I present my translation of Dignāga's PS verse at issue which I believe conforms to what he purported to mean by *mānasa-pratyakṣa*.

> There is also mental [perception which consists of] the awareness of an object and self-awareness [in such forms as] passion and the like, [both of which are] free from conceptual construction.


The above translation differs from Hattori's by taking "awareness of an object" and "self-awareness [in such forms as] passion and the like" as representing, not two different kinds of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, but "object-cognizing" and "self-cognizing" aspects of it. We now return to PSV on this verse.

a. The first half of PSV reads, as shown before in Hattori's translation: "The mental [perception] which, taking a thing of color, etc., for its object, occurs in the form of immediate experience (*anubhava*) is also free from conceptual construction." If we took this portion of PSV independently of the next in order to construe it, following the tradition, as introducing the first type of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, then we would have to question the point in postulating it. For it would simply amount to saying that there is a cognitive experience to be designated *mānasa-pratyakṣa* which occurs very much in the same way *indriya-pratyakṣa* does; it provides no hint whatsoever as to why *mānasa-pratyakṣa* has to be admitted or how it differs from *indriya-pratyakṣa*. This apparent difficulty, however, can be removed if we understood the passage as Dignāga's explication of the first *aspect*, viz. the "awareness of an object" or the object-cognizing aspect, of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* whose second *aspect* is its self-awareness in the form of passion, etc.

b. Now the second half of PSV reads: "The self-awareness of passion, anger, stupidity, pleasure, pain, etc., is mental perception because it does not depend on the sense-organ." In Dignāga's *pramāṇa* system, we must realize, self-awareness (*sva-saṃvedana*) – the fact that a given cognition does not require another cognition to have itself cognized because of its self-luminous nature – is considered another type of *pratyakṣa* and applies to every cognition, whether it be free from or involving mental construction with regard to the object. Thus the point of this second portion of PSV, if taken as Dignāga's postulation of the self-awareness of passion, etc., as another kind of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, would become incongruous with his *sva-saṃvedana* theory; whereas it comes to make perfectly good sense if considered as dwelling on the self-cognizing aspect, to be completed by the object-cognizing aspect, of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*. This can be further supported by Dignāga's reference to the two-fold appearance in which every cognition is experienced, viz. the appearance of an object (*arthâbhāsa*) and that of itself (*svâbhāsa*).[12] Why, then, did Dignāga deem it necessary to make special mention of emotive experience as constituting the self-cognizing aspect of

mānasa-pratyakṣa? As Dharmakīrti understood it (see next section), it was for the sake of countering the other schools, particularly the Sāṃkhya, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika in which pleasure, etc. were not considered self-luminous, but were dealt with as objects to be cognized. Furthermore, the emotive expereience of an object, as a case of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, presupposes *indriya-pratyakṣa*, viz. the cognition of the object by any one of the five sense faculties, but exceeds the domain of the function of the sense faculties to take on an emotive character: hence the qualifying phrase *indriyânapekṣatva* – "the fact that it does not depend on the sense-organ (alone)."

The following is a summary table of the structure of Dignāga's *mānasa-pratyakṣa* that we have examined thus far.




IV. CONCLUSION: DHARMAKĪRTI ON DIGNĀGA'S *MĀNASA-PRATYAKṢA*

We now come to the heart of the conundrum. If Dignāga's *mānasa-pratyakṣa* was what we have discussed above, why did the post-Dharmakīrti academics find it so confusing and even regard it as an unwanted child, as it were, in the Buddhist *pramaṇa* system? What were the origins of the problem? Most initially responsible for it is the fact that "the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* exhibits in exaggerated form the elliptical style that characterizes Sanskrit texts of philosophy,"[13] as Ingalls puts it. The PS verse at issue, *mānasaṃ cârtha-rāgâdi-sva-saṃvittir akalpikā* was in fact so elliptical that no two post-Dharmakīrti commentators reached an exact consensus on the reading of it, particularly with respect to the compound *artha-rāgâdi-sva-saṃvitti.* They did assume, however, if not quite approvingly, that the verse proposed two kinds of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*. They

were led to that assumption partly under the influence of Dignāga's PSV that dwelt on *mānasa-pratyakṣa*'s "awareness of an oject" and "self-awareness (in the form of) passion, etc." respectively as though each were syntactically independent of the other. But it was Dharmakīrti's PV that served for them as the definitive authority supporting the said assumption. It was an ironic twist, however. For contrary to their reading of PV, Dharmakīrti's intention was simply to elucidate the object-cognizing and self-cognizing aspects of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, but his silence, following on Dignāga's heels, on the syntactical link between his respective explications of the two aspects helped them to reinforce their assumption of a two-fold *mānasa-pratyakṣa* theory.

To explain: PV, Book III, vss. 239–248 is devoted specifically to elucidating the object-cognizing (aspect of) *mānasa-pratyakṣa*. The main thrust of these verses is to demonstrate (1) that *mānasa-pratyakṣa* is a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) because its object is not what has already been perceived by sense-perception but (2) that its substrate cause is sense-perception of the immediately preceding moment in the homogenous mind-continuum. These characteristics of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* are essentially the same as those Dharmakīrti provides in his *Nyāya-bindu*, which Stcherbatsky explicates using the following chart.



Mānasa-pratyakṣa (B) is produced with moment 2 of the object-continuum as its *ālambana* (object-cause) and the immediately preceding *indriya-pratyakṣa* (A) as its *samanantara-pratyaya* (substrate cause). Thus, according to Dharmakīrti, sense-perception and *mānasa-pratyakṣa* do not share the same object belonging to the same moment; nor does *mānasa-pratyakṣa* perceive an object utterly distinct from that of *indriya-pratyakṣa*. This precludes, says Dharmakīrti, the absurd implication that a blind man would experience an external object by *mānasa-pratyakṣa* alone without having recourse to the preceding (ocular) *indriya-pratyakṣa*.

tasmād indriya-vijnānânantara-pratyayôdbhavam /
mano 'nyam eva gṛhṇāti viṣayaṃ nândhadṛk tataḥ // [PV, III, 243]

Accordingly, mental perception that arises from sense perception as its immediately preceding (substrate cause) cognizes a different object. Hence there occurs no (absurd implication that) a blind man would cognize it (by mental perception alone).

Established thus is the fact that *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *mānasa-pratyakṣa* belong to the homogenous continuum in the same way their respective objects do. What Dharmakīrti failed to do, however, was to show in unequivocal terms (1) just what sort of cognitive experience, in his opinion, Dignāga meant to refer to by *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, and (2) how (or whether) "the awareness of an object" of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* was meant to be related to the "self-awareness" of it – the very source of confusion for the post-Dharmakīrti commentators and critics.

I submit that Dignāga's aim was not to propose two types of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, nor was this Dharmakīrti's intended reading of Dignāga. To observe this, we now turn to PV, III, vss. 249–267, the section which has traditionally been understood as elucidating the "self-awareness" of pleasure and so forth as a second type of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*. Concluding this section, Dharmakīrti furnishes the following two verses:

tasmāt sukhâdayo 'rthānāṃ sva-
saṅkrāntâvabhāsinām / vedakaḥ svâtmanaś
caiṣam arthebhyo janma kevalam // [PV, III, 266]

Accordingly, pleasure and so forth are conscious (1) of themselves as well as (2) of the objects that (cognitively) manifest (their own images) transposed onto them: they (viz. pleasure and so forth) originate only from their (own) objects.

To this the opponent may object that the direct awareness of the object by *mānasa-pratyakṣa* is one thing, and the self-awareness of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* is quite another. Dharmakīrti forestalls this objection:

arthâtmā svâtmabhūto hi teṣāṃ tair
anubhūyate / tenârthânubhava-khyātir
ālambas tu tadābhātā // [PV, III, 267]

The very object of these (sensations such as pleasure and so forth) is none other than (an aspect of) themselves: (hence) the former is directly

> experienced by the latter. It is to this effect that (conventional) mention is made of the "direct experience of the object (by sensation)" (only in a figurative sense). But (ultimately) the object (*ālamba*) means (the cognition's) manifestation in that (form).

These two verses amply demonstrate Dharmakīrti's stand on the structure of the *sva-saṃvedana* of human emotive experience as a *mānasa-pratyakṣa*. According to him, emotive experience such as pleasure and so forth means a cognitive experience: it cognizes an object in whose form it manifests, which really means it cognizes itself (*sva-saṃvedana*). This conventional distinction (and ultimate sameness) of the "object-cognizing" and "self-cognizing" aspects of pleasure and so forth applies equally to *indriya-pratyakṣa* in Dignāga's *pramāṇa* system. The so-called object of human emotive experience is the object-form in which it arises just as is that of *indriya-pratyakṣa*. Why then the distinction of *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *mānasa-pratyakṣa*?

One may directly experience passion toward a woman, to use Dharmakīrti's example in profane terms, or the Buddha is said to have experienced compassion toward fellow beings. Viewed from the perspective of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* to which the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system attempts to assign typologically all human cognitive activities, emotive experience is not possible prior to and without one's perception of the object by *indriya-pratyakṣa*. The initial experience of passion toward an object is a human experience which the five senses (*pañca-indriya*) alone cannot account for, and yet it is as direct and free from conceptual construction (*avikalpika*) as *indriya-pratyakṣa*. It would be inappropriate, then, to assign it either to *indriya-pratyakṣa* or to *anumāna* – hence it is treated as *mānasa-pratyakṣa* to accord it a legitimate place in the system. Being a type of direct cognitive experience, it is a *pratyakṣa* consisting of the object-cognizing (=manifesting in an object-form) and self-cognizing (=cognizing the object-form) aspects. These two aspects, according to Dharmakīrti's reading of Dignāga, correspond to the "awareness of an [external] object" and the "self-awareness" of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* in PS. Dharmakīrti, however, felt it unnecessary, either in deference to Dignāga's elliptical writing style or out of his impatience with the dull-minded, to inform his reader of the syntactical link between the two aspects which he took for granted, thus making himself unwittingly responsible for the source of confusion on Dignāga's *mānasa-pratyakṣa*.

> Valmīki dammed the sea with rocks put into place by monkeys, and Vyāsa filled it with arrows shot by Pārtha; yet neither is suspected of

hyperbole. On the other hand, I weigh both word and sense and yet the public sneers and scorns my work. O Reputation, I salute thee![14]

Such are the poignant words by which Dharmakīrti expresses his contempt for and impatience with a public who refused to give his work the recognition he felt it justly deserved. On the theme of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, I wonder whether he did not go a bit too far in his practice of "weighing word and sense", disregarding the limits of the power of word and concept, of which he himself was so conscious as a defender of Dignāga.

NOTES

[1] Th. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II, pp. 311–339.

[2] Masaaki Hattori: *Dignāga on Perception*, Harvard Oriental Series, no. 47, Cambridge, Mass., p. v.

[3] Paṇḍita Dalsukhbhai Malvania, ed.: *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa* [this work includes the *Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti and the Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara], Patna, 1955, pp. 56–70.

[4] Hattori, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94 (note 1.46) and Yuichi Kajiyama: *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta*, Kyoto, 1966, pp. 45–47.

[5] The PSV text, furnished by Hattori, reads *rāgâdiṣu* instead of *rāga-dveṣa-moha-sukha-duḥkhâdiṣu*. Thus the portion of "anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain" in Hattori's translation is put in square brackets. Another change is my preference for "passion" over "desire" for *rāga*.

[6] This article quotes from Dharmakīrti's PV, *Pramāṇasiddhi-pariccheda* (Book II) and *Pratyakṣa-pariccheda* (Book III). Unless otherwise indicated, the text used is R. Sāṃkṛtyāyana, ed., *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin, *The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vols. XXIV/3–XXVI/3, Patna, 1938–40.

[7] M. Nagatomi: "The Framework of the Pramāṇavārittika, Book I," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 79, pp. 263–266.

[8] Hattori, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[9] Here, by "the Buddha's words" I refer to the scriptural and commentarial tradition of Buddhism.

[10] R. Sāṃkrtyāyana, ed., *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (or *Vārttikālaṃkāra*) of Prajñākaragupta, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. I, Patna, 1953, p. 142 (the verse number in this text is 206).

[11] Sylvain Lévi, ed., *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, deux traités de Vasubandhu, Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā*, Paris, 1925.

[12] Hattori: *op. cit.*, p. 28 (PS, k. 9a).

[13] *Ibid.*, p. vi.

[14] Daniel H.H. Ingalls: *An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry: Vidyākara's "Subhāṣitaratnakośa"*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 44, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 444–445.

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